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true	 of	 a	 kind	 and	 I’m	 happy	 our	 lived	 crossed!	 Let’s	 continue	 to	 do	amazing	research	in	the	future!		
Alan,	 you	are	up	next!	Wow,	 I	 could	write	a	whole	book	about	all	 the	adventures	in	the	Decision	Neuroscience	Lab,	but	I’ll	try	to	stick	to	one	paragraph.	Thank	you	for	adopting	this	crazy	overly	excited	economist	who	wanted	to	 learn	more	about	the	brain.	You	welcomed	me	in	your	lab	 and	 gave	 me	 the	 opportunity	 to	 do	 research	 at	 the	 wonderful	Donders	 Institute.	 You	 understood	 the	 difficulty	 and	 challenges	 of	trying	to	do	research	in	the	interdisciplinary	field	of	Neuroeconomics.	I	could	 have	 not	 wished	 for	 anybody	 else	 who	 would	 be	 so	understanding	 and	 patient	 as	 you	 have	 been.	Moreover,	 what	 I	 value	most	is	your	personal	approach	to	research.	You	often	asked	how	I	was	doing	and	you	always	showed	 interest	 in	my	 life	outside	of	academia.	Besides	 your	 unique	 personal	 approach,	 I	 have	 had	 so	 much	 fun	working	with	you.	Even	at	this	point	in	time,	your	emails	can	lift	me	up	as	 I	 will	 absorb	 your	 positive	 encouragements	 and	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	email,	 I’ll	 think:	 ‘hell	yeah,	 let’s	get	this	paper	out!’.	Forgive	me	for	my	words,	 but	 this	 is	my	 overly	 excited	moment	 ;-)	 Thank	 you,	 Alan,	 for	everything!		
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Esther-Mirjam,	 how	 can	 I	 not	 thank	 you	 for	 all	 the	 amazing	opportunities	 you	 have	 given	me.	Wow!	 In	 the	 process	 of	 supporting	you	 with	 your	 work	 on	 translating	 insights	 from	 experimental	 and	behavioral	economics	for	policy-making,	it	has	forced	me	to	look	at	the	relevance	 of	 my	 own	 research.	 In	my	 view,	 too	 few	 researchers	 care	about	the	applicability	of	their	research	for	real-life	contexts.	Thank	you	for	making	that	clear	to	me	and	for	inspiring	me	with	your	amazing	and	admirable	work!	Thank	you	for	being	a	friend	too	and	for	our	up-close	and	personal	coffee	moments.	 I	could	not	be	more	proud	that	you	are	the	chair	of	my	manuscript	committee.			Thank	 you	 Stefan	 Trautmann	 and	 Frans	 van	 Winden	 for	 your	willingness	 to	 serve	 as	 members	 on	 the	 manuscript	 committee	 and	
Joris	Knoben,	Jan	Engelmann	and	Harold	Bekkering	as	members	of	my	corona.	It	is	so	much	appreciated	and	I	am	extremely	honored	that	you	were	willing	to	fulfill	this	role.			My	research	could	have	never,	ever,	ever,	been	conducted	without	the	help	of	my	amazing	colleagues.	 I	have	enjoyed	your	company,	 learned	from	 your	 specific	 expertise’s	 and	 personal	 views	 on	 research.	 Thank	you	Sascha,	 Jianying,	Oege,	Dirk-Jan,	Marzieh,	Ludger	and	Arnoud	(Arnoud,	 I’m	 not	 done	 with	 you	 yet….)	 for	 all	 your	 valuable	contributions.	Thank	you,	Mirre,	Catalina,	Vincent,	Annabel,	Amber,	
Leticia,	 Wenwen,	 Xu,	 Veerle,	 Linda,	 Jeroen,	 Peter,	 Inge,	 Marieke,	
Maarten	and	Claudia	 for	 tolerating	my	 endless	 streams	 of	 questions	during	 lab	 meeting.	 You	 have	 made	 my	 research	 life	 at	 the	 Donders	Institute	such	a	wonderful	experience.	Thank	you	so	much!			I	 have	 been	 extremely	 fortunate	 to	 have	 shared	my	 office	 space	with	some	amazing	people.	I	have	learned	from	you,	I	have	laughed	with	you,	I	have	shared	tears	with	you	and	we	have	shared	our	personal	stories.	Thank	 you,	Elexa,	 dank	 je	 wel,	Madelon,	 Bart,	Mieke	 en	 Ilke,	 party	people!!!	Thank	you,	Abiba.	You	have	been	such	an	inspiration.	And	last	
	 	 	
but	 not	 least,	 lieve	Annelies!	 Wat	 hebben	 we	 heel	 veels	 lief	 en	 leed	gedeeld.	Ik	zal	onze	maandagochtendsessies	nooit	vergeten	en	mis	onze	weekendupdates	 enorm.	Yeahhh,	 kijk	 er	 zo	naar	uit	 je	 snel	 te	 zien	 en	écht	in	real-life	in	real-time	bij	te	kletsen!		Geen	 PhD	 zonder	 een	 geweldige	 ondersteunende	 staf	 bij	 zowel	 het	Donders	 Instituut	 als	 bij	 de	 sectie	 Economie.	 Dank	 je	 wel,	 Karin,	
Amanda,	Helma	en	Wilma	voor	jullie	hulp	en	de	af	en	toe	broodnodige	onderbreking	 voor	 een	 gezellig	 praatje.	 Dank	 je	 wel,	 Tildie,	 Paul,	
Marek,	Mike,	Arthur	en	vele	IT-trainees	voor	de	geweldige	support	op	het	Donders	Instituut.			Lieve	 Elvira,	 ik	 misssssss	 jou!	 Ik	 mis	 het	 delen	 van	 mijn	weekendactiviteiten	 met	 jou,	 van	 mijn	 sportbelevenissen,	 van	 mijn	onderzoeksvoortgang,	ja	ik	mis	gewoon	alles!	Wat	kon	ik	met	jou	lachen	en	je	lacht	ook	nog	eens	net	zo	hard	als	ik,	yesssss!	Wat	zal	ik	trots	en	blij	 zijn	 als	 je	 mijn	 verdediging	 kan	 bijwonen.	 En	 anders	 sta	 ik	binnenkort	 gewoon	 weer	 als	 vertrouwd	 op	 maandagochtend	 in	 de	deuropening	van	je	kantoor	en	bulderen	we	de	hele	gang	bij	elkaar!		Lieve	 vriendjes	 en	 vriendinnetjes,	 wat	 heb	 ik	 veel	 plezier	 met	 jullie	beleefd!	 Ik	 lach,	 huil	 en	 praat	 zo	 graag	met	 jullie.	 En	 vaak	 het	 liefste	over	onze	levens,	over	onzinnigheden	en	vooral	niet	over	dat	serieuze	onderzoek	van	mij!		Lieve	 studievriendjes	 Vera,	 Ellen,	 Marie-Jose,	 Rob,	 Bobbie,	 Tom,	
Patrick	en	Martijn,	wat	 fijn	dat	we	nog	 steeds	 contact	hebben!	Lieve	
Jasper,	 altijd	 contact	 blijven	 houden	 na	 de	 middelbare	 school.	 Dank	voor	een	hele	mooie	vriendschap	en	de	open	gesprekken	over	het	leven	en	de	wetenschap!	 Lieve	Hanna,	 jou	 ken	 ik	 al	 sinds	mini-pupilletje	C,	wow!	Hoe	oud	ben	je	dan,	4?!	In	ieder	geval,	al	heel	lang	ken	ik	jou	al	en	ondanks	 alle	 international	 verhuizingen,	 jouw	 gezinsgroei,	 en	uiteenlopende	ontwikkelingen	zijn	we	elkaar	altijd	blijven	volgen	en	er	voor	elkaar	geweest!	 Ik	ben	blij	met	onze	 jarenlange	vriendschap.	We	hebben	echt	 aan	 een	woord	genoeg	 en	 ik	hoop	dat	dit	 een	 leven	 lang	mag	duren.		
Cifla-peeps,	 wat	 moest	 ik	 toch	 zonder	 jullie?!	 Arnoud,	 daar	 ben	 je	weer….	 Jan	 (treinmachinist	 van	 me!),	 ohhh	 wat	 maak	 je	 me	 aan	 het	
	 	 	
lachen!	Kristian,	wat	ben	je	áltijd	oprecht	geïnteresseerd!	Rens,	jij	liet	me	kennis	maken	met	het	állerleukste	sportteam	dat	er	bestaat!	Ferry,	wát	een	boel	mooie	herinneringen,	boefje,	thanks	voor	de	Alpen	en	de	dansjes!	 Alan,	 jeetje	 wat	 een	 prachtige	 sportmomenten	 hebben	 we	samen	beleefd.	 Ik	koester	Köln	 in	mijn	hart!	 Jasper,	 dank	 je	wel	 voor	Elin!	Paul,	je	bent	de	allerleukste	brombeer	op	deze	aardkloot!	Heleen,	dank	je	wel	voor	de	ellenlange	gesprekken	over	het	leven	tijdens	onze	ellenlange	 duurlopen!	 Lindsey,	 gewoon	 jouw	 aanwezigheid,	ongelooflijke	vrolijkerd	en	mede-wetenschapper!	Peter,	lief,	dat	ben	jij!	
Henk,	 blijf	 zoals	 je	 bent,	 jij	 bent	 een	 leukerd	 en	 fantastische	clubhuistijger!	Roy,	je	beheert	de	allerleukste	app-groep	die	er	bestaat.	Dank	 jullie	wel	voor	 jullie	betrokkenheid,	Monique	 en	 Inge!	Eindelijk	die	 17.59,	 Karen!	 En	 tot	 slot,	 Juriena,	 hardloopmaatje,	 fietsmaatje,	mede-wetenschapper,	 en	 lief	 vriendinnetje	 van	 me.	 Laten	 we	 blijven	praten,	 lachen	 en	 veel	 tranen	 delen	 over	 de	 mooie	 en	minder	 mooie	momenten	van	het	leven.	Allerleukste	 Wedrennermannen,	 jullie	 introduceerden	 mij	 in	 de	wondere	wereld	van	het	wielrennen	en	er	is	een	heuse	wereld	voor	me	open	 gegaan.	 Thanks,	Norman,	Martijn,	 Sjoerd,	Thijs	 en	Robert	 en	nog	meer	thanks	voor	Maurice,	lieve	sparringspartner	van	me.	
Pim	en	Gijs!!!!!!!	Allerleukste	homo-vrienden!	Uhm,	hoe	 leg	 ik	het	ook	alweer	uit	als	mensen	me	vragen	waar	ik	jullie	van	ken.	Ja,	van	een	ex-,	ex-vriend	haha.	Hoe	leuk	dat	we	altijd	contact	zijn	blijven	houden.	Jullie	vriendschap	 is	 me	 heel	 waardevol.	 Dank	 jullie	 wel	 voor	 de	 leuke	dinertjes,	onze	lachpartijen	en	spontane	telefoonsessies.			
ARNOUD.	 Collega,	 maatje,	 trainingspartner,	 mede-feestbeest,	 wat	hebben	we	niet	gedeeld?!	Oh	wacht,	het	bed	niet,	laat	ik	dat	maar	ff	heel	snel	hier	zeggen,	voordat	er	roddels	in	de	wereld	komen,	ha!	Maar	wat	hebben	we	wel	heel	veel	 lief	en	 leed	gedeeld!	 Je	kunt	het	bloed	onder	mijn	nagels	 vandaan	halen	met	 je	 stronteigenwijze	gedrag.	Oh,	wacht,	dat	gaat	ook	voor	jou	op	ten	aanzien	van	mij,	uhum…	In	ieder	geval,	af	en	 toe	 hebben	we	 ff	 afkoelperiodes	 nodig,	maar	 die	 duren	nooit	 lang,	want	 anders	 mis	 ik	 jou.	 Je	 kon	 mij	 als	 geen	 ander	 uit	 mijn	 serieuze	periodes	rukken.	Dan	was	 ik	namelijk	een	niet-sociaal	beestje	die	niet	achter	 haar	 pc	 vandaan	 gehaald	 kon	worden	 of	 die	 op	 tijd	 naar	 huis	wilde	 en	 op	 tijd	 op	 bed	wilde	 liggen.	 Je	moest	 er	 niets	 van	weten	 en	hield	me	langer	in	de	kroeg.	En	zo	beleefde	ik	de	leukst	meest	spontane	
	 	 	
avonden	met	 jou	en	die	had	ik	eigenlijk	stiekem	soms	heel	hard	nodig	als	evenwicht	voor	dat	serieuze	gedoe	van	mij.	Ik	ben	trots	en	super	blij	dat	je	mijn	paranimf	zal	zijn!				Lieve	roze	meisjes,	wat	wij	 samen	hebben	gecreëerd	 is	een	heel	heel	leuk	extraatje	in	mijn	leven.	Onze	blog,	alles	wat	daaruit	voortvloeit	en	gewoon	 ons	 zessen	 samen,	 is	 zo	 belangrijk	 voor	 mij.	 Dank	 jullie	 wel	voor	 jullie	medeleven,	 altijd,	 elke	 keer	weer,	Lot,	 Cin,	 Dieuw,	 Charis	en…	Lieve	 Leloupie,	 waar	 moet	 ik	 beginnen.	 Wat	 wij	 de	 afgelopen	 jaren	hebben	 gedeeld,	 is	 eigenlijk	 niet	 echt	 normaal.	 De	 zomer	 van	 2014,	Boston,	Boulder	onze	Halina	en	Carice	belevenissen,	 ik	ben	zo	blij	met	een	 vriendinnetje	 als	 jij	 en	 je	 bent	 er	 zo	 voor	mij	 geweest	 tijdens	 de	laatste	loodjes	van	dit	boekwerk.	Dank	je	wel	voor	alles!		Besides	 my	 own	 dear	 family,	 I	 am	 blessed	 with	 another	 home	 and	family	 in	 India.	 Thank	 you	 my	 dearest,	Harhu,	 Seema,	Madhumita,	
Angad	and	Arti	for	enriching	my	life!	I	just	have	to	knoch	the	door,	and	it	will	open.		Lieve	Roger,	 het	was	 India	 dat	 ons	 samenbracht.	We	maakten	mooie	reizen	door	 India,	we	 leerden	elkaar	door	en	door	kennen	en	 je	werd	een	 belangrijk	 persoon	 in	mijn	 leven.	 Ik	 koester	 deze	mooie	 tijden	 in	mijn	hart.		Lieve	Frank,	jeetje,	waar	moet	ik	beginnen.	Je	bent	mijn	leven	letterlijk	binnengestormd,	terwijl	 ik	op	het	punt	stond	naar	de	andere	kant	van	de	wereld	te	verhuizen.	De	timing	kon	écht	niet	slechter	en	ik	twijfelde	zeer	of	dit	wel	zou	gaan	werken,	maar	jij	liet	je	zo	niet	uit	het	veld	slaan!	Je	ging	ervoor.	Je	had	het	lef	om	te	investeren	in	ons	terwijl	dat	ons	nog	zo	onzeker	was.	 Jij	zag	al	veel	eerder	dan	 ik	dat	wij	samen	 ‘big	magic’	zijn.	Jij	had	het	rotsvaste	vertrouwen	dat	wij	samen	iets	moois	konden	opbouwen.	Dus	 je	 ‘bleef’,	 letterlijk	zelfs,	want	 jij	bleef	en	 ik	vertrok.	 Je	bleef	ook	toen	ik	in	een	wirwar	van	tumult	terecht	kwam	in	Boulder	en	ik	heel	veel	tijd	stak	in	mijn	nieuwe	baan.	Er	kwam	veel	op	me	af,	maar	wat	 heb	 ik	 veel	 steun	 aan	 jou	 gehad.	 Alle	 frustraties	 en	 kleine	winmomentjes	 die	 in	 de	 laatste	 fase	 van	 dit	 proefschrift	 voorbij	kwamen,	het	wennen	aan	het	ritme	van	een	nieuwe	baan	en	een	nieuwe	
	 	 	
woonomgeving,	alles	maakte	je	mee.	Je	was	er	en	je	stond	dag	en	nacht	klaar	als	ik	even	die	tranen	de	vrije	loop	moest	laten.	Ik	liet	je	Boulder	zien	 en	 we	 konden	 samen	 onze	 passies	 voor	 wielrennen,	 hardlopen,	bergen,	 koffie,	 biertjes	 en	ontbijtjes	delen.	En	 ik	durfde	eindelijk	 in	 te	zien:	 wat	 zijn	 wij	 leuk	 samen,	 laten	 we	 samen	 maar	 het	 diepe	 in	springen.	Ik	kan	niet	wachten	om	met	jou	het	avontuur	aan	te	gaan!	Ben	zo	gek	op	jou.			Lieve	Oma,	 ik	 ben	 zo	 blij	 dat	 je	 deze	mooie	 gebeurtenissen	 nog	mag	meemaken.	 Ik	 hoop	 nog	 heel	 lang	 te	 mogen	 genieten	 van	 uw	aanwezigheid.	We	hebben	een	afspraak	en	ik	houd	u	eraan!	Dank	je	wel	voor	 de	 allermooiste	 jeugdherinneringen.	 Ik,	Nikki	 en	 Jes,	 hadden	het	niet	beter	kunnen	treffen	met	u	en	opa!			Dank	 je	 wel,	 lieve	 Ingrid,	 Richard,	 Timo	 en	 Steffie	 voor	 jullie	betrokkenheid	in	al	die	gekke	uitbundige	acties	van	mijn	kant	en,	voor	jullie,	 vreemde	wereld	 van	 de	 wetenschap.	 Ook	 al	 hadden	 jullie	 vaak	geen	 idee	 wat	 mijn	 onderzoek	 inhield,	 jullie	 bleven	 vragen	 en	 me	success	wensen!			Lieve	 Mammy	 en	 Daddy,	 jullie	 onvoorwaardelijke	 steun	 is	 heel	belangrijk	 voor	 mij.	 Op	 belangrijke	 momenten	 kan	 ik	 terugvallen	 op	jullie	 adviezen.	 Daarnaast	 ben	 ik	 zo	 trots	 op	 jullie	 ruimdenkendheid,	avontuurlijke	 instelling,	 hartelijkheid,	 en	 betrokkenheid	 in	mijn	 leven	en	dat	van	mijn	lief	en	vrienden.	Geen	Kimmie,	die	alles	uit	haar	leven	probeert	 te	 halen,	 zonder	 de	 basis	 die	 door	 jullie	 is	 gelegd.	 Dikke	denkbeeldige	knuffel!			Lieve	 zusjes,	 die	 gekke	 zus	 van	 jullie	 draagt	 dit,	 in	 jullie	 beleving,	oersaai	boekwerk	aan	jullie	op!	Maar	ik	doe	dit	met	een	hele	duidelijke	reden.	Wie	kan	er	nu	zeggen	dat	drie	zo	verschillende	persoonlijkheden	als	wij	zoveel	respect	voor	elkaar	hebben	over	de	wijze	waarop	wij	ons	leven	leiden.	We	mogen	dan	zo	verschillend	zijn,	we	kunnen	ook	keten	en	lol	maken	als	geen	ander.	En	we	staan	altijd	voor	elkaar	klaar	als	we	elkaar	 nodig	 hebben.	 Het	 is	 mijn	 grootste	 goed	 en	 ik	 zal	 er	 altijd,	ondanks	de	enorme	afstand	nu,	voor	jullie	zijn!	Ben	zo	enorm	trots	op	jullie	beiden,	en	op	ons	als	zussen.	Daarom	dus,	deze	is	voor	jullie!	 	
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Chapter	1	
Introduction		 From	 my	 own	 personal	 experience,	 I	 can	 tell	 you	 that	 many	uncertainties	come	together	in	the	process	of	preparing	to	emigrate	for	a	 postdoctoral	 position	 abroad.	While	writing	 the	 introduction	 of	 this	thesis,	 I	 experienced	 uncertainty	 in	 a	 way	 that	 almost	 perfectly	illustrates	one	of	the	main	topics	addressed	in	this	thesis.		After	 I	 had	 found	 myself	 a	 nice	 place	 to	 stay	 in	 my	 future	hometown	abroad,	my	 landlord	requested	that	 I	 transfer	a	deposit.	As	her1	bank	account	in	The	United	States	was	not	yet	compatible	with	the	European	system,	an	 international	wire	 transfer	was	not	possible.	We	both	agreed	that	Western	Union	would	be	the	best	method	to	transfer	the	money.	 At	 the	Western	 Union	 office,	 the	 lady	 behind	 the	 counter	nicely	helped	me	 set	up	 the	process,	 but	 just	 before	 I	was	 to	 sign	 the	financial	 document,	 she	 politely	 asked	 what	 the	 purpose	 was	 of	 this	transaction.	 She	 nodded	 while	 I	 enthusiastically	 explained	 my	 plans.	She	 then	 looked	 at	me	 seriously	 and	 told	me	 that	many	 scams	 occur	with	 these	 kinds	 of	 transactions.	 She	 explained	 that	 people	 portray	themselves	 as	 landlords	 and	 send	 pictures	 of	 imaginary	 rental	properties.	When	 I	 told	 her	 I	was	 very	 confident	 that	 everything	was	fine,	she	continued	to	express	her	concerns.	She	told	me	that	she	often	feels	sorry	 for	 the	customers	 that	 fall	prey	 to	 financial	scams,	and	she	urged	 me	 to	 re-check	 all	 the	 detals	 of	 my	 future	 landlord’s	 contact	information.	Suddenly	 I	 found	 myself	 in	 a	 very	 puzzled	 state	 of	 mind.	 My	brain	 was	 turning	 circles	 as	 I	 tried	 to	 uncover	 possible	 complot	theories.	 Could	 I	 trust	 this	 person	 on	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 Atlantic	Ocean?	Was	she	really	renting	a	house	or	trying	to	rip	me	off?																																																										1	As	my	landlord	is	a	woman,	I	correctly	refer	to	‘her’	here.	Nonetheless,	in	this	thesis	I	will	use	‘she’	and	‘her’	to	refer	to	persons,	which	could	equally	be	replaced	by	‘he’	and	‘his’	otherwise.	
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1.1	Sources	and	types	of	uncertainty	
Sources	of	uncertainty:	As	in	the	example	above,	decision-making	under	 uncertainty	 (DMUU)	 is	 an	 inevitable	 feature	 of	 our	 daily	 lives.	Traditionally,	 humans’	 preferences	 for	uncertainty	 are	measured	with	standard	lottery	elicitation	methods	(Charness	et	al.,	2013).	In	contrast,	the	 personal	 example	 above	 highlights	 strategic	 uncertainty	 whereby	the	 source	 of	 uncertainty	 stems	 from	 the	 actions	 and	 behavior	 of	another	 person	 (Houser	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 Generally,	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	preferences	 for	 uncertainty	 are	 consistent	 across	 several	 decision	domains	 (Dohmen	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Vieider	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 Also,	 standard	economic	models	assume	that	once	a	probability	 is	 fixed,	or	a	belief	 is	formed,	 it	 should	 not	matter	 where	 the	 uncertainty	 stems	 from	 (von	Neumann	 and	 Morgenstern,	 1944;	 Savage,	 1954).	 However,	 many	experimental	 studies	 cannot	 find	 a	 relationship	 between	 preferences	for	 uncertainty	 -	 measured	 via	 lotteries	 -and	 uncertainty	 that	 stems	from	 another	 decision-maker	 (Eckel	 and	 Wilson,	 2004;	 Ashraf	 et	 al.,	2006;	Ben-Ner	and	Halldorsson,	2010;	Houser	et	al.,	2010;	and	Etang	et	al.,	 2011).	 In	 this	 thesis	 I	 consider	 the	 role	 of	 different	 sources	 of	uncertainty	on	DMUU	and	particularly	focus	on	the	role	of	social	versus	non-social	sources	of	uncertainty.	Besides	sources	of	uncertainty,	we	can	distinguish	between	types	
of	uncertainty	 as	 well	 (Knight,	 1921).	 For	 some	 events	 we	 may	 have	information	regarding	the	likelihood	of	each	possible	outcome	-	as	in	a	fair	 coin	 toss.	However,	 for	most	 real-life	 events	we	 do	 not	 know	 the	probability	of	each	possible	outcome	(Post	et	al.,	2008).	The	 former	 is	known	 as	 risk	 (known	 probabilities),	 whereas	 the	 latter	 illustrates	ambiguity	 (unknown	 probabilities).	 Both	 probabilistic	 characteristics	are	 captured	 by	 the	 general	 term	 uncertainty.	We	 speak	 of	 risk,	 as	 a	special	 limiting	 case	 of	 uncertainty	 (Wakker,	 2010).	 Although	 most	events	 in	 our	 daily	 lives	 are	 ambiguous	 rather	 than	 risky,	 empirical	studies	mostly	address	risk	preferences	in	relation	to	real-life	decision-making	 (Trautmann	 and	 van	 de	 Kuilen,	 2013).	 In	 this	 thesis	 I	 will	examine	 the	 external	 validity	 of	 types	 of	 uncertainty	 by	 relating	 both	individuals’	risk	and	ambiguity	preferences	to	real-life	decision-making.	
Types	of	uncertainty	have	received	much	attention	since	Ellsberg	published	 his	 findings	 in	 1961	 (BOX	 1),	 which	 showed	 that	 many	people	 are	 ambiguity	 averse.	 Ellsberg’s	 finding	 impies	 a	 revealed	
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preference	 for	 risky	 over	 ambiguous	 choice	 events,	 and	 contradicts	subjective	expected	utility	(SEU)	(Trautmann	and	van	de	Kuilen,	2013).	Ellsberg’s	 result	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 two	 distinct	 research	streams,	 the	 first	 of	 which	 was	 based	 on	 theoretical	 models	 that	incorporated	 parameters	 for	 ambiguity	 aversion	 instead	 of	 assuming	maximization	 of	 SEU	 (Kocher	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 Such	models,	 for	 instance,	can	 explain	 low	participation	 in	 the	 stock	market	 (Easley	 and	O’Hara,	2009;	 Guidolin	 and	 Rinaldi,	 2009),	 less	 risky	 stock	 portfolio	 choices	(Uppal	 and	Wang,	2003;	Liu,	2011)	and	 suboptimal	 insurance	 choices	(Alary	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Snow,	 2011).	 Although	 ambiguity	 has	 been	theoretically	 linked	 to	 several	 behavioral	 phenomena,	 few	 empirical	studies	have	validated	the	relationship	between	ambiguity	preferences	and	 real-life	 decision-making	 (Trautmann	 and	 van	 de	 Kuilen,	 2013).	Instead,	individual’s	risk	preferences	have	been	empirically	related	to	a	diverse	set	of	decision	domains	in	real	life	(Dohmen	et	al.,	2011;	Vieider	et	al.,	2014).		The	 second	 research	 stream	 which	 stemmed	 from	 Ellsberg’s	finding	 was	 experimental	 research	 on	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	 aversion.	Based	on	these	experimental	findings,	we	know	that	people	can	express	heterogeneous	 attitudes	 toward	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	 (Tversky	 and	Kahneman,	1992;	Wakker,	2010).	Namely,	preferences	 for	uncertainty	are	 influenced	 when	 people	 face	 losses	 instead	 of	 gains	 or	 when	different	 likelihoods	are	considered	(Kocher	et	al.,	2015;	Vieider	et	al.,	2012;	Abdellaoui	et	al.,	2011;	Dimmock	et	al.,	2015a,	2015b;	Trautmann	and	Wakker	2012;	De	Lara	Resende	et	al.,	2010).	The	results	from	these	experimental	studies	primarily	stem	from	lottery	setups,	very	much	in	the	 same	 tradition	 as	 Ellsberg’s	 original	 experiment	 (BOX	 1).	 Some	studies	 investigated	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	 preferences	 for	more	 real-life	events	like	betting	on	weather	forecasts,	stock	indices	or	sports	results	(Abdellaoui	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Fox	 and	 Weber,	 2002;	 Heath	 and	 Tversky,	1991;	Tversky	and	Fox,	1995).	Much	as	with	standard	lottery	setups,	in	these	more	real-life	settings	it	remains	a	bet	beyond	the	direct	control	of	humans.	The	 main	 focus	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 examine	 the	 underlying	decision	 processes	 regarding	 different	 types	 of	 uncertainty	 as	well	 as	social	and	non-social	sources	of	uncertainty.	I	aim	to	understand	if	and	why	 people	 differentiate	 between	 uncertainties	 that	 stem	 from	 a	
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lottery,	state	uncertainty	(or	also	referred	to	as	non-social	uncertainty	in	our	 individual	 Chapters),	 versus	 uncertainty	 that	 arises	 due	 to	 the	actions	 of	 other	 people,	 strategic	 uncertainty	 (or	 also	 referred	 to	 as	
social	uncertainty	 in	 our	 individual	 Chapters).	Moreover,	within	 these	sources	of	uncertainty,	I	account	for	a	broad	spectrum	of	uncertainty	by	considering	both	risk	and	ambiguity.		To	 study	 why	 preferences	 for	 uncertainty	 might	 be	 processed	differently	 between	 sources	 and	 types	 of	 uncertainty	 I	 employ	 a	combination	of	both	behavioral	and	neuroimaging	methods.	Moreover,	to	test	whether	DMUU	and	revealed	preferences	in	the	lab	translate	to	real-life	 behavior	 I	 also	 examined	 participants’	 decisions	 outside	 the	usual	 university	 laboratory.	 Such	 field	 research	 reduces	 experimenter	control,	 but	 greatly	 helps	 in	 relating	 human	 preferences	 for	 risk	 and	ambiguity	 in	 the	 lab	 to	 real-life	 DMUU.	 Theoretical	models	 as	well	 as	implications	for	policies	are	based	on	experimental	laboratory	findings	(Farber,	 2011;	 Kocher	 et	 al.,	 2015),	 and	 therefore	 it	 is	 particularly	important	 to	 confirm	 the	 external	 validity	 of	 experimental	 research	related	 to	 both	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	 preferences.	 Ambiguity	 prefrences	are	given	preferential	 treatment	 in	 this	 thesis,	 as	precise	probabilities	relating	to	risk	are	seldom	found	 in	daily	 life	(Post	et	al.,	2008).	Many	studies	 link	 decision	 makers’	 risk	 preferences	 to	 decision-making	outside	the	laboratory	(Dohmen	et	al.,	2011;	Vieider	et	al.,	2014;	Rieger	et	 al.,	 2014),	 but	 this	 does	 not	 fully	 address	 the	 notion	 of	 types	 of	uncertainty.		Due	 to	 its	 rigorous	 theoretical	 underpinnings,	 DMUU	 often	comes	 across	 as	 abstract	 and	 unrealistic.	 However,	 there	 are	 many	examples	 where	 DMUU	 and	 the	 research	 topics	 in	 this	 thesis	 can	 be	seen	in	daily	life:	In	the	medical	domain	models	of	DMUU	are	helpful	in	evaluating	 treatments	 and	 precriptions	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 survival	 rates,	potential	 side-effects	 and	 the	 patients’	 individual	 willingness	 to	 take	risks	and	accept	ambiguity	 (Berger	et	al.,	2013;	Wakker,	2010).	Other	applications	 of	 DMUU	 can	 be	 found	 in	 buying	 insurance,	 financial	investments	or	climate	change	(Millner	et	al.,	2013).	Before	 I	 relate	 the	 research	 questions	 of	 this	 thesis	 with	previous	 literature	 and	 discuss	 the	 research	 approach,	 I	 provide	 a	historical	 context	 on	 these	 standard	 economic	 models	 of	 DMUU	 and	how	these	have	evolved.		
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1.2	Historical	setting	DMUU	is	a	cornerstone	in	microeconomic	research.	Historically,	there	have	been	numerous	 theories	proposed	 to	best	describe	DMUU.	In	general,	one	could	say	that	earlier	theories	from	the	previous	century	envisioned	DMUU	as	a	normative	tool	 to	prescribe	how	human	beings	should	behave	(Wakker,	2010).	Within	this	framework	expected	utility	(EU)	 is	 the	 benchmark	 model	 in	 DMUU	 with	 objective	 probabilities	(risk).	 This	 model	 is	 accompanied	 by	 a	 complete	 set	 of	 rules	 of	behavior,	 formally	known	as	axioms	 (von	Neumann	and	Morgenstern,	1944).	 The	 gold	 standard	 in	 EU	 is	 rationality,	 which	 means	 that	individuals	 should	 choose	 the	 option	 that	 obtains	 the	 highest	 utility.	Savage	 (1954)	 extended	 EU	 to	 SEU	 for	 ambiguous	 events	 when	 no	objective	probabilities	are	available.	He	made	use	of	the	EU	framework	for	 risk	 (von	Neumann	 and	Morgenstern,	 1944)	 and	 insights	 from	de	Finetti	(1931)	and	Ramsey	(1931)	on	subjective	probabilities.	See	BOX	2	for	a	short	explanation	of	EU	and	SEU	and	its	most	important	axioms,	the	 independence	 condition	 for	 risk,	 and	 the	 sure-thing	 principle	 for	ambiguity,	which	were	later	adapted	in	new	classes	of	DMUU	models.		Based	 on	 the	 assumptions	 of	 SEU,	 a	 decision-maker	 is	 to	 be	probabilistically	 sophisticated	 (Machina	 and	 Schmeidler,	 1992).	 This	means	 that	 she	 should	 be	 indifferent	 between	 a	 risky	 and	 ambiguous	event	 if	objective	probabilities	 in	the	risky	setting	match	beliefs	 in	the	ambiguous	 setting.	 For	 instance,	 let	 us	 assume	 that	 you	 believe	 that	your	 favorite	 football	 team	has	an	80	percent	chance	of	winning	 their	next	match.	If	they	indeed	win,	you	receive	a	monetary	reward	of	€10,	otherwise	you	will	get	nothing.	The	alternative	option	 is	 to	bet	on	the	roll	 of	 a	 5-sided	die.	 You	will	win	€10	 if	 you	 roll	 the	numbers	 one	 to	four,	and	nothing	if	you	roll	five.	Would	you	rather	bet	on	your	favorite	football	 team	 to	 win	 the	 match,	 or	 the	 roll	 of	 a	 die?	 Your	 individual	belief	of	80	percent	that	your	favorite	football	team	will	win	the	draw	is	matched	with	a	corresponding	objective	probability	of	0.8	in	a	die	task.	Based	 on	 SEU	 we	 were	 to	 conclude	 that	 a	 decision-maker	 should	 be	indifferent	between	both	choice	options.		Empirically,	 this	 is	 not	what	we	observe	when	human	 subjects	complete	 this	 thought	 epxeriment.	 Most	 people	 shy	 away	 from	uncertainty.	 They	 prefer	 risk	 to	 ambiguity,	 even	 more	 so	 when	 the	
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underlying	objective	probabilities	are	higher	than	0.5	(Abdellaoui	et	al.,	2011).	This	behavioral	phenomenon	is	known	as	ambiguity	aversion.		Already	 in	 1921,	 both	 Knight	 (1921)	 and	 Keynes	 (1921)	proposed	 a	 clear	 distinction	 between	 these	 two	 types	 of	 uncertainty.	Ellsberg	 empirically	 translated	 their	 insight	 into	 an	 influential	experiment	 in	 1961.	 The	 setup	 of	 his	 experiment	 is	 still	 widely	 used	today	to	elicit	individuals’	ambiguity	preferences.	I	will	refer	to	it	as	the	Ellsberg	setup	(see	BOX	1).	In	the	following	chapters	of	this	thesis,	the	Ellsberg	setup	is	used	to	elicit	ambiguity	preferences.		After	Ellsberg	showed	that	probabilistic	sophistication	does	not	necessarily	 hold,	 more	 general	 models	 that	 could	 explain	 ambiguity	aversion	were	 developed	 (Abdellaoui	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Etner	 et	 al.,	 2012).	Savage’s	 sure-thing	 principle	 (BOX	 2)	 was	 regarded	 as	 the	 most	stringent	 axiom,	which	was	weakened	by	a	 first	 set	 of	new	ambiguity	models	 which	 allowed	 for	 non-linear	 probabilities.	 One	 of	 the	 first	alternatives	 to	 SEU	was	 Choquet	 expected	 utility	 (Schmeidler,	 1989).	This	 model	 still	 assumes	 that	 people	 are	 able	 to	 form	 beliefs,	 yet	Savage’s	 sure	 thing	 principle	 (BOX	 2)	 was	 relaxed.	 This	 idea	 of	 non-linear	probabilities	was	further	generalized	in	prospect	theory	by	also	adding	 a	 reference	 point,	 and	 as	 such	 an	 asymmetry	 of	 individuals’	valuation	 of	 gains	 and	 losses	 (Kahneman	 and	Tversky,	 1979;	 Tversky	and	 Kahneman,	 1992;	 Wakker,	 2010).	 Newer	 classes	 of	 ambiguity	models	 assumed	 that	 people	 are	 not	 able	 to	 assess	 precise	 subjective	probabilities	and	proposed	the	use	of	multiple	priors	(different	sets	of	probability	 distributions).	 Such	 models	 are	 called	 maxmin	 expected	utility	 (Gilboa	 and	 Schmeidler,	 1989)	 and	 a-maxmin	 expected	 utility	(Ghirardato	 et	 al.,	 2004).	 Another	 popular	 ambiguity	 model	 is	 the	smooth	ambiguity	model	by	Klibanoff	et	al.	(2005)	that	rests	on	the	idea	that	people	formulate	second-order	beliefs	(a	prior	over	all	priors),	yet	are	 not	 able	 to	 reduce	 these	 to	 compound	 lotteries.	 Finally,	 a	 more	recent	development,	 in	 line	with	our	 idea	of	 sources	of	uncertainty,	 is	the	notion	of	source	dependence	(Chew	and	Sagi,	2006;	Wakker,	2010).	In	 line	with	Savage’s	 terminology	of	 ‘small	worlds’,	 the	 idea	here	 is	 to	find	 domains	 for	 which	 decision-makers	 have	 well-established	probabilistic	 beliefs.	 Within	 these	 small	 worlds	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	people	 are	 ambiguity	 neutral.	 However,	 across	 domains,	 ambiguity	aversion	can	arise.	
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BOX	1	The	Ellsberg	setup		Ellsberg	 created	 risky	and	 ambiguous	 gambles	with	 the	attributes	urns,	 balls	and	colors.	Ellsberg	implemented	two	different	versions,	namely	the	two-color	and	 three-color	 Ellsberg	 problem.	 Below	 I	 describe	 the	 two-color	 Ellsberg	
problem,	as	researchers	mostly	use	this	version.	Please	review	the	following	setup:	one	urn	contains	exactly	5	black	and	5	red	balls	and	a	second	urn	contains	10	balls	 in	an	unknown	composition	of	either	black	or	 red	 balls.	 The	 first	urn	 represents	 the	 risky	urn	as	 there	 is	 an	equal	objective	 probability	 of	 0.5	 to	 draw	 a	 black	 or	 red	 ball.	 The	 second	 urn	 is	ambiguous	 as	 you	 do	 not	 know	 how	 many	 red	 or	 black	 balls	 are	 present.			Mathematically,	 if	 one	 were	 to	 describe	 all	 the	 different	 combinations	 the	ambiguous	urn	could	have,	taking	into	account	the	ten	balls,	the	two	available	colors	and	the	equal	likelihood	with	which	each	combination	could	materialize,	an	underlying	 likelihood	of	0.5	to	either	draw	a	black	or	red	ball	 is	 expected.	Nevertheless,	 a	 decision-maker	 is	 uncertain	 about	 the	 exact	 probability,	 and	could	 potentially	 face	 a	 skewed	 urn	with	 more	 red,	 respectively	 black	 balls.	Based	 on	 this	 setup,	 the	 decision-maker	 is	 confronted	 with	 four	 different	reward	schemes	(see	below).		Choice	options	 Blackr	 Redr	 Blacka	 Reda	1.0	 €10	 €0	 	 	2.0	 	 	 €10	 €0	1.1	 €0	 €10	 	 	2.1	 	 	 €0	 €10		Blackr	and	 Blacka	 stand	 for	 a	 black	 ball	 drawn	 from	 the	 risky,	 respectively	ambiguous	 urn,	 and	 vice	 versa	 for	 the	 red	 ball.	 First,	 a	 participant	 in	 this	experiment	has	to	choose	between	options	1.0	and	2.0:	does	she	prefer	to	draw	a	ball	from	the	risky	urn	when	a	black	ball	will	result	in	a	€10	gain,	or	else	win	nothing.	Or	does	she	prefer	to	draw	a	ball	 from	the	ambiguous	urn	in	which	a	black	ball	will	result	in	a	similar	gain	of	€10,	else	win	nothing.			After	indicating	this	preference,	she	has	to	choose	between	options	1.1	and	2.1.	Now	drawing	a	red	ball	from	either	the	risky	or	ambiguous	urn	will	result	in	a	gain	of	€10,	else	nothing.	 Majority	 of	 participants	 choose	 options	 1.0	 and	 1.1.	 Let	me	 explain	why	SEU	does	not	hold	here.	A	participant	that	prefers	to	bet	on	a	black	ball	in	1.0	assigns	a	belief	B	to	draw	a	black	ball	from	the	ambiguous	urn	that	 is	less	than	 the	objective	probability	of	0.5	 to	draw	a	 black	 ball	 from	 the	 risky	urn:		B(Blacka)<0.5.	 One	 might	 conclude	 from	 this	 observation	 that	 majority	 of	participants	believe	the	ambiguous	urn	to	have	more	red	than	black	balls	and	thus	expect	B(Reda)>0.5.	However,	majority	of	participants	also	prefer	 to	 bet	on	a	red	ball	in	the	risky	urn	in	choice	option	1.1,	indicating	that:	B(Reda)<0.5.	Both	preferences	 lead	 to	non-additive	 beliefs,	 as	 both:	 	 B(Blacka)+B(Reda)<1.	This	 finding	 contradicts	 SEU	 and	 is	 coined	 ambiguity	 aversion.	 Ellsberg	concluded	 that	 people	 prefer	 risk	 to	 ambiguity,	 because	 they	 dislike	uncertainty	and	therefore	mostly	choose	to	bet	on	drawing	balls	from	the	risky	urn.	
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BOX	2	Expected	utility	and	subjective	expected	utility	Risk	 entails	 events,	 which	 outcomes	 materialize	 with	 known	 probabilities.	 For	instance,	imagine	that	you	could	win	€5	if	a	coin	tosses	head	and	€0	when	it	tosses	tail,	each	with	50	percent	probability	(p=0.5).	How	much	is	this	bet	worth	to	you?	The	 expected	 value	 is:	 0.5*5	 +	 0.5*0	 =	 €2.50.	 Now	 consider	 the	 same	 setup,	 but	with	the	following	outcomes.	You	could	win	€1000	if	head	faces	up,	and	€0	in	case	of	 tail.	 The	 expected	 value	 of	 this	 gamble	 is	 €500.	 If	 I	 would	 offer	 you	 a	 choice	between	playing	this	last	coin	gamble	and	receiving	€500	for	sure,	you	would	most	probably	go	for	the	sure	option.	The	larger	the	money	at	stake	the	less	risk	you	are	willing	to	take	by	playing	the	gamble.	 It	was	Bernoulli	 (1738)	who,	based	on	this	logic,	 introduced	 the	 idea	 of	 EU.	 Depending	 on	 your	 risk	 preferences,	 a	 utility	function	 is	 attached	 to	 outcomes	 before	 it	 is	 multiplied	 by	 corresponding	probabilities.	Von	Neumann	and	Morgenstern	(1947)	subsequently	defined	axioms,	which	 can	 be	 understood,	 as	 a	 set	 of	 choice	 preferences	 people	 ought	 to	 apply.	Please	 consider	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 axioms,	 the	 independence	 condition,	which	 von	 Neumann	 and	 Morgenstern	 (1947)	 derived	 based	 on	 EU.	 This	 axiom	postulates	 that	 a	 preference	 for	 one	 lottery	 over	 the	 other	 should	 remain	 intact	when	the	 lotteries	get	mixed	with	another	 lottery.	For	 instance,	 lottery	X	 leads	to	an	outcome	of	120	or	40	with	equal	probability,	whereas	lottery	Y	 leads	to	a	sure	outcome	of	80.	If	I	would	add	a	lottery	with	zero	mean	and	the	original	lotteries	X	and	Y	multiplied	by	0.5	(see	decision	tree	below	as	illustration),	people	should	not	switch	preferences.	That	is,	if	they	preferred	X	to	Y,	they	should	still	prefer	X’	to	Y’,	and	vice	versa.													Maurice	Allais	showed	that	many	people	do	not	satisfy	a	preference	relation	in	line	with	 the	 independence	 condition	 (1953).	When	 probabilities	 are	not	known,	 and	we	 thus	 speak	 of	 ambiguity,	 SEU	 postulates	 that	 people	 use	 their	 inference	 to	construct	their	own	expectations,	 formally	known	as	subjective	probabilities.	The	foundation	 of	 EU	 is	 merged	 with	 the	 idea	 that	 people	 construct	 subjective	probabilities	 (Savage,	 1954).	 The	most	 important	 axiom	 in	 SEU	 is	 the	 sure-thing	principle.	 It	 means	 that	 the	 preference	 for	 a	 certain	 lottery	 X	 over	 Y	 is	 not	influenced	by	common	outcomes.	For	instance,	if	event	E1	can	lead	to	outcome	α	or	X	and	event	E2	 leads	to	outcomes	α	or	Y,	 then	the	preference	between	E1	and	E2	should	be	solely	determined	by	the	outcomes	X	and	Y.	Now	consider	events	E3	and	E4,	 which	 respectively	 lead	 to	 outcomes	 β	 or	 X	 and	 β	 or	 Y.	 If	 a	 decision-maker	prefers	to	bet	on	event	E1,	she	should	also	prefer	to	bet	on	event	E3	as	the	common	outcome	Y	should	be	disregarded.		
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The	goal	is	to	define	such	small	worlds	and	based	on	de	Finetti’s	idea	of	exchangeability	a	model	is	formulated	(Etner	et	al.,	2012).	Besides	 formulating	 these	 new	 theoretical	 models	 of	 DMUU,	experimental	 research	 began	 to	 identify	 moderators	 of	 ambiguity	aversion	 after	 Ellsberg’s	 findings.	 For	 instance,	 ambiguity	 preferences	are	influenced	when	elicited	in	isolation	and	not	directly	in	comparison	with	 risk	 (Fox	 and	 Weber,	 2002;	 Qiu	 and	 Weitzel,	 2011).	 Ambiguity	aversion,	but	not	risk	aversion,	is	also	reduced	when	participants	need	to	reveal	to	reveal	their	choices	amongst	their	peers	(Curley	et	al.,	1986;	Trautmann	 et	 al.,	 2008).	 However,	 jointly	 deciding	 in	 group	 settings	leads	to	more	ambiguity	neutral	choices	(Keller	et	al.,	2007;	Charness	et	al.,	2013).	Overall,	we	 can	 conclude	 that	 a	 new	area	 of	 research	began	 to	arise	in	reaction	to	Ellsberg’s	finding,	and	simultaneously	as	a	reaction	to	 Maurice	 Allais	 (1953),	 who	 empirically	 challenged	 EU	 as	 a	descriptive	 model	 for	 risk	 by	 showing	 that	 people	 do	 not	 behave	according	 to	 the	 independence	 condition	 (BOX	 2).	 Ellsberg	 and	 Allais	empirically	 showed	 that	 the	 axioms	 of	 a	 model	 could	 be	 tested	 and	therefore	directly	refuted	or	validated.	At	this	time,	von	Neumann	and	Morgenstern	 (1944)	 and	 Savage	 (1954)	 acknowledged	 that	 their	 goal	was	to	prescribe	how	an	individual	should	behave,	and	thereby	realized	that	in	reality	they	might	not	do	so.	Ellsberg	and	Allais	wanted	to	model	and	 describe	 how	 people	 actually	 behave	 (Heukelom,	 2015)	 albeit	 at	the	 cost	 of	 parsimonious	 theory.	 This	 has	 led	 to	 an	 era	 in	 which	“economics	 became	 a	 behavioral	 science”	 (Heukelom,	 2015,	 p.	 167),	and	 “economics	 has	 been	 opening	 up	 to	 introspective	 and	neuroimaging	data”	(Wakker,	2010,	p.	3).		The	 research	 approach	 in	 this	 thesis	 stems	 from	 the	 above	mentioned	 developments	 in	 the	 economic	 literature	 as	 I	 use	 several	methodologies	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 mechanisms	 with	 which	people	make	 certain	 decisions.	 This	 includes	 the	 use	 of	 neuroimaging	data,	 which	 is	 a	 relatively	 new	 endeavor	 in	 economics	 and	 is	 also	known	as	‘neuroeconomics’.			
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1.3	Neuroeconomics	The	interdisciplinary	field	of	neuroeconomics	combines	insights	from	economics,	psychology	and	neuroscience	(Sanfey	et	al.,	2007).	All	three	 disciplines	 share	 the	 same	 goal	 within	 decision	 sciences:	 to	understand	 the	 choices	 of	 human	 beings.2	Neuroeconomics	 aims	 to	contribute	to	decision	sciences	by	accumulating	knowledge	from	these	three	disciplines	 (Glimcher	 and	Rustichini,	 2004).	 The	 contribution	of	neuroscience	 to	 economics	 is	 that	 it	 maps	 a	 neural	 circuitry	 that	describes	 and	 explains	 behavioral	 output	 (Sanfey	 et	 al.,	 2006;	Loewenstein	et	al.,	2008).	Technological	advances	in	neuroscience	have	allowed	neuroeconomic	researchers	to	analyze	the	neural	mechanisms	that	underlie	behavior	(Camerer,	2013).	There	are	many	methodologies	to	measure	neural	activity,	but	functional	magnetic	resonance	imaging	(fMRI)	 is	 the	most	commonly	used	 in	neuroeconomic	research,	due	 to	its	 high	 spatial	 resolution.	 BOX	 3	 describes	 the	 basic	 concepts	 of	 this	technique.		Decision-making	 is	 a	 highly	 developed	 cognitive	 ability,	requiring	 an	 interplay	 of	 elementary	 processes	 like	 attention,	 visual	perception,	motivation	and	cognitive	control.	Behaviorally,	it	is	difficult	to	 tease	 apart	 these	underlying	decision	processes,	 but	 fMRI	methods	offer	 us	 a	 tool	 to	 empirically	 investigate	 the	 underlying	 neural	mechanisms	a	decision-maker	uses	to	reach	a	decision.	One	 of	 the	 first	 fMRI	 studies	 of	 DMUU	 came	 from	 Platt	 and	Glimcher	 (1999).	 Their	 research	 with	 monkeys	 demonstrated	 that	neurons	in	the	lateral	parietal	cortex,	a	region	known	as	LIP,	are	active	when	 animals	 act	 on	 priors	 as	 well	 as	 posterior	 probabilities.	Subsequently,	 this	 finding	 was	 also	 replicated	 in	 humans	 when	decisions	are	made	under	uncertainty	(Huettel	et	al.,	2006;	Bach	et	al.,																																																									2	The	 influence	 of	 psychology	 in	 economics	 is	 not	 new	 and	 has	 led	 to	 the	 rise	 of	behavioral	 economics	 (Rabin,	 2002).	 Insights	 from	 psychology	 have	 outlined	 a	collection	of	heuristics	and	biases	people	use	as	rules	of	thumb	to	guide	their	DMUU	(Tversky	and	Kahneman,	1981).	Prospect	 theory	 is	 a	direct	 result	 of	 the	 translation	from	 descriptive	 choice	 behavior	 to	 standard	 economic	 models	 (Kahnemen	 and	Tversky,	 1979;	 Tversky	 and	 Kahneman,	 1992).	 This	 model	 is	 seen	 as	 “the	 first	descriptive	 theory	 that	 explicitly	 incorporated	 irrational	 behavior	 in	 an	 empirically	realistic	 manner	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 being	 systematic	 and	 tractable”	 (Wakker,	2010,	p.	2).	
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2009).	These	studies	demonstrate	that	neurons	in	the	LIP	region	carry	information	 about	 prior	 probabilities,	 which	 is	 used	 by	 both	monkey	and	human	decision-makers	to	select	the	most	rewarding	option.		I	 find	 it	 important	to	note	that	Platt	and	Glimcher’s	experiment	(1999)	was	greatly	influenced	by	a	debate	on	the	exact	role	of	the	LIP.	Namely,	 previous	 research	 (Anderson	 et	 al.,	 1987;	 Colby	 et	 al.,	 1996)	was	 inconclusive	 as	 to	 whether	 signals	 in	 the	 LIP	 carry	 sensory	 or	motor	 input,	 and	 either	 attention	 or	 intention.	 Platt	 and	 Glimcher	(1999)	 offered	 a	 new	 perspective	 on	 the	 role	 of	 the	 LIP	 (Glimcher,	2004)	by	taking	an	economic	approach	to	a	visual	experiment,	the	cued	saccade	 experiment.	 This	 research	 also	 provided	 a	 first	 outline	 of	 a	neural	 mechanism	 for	 DMUU.	 For	 me,	 this	 illustrates	 two	 important	points.	First,	that	understanding	basic	neural	elementary	processes,	like	vision	and	attention,	 can	 influence	economic	hypotheses	pertaining	 to	decision-making,	 and	 second,	 that	 an	 economic	 perspective	 also	 adds	value	to	neuroscience	by	relating	concepts	like	probability	and	value	to	elementary	realms	of	experimentation	like	vision	and	attention.	 In	the	same	 way	 psychological	 insights	 were	 fruitfully	 combined	 with	economic	models	of	utility,	neuroscientific	contributions	may	stimulate	new	 economic	 models	 of	 decision-making	 (Glimcher	 and	 Rustichini,	2004).		Neuroscientific	 research	 has	 focused	 on	 two	 issues	 relavant	 to	this	 thesis,	 namely	 the	 importance	 of	 probabilities	 and	 value	 on	decision	 making,	 and	 the	 comparison	 between	 social	 and	 non-social	interactions	 (i.e.	 sources	 of	 uncertainty).	 	 There	 is	 little	 research	however	 -	with	 the	 exception	 of	 some	notable	 publications	 (Corricelli	and	Nagel,	2009;	Hampton,	et	al.,	2008)3	-	investigating	the	combination	of	these	two	features	of	strategic	uncertainty.		Ambiguity	aversion	is	known	to	have	a	distinct	neural	basis,	and	the	 few	 fMRI	 studies	 on	 ambiguity	 hint	 at	 two	 potential	mechanisms.	One	proposed	mechanism	focuses	more	on	emotional	processes	(Hsu	et	al.,	 2005),	 whereas	 the	 other	 promotes	 more	 abstract	 computational	mechanisms	(Huettel	et	al.,	2006;	Bach	et	al.,	2011).	It	is	problematic	to	reach	 conclusions	 in	 order	 to	 pinpoint	 the	 exact	 underlying																																																									
3	These	 fMRI	 studies	 focus	 on	 mentalizing	 abilities	 of	 humans,	 but	 do	 not	 consider	their	studies	within	the	framework	of	DMUU.	
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mechanisms	 leading	 to	 ambiguity	 aversion	 as	 the	 research	 designs	 of	these	fMRI	studies	differ	to	quite	some	extent,	it	The	 literature	 on	neural	 differences	when	people	 interact	with	humans	 instead	 of	 lotteries	 does	 not	 distinguish	 between	 risk	 and	ambiguity	 (McCabe	 et	 al.,	 2001;	 Delgado	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Kosfeld	 et	 al.,	2005;	Amodio	et	al.,	2006;	Saxe	et	al.,	2006;	Behrens	et	al.,	2008;	2009).	The	fMRI	study	that	comes	closest	to	investigating	strategic	uncertainty	within	the	domain	of	DMUU	is	by	Aimone	et	al.	(2014).	They	study	the	neural	 mechanisms	 of	 strategic	 ambiguity,	 yet	 do	 not	 consider	 risk.	Their	 fMRI	 results	 stress	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	 right	 anterior	 and	posterior	 insular	 cortex	 when	 subjects	 decide	 to	 trust	 others	 in	comparison	to	a	computer-mediated	treatment.	The	insula	is	a	region	in	the	midbrain	that	is	engaged	with	a	wide	variety	of	negative	emotions	like	 disgust	 (Sanfey	 et	 al.,	 2003).	 Therefore,	 Aimone	 et	 al.	 (2014)	interpreted	 activation	 in	 the	 insular	 cortex	 to	 reflect	 the	 heightened	negative	state	of	betrayal	aversion.	In	 this	 thesis	 I	 offer	 a	 new	 perspective	 on	 the	 neural	 basis	 of	ambiguity	preferences	by	allowing	for	individual	variation	in	ambiguity	preferences,	 which	 arises	 due	 to	 humans’	 attitudes	 towards	 (the	interaction	 of)	 types	 and	 sources	 of	 uncertainty.	 These	 neuroimaging	results	offer	insights	into	the	underlying	decision-processes	of	DMUU.		
1.4	Contributions	and	overview	
Extending	uncertainty	beyond	lotteries	When	 Von	 Neumann	 and	 Morgenstern	 introduced	 EU	 in	 1944	they	 intended	 to	 analyze	 individual	 risk	 taking	 in	 strategic	 game	situations.	They	assumed	strategic	uncertainty	where	a	decision-maker	incorporates	the	expected	utility	and	best	response	of	other	players	in	order	to	maximize	her	own	utility.	 In	their	 framework,	 the	probability	of	 receiving	 a	 good	 outcome	 is	 independent	 of	 the	 source	 of	uncertainty.	In	other	words,	a	decision-maker	should	equally	evaluate	a	50	 percent	 chance	 to	 win	 a	 gamble	 when	 it	 stems	 from	 a	 random	mechanistic	device	or	from	somebody	else’s	conscious	decision.		
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BOX	3	fMRI	experiments	fMRI	stands	for	functional	magnetic	resonance	imaging.	This	technique	makes	use	of	 MRI	 (magnetic	 resonance	 imaging)	 technology	 to	 be	 able	 to	 localize	 brain	activation.	Brain	activity,	which	means	 certain	 brain	 cells	 (neurons)	are	actively	engaged	 to	 perform	 a	 certain	 task,	 is	 accompanied	 by	 an	 increase	 in	 blood	oxygenation.	 Quite	 literally,	 these	 active	 brain	 regions	 require	 oxygen,	 which	serves	as	fuel	for	this	region.	Via	fMRI	we	measure	changes	in	blood	oxygenation:	the	 difference	 in	 magnetization	 between	 oxygenized	 and	 deoxygenized	hemoglobin.	 The	 signal	 the	MRI	 scanner	 records	with	 fMRI	 is	what	 we	 label	 as	BOLD	 (Blood	 Oxygenation	 Level	 Dependent)	 and	 this	 signal	 serves	 as	 our	dependent	variable	when	analyzing	neuroimaging	data.	In	contrast,	standard	MRI	is	not	tuned	to	changes	in	blood	oxygenation,	but	outlines	anatomical	structures	of	the	brain	(or	any	part	of	the	body)	without	any	connection	to	actions	or	decisions,	which	are	evoked	by	experiments	when	applying	fMRI.		fMRI	is	a	non-invasive	technique,	in	contrast	to,	for	instance,	single-cell	recording.	When	placing	an	electrode	near	or	within	a	neuron	one	is	able	to	record	the	actual	activation	of	that	neuron.	With	healthy	human	subjects	it	is	ethically	impossible	to	place	 an	 electrode	within	 the	 brain,	 and	 thus	 fMRI	 is	 as	 close	 as	 we	 can	 get	 to	precisely	 indicate	 where	 in	 the	 brain	 activation	 takes	 place.	 Although	electroencephalography	 (EEG)	 is	 able	 to	 directly	 measure	 the	 electrical	 and	magnetic	activity	from	within	the	brain	by	placing	electrodes	on	the	human	skull,	this	measure	has	a	bad	spatial	resolution.	It	cannot	precisely	indicate	where	in	the	brain	 the	 activation	 stems	 from.	 fMRI	 offers	 us	 a	 technique	 to	 localize	 brain	activity	 within	 millimeters	 of	 its	 origin.	 EEG	 is,	 however,	 more	 precisely	 in	indicating	when	the	activation	occurred	(high	temporal	resolution).	In	contrary	to	its	 high	 spatial	 resolution,	 fMRI	 offers	 low	 temporal	 resolution,	 as	 the	 BOLD	response	 is	 a	 correlational	 measure	 of	 the	 actual	 neural	 activity	 (Huettel	 et	 al.,	2009).	How	 can	 we	 infer	 meaning	 to	 our	 findings	 once	 we	 have	 done	 proper	preprocessing	on	our	raw	BOLD	signal	and	are	able	to	indicate	where	in	the	brain	activation	 occurred	 during	 certain	 decision-making	 tasks?	 Knowledge	 about	specific	processes	of	 brain	areas	 comes	 from	 lesion	 studies	and	animal	 research	(Huettel	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 If	 patients	 with	 brain	 damage	 to	 certain	 brain	 areas	 are	unable	 to	 perform	 a	 specific	 task	 compared	 to	 healthy	 controls,	 this	 reveals	 a	causal	relationship	between	the	brain	and	some	action.	With	animals,	permanent	lesions	can	be	 investigated	and	this	 increases	our	knowledge	about	brain	regions	and	their	necessity	 for	specific	 functions.	 In	humans,	a	common	approach	to	 link	brain	activity	to	a	particular	cognitive	process	is	‘reverse	inference’.	However,	we	need	 to	 be	 careful	with	 this	 approach,	 as	 the	BOLD	measurement	 is,	 in	 essence,	correlational.	With	the	help	of	neuroimaging	databases,	we	can	formally	describe	which	 cognitive	 process	 is	 most	 likely	 as	 a	 result	 of	 brain	 activity	 within	 a	particular	experimental	design	(Poldrack,	2006).		
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This	 is	 often	 not	 the	 case,	 as	 experimental	 studies	 have	 found	that	 decision-makers	 behave	 differently	 towards	 sources	 of	 risk	 and	ambiguity	 (Abdellaoui	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 L’Haridon	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 Amos	Tversky	was	 the	 first	 to	 speak	about	sources	of	uncertainty,	which	he	defined	as	groups	of	events	that	are	generated	by	the	same	mechanism	of	uncertainty,	and	 thus	have	similar	characteristics	 (Abdellaoui	et	al.,	2011).	Sources	of	uncertainty	could	also	explain	why	people	are	equally	willing	to	exchange	a	bet	on	a	specific	color	of	the	ball	in	the	risky	and	ambiguous	 urn	 in	 the	 Ellsberg	 setup	 (BOX	 1),	 but	 dislike	 exchanging	their	bet	on	a	particular	colored	ball	between	the	urns.	The	willingness	to	exchange	within	but	not	between	urns	 implies	 that	 the	same	urn	 is	one	specific	source	of	uncertainty,	but	the	risky	and	ambiguous	urns	are	considered	two	different	sources	of	uncertainty	(Wakker,	2010).	Social	 sources	 of	 uncertainty	 have	 not	 been	 studied	 often	(Trautmann	and	Vieider,	2011).		However,	in	real-life	uncertainy	rarely	stems	 from	 some	 sort	 of	 random	 device,	 like	 a	 color	 of	 a	 drawn	 ball	from	an	urn,	the	flip	of	a	coin,	or	the	roll	of	a	die.	As	Trautmann	and	van	de	Kuilen	(2013,	p.	600)	explain	in	their	review	of	ambiguity,	“real	life	is	not	about	balls	and	urns”.	Human	beings	are	social	beings,	and	thus	some	of	the	uncertainties	we	face	are	due	to	the	actions	of	other	human	beings.	 Even	 very	 subtle	 social	 influences	 can	 have	 an	 impact	 on	human’s	decision-making	(Asch,	1956;	Reno	et	al.,	1993).		Nonetheless,	 in	 the	historical	 tradition	of	EU	and	SEU,	 risk	and	ambiguity	 are	 still	 primarily	 elicited	 via	 lottery	 setups.	 The	 most	common	 elicitation	 methods	 for	 risk	 include	 choosing	 to	 allocate	resources	between	a	safe	and	risky	asset	(Gneezy	and	Potters,	1997),	a	single	choice	between	a	set	of	different	gambles	(Eckel	and	Grossman,	2002)	and	a	multiple	price	list	procedure,	which	the	risky	lottery	setup	by	 Holt	 and	 Laury	 (2002)	 is	 frequently	 used	 (Charness	 et	 al.,	 2013).	Ambiguity,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 is	 primarly	 measured	 via	 the	 Ellsberg	setup	(BOX	1),	which	can	essentially	be	considered	a	lottery	setup.	Since	 the	 last	 decade	 there	 has	 been	 a	 shift	 and	 experimental	economics	 has	 outlined	 the	 effects	 of	 social	 preferences,	 fairness	considerations,	and	intentions	of	other	decision-makers	(Andreoni	and	Miller,	 2002;	 Fehr	 and	Schmidt,	 1999;	 Falk	 and	Fischbacher,	 2006).	A	common	 experimental	 approach	 to	 compare	 social	 and	 non-social	sources	of	risk	is	a	trust	decision,	typically	administered	experimentally	
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with	the	Trust	Game	from	Berg	et	al.	(1995).4	A	trust	decision	involves	strategic	uncertainty,	as	the	Trustor	must	form	a	belief	about	the	risk	of	betrayal	 by	 the	 Trustee	 and,	 given	 this	 subjective	 probability	 of	betrayal,	 either	decides	 to	 trust	or	not	 (Coleman,	1990).	 Interestingly,	although	 placing	 trust	 in	 someone	 is	 intuitively	 risky,	 experimental	evidence	 on	 risk	 preferences,	 stemming	 from	 a	 lottery,	 and	 trusting	behavior	 is	 mixed.	 Houser	 et	 al.	 (2004)	 find	 no	 correlation	 between	trust	 and	 lottery	 risk,	 whereas	 Schechter	 (2007)	 does	 find	 a	 positive	correlation.	Also,	some	studies	find	that	aversion	to	risk	is	strongest	in	the	 Trust	 Game	 versus	 a	 comparable	 lottery	 context	 (Bohnet	 and	Zeckhauser,	2004;	Aimone	and	Houser,	2008).	This	finding	was	labeled	betrayal	 aversion	 (Bohnet	 and	 Zeckhauser,	 2004).	 It	 implies	 that	participants	show	more	risk	averse	behavior	in	a	strategic	uncertainty	context,	 as	 compared	 to	 a	 lottery	 context,	 because	 they	 dislike	 being	betrayed	 by	 a	 person	 who	 consciously	 decided	 not	 to	 reciprocate	 an	investment.			 In	the	next	Chapter	of	this	thesis,	titled	Trust	and	Risk	revisted,	I5	reflect	on	these	mixed	experimental	results	regarding	trust	and	risk.	As	there	is	no	clear	evidence	for	a	link	between	lottery	risk	preferences	and	risk	involved	in	trusting	others	I	argue	that	sources	of	risk	should	be	considered	as	a	possible	explanation.	Namely	I	propose	that	there	is	a	 crucial	 difference	 between	 risk	 measurements	 in	 the	 two	 settings.	Trusting	involves	giving	up	control	to	another	human	while	lottery	risk	arises	 from	 a	 mechanistic	 randomization	 device.	 In	 this	 Chapter	 I	designed	a	risky	Trust	Game	 that	experimentally	measures	risk	 in	 the	same	 context	 as	 the	 standard	 Trust	 Game,	 but	 reduces	 the	 trust	decision	to	objective	risk.	The	results	show	that	 transfers	 in	 the	Trust	Game	can	indeed	be	explained	by	individual	risk	attitudes	elicited	with																																																									4	In	this	game	there	are	two	players,	which	are	known	as	the	Trustor	and	Trustee.	The	Trustor	 is	 usually	 endowed	 with	 10	 tokens	 and	 can	 choose	 to	 invest	 some	 of	 her	tokens	 with	 a	 Trustee.	 The	 experimenter	 usually	 triples	 this	 investment	 before	 it	reaches	 the	 Trustee.	 The	 Trustee	 can	 return	 some	 of	 this	 tripled	 investment	 to	 the	Trustor,	but	is	free	to	keep	the	whole	investment	to	him-	or	herself.	The	Trustor	needs	to	offset	the	possibility	of	receiving	back	a	multiplier	of	her	investment	versus	the	risk	of	 losing	 a	 great	 part	 or	 even	 the	 complete	 investment.	 Trust	 is	 quantified	 as	 the	amount	a	Trustor	invests	with	a	Trustee.	5	Although	I	write	the	Introduction	from	my	own	perspective,	the	individual	Chapters	are	without	no	doubt	a	collective	product	of	me	and	my	(co)-superisors.		
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the	 risky	 Trust	 Game,	 while	 lottery	 risk	 preferences	 have	 no	explanatory	power.			In	this	thesis	I	also	put	forward	the	idea	that	types	of	uncertainty	should	 be	 considered,	 as	 many	 uncertainties	 in	 real-life	 cannot	 be	captured	 by	 objective	 probabilities.	 Also	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 social	sources	 of	 uncertainty,	we	 rarely	 know	 the	 exact	 probability	 of	 other	decision-makers’	moves.	 In	 a	Trust	Game	 setting,	 you	 could	 speculate	that	you	only	know,	with	quite	some	certainty,	the	rate	of	reciprocation	if	 the	Trustee	would	 be	 your	 best	 friend.	Generally,	we	 cannot	 assess	such	 precisce	 probabilities	 in	 our	 day-to-day	 social	 interactions	 with	others.	 Yet,	 experimental	 studies	 primarily	 focus	 on	 comparing	 social	versus	 non-social	 sources	 of	 risk	 as	 specific	 type	 of	 uncertainty.	 Only	Aimone	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 studied	 betrayal	 aversion	 in	 the	 context	 of	ambiguity.	6				In	 Chapters	 3	 and	 4	 I	 investigate	 both	 types	 and	 sources	 of	uncertainty	 simultaneously	 in	 a	 single	 MRI	 experiment.	 In	 the	 social	context	 I	 adapted	 the	 standard	 Trust	 Game	 (Berg	 et	 al.,	 1995),	 as	described	above,	to	evoke	social	uncertainty.	For	the	non-social	context	I	 used	 the	 typical	 Ellsberg	 lottery	 setup.	 In	 both	 settings,	 participants	could	choose	between	six	discrete	investment	amounts:	0,	2,	4,	6,	8	or	10	 tokens.	 This	 investment	 was	 tripled	 and	 was	 either	 placed	 in	 the	lottery,	or	was	sent	to	another,	real	person	who	had	previously	made	a	return	 choice	 in	 the	 role	 of	 Trustee	 in	 the	 Trust	 Game.	 Additionally,	there	were	 two	different	 types	of	uncertainty	regarding	 the	 likelihood	of	their	investment	being	repaid.	Ultimately	a	total	of	four	experimental	conditions:	 a	 risky	 Trust	 Game,	 a	 risky	 lottery,	 an	 ambiguous	 Trust	Game	and	an	ambiguous	 lottery	were	 impletemented.	This	 implicated	that	 participants	 faced	 choices	 in	 which	 they	 explicitly	 knew	 the	probabilities	of	either	a	reciprocating	Trustee	or	a	ball	with	a	winning	color	respectively	 (risk	conditions),	or	where	 these	probabilities	were	unknown	(ambiguity	conditions).	 It	was	challenging	to	simultaneously																																																									6	Notable	 exceptions	 are	 studies,	 which	 address	 ambiguity	 preferences	 to	 strategic	games	 by	 comparing	 behavior	 in	 dyadic	 risk	 and	 ambiguous	 games	 (Pulford	 and	Colman,	 2007;	 Eichberger	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 These	 contributions	 aim	 to	 show	 that	ambiguity	 aversion	 plays	 a	 role	 in	 interactive	 decision-making	 and	 should	 be	considered	as	an	important	preference	in	its	own	right	in	game	theory.	
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study	DMUU	in	a	social	and	non-social	context,	as	underlying	subjective	probabilities	can	be	easily	manipulated	in	a	lottery	context7,	but	people	have	 more	 idiosyncratic	 expectations	 in	 social	 environments.	 It	 is	essential	 to	 address	 these	 individual	 beliefs	 in	 order	 to	 have	 a	 useful	comparison	 between	 our	 different	 treatments.	 This	 design	 took	 this	into	account	by	matching	 individual	beliefs	 -	regarding	the	ambiguous	social	 interaction	 -	 to	 the	 other	 decision	 contexts,	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	that	any	observed	differences	could	be	attributed	to	either	the	type	or	source	 of	 uncertainty	 respectively.	 Namely,	 I	 elicited	 participants’	beliefs,	 stemming	 from	 the	 Trust	 Game,	 by	 asking	 participants	 how	many	Trustees	they	thought	would	likely	reciprocate	their	investment.	This	 prediction	was	 then	 used	 to	 align	 individual	 beliefs	 in	 the	 social	context	 with	 a	 similar	 underlying	 likelihood	 of	 drawing	 a	 winning	colored	 marble	 in	 the	 ambiguous	 lottery.	 Subsequently,	 participants	received	objective	probabilities	in	a	risky	lottery	and	risky	Trust	Game	that	matched	their	individual	social	prediction.		Taking	these	individual	beliefs	into	account	also	allowed	me	to	explore	individual	differences	in	ambiguity	preferences.	In	 Chapter	 3	 I	 examined	 the	 decision-making	 phase	 of	 the	experimental	 design	 discussed	 above.	 I	 found	 a	 significant	 behavioral	main	effect	of	ambiguity	aversion.	Participants	 invested	 less	when	the	type	of	uncertainty	was	ambiguous	as	compared	to	when	it	was	risky.	When	I	took	sources	of	uncertainty	into	account,	this	aversion	was	only	observed	 in	 the	 social	 domain.	 Secondly,	 I	 found	 that	 ambiguity	preferences	 were	 dependent	 on	 individual	 beliefs.	 That	 is,	 when	individual	beliefs	were	taken	into	account,	ambiguity	aversion	was	only	part	 of	 the	 overall	 picture.	 In	 the	 social	 context,	 ambiguity	 aversion	increased	 as	 individuals	 held	 higher	 expectations	 concerning	 the	reciprocity	of	Trustees.	In	the	non-social	context	I	did	not	observe	such	a	linear	relationship	between	beliefs	and	ambiguity	preferences.	These	individual	 differences	were	 also	 reflected	 in	 the	 neuroimaging	 results	where	 significant	 clusters	 of	 brain	 activity	 related	 to	 individual	 social	ambiguity	 preferences	 but	 not	 to	 lottery	 ambiguity	 preferences.																																																									7	For	 instance,	by	 changing	 the	 two-color	urn	 in	an	Ellsberg	 setup	 (BOX	1)	 to	a	 ten-color	urn	in	which	either	1	color	is	a	winning	color,	or	nine	colors	are	winning	color,	the	underlying	likelihood	changes	from	0.5	in	a	two-color	urn	to	0.1	respectively	0.9	in	a	ten-color	urn.	
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Specifically,	the	inferior	frontal	gyrus	(IFG)	consistently	correlated	with	individual	 social	 ambiguity	 preferences.	 These	 findings	 are	 supported	by	 results	 indicating	 that	 the	 IFG	 is	 involved	 with	 social	 cognition	(Oberman	et	al.,	2007).		 In	 Chapter	 4	 I	 specifically	 looked	 at	 the	 outcome	 phase	 of	 the	experimental	 design	 discussed	 above.	 Here	 fMRI	 participants	anticapted	their	outcomes	as	they	were	confronted	with	their	previous	decision-making.	From	an	economic	perspective	this	might	seem	like	an	odd	 approach,	 as	 there	 was	 no	 actual	 decision-making	 taking	 place	anymore.	 However,	 reward	 anticipation	 is	 a	well-studied	 topic	 in	 the	field	 of	 Neuroeconomics.	 I	 aimed	 to	 contribute	 to	 this	 literature	 by	incorporating	 the	 design	 I	 had	 established,	 which	 allowed	 me	 to	investigate	 expected	 reward	 signals	 by	 examining	 the	 effect	 of	 both	sources	and	types	of	uncertainty,	while	taking	participants’	beliefs	into	account	as	well.	This	approach	differs	from	the	standard	neurscientific	approach,	 which	 is	 based	 on	 conditioning	 experiments	 in	 which	arbitrary	cues	signal	positive	and	negative	rewards.	Here,	I	investigated	whether	 decision-makers’	 beliefs	 about	 the	 outcomes	 of	 their	 choices	can	also	act	as	a	cue	 for	reward	anticipation,	or	 in	other	words,	when	the	reward	cue	is	a	function	of	prior	internal	evaluations	as	opposed	to	an	externally-provided	association.	My	neuroimaging	analyses	focused	on	 whether	 belief-related	 expectation	 signals	 were	 evident	 in	 brain	regions	 related	 to	 standard	 cue-based	 reward	 anticipation.	 I	 found	confirmatory	 evidence	 of	 this,	 with	 the	 greater	 the	 expectation	 of	receiving	a	back-transfer	in	the	Trust	Game,	the	greater	the	investment	amount,	and	in	turn	the	higher	the	activation	in	a	region	encompassing	the	 left	 ventral	 caudate	 and	 nucleus	 accumbens.	 This	 novel	 result	illustrated	 that	 one’s	 own	 investment	 choice,	 modulated	 by	expectations	 regarding	 receivers’	 reciprocating	 behavior,	 served	 as	 a	similar	 type	 of	 anticipatory	 cue	 from	 standard	 conditioning	experiments.	 Interestingly,	 I	 did	 not	 find	 a	 similar	 anticipated	 reward	signal	 in	 the	 lottery	 contexts.	 In	 Chapter	 4	 I	 further	 speculate	 about	these	findings	based	on	the	neuroimaging	results.		
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Extending	 the	 scope	 of	 uncertainty	 beyond	 the	
laboratory	Many	 theoretical	 contributions	 use	 experimental	 evidence	 on	ambiguity	 to	 include	 it	 in	 models	 when	 aiming	 to	 simulate	 real-life	phenomena	 like	 the	 equity	 premium	 puzzle,	 the	 stock	 market	participation	 puzzle,	 and	 the	 home	 bias	 (Guidolin	 and	 Rinaldi,	 2013).	Policy	makers	use	experimental	 insights	on	ambiguity	 to	propose	and	construct	new	policy	measures	 (Farber,	2011).	Predicting	how	people	will	 behave	 to	 certain	 economic	 stimuli	 is	 important	 for	 designing	policy	 institutions	 (Farber,	 2011).	 This	 raises	 questions	 regarding	 the	external	validity	of	DMUU	elicited	in	the	laboratory.	We	assume	that	we	can	 generalize	 our	 findings	 from	 the	 laboratory	 to	 human	 beings’	behavior	in	the	real	world	(Levitt	and	List,	2007),	but	do	our	measures	from	the	laboratory	actually	capture	meaningful	predictors	of	DMUU?	It	 is	 important,	 both	 scientifically	 as	 well	 as	 practically,	 that	laboratory	 measures	 of	 uncertainty	 capture	 a	 meaningful	 feature	 of	peoples’	 preferences	 for	 uncertainty	 in	 the	 real	 world.	 Only	 then	 can	experimental	 insights	 be	 fruitful	 and	 serve	 as	 an	 indicator	 of	 how	people	might	respond	when	introducing	new	policy	measures	or	when	changing	the	decision	landscape.		While	in	economics	it	is	generally	assumed	that	preferences	for	risk	 and	 ambiguity	 are	 context	 independent,	 in	 psychology,	 it	 is	common	to	assume	that	the	context	and	the	situation	play	an	important	role	(Weber	and	Johnson,	2008).	The	latter	argues	against	the	universal	external	 validity	 of	 context-independent	 preferences	 and	 for	 eliciting	risk	preferences	per	different	decision	domain	(Weber	et	al.,	2002).		In	order	to	resolve	this	controversy,	a	few	experimental	studies	have	 elicited	 preferences	 for	 uncertainty,	 and	 have	 done	 so	 by	 taking	the	underlying	decision	context	 into	account.	Subsequently	they	relate	these	measures	 to	 real-life	 behavior	 in	 order	 to	 assess	 if	 one	 general	overarching	 preference	 for	 uncertainty	 can	 be	 used,	 or	 domain	specificity	 is	more	 prominent.	 The	 results	 of	 these	 studies	 are	mixed.	Although	 several	 risk	 measures	 from	 different	 domains,	 including	survey	 questions	 and	 lottery	 measures,	 are	 correlated	 (Einav	 et	 al.,	2012;	Dohmen	et	 al.,	 2011;	 Lauriola	 et	 al.,	 2007;	Vieider	 et	 al.,	 2014),	their	predictive	power	does	not	always	translate	from	the	laboratory	to	the	field.	
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Dohmen	et	al.	(2011)	used	survey	questions	to	elicit	risk,	which	positively	correlate	with	risk	elicited	via	a	lottery	setup,	and	show	that	the	 most	 general	 risk	 question	 is	 the	 best	 overall	 predictor	 for	 real	world	risky	behavior.		On	the	other	hand,	they	also	stress	that	the	best	predictor	 in	a	specific	 real-life	 risky	context	 is	best	 represented	by	an	elicitation	procedure	 that	 incorporates	 the	corresponding	context.	For	example,	 the	 best	 independent	 variable	 of	 smoking	 behavior	 is	 the	survey	question	that	measures	risk	in	the	health	domain.	Dohmen	et	al.	(2011)	 stress	 that	 survey	measures	 of	 risk	 can	 be	 used	 as	 a	 reliable	measure	 that	 is	 cheap	 and	 fast	 in	 order	 to	 collect	 data	 on	 risk	preferences	 in	 big	 samples,	 but	 some	 studies	 claim	 the	 opposite.	 For	instance,	Pennings	and	Smidts	(2000)	show	that	real	world	risk	averse	strategies	 by	 Dutch	 hog	 farmers	 cannot	 be	 predicted	 by	 survey	measures	 on	 risk,	 and	 is	 better	 predicted	 by	 standard	 risky	 lottery	measures.		Also	in	the	field	of	developmental	economics,	studies	have	tried	to	relate	risk	preferences	to	basic	features	of	human	preferences	in	the	developing	 world.	 Tanaka	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 showed	 that	 mean	 village	income	is	significantly	positively	correlated	with	risk	aversion.	Liu	and	Huang	 (2013)	 showed	 that	more	 risk	 averse	 cotton	 farmers	 in	 China	use	greater	quantities	of	pesticides.	Cole	et	al.	(2013),	however,	found,	in	 contrary	 to	 their	 hypothesis,	 that	more	 risk	 averse	 Indian	 farmers	are	less	likely	to	take	up	insurance.		A	critical	reader	might	wonder	why	most	of	the	empirical	work	discussed	so	far	 is	only	based	on	risk	preferences.	Still	most	empirical	studies	do	not	take	preferences	for	true	uncertainty,	or	ambiguity,	into	account.	 Despite	 numerous	 experimental	 studies	 on	 ambiguity	preferences	in	the	laboratory,	there	are	relatively	few	empirical	studies	on	 ambiguity	 preferences	 in	 the	 field	 and/or	 with	 participants	 other	than	 university	 students.	 The	 few	 empirical	 studies	 on	 the	 external	validity	 of	 ambiguity	 aversion	 show	 a	 positive	 relationship	 with	smoking	 behavior	 in	 adolescents	 (Sutter	 et	 al.,	 2013),	 and	 negative	relationships	 with	 retirement	 planning	 (Dimmock	 et	 al.,	 2015a),	adoption	of	new	varieties	of	crop	(Engle-Warnick	et	al.,	2007)	and	new	variety	of	rice	(Ross,	2012).	Nonetheless,	Trautmann	and	van	de	Kuilen	(2013)	 claim	 in	 their	 review	 on	 ambiguity	 that	 ‘there	 is	 too	 little	
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convincing	 evidence	 so	 far	 on	 the	 external	 validity	 of	 ambiguity	attitudes’	(p.	597).	In	Chapters	5	and	6	I	aimed	to	close	this	gap	by	conducting	two	experimental	 studies	 in	 which	 I	 related	 both	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	preferences	 to	 real-life	 decision-making.	 Also,	 in	 Chapter	 6	 our	population	pool	consisted	of	adolescents	instead	of	university	students,	which	are	normally	used	as	participants	in	experimental	studies.	In	 Chapter	 5	 I	 studied	 the	 external	 validity	 of	 ambiguity	attitudes8	on	real-life	decision-making	in	the	context	of	student	loans	in	The	Netherlands.	Although	a	substantial	proportion	of	students	(35%)	in	 the	Netherlands	 take	out	 student	 loans	 (Nibud,	2012),	 the	majority	prefers	 to	 finance	 their	 studies	 with	 a	 part-time	 job.	 This	 negatively	affects	 the	 total	 study	 duration.	 Student	 borrowing	 is	 therefore	 an	important	policy	 instrument	 for	 the	Dutch	government.	 Students’	 risk	preferences	 have	 been	 related	 to	 the	 take	 up	 of	 student	 loans	(Oosterbeek	and	van	den	Broek,	2009),	but	ambiguity	preferences	have	not	been	 considered	 so	 far.	We	argue	 that	 taking	out	 student	 loans	 is	less	 about	 risk,	 but	 more	 about	 ambiguity.	 Students’	 aversion	 to	borrowing	 may	 be	 primarily	 driven	 by	 their	 aversion	 to	 ambiguity	regarding	 the	 repayment	 of	 their	 loans.	 Specifically,	 students	 are	uncertain	if	they	will	be	able	to	repay	their	debt	after	having	obtained	a	degree,	and	also	if	they	will	graduate	in	the	first	place.	Secondly,	Dutch	students	face	a	multitude	of	ambiguous	elements	in	the	decision	to	take	out	 a	 loan,	 including	 uncertain	 interest	 rates.	 Accordingly,	 we	 expect	that	 students	 who	 are	 more	 ambiguity	 averse	 will	 borrow	 less	 than	other	students.	We	elicited	ambiguity	attitudes	experimentally	and	not	with	 survey	 questionnaires,	 which	 is	 the	 most	 commonly	 used	approach	 to	 understand	 students’	 borrowing	 behavior.	 Ambiguity	attitudes	 were	 measured	 based	 on	 matching	 probabilities	 of	 three	uncertain	 events	 with	 the	 following	 likelihoods:	 0.1,	 0.5	 and	 0.9	(Abdellaoui	et	al.,	2011;	Dimmock	et	al.,	2015a;	2015b).	After	eliciting	participants’	 ambiguity	 attitudes,	 students	 answered	 a	 variety	 of	questions	 concerning	 their	 borrowing	 behavior.	 I	 found	 a	 negative	relationship	 between	 a	 student’s	 ambiguity	 aversion	 and	 the	 amount																																																									8	Ambiguity	 attitudes	 encompass	 both	 ambiguity	 preferences	 and	 insensitivity.	 In	Chapter	5	I	discuss	insensitivity	in	greater	depth.	
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she	borrows,	and	no	relationship	between	risk	and	borrowing	behavior.	These	 results	 have	 important	 policy	 implications,	 which	 I	 further	address	in	Chapter	5.	In	Chapter	6	I	conducted	an	experimental	study	on	DMUU	with	adolescents.	 Sutter	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 has	 primarily	 looked	 into	 the	relationship	 between	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	 and	 health-related	 variables	such	 as	 smoking	 and	 drinking.	 In	 this	 Chapter	 I	 related	 adolescents’	preferences	for	risk	and	ambiguity	to	their	mental	health.	Specifically,	I	tested	if	risk	and	ambiguity	preferences	correlated	with	their	degree	of	self-confidence,	 which	 is	 a	 concept	 composed	 of	 self-belief	 regarding	own	 capabilities	 and	 social	 standing.	 Social	 standing	 is	 an	 essential	defining	feature	of	adolescence,	as	adolescents	have	a	strong	desire	for	social	 relatedness	 and	 are	 very	 sensitive	 to	 processing	 information	concerning	social	evaluation	and	social	standing	(Somerville,	2013).		At	the	 same	 time,	 adolescents’	 social	 relationships	 are	 rather	 instable	 as	friends	 come	 and	 go,	 and	 adolescents	 will	 experience	 peer	 rejection	more	 often	 compared	 to	 other	 age	 groups	 (Wang	 et	 al.,	 2009).	Therefore,	I	hypothesized	that	those	adolescents	who	are	more	risk	and	ambiguity	 averse	 are	 at	 the	 same	 time	 less	 confident	 regarding	 their	social	 standing.	 I	 tested	 187	 children	 at	 one	 high	 school,	with	 an	 age	range	of	12-17	years.	Risk	and	ambiguity	were	measured	via	a	standard	Ellsberg	 setup.	 In	 a	 choice	 list	 format	 adolescents	 had	 to	 choose	between	 drawing	 a	 ping-pong	 ball	 from	 either	 a	 risky	 or	 ambiguous	urn,	 or	 alternatively	 receiving	 a	 sure	 amount.	 As	 the	 sure	 amount	increased,	participants	tended	to	switch	from	drawing	from	the	urn	to	choosing	 the	 sure	 amount.	 From	 each	 individuals’	 switching	 point,	 a	certainty	 equivalent	 was	 inferred	 and	 served	 as	 an	 indication	 of	individual	risk	and	ambiguity	preferences	(Wakker,	2010).	The	school	provided	 a	 range	 of	 demographic	 data,	 school	 grades,	 independent	intelligence	 scores	 and	 psychological	 measures	 on	 well-being,	 self-confidence,	 and	 motivation.	 On	 average,	 I	 found	 that	 adolescents	 are	risk	neutral,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	ambiguity	 averse.	 Surprisingly,	 risk	and	 ambiguity	 preferences	were	 negatively	 correlated.	 Girls	 expected	substantially	more	winning	 colored	 ping-pong	 balls	 in	 the	 ambiguous	urn,	 though	 this	did	not	 result	 in	 greater	 ambiguity	 seeking	behavior.	When	relating	adolescents’	preferences	for	risk	and	ambiguity	to	levels	of	self-confidence,	I	found	that	their	risk	aversion	correlated	with	self-
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confidence.	 In	 particular,	 risk	 aversion	 affected	 the	 way	 adolescents’	rated	 their	 own	 social	 skills	 at	 school.	We	 did	 not	 find	 a	 relationship	between	ambiguity	and	self-confidence.	In	Chapter	6	I	further	reflect	on	these	findings.		 Altogether,	 this	 thesis	 investigates	 how	 sources	 and	 types	 of	uncertainty	 affect	 individuals’	 decision-making	 and	 their	 external	validity.	In	the	next	Chapter	I	will	focus	on	social	and	non-social	sources	of	risk	before	 I	 include	ambiguity	as	a	 type	of	uncertainty	 in	our	 fMRI	experiments	in	Chapters	3	and	4.	Finally,	Chapters	5	and	6	will	address	the	external	validity	of	sources	and	types	of	uncertainty.		
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Chapter	2	
Trust	and	risk	revisited9	
	
Introduction	A	 crucial	 element	 of	 trust	 is	 “the	willingness	 to	 increase	 one’s	vulnerability	 to	 another	 person	 whose	 behavior	 is	 not	 under	 one’s	control”	(Zand,	1972).	Namely,	a	Trustor	is	always	confronted	with	the	possibility	 that	 her	 trust	 might	 not	 be	 honored.	 A	 trust	 decision,	therefore,	involves	strategic	uncertainty:	a	Trustor	forms	a	belief	about	the	risk	of	betrayal	by	the	Trustee	and,	given	this	subjective	probability,	decides	 to	 trust	 or	 not.	 Moreover,	 if	 a	 Trustor	 is	 confident	 about	 the	probability	of	betrayal,	say	50	per	cent,	she	actually	faces	a	lottery	with	corresponding	 outcomes	 and	 50	 per	 cent	 chance	 of	 losing.	 One	 could	therefore	 argue	 that	 a	 Trustor	 faces	 a	 risky	 choice	 in	 the	Trust	Game	when	she	acts	upon	her	belief	regarding	the	chances	of	betrayal	by	the	Trustee	(Coleman,	1990).	But	 do	 individual	 risk	 attitudes	 indeed	 explain	 trust?	 Many	experimental	studies	have	attempted	to	answer	the	question	above,	but	could	 not	 identify	 a	 clear	 link	 between	 trust	 and	 Trustors’	 risk	preferences	(Eckel	and	Wilson,	2004;	Ashraf	et	al.,	2006;	Ben-Ner	and	Halldorsson,	2010;	Houser	et	al.,	2010;	and	Etang	et	al.,	2011).10																																																									9	This	chapter	is	based	on	a	joint	paper	with	Alan	Sanfey,	Jana	Vyrastekova,	and	Utz	Weitzel:	‘Trust	and	Risk	Revisited’,	2014,	http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2524281.	10	Subjects’	risk	preferences	are	measured	by	a	variety	of	tools,	e.g.	by	questionnaires	like	 Zuckerman’s	 sensation	 scale	 (Eckel	 and	 Wilson,	 2004),	 a	 lottery	 setup	 with	 a	menu	 of	 pair	 wise	 comparisons	 of	 two	 lotteries	 (Holt	 and	 Laury,	 2002,	 Eckel	 and	Wilson,	2004,	Houser	et	al.,	2010;	Corcos	et	al.,	2012),	or	by	a	task	involving	a	choice	between	a	lottery	and	a	sure	option,	which	mirror	the	distribution	of	outcomes	in	the	Trust	 Games	 (Eckel	 and	 Wilson,	 2004;	 Schechter,	 2007;	 Ben-Ner	 and	 Halldorsson	2010),	or	not	(Etang	et	al.,	2011).	
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We	 argue	 that	 this	 is	 due	 to	 a	 mismatch	 between	 the	measurement	of	 risk	 and	 the	 type	of	 risk	 a	Trustor	 faces	 in	 the	Trust	Game.	 The	 lottery	 setup,	 which	 has	 been	 typically	 used	 to	 elicit	individual	risk	attitudes,	does	not	fully	capture	the	risk	a	Trustor	faces	in	the	context	of	the	Trust	Game	and	thereby	distorts	the	measurement	of	risk	attitudes	that	are	relevant	in	trusting	behavior.		The	essential	difference	between	lottery	risk	and	the	risk	taken	in	 a	 Trust	 Game	 is	 that	 the	 former	 stems	 from	 a	 mechanistic	randomization	 device	 while	 the	 latter	 stems	 from	 a	 conscious	 choice	made	by	another	human	being.	These	different	sources	of	risk	can	affect	behavior	 even	 if	 both	 have	 the	 same	 objective	 probabilities	 and	outcomes	 (Abdellaoui	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 Such	 different	 responses	 towards	human	and	mechanistic	sources	of	risk	can	have	many	reasons.	Losing	money	to	a	randomization	device	(nature)	can	be	perceived	as	bad	luck,	but	incurring	a	loss	to	another	decision-maker	might	be	interpreted	as	wrong	 judgment;	 a	 signal	 of	 failure	 to	 assess	 the	 social	 situation	properly	 (Trautmann	 et	 al.,	 2008);	 or	 as	 an	 exposure	 to	 conscious	betrayal	 (referred	 to	as	 'betrayal	 aversion'	by	Bohnet	and	Zeckhauser	(2004),	 and	 corroborated	 by	 Aimone	 and	 Houser	 (2012)).	Intentionality	 may	 be	 another	 reason	 (Falk	 and	 Fischbacher,	 2006).	Imagine	that	John	wants	to	drive	home	and	has	to	choose	between	two	roads.	On	both	there	is	an	equal	objective	risk	of	crashing	because	of	a	branch	 that	 may	 lie	 on	 the	 road.	 On	 one	 road	 the	 branch	 may	 have	fallen	 off	 a	 tree	 by	 accident.	 On	 the	 other	 road	 a	 human	 may	 have	intentionally	broken	off	 the	branch.	As	 the	 sources	of	 risk	differ,	 John	may	 have	 a	 clear	 preference	 for	 the	 first	 road,	 although	 the	probabilities	 and	 the	 direct	 outcomes	 are	 identical	 for	 both.	 Thus,	 a	misalignment	in	the	sources	of	risk	might	explain	why	previous	studies	could	 not	 find	 a	 link	 between	 risk	 that	 originates	 from	 a	 lottery	 and	from	a	situation	of	trust.	The	objective	of	this	study	is	to	identify	the	role	of	risk	in	trust	and	 to	 suggest	 a	 novel	measure	 of	 risk	 that	 is	measured	 in	 the	 same	context	 as	 the	 ‘standard	Trust	Game’	 (STG)	 by	 Berg	 et	 al.	 (1995).	 To	elicit	 risk	 attitudes	 in	 the	 context	 of	 trusting,	 we	 developed	 a	 ‘risky	
Trust	Game’	 (RTG)	where	 risk,	 as	 in	 the	 STG,	 stems	 from	 a	 conscious	decision	of	another	person.	We	also	measure	lottery	risk	preferences	by	a	standard	 lottery	setup	(Holt	and	Laury,	2002),	which	has	been	used	
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by	most	 studies	 that	 try	 to	 find	 a	 relationship	between	 risk	 and	 trust	(Eckel	and	Wilson,	2004;	Houser	et	al.,	2010;	Corcos	et	al.,	2012).	We	then	relate	both	lottery	risk	preferences	and	risk	preferences	measured	in	the	RTG	to	Trustors’	invested	amount	in	the	Trust	Game.		We	 hypothesize	 that	 individuals’	 risk	 preferences	 stemming	from	 the	 RTG	 influence	 Trustors’	 decisions	 in	 the	 Trust	 Game,	 but	lottery	risk	preferences	do	not.	In	both	cases,	the	decision-maker	faces	pure	risk,	captured	by	objectively	known	probabilities	of	possible	states	of	 the	world.	However,	 in	 the	 lottery	 setup,	 the	 outcomes	materialize	due	to	the	properties	of	the	 lottery	mechanism,	while	the	outcomes	in	the	RTG	were	generated	by	a	conscious	choice	of	a	human	being.		In	our	RTG,	the	Trustor	objectively	knows	the	probability	that	a	Trustee	 will	 honor	 her	 trust,	 and	 has	 to	make	 a	 decision	whether	 to	trust	or	not.	The	fact	that	the	probability	of	trustworthiness	is	objective	and	correct	is	guaranteed	by	implementing	a	conditional	lottery	design	(Bardsley,	 2000).	We	 randomly	match	 the	 Trustor	 to	 one	 out	 of	 four	Trustees	who	decided	individually	and	independently	to	honor	trust	or	not.	When	deciding	whether	to	trust	and,	if	so,	with	which	amount,	the	Trustor	knows	 that	 either	none,	 one,	 two,	 three	or	 all	 four	Trustee(s)	are	 trustworthy.	 We	 ask	 the	 Trustor	 to	 decide	 for	 each	 of	 these	 five	possible	 scenarios	 which	 amount	 she	 would	 transfer	 to	 a	 randomly	matched	Trustee.	Hence,	depending	on	the	scenario,	the	Trustor	knows	that	the	probability	to	be	matched	with	a	trustworthy	Trustee	is	either	0,	0.25,	0.5,	0.75	or	1.0.	At	the	end	of	the	experiment	only	one	of	the	five	scenarios,	determined	by	the	real	return	decisions	made	by	Trustees,	is	payoff-relevant	 for	 the	 Trustor.	 Like	 a	 lottery,	 this	 RTG	 replicates	 a	risky	bet	on	a	set	of	outcomes	with	objective	probabilities.	The	essential	difference	is	that	the	risk	in	the	RTG	stems	from	the	decisions	of	other	people	and	not	solely	from	a	mechanistic	device.	Hence,	the	decision	in	the	 RTG	 captures	 the	 effects	 of	 a	 Trustor’s	 vulnerability	 to	 another	person	 (Trustee),	 who	 is	 better	 off	 when	 keeping	 a	 Trustor’s	transferred	investment	for	himself.	To	analyze	a	possible	link	between	risk	and	trust	we	investigate	the	relationship	between	subjects’	risk	preferences	elicited	 in	the	RTG	and	Trustors'	decisions	in	a	STG,	which	builds	on	Berg	et	al.	(1995).	In	the	 STG,	 we	 also	 randomly	 select	 one	 Trustee	 from	 four	 possible	Trustees	 for	 reasons	 of	 implementation	 comparability.	 The	 only	
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difference	 between	 the	 risky	 and	 the	 STG	 is	 that,	 in	 the	 latter,	 the	Trustor	cannot	condition	an	investment	 level	on	an	objectively	known	probability	distribution	of	trustworthiness	among	Trustees.		Our	experimental	 results	show	that	risk	preferences,	measured	in	 the	 RTG,	 strongly	 predict	 transfers	 in	 the	 STG,	 while	 lottery	 risk	preferences	(Holt	and	Laury,	2002)	do	not.	These	results	are	robust	in	bivariate	and	multivariate	settings	and	also	 in	regressions	where	both	risk	measurements	are	 included	 together.	Moreover,	we	 find	 that	 risk	preferences	measured	 in	 the	RTG	 setting	 and	 lottery	 risk	 preferences	are	not	correlated	with	each	other,	supporting	the	notion	that	sources	of	 risk	 matter	 (Abdellaoui	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 L’Haridon	 et	 al.,	 2013).	Altogether,	 these	 results	 indicate	 that	 individual	 risk	 attitudes	 can	predict	trusting	decisions,	but	only	when	elicited	in	the	same	context	as	the	decision	to	trust.		This	paper	contributes	to	the	continuing	discourse	on	the	role	of	risk	 in	 trust	 decisions,	 in	 particular	 to	 the	 following	 studies	 that	attempted	to	analyze	and	elicit	risk	attitudes	in	trust-related	settings.		Bohnet	 and	 Zeckhauser	 (2004)	 provide	 the	 first	 attempt	 of	 a	direct	assessment	of	risk	in	a	trust	setting.	In	their	experiments	with	a	binary	 Trust	 Game,	 they	 elicit	 the	 minimum	 acceptable	 probability	(MAP)	of	being	matched	to	a	trustworthy	Trustee	for	which	the	Trustor	would	 choose	 to	 trust.	 This	 design	 ultimately	 converts	 the	 trusting	decision	 into	a	decision	under	risk,	because	 the	Trustor	can	condition	trusting	 on	 the	 (subjective	 belief	 of	 the)	 trustworthiness	 of	 the	Trustees.	The	authors	show	that	such	a	trusting	decision	 is	more	than	betting.	 Trustors	 reveal	 a	 higher	willingness	 to	 bet	 on	 “trust”	when	 a	lottery	generates	the	outcomes	than	when	Trustees	decide.	The	authors	refer	to	the	costs	of	losing	control	to	the	benefit	of	Trustee	as	betrayal	
aversion.	Although	 Bohnet	 and	 Zeckhauser	 (2004)	 find	 that	 decisions	differ	 between	 trust	 and	 risk	 environments,	 this	 is	 not	 supported	 by	Kosfeld	 et	 al.	 (2005)	 and	 contradicted	 by	 Fetchenhauer	 and	 Dunning	(2012).	 Houser	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 argue	 that	 the	 conflicting	 results	 can	 be	due	to	the	fact	that	the	analyses	are	based	on	aggregate	data	analyses	of	distributions	between	games.	By	collecting	individual-level	data	on	risk	attitudes,	 Houser	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 control	 for	 individual	 heterogeneity.	Their	experimental	design	consists	of	four	variations	of	the	Trust	Game.	
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In	 two	 of	 them,	 the	 decision-maker	 places	 a	 bet,	 and	 the	 return	 is	decided	by	a	 computer	according	 to	a	known	probability	distribution.	The	 return	 decision	 either	 affects	 only	 the	 decision-maker,	 or	 it	 also	affects	 a	 dummy	 player.	 Comparison	 of	 these	 two	 variants	 allows	addressing	the	role	of	social	preferences	 in	placing	the	bet.	Their	role,	however,	 is	 found	 to	be	negligible.	In	 two	other	 treatments,	 a	Trustee	makes	the	return	decision.	The	Trustor	has	either	no	information	about	the	 trustworthiness	 of	 the	 Trustee,	 or	 he	 receives	 social	 history	information	 about	 the	 typical	 observed	 behavioral	 pattern	 in	 a	Trustees’	population.	Houser	et	al.	(2010)	find	that	subjects’	lottery	risk	preferences,	as	measured	by	Holt	and	Laury	(2002),	explain	behavior	in	their	 computerized	 risk	 treatments,	 but	 not	 in	 the	 interpersonal	 trust	treatments.	They	state,	“this	finding	does	not	necessarily	imply	that	risk	attitudes	are	unimportant	to	trusting	decisions,	but	it	does	suggest	that,	to	 the	 extent	 that	 risk	 attitudes	 do	 modulate	 trusting	 decisions,	 the	mechanism	remains	to	be	discovered”.		Both	 Bohnet	 and	 Zeckhauser	 (2004)	 and	 Houser	 et	 al.	 (2010)	attempt	to	align	the	measurement	of	risk	preferences	with	uncertainty	in	 the	 Trust	 Game.	 Risk	 is	 simulated	 via	 information	 about	 the	distribution	 of	 Trustees’	 decisions	 from	previous	 rounds	 (Bohnet	 and	Zeckhauser,	 2004),	 or	 other	 experiments	 (Houser	 et	 al.,	 2010).	Therefore,	 the	 information	 provided	 to	 Trustors	 on	 which	 basis	 they	can	assess	Trustees’	risk	profile	does	not	directly	relate	to	the	situation	at	hand	and	it	might	fail	to	induce	purely	objective	risk.	In	 Bohnet	 and	 Zeckhauser	 (2004)	 participants’	 MAP	 was	compared	 to	 a	 predetermined	 probability,	 P*,	 in	 both	 their	 decision	problem	(lottery)	and	 the	Trust	Game.	The	value	of	P*	 in	 the	decision	problem	 was	 established	 by	 the	 fraction	 of	 Trustees	 who	 chose	 to	reward	 trust	 in	 the	Trust	 Game	 in	 the	 first	 two	 sessions.	 Participants	are	not	 told	how	 this	P*	 is	determined,	nor	what	 its	 value	 is.	As	P*	 is	unknown	it	is	up	to	the	participants	to	form	a	prior.	The	P*	for	the	Trust	Game,	on	 the	other	hand,	 is	determined	 in	each	 session	 separately	by	Trustees’	 statements,	before	 they	actually	decide,	whether	 they	would	reciprocate	if	their	matched	partner	would	choose	trust.	This	opens	the	possibility	that	participants	interpreted	the	P*	differently	in	the	lottery	and	in	the	Trust	Game.	Also,	participants	remain	uncertain	whether	the	P*	 in	 the	 Trust	 Game	 is	 the	 correct	 description	 of	 the	 Trustees	 they	
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interact	with.	In	summary,	the	design	does	not	fully	induce	objectively	known	risk	in	the	trust	decision.	In	Houser	et	al.	(2010),	the	probability	distribution	of	reciprocity	in	both	trust	treatments	is	similar	to	the	social	history	information	from	Berg	 et	 al.	 (1995).	 Participants	 knew	 that	 this	 information	 describes	Trustee’s	 choices	 in	 the	 past,	 and	 that	 it	 does	 not	 guarantee	 that	 it	precisely	 reflects	 the	decisions	of	Trustees	 in	 the	current	session.	The	social	 history	 provided	 to	 participants	 might	 not	 correspond	 to	 the	actual	 probability	 distribution	 of	 trustworthiness	 in	 a	 given	 session,	and	 subjects	might	be	aware	of	 this.	This	 leaves	 room	 for	Trustors	 to	formulate	 alternative	 beliefs	 about	 trustworthiness	 of	 Trustees.	 Most	importantly,	 this	 information	 does	 not	 fully	 remove	 the	 uncertainty	about	the	trustworthiness	of	Trustees	in	the	current	session.		Thus,	although	both	studies	attempt	to	capture	risk	directly	in	a	trust	 setting,	 they	 do	 not	 guarantee	 that	 the	 Trustors	 know	 the	probability	 distribution	 of	 trustworthiness	with	 certainty.	 The	 simple	design	 presented	 in	 this	 paper	 generates	 such	 an	 environment,	 with	Trustors	 acting	 upon	 an	 objective	 probability	 distribution	 of	trustworthiness,	which	 is	both	 correct	 and	payoff-dependent.	We	also	use	 a	 within	 subject	 design	 to	 control,	 like	 Houser	 et	 al.	 (2010),	 for	individual	effect	confounds	due	to	individual	heterogeneity.		The	 remainder	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 organized	 as	 follows.	 In	 the	 next	section,	we	explain	the	experimental	design	and	procedures.	In	Section	3	we	present	our	results.	Section	4	concludes.		
Experimental	design	and	procedures		
The	standard	Trust	Game	The	STG	that	we	study	as	a	baseline	builds	on	the	Trust	Game	by	Berg	et	al.	(1995).	We	implement	the	game	as	follows.	The	first	mover,	Trustor,	decides	how	much	of	her	endowment	E	=	10	tokens	(1	token	=	€0,50)	to	transfer	to	the	second	mover,	the	Trustee.	Transfer	x∈{0,	1,	…,	9,	 10}	 is	multiplied	by	 three	before	 reaching	 the	Trustee.	Trustees	on	their	 behalf	 make	 a	 binary	 choice	 between	 either	 keeping	 the	 full	amount	or	sending	back	half	of	 the	 transferred	tokens.	We	 implement	
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the	game	behind	the	veil	of	ignorance.	All	subjects	make	their	decisions	as	 a	 Trustor	 first	 and	 then	 as	 Trustee.	 They	 receive	 no	 feedback	 on	decisions	 of	 others	 before	 providing	 complete	 information	 in	 the	experiment.	At	the	end	of	the	experiment,	one	of	these	roles	is	assigned	to	each	subject,	and	only	the	decisions	in	the	assigned	role	are	payoff-relevant	for	the	subject.11		When	taking	their	decision	to	honor	trust,	Trustees	do	not	know	whether	 a	 Trustor	 has	 sent	 money	 or	 not.	 Trustees	 make	 a	 binary	choice	between	returning	either	half	or	nothing	of	the	money	in	case	of	a	 transfer.	 Such	 a	 restricted	 Trustee	 strategy	 set	 is	 also	 used	 in,	 for	example,	 Bohnet	 and	 Zeckauser	 (2004).	 This	 design	 ensures	 that	Trustors	choose	a	level	of	investment	that	exclusively	stems	from	their	inherent	 beliefs	 about	 Trustees’	 trustworthy	 behavior	 and	 prevents	that	the	decision	to	trust	 is	confounded	by	other	motives,	 for	example	signaling	or	elicitation	of	positive	reciprocity.12	
	
The	risky	Trust	Game	For	the	RTG	we	use	the	same	setup	as	in	the	STG	(see	above)	but	implement	 the	 Conditional	 Information	 Lottery	 design	 developed	 by	Bardsley	(2000).13	Trustors	receive	information	that	four	Trustees	have	been	 randomly	 assigned	 to	 them,	 and	 that	 one	 of	 these	 four	Trustees	will	be	matched	 to	 them	at	 random	after	 the	Trustees’	decisions	have	been	 made.	 The	 Trustor	 is	 confronted	 with	 five	 possible	 scenarios:	either	none,	one,	two,	three,	or	all	four	Trustee(s)	may	choose	to	return	one	half	of	the	received	amount.	In	the	moment	of	decision-making,	the	
																																																								11	If	 subjects	 engage	 in	both	 roles	 (as	Trustor	and	Trustee)	 this	 can	have	a	negative	impact	on	trustworthiness	(Casari	and	Cason,	2009).	To	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	no	studies	have	shown	any	significant	effects	on	trust	(Johnson	and	Mislin,	2011),	which	is	the	main	focus	of	our	study.	12	Servátka	 et	 al.	 (2007),	 for	 example,	 argue	 that	 Trustors	 may	 choose	 to	 invest	 a	significant	amount	of	their	endowment	in	the	hope	that	Trustees	are	more	inclined	to	reciprocate,	possibly	due	to	guilt	aversion.	13	The	 Conditional	 Information	 Lottery	 offers	 all	 the	 benefits	 associated	 with	deception	in	experiments,	without	actually	deceiving	anyone.	The	deceptive	scenarios	of	 designs,	 which	 use	 deceit,	 are	 replaced	 with	 scenarios,	 each	 of	 which,	 from	 a	subject’s	viewpoint,	has	a	chance	of	being	true	(Bardsley,	2000).	
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Trustor	 does	 not	 know	 which	 of	 these	 five	 possible	 scenarios	 will	materialize.		For	 each	 of	 the	 five	 possible	 scenarios,	 we	 ask	 the	 Trustor	 to	choose	an	amount	that	she	wants	to	transfer	to	the	Trustee	that	will	be	eventually	 randomly	matched	 to	her.	Thus,	Trustors	 in	 the	RTG	make	five	 decisions,	 x0,	 x1,	 x2,	 x3	 and	 x4,	 where	 xi,	 i=0,1,…,4,	 denotes	 the	payoff-relevant	transfer	 in	case	the	group	of	 four	Trustees	assigned	to	the	 Trustor	 contains	 i	 trustworthy	 Trustees.	 Allowing	 Trustors	 to	condition	 their	 transfer	 in	 the	 RTG	 on	 all	 possible	 scenarios	 of	trustworthiness	 that	 may	 occur,	 transforms	 the	 trust	 decision	 into	 a	decision	 under	 risk	 with	 objectively	 known	 probabilities	 of	 Trustees’	trustworthiness	(in	our	case	probabilities	are	0,	0.25,	0.5,	0.75,	and	1).		At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 experiment,	 the	 actual	 distribution	 of	trustworthiness	in	the	group	of	four	Trustees	will	determine	the	payoff-relevant	scenario	for	the	Trustor.	The	Trustor’s	specific	transfer	in	the	materialized	scenario	of	trustworthiness	is	randomly	matched	to	one	of	the	 four	 Trustees	 assigned	 to	 him.	 The	 return	 decision	made	 by	 this	Trustee	 subsequently	 determines	 the	 monetary	 outcome	 of	 the	randomly	paired	Trustor	and	Trustee.	For	comparability	reasons,	we	use	the	same	matching	procedure	in	 the	 STG.	 Each	 Trustor	 is	 assigned	 to	 four	 Trustees,	 and	 one	 of	 the	four	 Trustees	 is	 randomly	 selected	 as	 the	 payoff-relevant	 Trustee	 for	the	Trustor.	In	the	STG,	as	explained	in	the	previous	section,	the	Trustor	cannot	 condition	 the	 transfer	 on	 the	 trustworthiness	 of	 these	 four	Trustees.	Hence,	the	only	difference	between	both	Trust	Games	is	that	Trustors	have	objective	probabilities	about	 the	 trustworthiness	of	 the	Trustees	in	the	RTG	but	not	in	the	STG.		
Risk	preference	measures	We	elicit	subjects’	lottery	risk	preferences	with	a	standard	lottery	setup	(Holt	and	Laury,	2002).	 In	 this	 lottery	risk	 task	subjects	make	a	sequence	 of	 10	 choices	 between	 two	 lotteries	 with	 changing	probabilities	 of	 given	 outcomes.	 Subjects’	 lottery	 risk	 preferences	 are	measured	 as	 the	 (last)	 point	where	 a	 subject	 switches	 from	option	A,	the	 less	 risky	 lottery,	 to	 option	 B,	 the	 more	 risky	 lottery	 (Holt	 and	
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Laury,	 2002).14	At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 experiment	 one	 of	 the	 10	 choices	between	option	A	and	B	is	randomly	drawn	and	the	chosen	lottery	(A	or	B)	 is	 then	 played	 out	 with	 another	 random	 draw	 by	 a	 mechanistic	random	device	(the	computer).	For	 all	 subjects,	we	 also	 estimate	 their	RTG	risk	preferences	 by	using	 their	decisions	 in	 the	 five	 conditional	 scenarios	 in	 the	RTG.	The	expected	utility	of	a	Trustor	transferring	xi	 from	an	initial	endowment	(E)	in	a	scenario	with	a	fraction	of	p	trustworthy	Trustees	(p= ),	who	return	half	of	the	tripled	transfer,	is	given	by:		 𝐸𝑈(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑝 ∙ 𝑈 𝐸 − 𝑥𝑖 +	-. 𝑥𝑖 + 1 − 𝑝 ∙ 𝑈(𝐸 − 𝑥𝑖)	 	 (1)		We	assume	 the	 functional	 form	of	 the	Trustor’s	utility	 function	to	 come	 from	 the	 family	 of	 constant	 relative	 risk	 aversion	 functions:			 (see,	 e.g.,	Holt	 and	Laury,	 2002;	Wakker,	 2008).	 The	 first	order	conditions	of	the	Trustor’s	expected	utility	maximization	imply:			
	𝑙𝑛 2.(342) = 𝛼 − 1 [𝑙𝑛 𝐸 − 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑙𝑛 𝐸 + 3. 𝑥𝑖 ]	 	 	 (2)		 The	 parameter	 α	 is	 estimated	 by	 means	 of	 an	 ordinary	 least	square	 estimation	 for	 each	 subject	 separately,	 and	 we	 use	 it	 as	 our	measure	of	interest	for	RTG	risk	preferences.		
Experimental	procedure	The	 experiments	 were	 conducted	 at	 ELSE	 (Experimental	Laboratory	 for	 Sociology	 and	 Economics)	 at	 the	University	 of	 Utrecht	with	 92	 students	 (49	 females	 and	 43	 males).	 The	 experiments	 were	computerized	using	the	software	z-Tree	(Fischbacher,	2007).	At	the	end	of	 each	 session,	 subjects	were	paid,	 in	 cash	 and	 in	private,	€11.50	on	average	for	a	session	lasting	about	one	hour.																																																									14	Only	four	subjects	switch	more	than	once	from	the	safer	to	the	more	risky	lottery.	The	results	we	report	later	do	not	change	if	we	drop	subjects	who	switch	more	than	once.	
i
4
U (w)=W α
48	
	
In	 the	 experiment,	 we	 control	 for	 individual	 heterogeneity	 by	implementing	 a	within-subject	 design.	 Subjects	 submit	 their	 decisions	in	two	blocks.	One	block	contained	both	versions	of	the	Trust	Game,	the	STG	and	RTG.	Another	block	contained	the	measurement	of	lottery	risk	and	 some	 other	 incentivized	 auxiliary	 measures15.	 We	 balance	 the	order	 of	 the	 Trust	 Games	 (RTG	 before	 or	 after	 the	 STG)	 in	 the	 Trust	Game	block,	as	well	as	the	order	of	the	two	blocks	themselves.		In	the	Trust	Games,	subjects	always	submit	their	decision	in	the	role	of	a	Trustor	first,	and	only	then	in	the	role	of	a	Trustee.	All	subjects	received	 the	 same	 set	 of	 instructions	 and	were	 aware	 of	 the	 fact	 that	they	had	 to	 submit	 choices	 for	both	 roles	 in	 the	Trust	Game,	and	 that	payment	 in	 the	 Trust	 Game	would	 depend	 on	 one	 role	 only.	We	 also	administered	a	non-incentivized	post-experimental	questionnaire.			All	decisions	were	one-shot	and	we	delayed	any	feedback	about	the	decision	of	others	and	 the	outcomes	of	 the	 randomization	devices	until	 the	 end	 of	 the	 experiment.	 The	 instructions	 for	 all	 tasks	 can	 be	found	in	the	Appendix.		
Experimental	results	We	first	show	descriptive	statistics	on	Trustors'	decisions	in	the	STG	 and	 RTG,	 as	 well	 as	 lottery	 risk	 preferences	 and	 RTG	 risk	preferences.	 Figure	 1	 reports	 the	 distribution	 of	 transfer	 decisions	 in	the	 STG.	 The	 transfer	 distribution	 reveals	 the	 common	 peaks	 at	 the	extreme	transfers,	as	well	as	a	considerable	mass	of	transfers	between	zero	 and	 half	 of	 the	 endowment.	 The	 average	 transfer	 is	 3.6	 out	 of	maximum	 10	 tokens,	 which	 is	 lower	 than	 the	 average	 in	 Berg	 et	 al.	(1995),	 but	 well	 within	 the	 bounds	 of	 previously	 reported	 trusting	decisions	(Johnson	and	Mislin,	2011).	Figure	2	shows	the	transfers	of	Trustors	for	all	scenarios	in	the	RTG.	As	expected,	the	transfers	 increase	in	the	number	of	trustworthy	Trustees	 in	 a	 group.	 Average	 transfers	 in	 scenarios	 with	 0,	 1,...,4																																																									15	We	 measured	 social	 preferences	 via	 a	 standard	 social	 value	 orientation	 task	(Liebrand,	1984)	and	 lottery	ambiguity	preferences	(Fox	and	Tversky,	1995).	Lastly,	we	also	asked	which	scenario	from	the	RTG	participants	thought	to	be	most	likely.	The	results	reported	in	this	paper	remain	intact	when	we	control	for	any	combination	of	these	additional	measurements	(See	Appendix).	
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trustworthy	 Trustees	 per	 group	 are	 1.02,	 1.83,	 3.45,	 6.28	 and	 8.59	tokens,	 respectively.16	The	 transfer	 of	 a	 risk-neutral	 Trustor	 in	 RTG	would	form	a	step-function	with	a	transfer	of	0	in	scenarios	with	0,	1,	or	2	trustworthy	Trustees	and	transfer	of	all	tokens	in	scenarios	with	3	or	4	trustworthy	Trustees.	The	corresponding	value	of	the	parameter	α	for	the	constant	relative	risk	aversion	utility	function	is	0.656.			
																																																													16	We	also	observe	that	about	30%	of	subjects	transfer	more	than	zero	in	the	scenario	with	zero	trustworthy	Trustees.	These	positive	transfers	may	reflect	mistakes,	warm	glow	 from	 investing,	 or	 even	 belief	 that	 one	 can	 beat	 the	 odds	 even	 when	 this	contradicts	 the	 available	 information	 (Andreoni	 and	 Miller,	 2002;	 Ortmann	 et	 al.,	2000).	 Most	 of	 these	 subjects	 transfer	 one	 or	 two	 units	 only,	 suggesting	 that	 some	motivation	 rather	 than	 misunderstanding	 or	 noise	 guide	 such	 seemingly	 irrational	transfers.	At	 the	other	extreme,	most	of	 the	 subjects	 transfer	 the	whole	endowment	when	the	probability	to	meet	a	trustworthy	Trustee	is	equal	to	one.	Here,	the	omission	to	transfer	the	whole	endowment,	next	to	mistakes,	may	be	explained	by	competitive	social	 preferences	 because	 any	 transfer	 below	 10	 creates	 a	 payoff	 disparity	 to	 the	advantage	of	the	Trustor.	
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Figure	1:	Distribution	of	transfers	in	the	STG		
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		Table	 1	 reports	 the	 estimates	 for	 parameter	 α	 in	 equation	 2	above,	which	measures	subjects'	risk	preferences	in	the	RTG.	There	are	8	 participants	 with	 value	 α=0.656,	 corresponding	 to	 risk-neutral	behavior.	However,	the	majority	of	participants	(n=64)	are	risk	averse	in	the	RTG.17	As	Table	1	shows,	the	RTG	risk	preferences	range	from	a	minimum	of	 -18.529	(one	extreme	outlier)	 to	a	maximum	of	2,	with	a	mean	of	-0.278	and	a	median	of	0.378.	Both	of	the	latter	are	well	below	risk	neutrality.																																																													17	As	a	control	measure,	we	analyze	transfer	decisions	in	scenario	x3	separately.	In	this	scenario	 participants	 should	 transfer	 the	whole	 endowment	 or	 at	 least	much	more	compared	 to	 previous	 scenarios.	 The	 transfer	 in	 x3	 is	 highly	 correlated	 with	 the	parameter	α,	elicited	from	all	scenarios	in	the	RTG.	
Figure	2:	Distribution	of	transfers	in	the	RTG,	for	each	scenario	
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Table	1:	RTG	risk	preferences	 		 		Descriptives	 Parameter	α	 		 		Minimum	 -	18.529	 	 	q	0.25	 0.354	 	 	Median	 0.378	 	 	q	0.75	 0.656	 	 	Maximum	 2	 	 	Mean	 -	0.278	 	 	Standard	deviation	 2.416	 	 		 Table	 2	 provides	 descriptive	 statistics	 for	 risk	 preferences	elicited	 with	 the	 Holt	 and	 Laury	 (2002)	 lottery	 task.	 A	 risk	 neutral	subject	would	 switch	 to	Option	B,	 the	more	 risky	 lottery,	 after	having	chosen	 Option	 A	 four	 times.	We	 find	 a	mean	 switching	 point	 of	 5.82,	which	 indicates	 that	 our	 subjects	 are	 risk	 averse,	 on	 average,	 in	 the	lottery	 task.	 Compared	 to	 Holt	 and	 Laury	 (2002)	 our	 subjects	 are	slightly	more	risk	averse	as	they	report	a	mean	switching	point	of	5.2.	Our	 mean	 switching	 point,	 however,	 is	 well	 in	 line	 with	 previously	reported	 figures.	 Houser	 et	 al.	 (2010),	 for	 instance,	 report	 a	 mean	switching	point	of	5.86.		
Table	2:	Lottery	risk	preferences	 		Number	of	safe	choices	 Total	(N=92)	 Holt	and	Laury	0-1	 0.00	(0)	 0.01	2	 0.01	(1)	 0.01	3	 0.01	(1)	 0.06	4	 0.16	(15)	 0.26	5	 0.16	(15)	 0.26	6	 0.25	(32)	 0.23	7	 0.27	(25)	 0.13	8	 0.00	(0)	 0.03	9-10	 0.03	(3)	 0.01		 	 	Mean		 5.82	 5.2		
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	 Having	 described	 the	 most	 important	 data,	 we	 now	 move	 to	bivariate	 analyses	 on	 risk	 and	 trust.	 Figure	3	 reports	 the	 relationship	between	 RTG	 risk	 preferences	 and	 trusting	 behavior	 in	 the	 STG.	 For	visualization	purposes	we	split	 the	scores	 for	risk	preferences	elicited	from	the	RTG	in	three	equally	sized	categories,	ranging	from	risk	averse	to	least	risk	averse.	Subjects	who	are	least	risk	averse	send,	on	average,	nearly	 4	 tokens	more	 in	 the	 STG	 compared	 to	 subjects	who	 are	most	risk	averse.	
		A	 Jonckheere-Terpstra	 test	 rejects	 the	 Null	 that	 there	 are	 no	systematic	 relationships	 among	 the	 medians	 of	 the	 three	 different	categories,	 in	 support	of	 the	 alternative	 that	 the	medians	 are	ordered	from	most	risk-averse	(lowest)	to	least	risk-averse	(highest)	(p<0.001).	
Figure	3:	Relating	risk	preferences	measured	in	RTG	and	transfer	in	the	STG	
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Moreover,	 a	 Pearson	 product-moment	 correlation	 test	 confirms	 that	subjects'	 individual	 RTG	 risk	 preference	 measures	 are	 positively	 and	statistically	significantly	correlated	with	corresponding	transfers	in	the	STG	 (r=0.242;	 p<.05).	 This	 is	 also	 confirmed	 by	 Kendall's	 tau	 rank	correlation	coefficient	between	RTG	risk	preferences	and	STG	transfers,	which	 is	 τ=0.341	 with	 p<.01.	Hence,	 as	 a	 first	 result,	we	 find	a	 strong	
positive	 bivariate	 relationship	 between	 risk	 preferences	 measured	 in	 a	
trust	setting	(RTG)	and	trusting	behavior	in	the	STG.	Figure	4	shows	the	relationship	between	lottery	risk	preferences	and	trusting	behavior	in	the	STG.	To	enable	a	comparison	with	Figure	3	we	split	the	lottery	risk	preferences	into	three	equally	sized	categories	ranging	from	most	risk	averse	to	least	risk	averse.18		Although	 the	mean	 transfer	 in	 the	 STG	 slightly	 increases	 from	2.85	to	3.15	and	to	3.97	as	we	move	into	less	risk	averse	categories,	the	bivariate	relationship	between	lottery	risk	and	trust	is	not	statistically	significant.	A	Jonckheere-Terpstra	test	cannot	reject	the	Null	that	there	are	 no	 systematic	 relationships	 among	 the	 medians	 of	 the	 three	different	 categories	 (p=0.220).	 Also,	 the	 Pearson's	 correlation	coefficient	 (r=0.151;	 p=0.15)	 and	 Kendall's	 tau	 rank	 correlation	coefficient	 (τ=	 0.114;	 p=0.17)	 cannot	 reject	 that	 subjects'	 individual	lottery	 risk	 preferences	 are	 uncorrelated	 with	 transfers	 in	 the	 STG.	
Hence,	 as	 a	 second	 result,	 we	 find	 no	 bivariate	 relationship	 between	
lottery	risk	preferences	and	trusting	behavior	in	the	STG.		
	
	 																																																															18	If	 we	 apply	 the	 categorization	 based	 on	 Holt	 and	 Laury	 (2002),	 we	 find	 that,	 on	average,	 risk	 averse	 participants	 transfer	 2	 tokens,	 risk	 neutral	 participants	 4.73	tokens	and	risk	seeking	participants	3.12	tokens.	
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	As	the	RTG	risk	preferences	of	Trustors	predict	transfers	in	the	STG	 but	 lottery	 risk	 preferences	 do	 not,	 we	 expect	 to	 find	 no	 direct	correlation	 between	 the	 two	 risk	 measures.	 Indeed,	 the	 Pearson	correlation	coefficient	for	the	two	risk	measurements	is	not	statistically	significant	 (r=-0.10;	 p=0.921).	 This	 also	 applies	 to	 Kendall's	 tau	 rank	correlation	coefficient	(τ=	0.081;	p=0.301),	which	rejects	any	significant	relationship	 and	 suggests	 that	 the	 two	 risk	 preference	measurements	are	orthogonal.	Hence,	as	a	third	result,	we	find	no	bivariate	relationship	
between	lottery	risk	preferences	and	RTG	risk	preferences.	Finally,	 we	 support	 our	 bivariate	 findings	 with	 multivariate	estimations	 where	 we	 use	 the	 transfers	 in	 the	 STG	 as	 dependent	variable	 and	 both	 risk	 measures	 as	 independent	 variables.	 Table	 3	
Figure	4:	Lottery	risk	preferences	and	transfer	in	the	STG	
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presents	 the	 results	 of	 OLS	 regression	 models	 where	 we	 control	 for	demographic	variables	and	session	fixed	effects.		
	
Table	3:	OLS	regression	models	explaining	transfer	in	STG.	
Independent	variables:	 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	RTG	risk	preferences	 0.303***												(0.098)	 -	 0.316***						(0.091)	Lottery	risk	preferences	 -	 0.367										(0.265)	 0.405									(0.273)	Gender	 -0.048													(0.817)	 0.084										(0.857)	 0.236									(0.834)	Economics	major	 -0.001												(0.844)	 -0.008									(0.820)	 -0.123									(0.808)	Session	1	 0.291											(1.209)	 0.387										(1.243)	 0.121										(1.192)	Session	2	 -2.029**											(1.016)	 -1.868*										(1.047)	 -2.137**										(0.970)	Session	3	 0.595											(1.066)	 1.080										(1.058)	 0.627										(1.039)	Session	4	 0.121											(1.133)	 0.177										(1.155)	 -0.288										(1.083)	Session	5	 -0.197											(1.301)	 0.128										(1.326)	 -0.350										(1.274)	Constant	 3.729												(0.890)	 1.855									(1.326)	 2.053								(1.436)	N	 92	 92	 92	F	test	 (8,	83)		2.96	 (8,	83)							1.67		 (9,	82)							3.00		Prob.	>	F	 0.0057	 0.1168	 0.0038	R	-	squared	 0.1363	 0.1085	 0.1596		 	The	 estimation	 results	 in	 Table	 3	 clearly	 show	 that	 risk	preferences	 stemming	 from	 the	 RTG	 remain	 economically	 and	statistically	significant	predictors	of	trust.	RTG	risk	preferences	are	an	important	 predictor	 of	 trusting	 behavior	 in	 the	 STG	 with	 or	 without	
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lottery	 risk	 preferences	 as	 simultaneous	 independent	 variable	 (see	Model	1	and	3).	 In	 contrast,	 as	expected,	we	 find	no	 relation	between	lottery	 risk	 preferences	 and	 transfers	 in	 the	 STG,	 neither	 individually	(Model	 2)	 nor	 in	 combination	 with	 RTG	 risk	 preferences	 (Model	 3).	
Hence,	 as	 a	 fourth	 and	most	 prominent	 result,	we	 find	 an	 economically	
and	 statistically	 significant	 relationship	 in	 multivariate	 regressions	
between	 risk	 preferences	 and	 trusting	 behavior,	 provided	 that	 risk	
preferences	are	measured	in	a	trust	setting	and	not	with	a	lottery	setup.	
	 We	conducted	several	robustness	checks	to	analyze	the	validity	of	 the	 above	 results.	 First,	 we	 ran	 regression	 models	 in	 which	 we	included	 all	 auxiliary	 measures	 elicited	 in	 the	 experiment	 (lottery	ambiguity	preferences,	social	preferences	and	Trustor's	beliefs).	In	line	with	 previous	 studies	 (Dufwenberg	 and	 Gneezy,	 2000)	 we	 find	 that	Trustors’	 beliefs	 about	 Trustees’	 return	 decisions	 play	 a	 role	 when	explaining	the	variation	of	transfers	in	the	STG.		We	also	ran	regression	models	in	which	we	excluded	all	subjects	from	the	regression	analyses,	who	transferred	more	than	zero	(less	than	ten)	tokens	in	the	scenarios	with	zero	 (with	 four)	 trustworthy	Trustees.	This	 resulted	 in	a	 smaller	sample	of	51	subjects.	In	all	these	models,	RTG	risk	preferences	remain	highly	 significant	 while	 lottery	 risk	 preferences	 fail	 to	 be	meaningful	predictors	of	trust.19		
Conclusion	In	this	paper	we	propose	a	measure	of	risk	preferences	relevant	for	decisions	of	Trustors	 in	the	Trust	Game.	We	present	a	new	design,	the	 RTG,	 which	 fully	 aligns	 the	 context	 for	 the	 measurement	 of	 risk	preferences	with	the	context	of	the	Trust	Game.	We	show	that	subjects’	risk	 preferences,	 measured	 in	 the	 RTG,	 explain	 transfers	 in	 the	standard.	In	contrast,	and	in	line	with	previous	studies,	our	results	also	show	 that	 subjects’	 lottery	 risk	 preferences	 are	 not	 able	 to	 explain	variations	 in	 transfers	 in	 the	 Trust	 Game.	 This	 suggests	 that	 subjects	perceive	the	same	objective	risk	in	trusting	differently	from	the	risk	in	a	lottery.	In	fact,	we	find	that	risk	preferences	that	are	elicited	in	a	trust	setting	(in	our	RTG)	are	completely	uncorrelated	with	risk	preferences																																																									19	All	results	are	available	in	the	Appendix.	
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elicited	 with	 the	 well-known	 Holt	 and	 Laury	 (2002)	 lottery	 design.	Subjects’	risk	preferences	are	context	dependent,	and	the	risk	measure	obtained	in	the	lottery	context	does	not	sufficiently	capture	the	risk	that	subjects	perceive	in	the	trust	decisions.		Our	findings	relate	to	recent	research	on	sources	of	risk	(Weber	et	al.,	2002;	Abdellaoui	et	al.,	2011;	L’Haridon	et	al.,	2013).	Rather	than	describing	 a	 risky	 decision	 purely	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 set	 of	 states	 and	objectively	known	probabilities	of	these	states,	the	sources	of	risk	take	into	 account	 that	 human	 decision-makers	 process	 objectively	 known	probabilities	 in	a	 context-dependent	way.	This	notion	 is	 supported	by	recent	neurocognitive	studies,	which	propose	that	the	origins	of	source	dependence	 in	 risk	 processing	 can	 be	 found	 in	 human	 neurobiology.	They	 highlight	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 brain	 circuit	 that	 specifically	underlies	 the	 representation	 of	 other’s	 beliefs	 and	 intentions	 (Saxe,	2006;	 Behrens	 et	 al.,	 2008;	 2009;	 Hampton	 et	 al.,	 2008).	 The	dissociation	 in	 processing	 of	 risks	 from	 social	 and	 non-social	 sources	was	 also	 linked	 to	 neuroanatomy.	 Brain	 signals	 from	 the	 regions	processing	 social	 risk	 are	 strongly	 interconnected	 with	 other	 brain	regions	involved	with	the	processing	of	emotions	and	facial	expression	(Van	 Hoesen	 et	 al.,	 1993).	 Closely	 related	 to	 our	 research,	Lauharatanahirun	et	al.	 (2011)	observe	that	risky	decisions	 in	a	social	vs.	 non-social	 setup	 recruit	 different	 brain	 regions	 of	 interest,	 giving	further	 support	 to	 the	 source	 perspective	 of	 risk	 decisions	 of	 human	decision-makers.	Coming	 back	 to	 the	 question	we	 started	 this	 paper	with	 –	 can	trust	 in	 the	 STG	 be	 explained	 by	 a	 person’s	 risk	 preferences	 –	 our	results	suggest	the	following	answer:	Yes,	it	can,	but	only	if	we	align	the	measurement	of	risk	preferences	to	the	source	of	uncertainty	a	person	faces	in	trust	decisions.	
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Chapter	3	
Social	 sources	 of	 uncertainty:	
an	fMRI	study20	
	
Introduction	Decision-making	under	situations	of	uncertainty	 is	an	everyday	feature	 in	 life.	For	 instance,	your	best	 friend	 just	 lost	her	 job	and	asks	you	to	lend	him	money.	In	this	case,	we	assume	you	know	your	friend	well	 and	 are	 therefore	 perhaps	 95%	 sure	 of	 your	 belief	 estimation	concerning	 the	 likelihood	 of	 repayment.	 	 But,	 what	 if	 a	 stranger	approaches	you	and	also	asks	you	to	lend	him	money	after	a	similar	job	loss?	 In	 the	 latter	 situation,	 without	 knowing	 anything	 about	 this	stranger	 it	 is	 very	 difficult	 to	 assess	 an	 accurate	 probability	 of	repayment.	 These	 differences	 illustrate	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	concepts	of	risk	and	ambiguity	(Wakker,	2010)	as	two	different	types	of	uncertainty.	 Most	 of	 our	 decisions	 are	 ambiguous,	 as	 the	 majority	 of	events	 cannot	 be	 fully	 described	 by	 exact	 probability	 estimation.	 In	addition	 to	 the	 distinction	 between	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	 as	 types	 of	uncertainty,	the	example	above	also	highlights	an	additional	feature	of	DMUU,	namely,	its	source.	The	uncertainty	mentioned	above	has	a	social	
source	as	it	stems	from	the	actions	of	another	human	being.	As	we	move	through	society	we	are	 constantly	 interacting	with	others,	 and	 indeed	many	 of	 the	 uncertainties	we	 face	 on	 a	 daily	 basis	 are	 related	 to	 the	behavior	of	others	(Trautmann	and	Vieider,	2011).	Despite	the	involvement	of	the	intentions	of	other	people	in	our	risky	 and	 ambiguous	 choices,	 most	 experimental	 studies	 on	 DMUU	primarily	 focus	 on	 lottery	 contexts.	 The	 majority	 of	 experimental	studies	 still	 use	 a	 setup	 that	 was	 implemented	 in	 an	 influential																																																									
20	This	chapter	is	based	on	a	joint	paper	with	Alan	Sanfey,	Jana	Vyrastekova,	and	Utz	Weitzel,	Social	Sources	of	uncertainty:	an	fMRI	study,	2015,	under	review.	
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experiment	by	Daniel	Ellsberg	in	1961	(see	BOX	1	of	the	Introduction).	The	predominant	finding	that	participants	shy	away	from	ambiguity	in	this	 experiment	 contradicts	 SEU	 and	 has	 been	 termed	 ambiguity	aversion	(Trautmann	and	van	de	Kuilen,	2013).		In	 this	 Chapter	 we	 investigate	 how	 preferences	 for	 risk	 and	ambiguity	are	affected	when	the	outcome	is	determined	by	the	choice	of	another	 person	 (social	 source),	 as	 compared	 to	 when	 the	 outcomes	hinges	 on	 the	 draw	 of	 a	 marble	 from	 a	 standard	 Ellsberg	 urn	 (non-social	 source).	 Although	 economic	 studies	 do	 acknowledge	 different	sources	 of	 uncertainty,	 these	 different	 sources	 of	 uncertainty	 to	 date	have	only	been	applied	 in	non-social	 settings	 (Abdellaoui	 et	 al.,	 2011;	Hsu	et	al.,	2011).	For	instance,	these	sources	of	uncertainty	occur	due	to	meteorological	 conditions	 (betting	 on	 the	 temperature	 of	 a	 city	 in	 a	foreign	country)	or	a	process	beyond	the	control	of	the	decision-maker	(betting	on	the	trajectory	of	a	stock	on	a	foreign	stock	exchange),	but	do	not	 stem	 from	 a	 conscious	 choice	 made	 by	 another	 human	 being.	Therefore,	 in	 this	Chapter	we	differentiate	between	uncertainties	 that	stem	from	a	lottery,	state	uncertainty	versus	uncertainty	that	arises	due	to	 the	 actions	 of	 other	 people,	 strategic	 uncertainty	 (Houser	 et	 al.,	2010).	There	are	several	reasons	as	to	why	attitudes	towards	social	and	non-social	sources	of	uncertainty	may	differ.	Losing	money	to	another	decision-maker	 instead	 of	 to	 a	 random	 mechanistic	 device	 can	 be	perceived	as	a	conscious	betrayal,	and	work	in	experimental	economics	suggests	 that	 people	 experience	 betrayal	 aversion	 (Bohnet	 and	Zeckhauser,	2004;	Aimone	and	Houser,	2012).	This	rationale	proposes	that	 participants	 exhibit	 greater	 risk	 aversion	 in	 a	 social	 setting	 as	compared	 to	 a	 non-social	 context	 because	 they	 dislike	 when	 another	player	 consciously	 decides	 not	 to	 reciprocate	 a	 positive	 action,	 thus	‘betraying’	 the	 decision-maker.	 Betrayal	 aversion	 might	 be	 due	 to	intentionality	 (Falk	 and	 Fischbacher,	 2006),	 as	 clearly	 a	 mechanistic	random	device	such	as	a	die	or	slot	machine	cannot	make	a	conscious	choice	 in	 (dis)honoring	 risk-taking	 behavior.	 Alternatively,	 when	interacting	 with	 another	 decision-maker	 results	 in	 a	 loss,	 one	 may	perceive	this	more	as	a	 ‘failure	signal’	 in	correctly	assessing	the	social	situation.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 losing	 to	 a	 random	 mechanistic	 device	
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may	 be	more	 readily	 perceived	 as	 simply	 bad	 luck	 (Trautmann	 et	 al.,	2008).		As	previous	 studies	have	demonstrated	 the	 role	of	 these	 social	influences	on	either	risk	(Bohnet	and	Zeckhauser,	2004;	Houser	et	al.,	2010;	Trautmann	and	Vieider,	2011)	or	ambiguity	(Aimone	and	Houser,	2012;	Trautmann	et	al.,	2008)	separately,	w	take	account	of	both	types	of	 uncertainty	 in	 this	 Chapter.	 We	 aim	 to	 understand	 why	 decision-makers	 might	 differentiate	 between	 social	 and	 non-social	 sources	 of	risk	and	ambiguity.	We	conducted	an	fMRI	experiment	in	order	to	study	the	neural	mechanisms	underlying	social	and	non-social	of	uncertainty.	Several	previous	 fMRI	studies	have	explored	neural	differences	when	people	interact	with	humans	instead	of	computers	(McCabe	et	al.,	2001;	 Delgado	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Kosfeld	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Amodio	 et	 al.,	 2006;	Saxe	et	al.,	2006;	Behrens	et	al.,	2008;	2009).	Some	of	these	studies	use	a	 standard	 Trust	 Game	 setup	 (Berg	 et	 al.,	 1995)	 to	 evoke	 the	 social	interaction.	 In	 this	game	there	are	 two	players,	known	respectively	as	the	Trustor	 and	Trustee.	The	Trustor	 is	 endowed	with	10	 tokens	 and	can	 choose	 to	 invest	 some	 of	 these	 tokens	 with	 the	 Trustee.	 The	experimenter	then	(standardly)	triples	the	investment	before	it	reaches	the	Trustee.	The	Trustee	can	return	some	of	this	tripled	investment	to	the	Trustor,	 but	 is	 also	 free	 to	 keep	 the	whole	 investment	 to	 himself.	The	Trustor	needs	to	offset	the	possibility	of	receiving	back	a	multiplier	of	 her	 investment	 with	 the	 risk	 of	 losing	 some,	 or	 even	 all,	 of	 this	investment.	Trust	 is	quantified	as	the	amount	a	Trustor	 invests	with	a	Trustee.		Typical	 comparisons	 of	 decision-makers’	 behavior	 in	 the	 Trust	Game	 to	 a	 non-social	 setting	 go	 along	 these	 lines:	 subjects	 were	matched	with	either	a	human	or	computer	counterpart.	When	subjects	played	 with	 the	 computer	 they	 were	 told	 that	 it	 would	 play	 a	 fixed	probabilistic	strategy	of	X	percent	of	returning	half	and	(100-X	percent)	of	 returning	 none	 of	 the	 Trustor’s	 investment.	 In	 the	 social	 context,	participants	 did	 not	 receive	 any	 such	 probabilistic	 information	regarding	 the	 reciprocation	 rate	 of	 the	 Trustee	 (McCabe	 et	 al.,	 2001;	Kosfeld	 et	 al.,	 2005).	 This	 procedure	 obviously	 introduces	 some	confounds	 regarding	 the	 type	 of	 uncertainty	 by	 comparing	 lottery	choices	 under	 risk	 with	 trust	 decisions	 under	 ambiguity.	 These	methods	 introduce	 another	 aspect	 beyond	 comparing	 social	 to	 non-
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social	 interactions,	 namely	 the	 distinction	 between	 both	 types	 of	uncertainty,	and	make	it	difficult	to	assess	the	true	effect	of	the	source	of	uncertainty.		Other	fMRI	studies	have	focused	on	types	of	uncertainty,	though	not	in	concert	with	social	sources	(Hsu	et	al.,	2005;	Huettel	et	al.,	2006;	Bach	et	al.,	2009;	2011;	Levy	et	al.,	2010;	Rustichini	et	al.,	2005).	These	latter	 studies	 consistently	 show	 evidence	 of	 ambiguity	 aversion	 in	lottery	 contexts,	 but	 offer	 different	 explanations	 as	 to	 the	 neural	mechanisms	underlying	this	behavioral	pattern.	One	group	emphasizes	the	 role	 of	 the	 amygdala	 and	 the	 orbitofrontal	 cortex,	 explaining	ambiguity	 aversion	 in	 terms	 of	 fear	 of	 uncertainty	 (Hsu	 et	 al.,	 2005).	However,	another	group	finds	brain	regions	such	as	the	inferior	frontal	gyrus	 (IFG),	 the	posterior	parietal	 cortex,	precuneus,	middle	 temporal	gyrus,	and	the	superior	and	inferior	parietal	lobule	(Huettel	et	al.,	2006;	Bach	et	 al.,	 2011),	 and	explain	 ambiguity	 aversion	as	 a	more	 complex	expected	 value	 calculation	where	 one	 is	 integrating	multiple	 possible	subjective	 probability	 distributions	 in	 order	 to	 resolve	 ambiguity.	Importantly,	all	of	these	studies	use	lotteries	to	evoke	uncertainty.		Therefore,	our	goal	here	is	to	examine	the	relationship	between	the	 source	 of	 uncertainty	 (social	 vs.	 non-social)	 and	 the	 type	 of	uncertainty	(risk	vs.	ambiguity),	in	a	design	that	allows	for	dissociation	between	 these	 aspects,	 as	 well	 as	 exploring	 the	 interaction	 between	them.	This	multi-faceted	approach	allows	us	to	investigate	if	the	source	of	 uncertainty	 itself	 affects	 the	 neural	 correlates	 related	 to	 ambiguity	preferences.	 In	 addition,	 this	 approach	 allows	 us	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 the	different	 explanations	 given	 thus	 far	 to	 the	 underlying	mechanism	 of	ambiguity	aversion.		In	 this	 study	 we	 also	 take	 account	 of	 individual	 beliefs	 as	 we	expect	 that	 individual	 differences	 in	 beliefs	might	 affect	 both	 sources	and	 types	 of	 uncertainty.	 Namely,	 previous	 work	 has	 highlighted	 the	role	 of	 individual	 beliefs	 in	 trust	 decisions	 (Chang	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 Also,	ambiguity	 preferences	 are	 influenced	 by	 the	 underlying	 likelihood.	Decision-makers	express	more	ambiguity	seeking	behavior	when	 they	consider	 low	 likelihood	 events,	 but	 express	more	 ambiguity	 aversion	for	high	likelihood	events	(Abdellaoui	et	al.,	2011;	Kocher	et	al.,	2015).	Therefore	 we	 elicited	 decision-makers’	 beliefs	 in	 our	 experiment	 in	order	to	investigate	individual	differences	in	ambiguity	preferences.			
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Two	 existing	 fMRI	 studies	 have	 conceptual	 similarities	 to	 our	approach.	 Lauharatanahirum	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 looked	 at	 the	 difference	 in	neural	 activity	 between	 social	 and	 lottery	 risk.	 Participants	 in	 their	study	 could	 either	 invest	 nothing	 (sure	 option)	 or	 their	 complete	endowment	 (risky	 choice).	 In	 the	 social	 condition	 the	 probabilistic	information	 stems	 from	 actual	 decisions	 of	 Trustees	 taken	 from	 a	previous	 behavioral	 session.	 In	 the	 non-social	 condition,	 the	distribution	 of	 outcomes	 in	 a	 lottery	 was	 matched	 to	 have	 the	 same	mean,	 variance,	 and	 skewness.	 Their	 findings	 show	 that	 activation	 in	the	 left	 amygdala,	 based	 on	 an	 anatomical	 region	 of	 interest	 (ROI)21,	correlates	with	 a	 three-way	 interaction	 of	 group	 (more	 risk	 averse	 in	social	 context	 versus	 lottery	 context)	 times	 condition	 (social	 versus	non-social)	times	choice	(risky	option	versus	sure	option).	Aimone	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 also	 investigated	 social	 and	 non-social	sources,	but	 they	exclusively	 focus	on	ambiguity	by	not	providing	any	probabilistic	 information.	 In	 their	 setup,	 players	 can	 either	 indicate	trust	by	 investing	all	 their	 tokens,	or	no	 trust	by	 investing	nothing.	 In	the	 trust	 treatments	 the	Trustor’s	 choice	was	 randomly	paired	with	a	Trustee	 who	 previously	 chose	 to	 either	 reciprocate	 or	 betray.	 In	 the	non-social	context,	the	investor’s	choice	was	also	randomly	paired	with	a	Trustee,	but	a	computer	mediated	in	such	a	way	that	investors	could	not	 identify	 the	 potential	 betrayal	 by	 the	 Trustee.	 The	main	 focus	 of	their	study	is	on	betrayal	aversion,	and	their	behavioral	results	suggest	that	 significantly	 more	 trust	 was	 displayed	 when	 the	 likelihood	 of	betrayal	aversion	was	removed	 in	 the	computer-mediated	 trials.	They	find	higher	activation	in	the	right	anterior	and	posterior	insular	cortex	when	 subjects	 decide	 to	 trust	 in	 the	 trust	 treatment	 compared	 to	 the	computer-mediated	 treatment.	 Aimone	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 interpret	activation	 in	 the	 insula	 to	 reflect	 the	 heightened	 negative	 state	associated	with	betrayal	aversion.		Whereas	the	aforementioned	studies	compare	neural	differences	between	social	and	non-social	risk	(Lauharatanahirum	et	al.,	2012),	and	social	 and	 non-social	 uncertainty	 (Aimone	 et	 al.,	 2014),	 our	 study	incorporates	the	full	spectrum	of	uncertainty	by	incorporating	both	risk																																																									21	A	 common	approach	 to	 the	analysis	of	 fMRI	data	 involves	 the	extraction	of	 signal	from	specified	regions	of	interest	(Poldrack,	2007).	
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and	ambiguity	in	a	social	and	lottery	domain,	additionally	allowing	us	to	examine	 the	 relationship	 between	 these	 contexts.	 	Moreover,	we	 take	individual	 beliefs	 into	 account,	 which	 enables	 us	 to	 study	 individual	differences	in	social	and	non-social	ambiguity	preferences.		Participants	 will	 undergo	 fMRI	 as	 we	 examine	 participants’	attitude	towards	both	risk	and	ambiguity,	within	the	framework	of	both	a	 social	 and	 non-social	 source.	 In	 the	 social	 context	 we	 adapted	 the	standard	 Trust	 Game	 (Berg	 et	 al.,	 1995),	 as	 described	 previously,	 to	evoke	 strategic	 uncertainty	 whereby	 the	 social	 source	 of	 uncertainty	stems	 from	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 Trustee.	 Here,	 participants	 can	 choose	between	 six	 discrete	 investment	 amounts:	 0,	 2,	 4,	 6,	 8	 or	 10	 tokens	(tokens	 are	 exchanged	 for	 a	 monetary	 value	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	experiment).	 Participants’	 investment	 is	 tripled	 by	 the	 experimenter	and	is	either	placed	in	the	lottery,	or	is	sent	to	another,	real,	person	who	has	previously	made	a	return	choice	in	the	role	of	Trustee	in	the	Trust	Game.	 	For	 the	non-social	 context	we	used	 the	 typical	Ellsberg	 lottery	setup.		Importantly,	and	as	an	additional	novel	feature	of	the	design,	we	take	 individual	beliefs	 into	account	 in	order	to	have	a	 fair	comparison	between	 our	 risk	 and	 ambiguous	 settings.	 We	 matched	 participants’	beliefs	concerning	Trustee’s	reciprocity	levels	with	an	equal	underlying	likelihood	 in	 the	 lottery	 context.	 This	 enables	 us	 to	 look	 at	 individual	differences	 in	 ambiguity	 preferences	 as	 modulated	 by	 participants’	individual	beliefs.		Based	 on	 fMRI	 and	 behavioral	 insights	 discussed	 above,	 we	hypothesize	 that	 people	 will	 be	 more	 sensitive	 to	 the	 distinction	between	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	 in	 the	 social	 context	 than	 in	 the	 lottery	context.	Therefore	we	expect	ambiguity	aversion	to	be	more	prominent	in	the	social	context.	Our	neuroimaging	data	will	allow	us	to	investigate	the	 underlying	 neural	mechanisms	 that	 affect	 social	 ambiguity,	 and	 if	they	 differ	 from	 previous	 fMRI	 findings	 on	 ambiguity	 evoked	 by	 a	standard	lottery.				 	
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Experimental	design	and	procedures		
Participants	Twenty-six	 participants	 (mean	 age	 =	 22	 years,	 50%	 female)	signed	up	for	this	study	via	the	online	recruitment	system	SONA	of	the	Donders	 Institute	 for	Brain,	 Cognition	 and	Behaviour.	 They	were	pre-screened	 for	 any	 behavioral	 and	 health	 related	 abnormalities	 via	 an	online	 questionnaire,	 and	 we	 also	 provided	 participants	 with	 online	information	regarding	the	MRI	scanner	and	safety	restrictions	(see	BOX	3	 in	 Introduction	 for	 distinction	 between	 fMRI	 and	MRI).	 Finally,	 we	contacted	our	participants	by	phone	to	fill	out	the	MRI	safety	checklist.	The	local	ethical	committee	approved	this	study.			We	excluded	four	participants	from	our	sample	prior	to	analysis.	One	was	removed	because	the	head	coil	was	not	applied	correctly,	one	because	 they	did	not	believe	 that	 there	was	real	human	 interaction	 in	the	 social	 condition,	 another	 because	 they	 chose	 the	 exact	 same	investment	 for	 all	 trials	 during	 the	 experiment,	 and	 finally	 one	participant	had	extreme	choices	which	differed	more	than	two	standard	deviations	 from	 mean	 responses.	 The	 analyses	 reported	 here	 are	therefore	based	on	twenty-two	participants	(mean	age	=	22,	12	females	and	10	males).		
Experimental	design	Participants	made	investment	choices	(described	as	‘transfer’	for	participants)	in	four	different	treatments:	a	risky	Trust	Game	(RTG),	an	ambiguous	Trust	Game	(ATG),	a	risky	lottery	(RLOT)	and	an	ambiguous	lottery	 (ALOT).	 Participants	 could	 choose	 between	 six	 different	investment	 options:	 0,	 2,	 4,	 6,	 8	 or	 10	 tokens.	 This	 investment	 was	tripled	by	the	experimenter,	and	was	sent	to	either	a	(human)	receiver	in	the	Trust	Game	or	invested	in	the	lottery.	In	 the	 social	 context,	 participants	 made	 investment	 choices	 in	the	 role	 of	 sender	 (Trustor	 in	 the	 original	 Trust	 Game),	 with	 this	investment	then	paired	with	one	receiver	(Trustee	in	the	original	Trust	Game)	randomly	drawn	from	a	group	of	nine	receivers.	In	a	pre-session,	all	receivers	previously	made	a	choice	to	either	reciprocate	(send	back	
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half	 of	 the	 received	 tokens)	 or	 keep	 an	 investment	 if	 paired	 with	 a	sender	 who	 transferred	 a	 positive	 amount.	 In	 the	 RTG	 the	 sender	received	 information	 about	 the	 composition	 of	 nine	 receivers,	 that	 is,	how	many	of	the	nine	receivers	chose	to	reciprocate	and	how	many	did	not,	whereas	in	the	ATG	they	did	not	receive	this	information.	In	 the	 non-social	 context,	 marbles	 in	 a	 lottery	 replaced	 the	receivers.	The	lottery	always	consisted	of	nine	marbles,	and	was	of	two	different	types.	In	RLOT	each	of	the	nine	marbles	has	a	different	color,	whereas	in	ALOT	the	lottery	is	made	up	of	an	unknown	composition	of	the	 nine	 available	 colors.	 Essentially	 any	 set	 of	 combination	 of	 nine	colors	 is	possible	 in	 the	ALOT	(thus	99	 combinations).	As	 in	 the	Trust	Game,	participants	can	receive	back	either	half	of	the	tripled	investment	or	lose	the	entire	investment.	In	both	the	RLOT	and	ALOT	participants	receive	information	as	to	which	of	the	nine	colors	are	‘winning’	colors.	As	 the	 ALOT	 is	 an	 urn	 filled	with	 nine	marbles	 in	 an	 unknown	 color	composition,	 receiving	 information	 regarding	 the	 number	 of	 winning	colors	is	not	the	same	as	the	objective	probability	seen	in	the	RLOT.	In	 our	 design,	 it	 is	 important	 that	 we	 control	 for	 individual	beliefs.	In	the	social	context,	participants	have	naturally	occurring	prior	beliefs	about	 the	reciprocity	behavior	of	receivers.	Before	participants	were	placed	 in	the	MRI	scanner	we	elicited	these	 individual	beliefs	by	asking	 participants	 how	many	 of	 nine	 random	 receivers	 they	 thought	would	 likely	 reciprocate	 their	 investment.	 This	 prediction	 was	 then	used	to	align	individual	beliefs	in	the	social	context	by	creating	a	similar	underlying	 likelihood	 of	 drawing	 a	 winning	 colored	 marble	 in	 the	lottery.	Participants	received	a	greater	number	of	RLOT	and	RTG	trials	with	 objective	 probabilities	 that	 matched	 their	 individual	 social	prediction	(see	Figure	5).					To	match	 for	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 a	 second	 player	 in	 the	 two	Trust	Games,	we	introduced	a	dummy	player	to	the	lottery	conditions.	This	dummy	player	did	not	make	any	choice,	but	acted	as	a	 recipient.	Therefore,	the	dummy	player	received	the	exact	same	outcome,	as	the	receiver	would	have	earned	in	the	Trust	Game,	but	based	on	the	lottery	outcome.	 If	 a	 winning	 marble	 was	 drawn	 in	 the	 lottery,	 half	 of	 the	tripled	 investment	went	 to	 our	 fMRI	participant	 and	 the	other	half	 to	the	dummy	recipient.	If	the	lottery	resulted	in	a	losing	colored	marble,	the	 tripled	 investment	 was	 directly	 handed	 over	 to	 the	 recipient.	 By	
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implementing	 this	 feature,	 we	 controlled	 for	 social	 preferences	 –	 for	example,	warm	glow	from	investing	–	as	a	potential	confounding	factor	(Houser	et	al.,	2010).	 Importantly,	 the	dummy	player	 is	not	one	of	the	receivers.	These	participants	were	recruited	after	an	experiment	at	the	Nijmegen	School	of	Management	decision	laboratory,	and	were	asked	if	they	 wanted	 to	 be	 a	 counterpart	 player	 in	 an	 upcoming	 fMRI	experiment.		
Experimental	procedures	All	behavioral	sessions	in	this	study	took	place	at	the	Nijmegen	School	 of	 Management	 decision	 laboratory.	 Here	 we	 collected	 the	receivers’	decisions	for	the	Trust	Games	and	recruited	dummy	players	to	 act	 as	 lottery	 recipients.	 The	 fMRI	 experiment	 took	 place	 at	 the	Centre	 for	 Cognitive	Neuroimaging	 at	 the	Donders	 Institute	 for	Brain,	Cognition	and	Behavior.		No	 deception	 was	 used	 in	 this	 experiment.	 Participants	 were	financially	compensated	based	on	their	actual	choices	and	the	accuracy	of	their	stated	beliefs.			
Receivers	In	 the	 social	 setting	 fMRI	participants	made	choices	as	 senders	and	 these	 were	 randomly	 paired	 with	 a	 receiver.	 Receivers’	 choices	were	 collected	during	a	behavioral	 session	 several	weeks	prior	 to	 the	fMRI	study.	Receivers	could	make	two	choices:	to	send	back	half	of	any	amount	 of	 tokens	 received	 (between	 0-10)	 or	 keep	 the	 transferred	amounts	 for	 themselves.	 Importantly,	 receivers	 had	 to	 make	 their	return	 choice	 unconditionally,	 not	 knowing	 if	 and	 how	 many	 tokens	they	would	 receive.	 This	 element	 in	 our	design	 is	 crucial,	 as	we	want	senders	 to	 make	 investment	 decisions	 based	 solely	 on	 their	 beliefs	regarding	receivers’	reciprocity.	In	this	way	we	ensure	that	the	decision	to	invest	is	not	confounded	by	other	motives,	 for	example	signaling	or	the	elicitation	of	positive	reciprocity.		When	receivers	made	their	decisions	in	the	decision	laboratory,	we	 videotaped	 the	 session	 and	 took	 pictures	 while	 they	 were	 seated	behind	a	laptop.	The	pictures	only	show	receivers’	silhouettes	in	black	
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and	 white	 and	 no	 facial	 features	 are	 shown.	 We	 asked	 for	 approval	upfront,	 but	 indicated	 that	 we	 would	 explain	 the	 necessity	 of	 this	material	after	they	had	made	their	decisions.	We	informed	them	about	the	 upcoming	 fMRI	 experiment	 only	 after	 receivers	 had	 made	 their	return	decision.	We	 asked	 participants’	 approval	 to	 use	 their	 return	 choice	 as	receiver	with	a	participant	who	would	play	 in	the	role	of	sender	 in	an	upcoming	 fMRI	 experiment.	 We	 also	 informed	 them	 that	 our	 fMRI	participants	 would	 see	 the	 video	 material	 and	 the	 photo	 material.	Lastly,	we	 asked	 receivers	 to	 answer	 a	 questionnaire	 regarding	 some	personal	 information,	 like	gender,	hobbies,	and	relationship	status.	All	questionnaires	were	 put	 together	 in	 a	 booklet	 and	would	 be	 given	 to	fMRI	participants	during	 the	 instructions.	This	was	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	fMRI	 participants	 would	 believe	 that	 the	 interaction	 in	 the	 social	context	was	really	based	upon	an	actual	social	choice	of	another	person.	Additionally,	 it	 ensured	 that	 all	 fMRI	 participants	 received	 the	 same	information	 about	 the	 receivers.	 In	 the	 same	 week	 we	 collected	receivers’	 choices,	 we	 also	 ran	 a	 behavioral	 session	 with	 senders.	Therefore	we	could	immediately	incentivize	receivers’	decision-making	by	 matching	 one	 receiver	 and	 sender,	 randomly	 drawn	 from	 each	behavioral	session.			
fMRI	experiment	One	day	prior	to	the	fMRI	session,	the	fMRI	participants	received	an	email	and	were	instructed	to	fill	in	a	color	table.	At	this	point	in	time	they	 did	 not	 receive	 any	 information	 regarding	 the	 experiment,	 and	were	 unaware	which	 purpose	 their	 selected	 colors	 served.	 This	 color	table	enabled	us	to	define	each	individual’s	selected	colors	in	the	lottery	context.	For	every	participant	the	winning	colors	in	the	RLOT	scenarios	were	programmed	and	visually	displayed	according	 to	 the	 color	 table	they	 themselves	 filled	 in.	 This	 procedure	 minimizes	 any	 suspicion	participants	might	have	had	with	regard	to	the	composition	of	the	ALOT	(Wakker,	2010).				 	
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Each	 trial	 consists	 of	 six	 screens.	 Figure	 1a	 is	 an	 example	 of	 a	 trial	 from	 the	 ATG.	
Fixation	 crosses	 are	 jittered.	 The	 second	 screen	 indicates	 the	 source	 of	 uncertainty.	
Nine	silhouettes	are	displayed	when	participants	are	in	a	social	context.	Nine	marbles	
are	displayed	when	participants	face	a	lottery	context	(Figure	1b).	The	fourth	screen	is	
the	decision	screen.	They	are	instructed	to	decide	how	much	to	transfer	here.	As	the	six	
possible	transfer	options	appear	in	a	random	order	on	the	next	screen,	they	are	unable	
to	prepare	for	a	specific	button	press.	In	the	ATG	(Figure	1a)	nine	silhouettes	on	a	grey	
background	 indicate	 that	 no	 information	 is	 given	about	 the	distribution	of	 receivers	
that	 decided	 to	 send	 back	 half	 or	 keep	 the	 investment.	 To	 illustrate	 the	 tailor-made	
structure	 of	 our	 design,	 we	 assume	 a	 participant	 who	 believes	 three	 out	 of	 nine	
receivers	will	reciprocate.	In	the	ALOT	(Figure	1c)	the	participant	receives	instruction	
that	 three	 out	 of	nine	 colors	 that	 can	be	used	 in	any	 combination	 in	 this	 lottery	are	
winning	 colors.	 In	 this	way	we	align	underlying	 subjective	probabilities	between	 the	
ATG	and	ALOT.	In	the	risky	trials	we	align	individual’s	beliefs	to	objective	probabilities.	
A	participant	who	believes	three	out	of	nine	receivers	will	reciprocate,	will	most	often	
face	a	RTG,	which	 is	composed	of	 three	receivers	(green	background)	that	decided	to	
send	back	half	of	any	received	investment	versus	six	receivers	(red	background)	that	
decided	to	keep	their	investment	(Figure	1d).	Finally,	in	the	RLOT	the	urn	is	composed	
of	all	nine	colors	out	of	which	three	are	winning	colors	(green	background)	and	six	are	
losing	colors	(red	background)	(Figure	1e).	
Figure	5:	Overview	experimental	design		
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On	 the	 day	 of	 scanning,	 participants	 received	 detailed	instructions,	had	time	to	ask	questions	about	the	procedure,	and	were	briefly	 tested	 as	 to	 their	 understanding	 of	 the	 tasks.	 On	 average	participants	 took	 75	 minutes	 to	 complete	 the	 instructions.	 This	 also	included	 the	 belief	 elicitation	 task.	 In	 the	 MRI	 scanner	 participants	could	 make	 some	 practice	 choices,	 and	 could	 ask	 questions	 for	clarification	if	necessary.		The	 fMRI	 task	 was	 presented	 using	 Psychtoolbox	 (Matlab).	Participants	 saw	 two	 runs,	 with	 a	 break	 in	 between.	 The	 first	 run,	where	they	made	their	decisions,	is	the	focus	of	this	paper.	There	were	96	trials	in	total,	equally	divided	between	Trust	Game	and	lottery	trials.	There	were	16	blocks	in	total.	Each	block	consisted	of	six	trials	of	either	Trust	 Game	 or	 lottery	 decisions.	 Within	 each	 block	 both	 risky	 and	ambiguous	trials	were	presented	in	a	random	order.		In	 the	 risky	 trials	 participants	 were	 shown	 the	 objective	probabilities	that	their	investment	would	be	returned	before	they	chose	to	invest.	As	outlined	above,	the	exact	set	of	risky	trials	was	tailored	to	each	participant’s	belief	 regarding	 receivers’	 return	 choice	 in	 the	ATG	(Figure	5).	 In	 addition,	we	 also	had	 filler	 trials	 for	 other	 probabilities	that	did	not	match	participants’	beliefs.	These	trials	were	not	included	in	the	fMRI	analyses.		There	were	no	filler	trials	in	the	ambiguity	setup.	The	ALOT	trials	only	consist	of	trials	where	the	underlying	likelihood	to	draw	a	marble	that	matches	one	of	their	selected	colors	is	equal	to	their	belief	from	the	ATG.		Participants	indicated	their	transfer	decisions	by	pressing	one	of	six	buttons	arrayed	on	 two	MRI	compatible	button	boxes,	which	were	placed	on	the	participant’s	lap.	The	three	transfer	options	on	the	left	of	the	screen	were	linked	to	the	left	button	box	and	the	options	of	the	right	were	 linked	 to	 the	right	box.	All	participants	reported	no	problems	 to	indicate	their	choices	via	this	procedure.		In	 the	 second	 run	 of	 this	 experiment	 the	 associated	 decision	outcomes	were	presented.	Results	from	this	phase	will	be	presented	in	Chapter	four	of	this	thesis.			
Imaging	procedures	Scanning	 was	 carried	 out	 on	 a	 3-Tesla	 Siemens	 MRI	 system	
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(Magnetom	Skyra).	Functional	MRI	(fMRI)	images	were	acquired	using	a	32-channel	head	coil,	with	a	standard	multi-echo	imaging	pulse	T2*-weighted	 sequence	 (field	 of	 view	 =	 224	 mm,	 matrix	 =	 64	 ×	 64,	repetition	time	(TR)	=	2390	ms;	echo	times	(TE)	=	9.4	ms,	20.6	ms,	32.0	ms,	43.0	ms,	54.0	ms,	flip	angle	=	90°,	slice	gap	=	0.5	mm).	Using	a	multi-echo	 sequence	 provides	 a	 better	 signal-to-noise	 ratio	 for	 brain	 areas	susceptible	to	dropout,	while	allowing	for	scanning	of	the	whole	brain	(Poser	 et	 al.,	 2006).	 One	 whole-brain	 volume	 consisted	 of	 thirty-one	ascending	slices	(slice	thickness	=	3.0	mm,	voxel	size	=	3.5	×	3.5	×	3.0	mm).	 For	 each	 participant	 we	 acquired	 a	 high-resolution	 anatomical	T1-weighted	image	(MPRAGE;	192	slices;	TR	=	2300	ms,	voxel	size	=	1	×	1	×	1	mm).	We	 loosely	 taped	participants'	 head	 to	 the	 coil	within	 the	scanner	in	order	to	limit	movement	during	image	acquisition.		
fMRI	preprocessing	fMRI	 data	 analysis	 was	 performed	 using	 SPM8	 (Statistical	Parametric	 Mapping;	 Wellcome	 Department,	 London,	 UK).	 Prior	 to	preprocessing	we	combined	and	realigned	 the	 five	read-outs	acquired	via	the	multi-echo	sequence	by	using	standard	procedures	described	by	Poser	 et	 al.	 (2006).	 The	 first	 31	 volumes,	 acquired	 prior	 to	 task	initiation,	were	used	to	estimate	 the	weighted	echo	time	per	voxel	 for	optimal	 echo	 combination	 including	 allowing	 T1	 equilibration	 effects.	These	31	volumes	were	then	discarded	from	the	analysis	(Poser	et	al.,	2006).	 After	 echos	 were	 combined,	 preprocessing	 consisted	 of	 slice-timing	to	the	middle	slice,	co-registration	of	the	functional	images	to	the	anatomical	 images,	 segmentation	 of	 the	 functional	 and	 anatomical	image,	and	normalization	to	the	Montreal	Neurological	Institute	(MNI)	template	 using	 the	 segmentation	 parameters.	 Functional	 images	were	then	 smoothed	 with	 a	 Gaussian	 kernel	 of	 8	 mm	 full-width	 at	 half	maximum	(FWHM).		
fMRI	statistical	analyses	To	 examine	 the	 neural	 mechanisms	 associated	 with	 both	 the	source	 and	 type	 of	 uncertainty,	 we	 investigated	 the	 BOLD22	response	during	 trials	 on	 which	 participants	 decided	 how	 much	 to	 invest	 in																																																									22	Please	see	BOX	3	of	the	Introduction	for	an	explanation	of	the	BOLD	response.		
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either	 another	 person	 or	 in	 a	 lottery.	 The	 main	 regressors	 for	 these	trials	 are:	 decision	 screen	 of	 RTG,	 decision	 screen	 of	 ATG,	 decision	screen	of	RLOT,	and	decision	screen	of	ALOT	(Figure	5,	screens	4).	The	onsets	 are	 defined	when	 the	decision	 screen	 appears,	 and	we	 include	the	 onset	 of	 the	 button	 press	 on	 the	 subsequent	 screen	 in	 our	generalized	linear	model	GLM	model.		These	regressors	were	modeled	with	a	canonical	hemodynamic	response	function	during	a	time-window	of	two	seconds	after	the	onset	(duration).	 To	 account	 for	 residual	 variance,	 we	 also	 included	 the	temporal	 derivatives	 of	 each	 regressor.	 The	motion	 parameters	 from	realignment,	 including	 its	quadratic	effect	and	 first	derivative	(in	 total	18	motion	parameters	per	individual),	were	included	in	the	GLM.		A	 standard	high-pass	 filter	 (cut-off	128	 s)	was	used	during	 the	GLM	 analysis	 to	 account	 for	 possible	 slow-frequency	 drifts.	 Finally,	 a	whole-brain	second-level	model	was	used	 to	analyze	group	effects	 for	the	specified	contrasts	discussed	in	the	results	section	(by	means	of	a	T-test).	 Individual	 beliefs	 were	 standardly	 included	 as	 a	 covariate.	Statistical	maps	were	corrected	for	multiple	comparisons	using	whole-brain	 cluster	 correction	 with	 an	 initial	 threshold	 of	 p	 <	 0.001	 and	 a	Family	 Wise	 Error	 corrected	 cluster	 threshold	 of	 p	 <	 0.05.	 We	 only	mention	 the	 number	 of	 voxels	 in	 clusters,	 which	 satisfy	 p	 <	 0.001,	uncorrected	(>	10	voxels).		First,	we	tested	the	main	effect	of	the	type	of	uncertainty	and	the	source	 of	 uncertainty	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 main	 contrast	 of	 ambiguous	choice	trials	>	risky	choice	trials	and	social	choice	trials	>	lottery	choice	trials,	respectively.	We	explored	the	neural	mechanisms	of	individuals’	social	 and	 lottery	ambiguity	preferences	 in	 two	ways.	First,	we	added	these	 individual	 preferences	 as	 covariates	 at	 the	 second	 level	 for	 the	main	contrast	of	ambiguous	choices	>	risky	choices.	Second,	we	added	participants’	investment	choices	as	parametric	modulators	to	our	GLM	model	 and	 contrasted	 investment	 choices	 in	 the	 ATG	 >	 investment	choices	 in	 the	 RTG	 (social	 ambiguity	 preferences),	 and	 investment	choices	 in	 the	 ALOT	 >	 investment	 choices	 in	 the	 RLOT	 (lottery	ambiguity	preferences).	
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Results	
Behavioral	results	
Beliefs	influence	investment	choices		The	average	transfer	in	the	ATG	was	3.61	out	of	10	tokens.	This	figure	 was	 lower	 than	 the	 average	 investment	 in	 the	 original	 Trust	Game	 by	 Berg	 et	 al.	 (1995),	 but	 within	 the	 bounds	 of	 previously	reported	 trusting	 decisions	 (Johnson	 and	 Mislin,	 2011).	 Importantly,	the	 average	 transfer	 in	 this	 fMRI	 study	 was	 very	 similar	 to	 mean	investment	 amounts	 in	 a	 similar	 design	we	 employed	 in	 a	 behavioral	laboratory	(Chapter	2	of	this	thesis).		Individual	 beliefs	 regarding	 receivers’	 reciprocity	 likelihoods	varied	 substantially.	 Some	 participants	 indicated	 very	 low	 beliefs	 by	stating	 that	 they	expected	 that	only	 two	or	 three	out	of	nine	Trustees	would	reciprocate.	On	the	other	hand,	some	participants	stated	a	belief	that	6	of	9	Trustees	would	return	their	investment.	Figure	6a	illustrates	that	 individual	 beliefs,	 which	 we	 elicited	 prior	 to	 decision-making,	indeed	 positively	 correlated	 with	 the	 amount	 they	 subsequently	invested	in	the	ATG	(r=0.642,	p=0.001).		We	 also	 found	 a	 positive	 relationship	 between	 the	 amount	 of	winning	 colors	 and	 participants’	 investment	 choices	 in	 the	 ALOT	(r=0.597,	 p=0.003)	 (see	 Figure	 6b).	 This	 indicated	 that	 participants	attended	 to,	 and	 used,	 this	 information,	 which	 we	 provided	 during	instructions	 before	 we	 placed	 them	 in	 an	 MRI	 scanner,	 to	 make	investment	decisions	in	the	ALOT.		These	 results	 provided	 insight	 into	 DMUU:	 participants	 have	expectations	 and	 use	 these	 to	 guide	 their	 choices.	 Moreover,	 in	 the	design	we	employed,	 it	 is	 important	 that	we	showed	this	relationship.	Any	difference	we	find	across	our	conditions	is	unlikely	to	be	the	result	of	a	mismatch	between	subjective	probabilities	(based	on	participants’	beliefs	from	the	ATG)	and	objective	probabilities	in	the	risk	treatments.	
Social	ambiguity	aversion	We	 applied	 repeated	 measures	 ANOVA	 with	 the	 transfer	decisions	 in	 the	 ATG,	 ALOT,	 RLOT	 and	 RTG	 as	 main	 variables.	 We	controlled	 for	 individual	 beliefs	 by	 adding	 this	 as	 covariate.	 This	analysis	 yielded	 a	 main	 effect	 of	 the	 type	 of	 uncertainty	 (F(1,20)	 =	
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5.973,	p=0.024).	Participants	invested	less	in	the	ambiguous	treatments	as	compared	to	 in	 the	risk	 treatments,	 illustrating	ambiguity	aversion.	When	 analyzing	 the	 pairwise	 comparisons,	 ambiguity	 aversion	 was	only	weakly	significant	in	the	social	context	(F(1,20)	=	3.680,	p=0.069),	but	 not	 in	 the	 lottery	 context.	 There	was	no	 significant	main	 effect	 of	the	 source	of	 uncertainty:	 investment	 choices	 across	 the	 lotteries	 and	Trust	Games	did	not	differ	(Figure	7).23				
	
																																																								23	In	 Chapter	 2	 of	 this	 thesis	 we	 concluded	 that	 risk	 preferences	 are	 context-dependent,	as	we	found	no	correlation	between	amount	invested	in	the	RTG	and	risk	preferences	elicited	with	the	Holt	and	Laury	risk	measurement.	We	used	the	Holt	and	Laury	risk	design	as	this	was	the	primary	elicitation	technique	to	link	individual	risk	in	trusting.	In	the	current	Chapter	we	carefully	designed	a	RTG	and	RLOT,	which	only	difference	is	the	source	of	risk.	Based	on	this	design	we	conclude	that	behavior	across	the	 RTG	 and	 RLOT	 is	 not	 significantly	 different,	 and	 is	 significantly	 correlated.	We	cannot	make	any	comparisons	between	the	current	and	previous	Chapter	with	regard	to	social	and	non-social	sources	of	ambiguity.	
Figure	6	Beliefs	and	transfer	in	ATG	and	ALOT		 						Figure	6a	 	 	 	 	 Figure	6b	
Elicited	 beliefs	 influenced	 chosen	 transfer	 in	 the	 ATG.	 Based	 on	 individual	
beliefs,	participants	received	a	matching	amount	of	winning	colors	in	the	ALOT.	
Particpants	 included	 this	 information,	 given	 during	 instructions	 prior	 to	 the	
experiment	in	the	MRI	scanner,	as	transfer	positively	increased	as	afunction	of	
the	amount	of	winning	colors.	
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Individual	differences	Taking	 individual	 beliefs	 into	 account	 illustrates	 interesting	individual	differences	in	ambiguity	preferences.		For	 each	 participant	 we	 calculated	 a	 normalized	 score	 of	ambiguity	 preferences	 in	 both	 the	 social	 and	 non-social	 domain.	 We	
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On	the	Y-axis	the	mean	amount	invested	is	plotted	for	each	different	treatment.	
Each	bar	represents	such	a	treatment.	A	main	effect	of	the	type	of	uncertainty	is	
found:	investment	was	significantly	lower	for	ambiguity	than	for	risk	(p	<	0.05).	
Only	 the	 pairwise	 comparison	 between	 the	 RTG	 and	 the	 ATG	 was	 weakly	
significant	(p	<	0.1).		
Figure	7:	Amount	invested	across	experimental	conditions	
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subtracted	the	participant’s	average	amount	 invested	 in	 the	ATG	from	their	average	amount	invested	in	the	RTG,	before	normalizing:	Social	ambiguity	aversion	=	((average	 transfer	RTG	–	average	 transfer	ATG)/	(average	transfer	RTG	+	average	transfer	ATG))					 A	 score	 of	 0	 indicates	 ambiguity	 neutral	 behavior,	 a	 score	between	 -1	 and	 0	 shows	 ambiguity	 seeking	 behavior,	 and	 between	 0	and	 1	 demonstrates	 ambiguity	 aversion.	 We	 used	 the	 same	 formula,	this	time	based	on	transfers	in	the	lottery,	to	extract	an	individual	score	of	ambiguity	preferences	in	the	lottery.	Ambiguity	 aversion	 in	 the	 social	 context	 increased	 as	participants	 had	 higher	 beliefs	 regarding	 receivers’	 reciprocating	behavior	(ANOVA,	F(1,20)	=	7.543,	p=0.012).	Participants	who	thought	two	 or	 three	 receivers	 would	 reciprocate	 scored	 lower	 on	 the	normalized	 score	 for	 social	 ambiguity	 aversion	 than	participants	who	thought	5	or	6	receivers	would	reciprocate	(Figure	8a).	In	other	words,	the	 first	 group	 was	 ambiguity	 seeking,	 whereas	 the	 latter	 group	expressed	ambiguity	aversion.	In	the	lottery	domain	we	also	found	that	ambiguity	 aversion	 increased	 as	 the	 amount	 of	 winning	 colors	increased.	 However,	 in	 the	 lottery	 context	 this	 relationship	 is	 less	continuous	 as	 compared	 to	 the	 linear	 pattern	 observed	 in	 the	 social	condition	(Figure	8b).		Overall	 these	 results	 show	 clear	 individual	 differences	 in	ambiguity	preferences	when	taking	participants’	beliefs	into	account.	Ambiguity	preferences	in	the	social	and	non-social	context	were	positively	correlated.	A	participant	who	was	ambiguity	averse	(seeking)	in	the	lottery	was	also	ambiguity	averse	(seeking)	in	the	social	context.	However,	 if	 we	 took	 individual	 beliefs	 into	 account,	 the	 relationship	between	individual	beliefs	and	ambiguity	attitudes	across	the	social	and	non-social	 domains	 was	 significantly	 different	 (MANOVA,	 F(2,19)	 =	3.735,	 p=0.043).	 Again,	 this	 illustrated	 that	 when	 taking	 individual	beliefs	into	account,	sources	of	uncertainty	matter.		
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Neuroimaging	results	We	 performed	 several	 analyses	 to	 understand	 the	 neural	mechanisms	 of	 DMUU.	 First	 we	 investigated	 the	 main	 contrasts	between	the	type	and	source	of	uncertainty.	Subsequently,	we	studied	the	neural	mechanisms	of	individual	ambiguity	preferences.		
Main	contrasts	The	main	contrast	between	ambiguity	and	risk,	 independent	of	the	 source	 of	 uncertainty,	 revealed	 bilateral	 activation	 in	 the	 middle	temporal	 gyrus,	 the	 left	 inferior	 parietal	 lobule	 (both	 in	 angular	 and	
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Ambiguity	 aversion	 in	 the	 Trust	 Game	 increases,	 as	 individual	 beliefs	 about	
Trustees’	 reciprocity	 are	 higher.	 In	 the	 non-social	 context	 this	 relationship	 is	
less	 continuous	 than	 in	 the	 social	 domain.	 We	 label	 participants’	 beliefs	 low	
when	 they	think	2	or	3	receivers	will	reciprocate	(n=7).	We	label	participants’	
beliefs	medium	when	they	express	a	belief	of	4	receivers	to	reciprocate	(n=7).	
Finally,	 we	 group	 participants’	 beliefs	 when	 they	 think	 5	 or	 6	 receivers	 will	
reciprocate	and	label	these	high	(n=8).	Only	for	illustration	purposes	do	we	plot	
these	effects	 for	 three	 separate	groups,	which	are	near	 to	 equal	 in	 size.	These	
effects	also	hold	when	analyzing	beliefs	as	a	continuous	variable	(p	<	0.05).		
Figure	8:	Individual	differences	in	ambiguity	preferences	
Figure	8a	 	 	 	 Figure	8b	
Ambiguity	preferences	in	
Trust	Game					 Ambiguity	preferences	in	lottery					
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supramarginal	gyrus)	and	the	left	superior	parietal	lobule	(precuneus)	(Figure	9	and	Table	4).	The	main	contrast	between	the	social	and	non-social	 source	 of	 uncertainty	 yielded	 activation	 in	 the	 right	 and	 left	fusiform	gyrus	and	the	right	IFG.	
Individual	ambiguity	preferences	Following	 up	 on	 our	 behavioral	 results,	 we	 added	 individual	scores	for	social	and	lottery	ambiguity	preferences	as	covariates	to	the	GLM	 model	 for	 the	 main	 contrast	 of	 ambiguity	 versus	 risk.	 We	 only	found	significant	brain	regions	related	to	social	ambiguity	preferences.	The	 greater	 ambiguity	 aversion	 in	 the	 social	 domain,	 the	 more	activation	was	shown	 in	 the	 left	 (24	voxels)	and	right	 IFG	(29	voxels)	and	the	left	inferior	temporal	gyrus	(29	voxels)	(p	<	0.001,	>	10	voxels).		
	
			
Significant	clusters	of	activation	when	subjects	make	investment	choices	under	
ambiguity	versus	under	risk:	left	middle	temporal	gyrus,	left	precuneus	and	left	
inferior	 parietal	 lobule	 (surpramarginal	 and	 angular	 gyrus).	 Not	 shown	 here,	
but	also	significantly	active:	right	middle	temporal	gyrus.	
Figure	9:	Activity	main	condition	ambiguity	versus	risk	
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Table	4:	Overview	brain	regions		
Brain	regions	 	 	 	 	
Hemisphere							Voxel							Voxel							MNI	coordinate																																																	
																															number			t	score						of	local	maxima		
Ambiguity	>	risk	trials		
(main	condition)	Middle	temporal	gyrus		 	 						Left	 																		142										6.1									-50,-32,-10;	-36,-38,-4;																-60,-28,-7	Middle	temporal	gyrus	 	 					Right	 		 69												4.29							52,-24,-10;	48,-35,-7	Precuneus	 	 	 					Left	 	 47												4.35							-8,-66,32;	-12,-56,35	Supramarginal/Angular	gyrus											 					Left	 	 71												4.81							-57,-49,32;	-46,-49,32															-54,-66,14		
Risk	>	ambiguity	trials	 	 	 	 	 	
(main	condition)	Fusiform	gyrus,	calcarine	gyrus	 						Left	 	 481										8.58						-29,-77,-14;	-8,-94,-4;															-29,-66,-18	Middle	occipital	gyrus;	fusiform	gyrus					Right	 												754										8.29						30,-66,32;	34,-70,-14;															38,-80,4		
Social	>	non-social	trials	
(main	condition)	Fusiform	gyrus	 	 	 						Right	 	 965								9.35								38,-46,-21;	27,-80,-10;			 	 	 	 	 	 																																38,-80,7	Fusiform	gyrus	 	 	 						Left	 	 746								8.97								-36,-84,-7;	-32,-56,-14;			 	 	 	 	 	 	 														-36,-46,-14	Inferior	frontal	gyrus	 	 						Right	 	 150								5.43								44,21,24;	52,10,28;															44,35,10		
Ambiguity	>	risk:	correlation		
with	individual	measure	of		
social	ambiguity	preferences	Inferior	and	middle	temporal	gyrus	 						Left	 	 29										5.06									-50,-56,-14;-43,-63,-4	Inferior	frontal	gyrus	 	 						Right	 	 29										4.58									55,14,24	Inferior	frontal	gyrus	 																								Left	 	 24										5.37									-46,32,21		
Investment	ambiguity	>	risky	Trust	Game:	
ANOVA	on	three	different	belief	groups	
(contrast	-1	0	1:		
increasing	ambiguity	aversion)	Inferior	and	middle	frontal	gyrus	 					Left	 																	 45										4.96									-40,42,10;	-36,42,18	Anterior	Cingulate	cortex	 																							Right	 	 26										4.88									13,28,28	Caudate	nucleus	 	 																							Right	 	 20										4.27									16,24,7	Caudate	nucleus	 	 																							Left	 	 13										4.35									-15,24,7;	-18,21,10				
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In	 addition	 to	 looking	 at	 individual’s	 aggregate	 score	 for	ambiguity	 preferences,	 we	 also	 investigated	 investment	 choices	 on	 a	trial-by-trial	 basis	 by	 adding	 investment	 amounts	 as	 parametric	modulator	to	our	GLM	model.	We	first	contrasted	investment	amounts	in	the	ATG	versus	the	RTG.	Subsequently	we	performed	an	ANOVA	on	this	 contrast	 between	 three	 equal	 groups	 ranging	 from	 low	 to	 high	beliefs	 in	 terms	of	 their	expectations	concerning	receivers’	 reciprocity	(see	Figure	8	for	more	details).	An	increase	in	ambiguity	aversion	over	these	three	classes	of	participants	yielded	activation	in	the	left	IFG,	the	right	 anterior	 cingulate	 and	 bilaterally	 in	 the	 caudate	 nucleus	 (Figure	10).		
Increasing	 social	 ambiguity	
aversion	 is	 associated	 with	
increasing	activation	 in	 the	 left	
IFG	 (p	 <	 0.05,	 FWE),	 the	 right	
anterior	 cingulate	 (p	 <	 0.001,	
26	 voxels),	 and	 bilaterally	 in	
the	caudate	nucleus	(p	<	0.001,	
20	 voxels	 in	 right	 caudate;	 13	
voxels	in	left	caudate)	
Figure	10:	Individual	differences	in	brain	activation	related	to	social	ambiguity	
preferences			
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Running	 the	 same	 ANOVA	 on	 the	 parametric	 contrast	 between	 the	investment	 choices	 in	 the	 ALOT	 versus	 the	 RLOT	 did	 not	 reveal	 any	significant	brain	activation.	
Discussion	This	 study	 investigates	 DMUU	 by	 comparing	 social	 and	 non-social	 sources.	 Previous	 (fMRI)	 research	 has	 either	 focused	 on	 the	dynamics	 of	 social	 interaction	 –	 playing	 against	 a	 computer	 versus	 a	person	 –	 or	 the	 distinction	 between	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	 in	 lottery	contexts.	We	examined	a	fourfold	pattern	of	both	the	source	and	type	of	uncertainty.	 We	 believe	 this	 is	 crucial,	 as	 real	 life	 decisions	 are	generally	not	determined	by	the	flip	of	a	coin	or	the	roll	of	a	die.	People	often	face	uncertainty	that	directly	stems	from	the	conscious	choice	of	(an)other	person(s).		It	 is	 challenging	 to	 study	 uncertain	 decision-making	 in	 a	 social	context.	 Whereas	 underlying	 subjective	 probabilities	 can	 be	 easily	manipulated	in	a	lottery	context,	people	have	more	idiosyncratic		expectations	in	social	environments,	and	it	is	essential	to	address	these	individual	 beliefs	 in	 order	 to	 have	 a	 useful	 comparison	 between	different	 treatments.	 Our	 design	 took	 this	 into	 account	 by	 matching	individual	 beliefs	 regarding	 the	 ambiguous	 social	 interaction	 to	 the	other	 decision	 contexts,	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	 any	 observed	differences	can	be	attributed	to	either	the	type	or	source	of	uncertainty,	respectively.	Taking	these	individual	beliefs	into	account	also	allows	us	to	 explore	 individual	 differences	 in	 DMUU,	 demonstrating	 more	 than	ambiguity	 aversion,	 typically	 the	 main	 focus	 of	 previous	 work	 on	DMUU.	 This	 study	 also	 stresses	 the	 interaction	 between	 individual	beliefs	and	individual	differences	in	ambiguity	preferences.	We	 find	 a	 significant	 behavioral	 main	 effect	 of	 ambiguity	aversion.	 Participants	 invest	 less	 when	 the	 type	 of	 uncertainty	 is	ambiguous	 as	 compared	 to	 when	 it	 is	 risky.	 This	 aversion	 is	 only	observed	in	the	social	domain.	The	neural	correlates	of	the	main	effect	of	 ambiguity	 aversion	 reveal	 significant	 brain	 activity	 in	 the	 left	 and	right	middle	 temporal	 gyrus,	 left	 inferior	 parietal	 lobule	 (angular	 and	surpramarginal	 gyrus)	 and	 left	 superior	 parietal	 lobule	 (precuneus).	The	 implications	 of	 these	 neuroimaging	 results	 suggest	 that	 the	underlying	 mechanisms	 of	 choice	 in	 ambiguous	 environments	 are	
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somewhat	 context-independent	 as	 the	 brain	 regions	 that	 significantly	correlate	 with	 ambiguity	 in	 our	 study	 do	 not	 differ	 from	 previous	findings,	which	are	on	ambiguous	lotteries	(Bach	et	al.,	2011;	Huettel	et	al.,	2005).	Although	the	experimental	set-up	of	Hsu	et	al.	(2005)	greatly	differs	 from	ours,	 they	 also	 find	no	differences	 in	neural	 correlates	of	ambiguity	 preferences	 as	 measured	 via	 three	 different	 elicitation	procedures:	 a	 lottery,	 a	 card-deck	 game	 and	 guessing	 the	 correct	temperature	in	another	city.	This	suggests	that	these	areas	are	involved	in	 a	 more	 general	 network	 of	 ambiguity	 processing,	 largely	independent	of	the	specific	elicitation	of	uncertainty	in	this	context,	this	providing	 a	 useful	 broader	 picture	 of	 how	 the	 brain	 deals	 with	ambiguity.		In	both	social	and	non-social	sources	of	ambiguity,	we	find	that	participants	make	use	of	their	beliefs	when	making	investment	choices	in	 the	 ATG	 and	 the	 provided	 number	 of	 winning	 colors	 in	 the	 ALOT.	This	 expectation	 thus	 feeds	 into	 a	 subjective	 probability,	 which	participants	 rely	 on	 in	 order	 to	 guide	 their	 DMUU.	 Risky	 decision-making	already	provides	objective	probability	and	participants	do	not	need	 to	 establish	 an	 expectation	 that	 can	 serve	 as	 a	 subjective	probability.	 As	 our	 neuroimaging	 results	 are	 similar	 to	 Bach	 et	 al.	(2011)	 and	 Huettel	 et	 al.	 (2005)	 we	 also	 view	 ambiguity	 as	 more	complex	 expected	 value	 calculation	where	 one	 is	 integrating	multiple	possible	subjective	probability	distributions.	Our	 second	 main	 finding	 is	 that	 ambiguity	 preferences	 are	dependent	 on	 individual	 beliefs.	When	we	 take	 individual	 beliefs	 into	account,	 ambiguity	 aversion	 is	 only	 part	 of	 the	 overall	 picture.	 In	 the	social	 context,	we	 find	 that	 ambiguity	 aversion	 increases	 as	 objective	probabilities	 of	 reciprocation	 in	 the	 RTG	 increase.	 When	 individuals	hold	low	beliefs	concerning	the	reciprocity	of	others,	participants	invest	more	 in	 the	ATG	 than	 in	 belief-matched	objective	probability	 trials	 in	the	 RTG.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 when	 individual	 beliefs	 regarding	receivers’	reciprocity	are	higher,	participants	invest	less	when	they	face	social	uncertainty	in	the	ATG	as	compared	to	social	risk	in	the	RTG.	These	results	are	consistent	with	the	reverse	S-shaped	curve,	a	behavioral	 phenomenon	 well	 described	 in	 economics	 literature	 for	lottery	evoked	choice	events	 (Abdellaoui	 et	 al.,	 2011).	This	 suggests	a	greater	 willingness	 to	 bet	 on	 risk	 than	 on	 ambiguity	 if	 the	 objective	
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probability	 exceeds	 0.5,	 and	 also	 suggests	 greater	 insensitivity	 to	ambiguity	 than	 to	 risk.	 Likelihood	 insensitivity	 implies	 that	people	do	not	discriminate	between	changes	in	likelihood,	but	move	towards	the	direction	of	a	probability	of	0.5.	This	pattern	has	previously	only	been	observed	in	lottery	contexts,	whereas	here	we	additionally	identify	this	behavioral	 pattern	 in	 the	 social	 domain	where	 the	 uncertainty	 stems	from	a	human-made	choice.		Behavioral	studies	that	have	looked	into	the	effect	of	the	reverse	S-shaped	 curve	 elicit	 different	 data	 points,	 per	 individual,	 along	 the	probability	 distribution.	 In	 our	 experiment	 we	 have	 participants	 that	vary	 substantially	 in	 their	 social	 expectations	 and	 therefore	 these	individuals	naturally	fall	in	clusters	along	the	probability	distribution.	A	participant	 who	 has	 pessimistic	 beliefs	 concerning	 the	 reciprocity	 of	others	 is	 ambiguity	 seeking.	 A	 participant	 with	 optimistic	 beliefs	concerning	 the	 reciprocity	 of	 others	 is	 much	more	 ambiguity	 averse.	But	we	cannot	state	anything	about	the	ambiguity	preferences	of	these	individuals	 if	 they	would	 have	 had	 other	 beliefs,	 or	 if	we	would	 have	given	 different	 amount	 of	 winning	 colors	 in	 the	 ALOT	 (not	 matching	their	 beliefs	 from	 the	 ATG).	 Nevertheless	 our	 findings	 relating	 to	 the	interplay	 between	 social	 beliefs	 and	 ambiguity	 preferences	 is	interesting	 and	 has	 important	 implications,	 but	 has	 to	 be	 put	 in	 the	perspective	of	our	experimental	design.		Individual	 differences	 are	 also	 reflected	 in	 our	 neuroimaging	results	where	 significant	 clusters	 of	 brain	 activity	 relate	 to	 individual	social	ambiguity	preferences,	but	not	to	lottery	ambiguity	preferences.	Specifically,	 the	 IFG	 consistently	 correlates	 with	 individual	 social	ambiguity	 preferences:	 this	 brain	 activation	 is	 found	 when	 adding	individual’s	 social	 ambiguity	 preferences	 as	 a	 covariate	 at	 the	 second	level,	and	is	also	evident	when	modeling	ambiguity	aversion	on	a	trial-by-trial	basis	as	a	parametric	modulator.		Interestingly,	 Bach	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 also	 showed	 that	 right	 IFG	activation	 correlated	 with	 individual	 differences	 in	 ambiguity	preferences,	 in	 this	 case	 in	 a	 lottery	 context,	 as	 distinct	 from	 our	findings	 indicating	 that	 the	 IFG	 specifically	 relates	 to	 social	 ambiguity	preferences.	 However,	 on	 careful	 examination	 the	 Bach	 et	 al.	 (2011)	lottery	setup	was	framed	in	a	rather	‘social’	manner.	Participants	were	told	 that	 this	 lottery	 would	 be	 resolved	 via	 a	 game	 between	 two	
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bowlers.	Each	bowler	had	a	different	colored	ball,	and	the	color	of	the	ball	indicated	a	first-order	objective	probability	to	win	the	lottery.	Only	one	of	 the	 two	bowlers	would	play,	 and	depending	on	where	 the	ball	would	 land,	 participants	 could	 indicate	 which	 bowler	 had	 played.	Participants	therefore	needed	to	integrate	the	position	of	the	ball	on	the	screen	 (second-order	 probabilities)	 with	 conditional	 first-order	probabilities	 (which	 bowler	 had	played).	 In	 this	manner	 the	 study	 by	Bach	et	al.	(2011)	addressed	the	question	if	second	order	uncertainty	is	different	from	the	categorical	difference	between	ambiguity	and	risk.	In	 our	 study	 individual	 differences	 in	 social	 ambiguity	preferences	 were	 linked	 to	 the	 IFG.	 These	 findings	 are	 supported	 by	results	 indicating	 that	 the	 IFG	 is	 involved	 with	 social	 cognition	(Oberman	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 Single	 cell	 recording	 in	 macaques’	 premotor	cortex	demonstrated	the	existence	of	a	unique	set	of	premotor	neurons,	which	 responded	when	 the	monkey	 observed	 an	 action	 of	 somebody	else	and	performing	the	action	itself	as	well	(Rizzolatti	et	al.,	2001).	In	the	human	brain,	the	existence	of	a	similar	system	has	been	found	in	the	IFG	 (Fadiga	 et	 al.,	 1995),	 and	 use	 of	 repetitive	 transcranial	 magnetic	stimulation	 (rTMS)24	demonstrated	 a	 causal	 relationship	 between	 the	left	IFG	and	its	necessity	to	make	accurate	perceptual	judgments	about	other	people's	actions	(Pobric	et	al.,	2006).	These	findings	can	explain	the	 role	 of	 the	 IFG	 in	 the	 study	 by	 Bach	 et	 al.	 (2011),	 whereby	participants	were	thinking	about	the	actions	of	the	bowlers,	which	end	position	 of	 the	 ball	 should	 be	 used	 for	 optimal	 DMUU.	 Also,	 the	 IFG,	together	 with	 the	 inferior	 parietal	 lobule	 and	 the	 superior	 temporal	sulcus,	has	been	implicated	in	a	network	that	tries	to	match	perceptions	of	 the	 environment	with	 internal	 representations	 in	 order	 to	 act	 and	decide	 appropriately	 (Parsons	 et	 al.,	 1995;	 Buccino	 et	 al.,	 2001;	Iacoboni	et	al.,	2001).	Gallese	et	al.	(2004)	speculate	that	the	IFG	further	developed	 in	 humans	 as	 to	 represent	 the	 underlying	 intentions	 and	feelings	of	other	people	beyond	the	physical	aspect	of	an	action.	In	our	study	participants	 use	 their	 beliefs	 about	 the	behavior	 of	 receivers	 to	decide	 under	 uncertainty,	 without	 any	 need	 to	 observe	 or	 imitate																																																									24	rTMS	 is	 a	 non-invasive	 procedure	 whereby	 a	 pulsed	 magnetic	 field	 stimulates	electrical	activity	 in	 the	brain,	which	subsequently	excites	or	 inhibits	a	certain	brain	area.	Via	rTMS	a	causal	link	between	brain	regions	and	behavior	can	be	demonstrated.	
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actions.	Overall,	 therefore,	 the	 IFG	seems	to	be	 involved	when	players	are	making	uncertain	 choices,	but	 specifically	when	 the	uncertainty	 is	resolved	 by	 a	 conscious	 move	 (as	 in	 Bach	 et	 al.,	 2011)	 or	 conscious	decision	 of	 another	 person,	 which	 extends	 our	 knowledge	 about	decisions	made	under	uncertainty	via	the	actions	of	another	person.	Overall,	 this	 study	 demonstrates	 the	 unique	 feature	 of	combining	 insights	 from	 economics	 and	 neuroscience	 in	 order	 to	understand	 DMUU.	 The	 conceptualization	 and	 understanding	 of	 our	behavioral	results	stem	from	economic	theories.	Neuroimaging	data,	on	the	 other	 hand,	 increase	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 mechanisms	 of	making	choices	under	uncertainty.	Our	fMRI	results	suggest	that	people	use	 the	same	approach	 to	 tackle	uncertain	choices,	 irrespective	of	 the	particular	decision	domain:	people	form	expectations	and	use	these	to	guide	their	choices	(Chang	et	al.,	2011).	Based	on	these	beliefs,	we	can	elucidate	 individual	 differences	 in	 ambiguity	 preferences,	 and	 the	neural	basis	for	these	individual	differences	points	to	the	role	of	the	IFG	in	 trying	 to	 assess	 the	 intentions	 of	 other	 humans	 in	 order	 to	 make	decisions	under	social	uncertainty.		This	 study	 is	 the	 first	 to	 simultaneously	 explore	 risk	 and	ambiguity	preferences	in	a	social	domain,	with	previous	studies	mostly	relying	 on	 lotteries	 to	 elicit	 ambiguity	 preferences.	 Therefore,	we	 are	able	 to	 take	 a	 broader	 approach	 to	 this	 topic,	 as	 many,	 if	 not	 most,	uncertainties	we	 face	 in	 real	 life	 are	 related	 to	 the	 behavior	 of	 other	people.	 Subsequently,	 previous	 studies	 have	 emphasized	 the	 role	 of	ambiguity	aversion	on	choice.	The	current	study	shows	that	individual	beliefs	vary	 in	social	 interactive	situations,	and	 this	has	a	direct	effect	on	ambiguity	preferences.	Assessing	choices	in	more	real-life	scenarios	enables	 us	 to	 think	 about	 practical	 implications	 of	 our	 findings.	 For	instance,	 our	 results	 suggest	 that	 people’s	 reactions	 towards,	 for	example,	 new	 policy	 measures	 are	 dependent	 on	 their	 expectations.	Imagine	a	new	policy	measure,	which	is	still	somewhat	unclear	in	how	it	 might	 resolve	 in	 the	 future.	 A	 citizen	 with	 high	 expectations	concerning	the	successful	rollout	of	this	policy	measure	greatly	benefits	from	 receiving	 more	 information,	 that	 is,	 when	 uncertainty	 becomes	more	 risky	 than	 ambiguous.	 A	 citizen	 with	 low	 expectations	 on	 the	other	 hand,	 would	 be	 more	 negatively	 affected	 when	 receiving	pessimistic	 information	 corresponding	 to	 their	 set	 of	 beliefs.	 Future	
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studies	could	usefully	follow	up	on	the	unique	interplay	of	individuals’	beliefs	within	the	framework	of	both	the	type	and	source	of	uncertainty.		 	
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Chapter	4	
Anticipating	rewards25	
The	 power	 of	 beliefs	 in	 activating	 an	 expected	 reward	
signal	in	the	ventral	striatum	
	
Introduction	Decision-making	under	 conditions	of	 uncertainty,	 that	 is,	when	we	cannot	exactly	know	the	outcome	of	our	choices,	is	often	guided	by	the	beliefs	we	have	about	the	world.	For	example,	we	bring	an	umbrella	to	work	 based	 on	 our	 estimations	 of	 likelihood	 of	 rain	 later	 that	 day,	and	 we	 choose	 to	 loan	 money	 to	 an	 acquaintance	 by	 assessing	 the	chance	our	money	will	be	repaid.	The	beliefs	we	generate	about	these	situations,	 and	 how	 these	 beliefs	 are	 updated	 once	 we	 find	 out	 the	outcome,	 are	 therefore	 critical	 in	 understanding	 this	 decision-making	process.	 Economic	 theory	 assumes	 that	 decision-makers	 have	 beliefs	about	uncertain	choice	events	(Savage,	1954),	with	these	beliefs	acting	as	subjective	probabilities,	which	in	turn	guide	individual	choice	under	uncertainty	 (Wakker,	 2010).26	Beliefs	 can	 be	 instantiated	 in	 several	ways,	 for	 instance	based	on	 specific	 knowledge,	 received	 information,	and	expertise	 in	a	particular	domain	(Fox	and	Tversky,	1995;	Fox	and	Weber,	2002).	For	example,	imagine	you	are	an	investor	who	regularly	reviews	business	 plans	 and	 needs	 to	 decide	which	 one	 to	 fund.	 Although	 you	have	experience	in	this	domain,	you	also	realize	the	world	is	uncertain,	and	therefore	you	carefully	decide	which	project	to	fund	based	on	your	expectations	about	which	entrepreneurs	will	successfully	execute	their	business	 plan.	 You	will	 learn	 if	 your	 expectations	were	 correct	when,																																																									25	This	chapter	 is	based	on	a	 joint	paper	with	Alan	Sanfey,	 Jana	Vyrastekova	and	Utz	Weitzel,	Anticipating	rewards.	The	power	of	beliefs	in	activating	an	expected	reward	signal	in	the	ventral	striatum,	2015,	in	preparation.	26	Please	see	BOX	2	in	the	Introduction	for	more	details	on	this	model.	
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after	 several	 months,	 you	 receive	 the	 financial	 statements	 of	 the	companies	you	funded.	In	particular	you	are	interested	in	reviewing	the	projects	you	expected	to	do	well	and	for	which	you	anticipated	a	high	return	on	investment.		Together,	an	investor’s	beliefs	regarding	successful	execution	of	the	business	plan	and	the	estimated	return	on	investment	feed	into	the	expected	reward	from	the	decision.	More	broadly,	decision-makers	only	ever	get	a	full	picture	of	the	relationship	between	beliefs	and	decisions	by	 examining	 the	 eventual	 outcomes	 of	 their	 decisions,	 which	 offers	opportunity	 to	 learn	whether	 the	decision-maker’s	 initial	expectations	are	met,	 or	were	 incorrectly	 assessed.	 Prior	 to	 learning	 the	 outcomes	however,	 one	 can	 imagine,	 as	 might	 the	 investor,	 that	 anticipated	rewards	 increase	 in	 correspondence	 to	 individual’s	 beliefs,	 i.e.	 the	higher	 the	 beliefs	 of	 obtaining	 a	 reward	 in	 the	 future,	 the	 higher	 the	anticipated	rewards	themselves.		In	this	Chapter	we	are	interested	in	the	mediating	role	of	beliefs	for	 anticipating	 rewards.	 One	 typical	 task	 used	 to	 investigate	anticipated	 rewards	 in	 humans	 is	 the	 monetary	 incentive	 delay	 task	(MID;	Knutson	et	al.,	2000).	Here,	the	decision-maker	must	respond	via	button	press	within	a	certain	time-limit	in	order	to	receive	a	monetary	reward.	 The	 essential	 feature	 of	 the	 MID	 is	 that	 before	 this	 reaction	time	 task,	 players	 learn	 that	 certain	 visual	 cues	 that	 they	 will	 later	respond	to	are	associated	with	specific	gains	or	losses,	indicating	either	how	large	the	monetary	reward	is,	or	how	much	they	can	avoid	losing	if	they	 perform	 the	 button	 press	 task	 successfully.	 In	 the	MID	 this	 cue-reward	association	is	labeled	anticipatory	reward	(Carter	et	al.,	2009).			The	 MID	 paradigm	 used	 to	 elicit	 anticipatory	 rewards	 and	punishments	 is	 based	 on	 earlier	 primate	work	 (Knutson	 et	 al.,	 2001).	Anticipatory	 reward	 in	 primates	 is	 studied	 using	 conditioning	experiments	in	which	arbitrary	stimuli	signal	appetitive	rewards.	When	these	 stimuli	 are	 repeatedly	 paired	 with	 an	 appetitive	 reward,	 these	stimuli	will	change	from	unconditioned	to	conditioned	stimuli	(Schultz	et	 al.,	 1997),	 with	 dopaminergic	 neurons	 modulating	 this	 process	(Fiorillo	 et	 al.,	 2003;	 Schultz	 et	 al.,	 1998;	 Schultz,	 2010).	 Dopamine	firing	 will	 initially	 only	 occur	 when	 primates	 receive	 the	 appetitive	reward	itself,	but	once	primates	have	learned	the	associations	between	stimuli	 and	 rewards,	 dopamine	 firing	 will	 then,	 and	 indeed	 only,	
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respond	when	 the	conditioned	stimuli	appear	 (Schultz,	2010).	Only	 in	the	 event	 of	 the	 delivery	 of	 the	 appetitive	 reward	 unexpectedly	changing	 following	 a	 conditioned	 stimuli	 will	 dopaminergic	 neuronal	activity	be	observed	at	the	time	of	reward	delivery	(Schultz,	2010).		In	 humans,	 the	 dopaminergic	 effects	 of	 rewards	 have	 been	associated	 with	 activation	 in	 the	 ventral	 striatum,	 in	 particular	 the	nucleus	 accumbens	 (NAcc),	 with	 this	 region’s	 axons	 receiving	dopaminergic	 input	 from	 the	 ventral	 tegmental	 area	 (VTA)	 in	 the	midbrain	 (Schultz,	 1998).	 Striatal	 activity	 has	 been	 observed	 for	anticipatory	 rewards	 in	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 modalities.	 For	 example,	activation	 in	 the	 ventral	 striatum,	 mediated	 by	 abstract	 cue-associations,	has	been	observed	for	monetary	rewards	(Knutson	et	al.,	2001;	Knutson	and	Greer,	2008),	food		(O’Doherty	et	al.,	2002;	Hare	et	al.,	 2008;	 2009),	 social	 cooperation	 (Powers	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Korn	 et	 al.,	2012;	Lin	et	al.,	2012;	Jones	et	al.,	2011;	Davey	et	al.,	2009;	Rilling	et	al.,	2004)	and	even	the	punishment	of	others	(Singer	et	al.,	2006).		Though	 many	 studies	 have	 investigated	 the	 neural	underpinnings	of	 reward	anticipation	by	varying	 the	 reward	 type	and	reward	modality,	 to	 the	best	of	our	knowledge	 the	method	of	evoking	anticipatory	 rewards	 via	 abstract	 cues	 has	 never	 been	 adapted.	Here,	we	investigate	whether	decision-makers’	beliefs	about	the	outcomes	of	their	choices	can	also	act	as	a	cue	for	reward	anticipation,	that	is,	when	the	reward	cue	is	a	function	of	prior	internal	evaluations	as	opposed	to	an	externally-provided	association.	 In	a	similar	vein	as	to	how	reward	anticipatory	 mechanisms	 operate	 when	 a	 previously-learned	 cue	 is	presented,	 we	 expect	 that	 people	 anticipate	 rewards	 when	 awaiting	outcomes	of	previous	decisions	that	were	mediated	by	internal	beliefs.	When	the	investor	from	our	earlier	example	anticipates	a	higher	return	from	 certain	 business	 projects,	 we	 would	 predict	 that	 these	expectations	 would	 lead	 to	 increased	 reward	 anticipation	 prior	 to	learning	 how	 these	 projects	 materialized.	 Mechanistically,	 we	hypothesize	 that	 this	 process	 is	mediated	 by	 activation	 in	 the	 ventral	striatum	when	participants	anticipate	the	receipt	of	their	rewards.	To	 examine	 this	 question	 experimentally,	 that	 is,	 the	 neural	mechanisms	of	belief-mediated	anticipatory	rewards,	the	first	step	is	to	elicit	beliefs	that	can	in	turn	be	related	to	participants’	decision-making.	Once	we	observe	that	participant’s	decisions	are	indeed	guided	by	their	
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beliefs,	 we	 can	 then	 investigate	 the	 associated	 BOLD	 response	 as	participants	 await	 the	 respective	 outcomes.	 The	 task	 should	 also	involve	 incentivized	 DMUU,	 as	 dopaminergic	 modulation	 is	 primarily	observed	 when	 rewards	 are	 actually	 valuable	 in	 an	 uncertain	environment	(Schultz,	2010).		In	our	design	we	distinguish	between	both	sources	and	types	of	uncertainty.	 The	 sources	 of	 uncertainty	 we	 use	 stem	 from	 either	 a	lottery	 or	 from	 the	 choices	 of	 another	 person.	 Though	 experimental	investigations	of	uncertainty	often	employ	a	mechanistic	 flip	of	a	 coin	or	 the	 roll	 of	 a	 die,	 people	 frequently	 face	 strategic	 uncertainty	 that	directly	 stems	 from	 the	 conscious	 choice	 of	 (an)other	 person(s)	(Trautmann	and	Vieider,	2011).	Though	anticipated	rewards	in	a	social	and	non-social	setting	may	both	be	processed	in	the	striatum	(Lin	et	al.,	2012),	 by	 using	 participants’	 own	 belief	 sets	 it	 could	 well	 be	 that	participants	rely	more	on	their	beliefs	in	a	social	context	(Chang	et	al.,	2011).	 Therefore	 we	 are	 interested	 in	 investigating	 if	 non-social	 and	social	 sources	 of	 uncertainty	 influence	 belief-mediated	 anticipatory	rewards	in	different	ways.		By	 types	 of	 uncertainty,	 we	 distinguish	 between	 risk	 and	ambiguity,	 that	 is	events,	which	are	characterized	by	known	objective	probabilities	 respectively	 unknown	 probabilities,	 in	 which	 case	decision-makers	 need	 to	 rely	 on	 their	 subjective	 probabilities	(Trautmann	and	van	de	Kuilen,	2013).	Most	of	our	daily	decisions	are	ambiguous,	 as	 the	 majority	 of	 events	 we	 encounter	 cannot	 be	 fully	defined	 in	 terms	of	exact	probability	estimation	 (Wakker,	2011).	That	is,	we	cannot	express	our	decisions	as	a	fair	coin	toss	or	the	roll	of	a	die.	The	majority	of	the	experiments	that	employ	the	MID	exclusively	focus	on	 ambiguity	 as	 type	 of	 uncertainty,	 meaning	 that	 anticipatory	 cues,	which	signal	gains	and	losses,	materialize	under	complete	uncertainty.	Uncertainty	 gets	 resolved	when	 the	 outcome	 associated	with	 the	 cue	either	occurs	or	does	not	occur,	 i.e.	probability	 is	1	or	0	(Knutson	and	Greer,	2008).	A	few	studies	focused	on	neural	differences	of	anticipated	rewards	 when	 cue-reward	 associations	 materialize	 with	 known	probabilities	 (risk)	 versus	 unknown	 probabilities	 (ambiguity).	 These	studies	show	a	distinct	pattern	of	brain	activation	between	anticipatory	rewards	 under	 risk	 versus	 ambiguity	 (Volz	 et	 al.,	 2002;	 Tobler	 et	 al.,	2006).	These	findings	are	in	line	with	primate	studies,	which	show	that	
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dopaminergic	 modulation	 of	 rewards	 varies	 across	 probability	distributions	 (Fiorillo	 et	 al.,	 2003).	 By	 employing	 different	 types	 of	uncertainty	we	can	study	anticipated	rewards	that	are	related	to	beliefs	and	from	objective	probabilities.		Therefore,	we	utilize	here	an	incentivized	task	in	which	we	can	manipulate	both	the	type	–	risk	and	ambiguity	–	and	the	source	–	social	and	non-social	–	of	uncertainty.	An	essential	feature	of	our	design	is	the	elicitation	 of	 individuals’	 beliefs	 prior	 to	 decision-making	 itself.	 This	enables	us	to	directly	examine	the	influence	of	beliefs	on	decisions,	and	in	 the	 subsequent	 anticipatory	 reward	 signals	 we	 can	 observe	 while	people	await	the	decision	outcomes.	Once	 participants	 view	 these	 outcomes,	 they	 likely	 compare	their	obtained	rewards	with	those	they	expected	based	on	their	beliefs.	This	 process	 is	 often	 labeled	 counterfactual	 thinking	 (Camille	 et	 al.,	2004)	and	describes	the	comparison	between	what	was	gained	versus	what	could	have	been	gained.	Unlike	the	feeling	of	disappointment	that	is	typically	experienced	after	a	 loss,	several	studies	(e.g.	Coricelli	et	al.	2005;	2007;	Loomes	and	Sugden,	1982)	have	shown	that	the	additional	emotion	 of	 regret	 is	 involved	 when	 people	 make	 this	 comparison	between	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 choice	 and	 an	 unrealized,	 better,	 foregone	alternative.	 Furthermore,	 Coricelli	 et	 al.	 (2005;	 2007)	 show	 that	 this	experience	 of	 regret	 is	 correlated	 with	 activity	 in	 the	 orbitofrontal	cortex	 (OFC),	 which	 is	 distinct	 from	 both	 activity	 in	 the	 striatum	following	rewarding	outcomes,	or	from	activity	in	the	middle	temporal	gyrus	and	dorsal	brainstem	following	mere	disappointment.	Additional	evidence	 regarding	 a	 causal	 role	 for	 the	 OFC	 in	 experiencing	 regret	stems	 from	 patients	with	 lesions	 to	 this	 region.	 Compared	 to	 healthy	controls,	these	patients	do	not	experience	anticipated	regret,	but	rather	make	 judgments	 solely	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 current	 choice	 without	making	any	comparison	to	previous	outcomes	(Camille	et	al.,	2004).			Our	paradigm	additionally	allows	us	 to	examine	how	outcomes	that	 deviate	 from	 our	 expectations	 are	 processed,	 i.e.	 those	 decisions	that	then	likely	 induce	decision	regret.	Therefore,	a	second	aim	of	this	study	is	to	investigate	the	neural	mechanisms	of	the	actual	experience	of	outcomes	following	participants’	decision-making.	The	 affective	 state	 of	 regret	 has	 to	 date	 only	 been	 studied	 for	risky	lotteries,	by	letting	participants	make	a	binomial	choice	between	
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two	risky	lotteries	(Coricelli	et	al.	2005;	2007,	Camille	et	al.,	2004).	Our	design	 allows	 us	 to	 investigate	 counterfactual	 thinking	 in	 a	 richer	environment	 that	 varies	 types	 and	 sources	 of	 uncertainty.	Hereby	we	can	address	if	risk	versus	ambiguity,	a	lottery	versus	a	social	source	of	uncertainty	 and	 this	 interaction	 affects	 the	 actual	 experience	 of	obtaining	a	reward.	
	 Taken	 together,	 our	 study	 aims	 to	 test	 how	 internally	constructed	beliefs,	as	opposed	to	the	learned	cue-outcome	associations	used	 in	 the	MID,	affect	 the	neural	mechanisms	of	 reward	anticipation.	Based	 on	 the	 findings	 that	 anticipated	 rewards,	 via	 abstract	 cues,	 are	coded	 in	 the	 ventral	 striatum,	 we	 hypothesize	 that	 belief-mediated	anticipatory	 rewards	 will	 likewise	 activate	 the	 ventral	 striatum.	 We	explore	 this	 question	 using	 an	 incentivized	 decision-making	 task	 that	distinguishes	between	types	and	sources	of	uncertainty.	This	paradigm	also	allows	us	 to	 study	 counterfactual	 thinking	when	decision-makers	learn	the	actual	outcomes.	We	specifically	investigate	if	the	OFC	tracks	the	 difference	 between	 what	 they	 expected	 and	 what	 they	 actually	obtained	in	our	decision-making	task	under	uncertainty.		
Methods	
	
Participants	A	 total	 of	 26	 participants	 (mean	 age	 =	 22,	 50%	 female)	 were	recruited	for	this	study	via	the	online	recruitment	system	SONA	of	the	Donders	 Institute	 for	Brain,	Cognition	and	Behaviour.	 Students	with	a	psychology	 or	 economics	 background	were	 excluded	 due	 to	 concerns	about,	 respectively,	 suspicions	 regarding	 the	 veracity	 of	 the	 actual	social	interaction	and	a	prior	detailed	understanding	of	game	theoretic	behavior.		Four	of	 the	26	participants	were	 excluded.	One	participant	did	not	 believe	 the	 real	 human	 interaction	 and	 the	 incentive	 scheme,	 one	made	the	same	choice	on	all	trials,	and	another	chose	extreme	options,	varying	 more	 than	 two	 standard	 deviations	 from	 mean	 responses.	Finally,	 one	participant	was	 excluded	due	 to	 technical	 issues	with	 the	
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MRI	scanner.	Therefore,	unless	explicitly	noted,	analyses	reported	here	are	based	on	22	participants	(mean	age	=	22,	12	females	and	10	males).			
Design	The	experiment	consisted	of	two	parts,	a	decision	phase	and	an	outcome	phase,	which	were	separated	by	a	short	break.	Here,	we	focus	on	the	outcome	phase.	We	have	discussed	the	decision-making	phase	in	detail	in	Chapter	3	of	this	thesis,	however	we	explain	here	this	phase	in	order	to	clarify	the	outcome	phase.			On	each	trial,	participants	received	an	endowment	of	10	tokens.	Participants	could	then	decide	to	invest	any	amount	of	these	tokens	in	either	a	human	partner	(social	source)	or	a	lottery	(non-social	source),	with	 the	 investment	 amount	 then	 tripled	 by	 the	 experimenter.	Additionally,	 there	 were	 two	 different	 types	 of	 uncertainty	 regarding	the	 likelihood	 of	 their	 investment	 being	 repaid,	 that	 of	 risk	 and	 of	ambiguity,	for	a	total	of	four	experimental	conditions.		In	the	social	condition,	the	fMRI	participant,	termed	the	sender,	has	their	(tripled)	investment	transferred	to	another	player,	known	as	the	 receiver.	 The	 receiver	 can	 then	 decide	 to	 either	 keep	 all	 of	 this	investment,	 or	 return	 half	 of	 it	 to	 the	 sender.	 If	 half	 is	 sent	 back,	 the	sender	 is	obviously	better	off	 than	 if	 they	had	not	 transferred	money,	but	at	the	time	of	decision	faces	uncertainty	as	to	whether	the	receiver	will	 reciprocate	 his	 or	 her	 trust.	 This	 is	 effectively	 a	 standard	 Trust	Game	(Berg	et	al.,	1995).	Receivers’	 choices	 were	 collected	 during	 a	 behavioral	 session	prior	to	the	fMRI	experiment.	Receivers	simply	made	a	binomial	choice	to	either	return	or	keep	the	investment	should	a	positive	investment	be	received	from	the	sender.	Receivers	could	not	condition	their	choice	on	the	 different	 investment	 amounts	 the	 sender	 could	 potentially	 invest	with	the	receiver.	Thereby	our	fMRI	participants,	in	their	role	as	sender,	only	 act	 upon	 beliefs	 regarding	 receivers’	 trustworthy	 behavior	 and	their	 decisions	 are	 not	 confounded	 by	 other	motives	 of	 investing,	 for	example	signaling	or	elicitation	of	positive	reciprocity.		In	the	non-social	condition,	participants’	outcomes	are	resolved	via	a	lottery,	specifically	a	marble	drawn	from	an	urn,	with	this	marble	being	 either	 a	 ’winning’	 or	 ‘losing’	 color.	 Again,	 the	 fMRI	 participant	
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decides	 on	 a	 transfer,	 receiving	 back	 either	 half	 of	 the	 tripled	investment	 (if	 a	 winning	 colored	 marble	 is	 drawn),	 or	 alternatively	losing	their	entire	investment	(if	a	losing	colored	marble	is	drawn).	This	is	a	typical	Ellsberg	lottery	design	(Ellsberg,	1961).27		In	both	social	and	non-social	decision	contexts,	participants	saw	trials	 where	 they	 explicitly	 knew	 the	 probabilities	 of	 either	 a	reciprocating	partner	or	a	winning	color	 respectively	 (risk	 condition),	or	 where	 these	 probabilities	 were	 unknown	 (ambiguity	 conditions).	Participants	made	investment	choices	across	these	four	settings,	known	as	the	ambiguous	trust	game	(ATG),	risky	trust	game	(RTG),	ambiguous	lottery	(ALOT)	and	risky	lottery	(RLOT).	We	are	able	to	create	risky	and	ambiguous	trials	by	introducing	a	group	principle	to	the	general	feature	of	 the	 games	 discussed	 above.	 In	 the	 Trust	 Game	 we	 group	 nine	decisions	made	 by	 nine	 different	 receivers.	 One	 receiver	 is	 randomly	drawn	from	the	pool	of	nine	receivers	and	matched	to	the	participant’s	investment	choice.	In	the	lottery	there	are	nine	marbles	in	the	urn.	One	randomly	 drawn	 marble	 from	 this	 urn	 determines	 if	 the	 participant	gets	back	half	of	his	tripled	investment.			In	 the	 social	 context	 participants	 have	 prior	 beliefs	 about	 the	reciprocal	 behavior	 of	 receivers.	 Therefore	 we	 elicited	 individuals’	beliefs	in	the	ATG	before	participants	made	decisions	in	our	experiment	in	the	scanner.	We	asked	how	many	receivers	out	of	the	pool	of	9	they	thought	would	reciprocate	their	investment.	This	belief	is	then	used	to	offer	 participants	 belief-corresponding	 scenarios	 in	 the	 other	experimental	 settings.	 Essentially,	 individual	 beliefs	 determined	 a	tailor-made	 trial	 structure	 for	 each	 participant.	 For	 example	 if	 a	participant	 expressed	 a	 belief	 that	 3	 out	 of	 9	 receivers	 would	reciprocate	 in	 the	 ATG,	 this	 participant	 was	 informed	 during	instructions	 that	3	out	of	9	 colors	 are	winning	 colors	 in	 the	ALOT.	As	the	 ALOT	 is	 an	 urn	 filled	 with	 nine	 marbles	 in	 an	 unknown	 color	composition,	 receiving	 information	 regarding	 the	 number	 of	 winning	colors	is	not	similar	to	an	objective	probability	in	the	RLOT.	In	the	RTG,	participants	 would	most	 often	make	 investment	 choices	 according	 to	the	 belief-corresponding	 scenario,	 in	 this	 case	 three	 receivers	 out	 of																																																									27	Please	 see	 BOX	 1	 in	 the	 Introduction	 for	 an	 explanation	 of	 the	 experiment	established	by	Daniel	Ellsberg	(1961).	
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nine	 receivers	will	 reciprocate.	Lastly,	 a	belief-corresponding	scenario	in	 the	 RLOT	 entails	 that	 three	 out	 of	 nine	 marbles	 are	 colored	 by	 a	winning	color	(See	Figure	5	in	Chapter	3).	By	 implementing	 this	 feature	 we	 make	 sure	 that	 beliefs	 are	aligned	 in	 our	 four	 settings.	 This	 enables	 us	 to	 investigate	 expected	reward	 signals	 by	 examining	 the	 effect	 of	 both	 source	 and	 type	 of	uncertainty,	 taking	 into	 account	 participant’s	 beliefs.	 To	 reiterate,	 we	focus	here	solely	on	the	outcome	phase,	that	is,	after	all	decisions	have	been	made	(see	Figure	11).	Two	screens	are	of	note.	Firstly,	we	examine	screen	4,	which	we	term	the	anticipation	screen;	here	participants	are	shown	a	choice	setup	and	 subsequent	 investment	 they	 themselves	 chose	 in	 the	 earlier	decision	phase.	Then,	they	see	the	actual	outcome	of	that	trial,	when	a	randomly	 selected	 receiver	 (social	 condition)	 or	 marble	 (nonsocial	condition)	is	selected	(final	screen	Figure	11,	henceforth	referred	to	as	the	 outcome	 screen).	 When	 the	 selected	 receiver	 or	 marble	 is	highlighted	green	 this	 indicates	a	winning	 trial,	and	when	colored	red	indicates	a	losing	trial.	After	each	block	of	six	trials	from	both	the	social	and	 non-social	 condition,	 one	 trial	 from	 both	 contexts	 was	 randomly	selected	 for	 actual	 payment	 (Figure	 12).	 After	 the	 experiment	 tokens	were	converted	to	Euros	and	participants	were	paid	accordingly.			The	 fMRI	 task	 was	 presented	 using	 Psychtoolbox	 (Matlab).	Participants	 read	 instructions	 and	 performed	 a	 belief	 elicitation	 task	(75	minutes	 in	 total)	 before	 they	were	 placed	 in	 the	MRI	 scanner	 for	approximately	 60	 min.	 They	 saw	 a	 total	 of	 96	 trials	 in	 the	 scanner,	equally	divided	between	outcomes	 in	 the	Trust	Game	and	 the	 lottery.	The	outcomes	were	presented	in	16	blocks,	with	each	block	consisting	of	six	trials	of	either	Trust	Game	or	lottery	outcomes.	Within	each	block	both	risky	and	ambiguous	trials	were	presented	in	a	random	order.	As	outlined	 above,	 the	 exact	 set	 of	 risky	 trials	 was	 tailored	 to	 each	participant’s	 belief	 regarding	 receivers’	 return	 choice	 in	 the	 ATG.	 In	addition,	 we	 also	 had	 filler	 trials	 for	 other	 probabilities	 that	 did	 not	match	participants’	beliefs.	These	 trials	were	not	 included	 in	 the	 fMRI	analyses.	 After	 the	 experiment	 subjects	 were	 paid	 out	 in	 cash	dependent	on	their	choices	and	randomly	selected	outcomes.	Please	see	the	Appendix	for	the	instructions	and	the	payment	scheme.		
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500	–	3500	ms	
1000	ms	
3000	–	5000	ms	
3500	ms	
3000	–	5000	ms	
3000	ms	
Above	you	can	see	an	outcome	related	to	ATG.	We	took	pictures	of	receivers	
while	 they	 were	 seated	 behind	 a	 laptop.	 The	 pictures	 only	 show	 receivers’	
silhouettes	in	black	and	white	and	no	facial	features	are	shown.	
Figure	11:	Illustration	of	an	outcome	trial	
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Image	acquisition	Functional	 neuroimaging	 data	 was	 collected	 on	 a	 3-Tesla	Siemens	 MRI	 system	 (Skyra)	 at	 the	 Donders	 Centre	 for	 Cognitive	Neuroimaging	 in	 Nijmegen,	 The	 Netherlands.	 Images	 were	 acquired	using	a	32-channel	head	coil,	with	a	standard	multi-echo	imaging	pulse	T2*-weighted	 sequence	 (field	 of	 view	 =	 224	 mm,	 matrix	 =	 64	 ×	 64,	repetition	time	(TR)	=	2390	ms;	echo	times	(TE)	=	9.4	ms,	20.6	ms,	32.0	ms,	43.0	ms,	54.0	ms,	flip	angle	=	90°,	slice	gap	=	0.5	mm).	Using	a	multi-echo	 sequence	 provides	 a	 better	 signal-to-noise	 ratio	 for	 brain	 areas	susceptible	to	dropout,	while	allowing	for	scanning	of	the	whole	brain	(Poser	 et	 al.,	 2006).	 One	 whole-brain	 volume	 consisted	 of	 thirty-one	ascending	slices	(slice	thickness	=	3.0	mm,	voxel	size	=	3.5	×	3.5	×	3.0	mm).	 For	 each	 participant	 we	 acquired	 a	 high-resolution	 anatomical	T1-weighted	image	(MPRAGE;	192	slices;	TR	=	2300	ms,	voxel	size	=	1	×	1	×	1	mm).	Participants'	heads	were	loosely	taped	to	the	coil	within	the	scanner	in	order	to	limit	movement	during	image	acquisition.	
Figure	 12:	 A	 randomly	 selected	 choice	 from	 the	 ALOT	 informing	
participants	how	many	tokens	they	won.	
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Data	analyses	
Behavioral	parameters	During	 the	 outcome	 phase	 no	 actual	 decision-making	 takes	place.	We	 do	 use	 two	 parameters	 from	 the	 previous	 decision-making	phase	 that	 are	 relevant	 when	 participants	 view	 the	 associated	outcomes.	The	 first	parameter	 is	 the	previously	made	 investment	choices,	which	participants	passively	review	while	anticipating	either	a	gain	or	a	loss.		 The	 second	 parameter	 of	 interest	 is	 the	 optimal	 amount	 of	investment	in	the	case	of	a	gain	(when	the	participant	is	matched	with	a	TG	 receiver	 who	 reciprocated	 or	 a	 winning	 colored	 marble	 in	 the	lottery)	or	a	 loss	 (the	participant	 is	matched	with	a	non-reciprocating	receiver	 in	 the	TG	or	a	 losing	colored	marble	 in	 the	 lottery).28	When	a	participant	 faces	 a	 gain,	 irrespective	 of	 the	 specific	 source	 of	uncertainty,	she	should	have	invested	all	her	10	tokens.	Any	deviation	from	an	 investment	of	10	 tokens	 is	what	we	 label	as	regret:	you	won,	but	 you	 could	 have	 won	 more	 when	 invested	 more	 tokens.	 To	 be	precise,	 this	 variable	 subtracts	 the	 participant’s	 investment	 from	 the	optimal	amount	 invested,	which	 is	10	 tokens,	 in	case	she	 faces	a	gain.	The	 higher	 this	 variable,	 themore	 tokens	 she	 has	 foregone,	 and	 the	more	 regret	 she	 arguably	 feels.	 This	 variable	 is	 created	 for	 both	 the	lottery	and	TG	setting.	On	the	other	hand,	when	a	participant	loses,	she	will	lose	most	when	she	invested	all	her	tokens.	Any	positive	deviation	from	0	token	will	increase	the	amount	lost	and	we	label	this	as	rejoice.	To	 be	 precise,	 here	 we	 take	 the	 participant’s	 investment	 amount,	 in	case	 she	 faces	 a	 loss.	 The	 higher	 this	 variable,	 the	 more	 tokens	 she	loses,	 and	 the	more	 rejoice	 she	 arguably	 feels.	 Again,	 this	 variable	 is	created	 for	 both	 the	 lottery	 and	 TG	 setting.	 Together	 we	 have	 four	variables:	 regret	 in	 the	 lottery,	 regret	 in	 the	TG,	 rejoice	 in	 the	 lottery	and	rejoice	in	the	TG.		
																																																								28	We	collapsed	the	risky	and	ambiguous	trials	due	to	the	restricted	number	of	trials	in	which	participants	either	faced	a	gain	or	a	loss	in	each	of	our	four	conditions.	
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Neuroimaging	analyses	To	 study	 the	 neural	 mechanisms	 of	 reward	 anticipation,	 we	examined	the	BOLD	response	during	trials	in	which	participants	review	their	previously	made	choices	and	await	 their	outcome	(fourth	screen	Figure	 11).	 The	main	 regressors	 for	 these	 relevant	 trials	 indicate	 the	onsets	of	 the	anticipation	screens	when	participants	either	played	 the	RTG	 (belief-corresponding	 risky	 trials),	 ATG,	 RLOT	 (belief-corresponding	 risky	 trials),	 and	 ALOT.	We	 refer	 to	 this	 model	 as	 the	
anticipation	model.	 To	 test	 if	 participant’s	 investment	 behavior	 serves	as	 a	 cue	 that	 triggers	 expected	 rewards,	 we	 add	 this	 variable	 as	parametric	modulator	to	the	anticipation	model.	To	 study	 the	 underlying	 neural	 mechanisms	 of	 the	 outcomes	themselves,	 we	 analyzed	 the	 BOLD	 response	 of	 trials	 in	 which	participants	 experience	 gains	 and	 losses	 (sixth	 screen	 Figure	 1).	 	 Our	main	regressors	 for	 these	relevant	 trials	are	 the	onsets	of	all	outcome	screens	 of	 the	 RTG	 (belief-corresponding	 risky	 trials),	 ATG,	 RLOT	(belief-corresponding	risky	trials),	and	ALOT.	We	refer	to	this	model	as	the	 outcome	model.	 To	 study	 the	 effect	 of	 regret	 and	 rejoice	 we	 add	these	variables	as	parametric	modulators,	respectively	attached	to	the	onsets	of	gain	trials	and	loss	trials.	The	 regressors	 were	 modeled	 with	 a	 canonical	 hemodynamic	response	function	during	a	time-window	of	two	seconds	after	the	onset	of	 the	 screen.	 To	 account	 for	 residual	 variance,	 we	 also	 included	 the	temporal	 derivatives	 of	 each	 regressor.	 Then,	 the	motion	 parameters	from	realignment,	 including	its	quadratic	effect	and	first	derivative	(in	total	 18	 motion	 parameters	 per	 individual),	 were	 included	 in	 the	generalized	linear	model	(GLM).	A	standard	high-pass	filter	(cut-off	128	seconds)	 was	 used	 during	 the	 GLM	 analysis	 to	 account	 for	 possible	slow-frequency	 drifts.	 Finally,	 a	 whole-brain	 second-level	 model	 was	used	 to	 analyze	 group	 effects	 for	 the	 specified	 contrasts	 discussed	 in	the	 results	 section.	 Individual	 beliefs	 were	 always	 included	 as	 a	covariate.	 Statistical	 maps	 were	 corrected	 for	 multiple	 comparisons	using	 whole-brain	 cluster	 correction	 with	 an	 initial	 threshold	 of	 p	 <	0.001	and	a	Family	Wise	Error	corrected	cluster	threshold	of	p	<	0.05.	Some	 contrasts	 also	mention	 clusters,	 at	 p	 <	0.001	uncorrected	 (>	30	voxels).		
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Results	
Beliefs	and	decision-making	under	uncertainty	In	 the	 ATG,	 participants	 decided	 how	 much	 to	 invest	 with	 a	receiver	 without	 knowledge	 of	 the	 exact	 likelihood	 of	 reciprocation	across	 receivers.	 Figure	 13a	 shows	 a	 positive	 correlation	 between	participants’	 beliefs,	 elicited	 prior	 to	 decision-making	 outside	 the	scanner,	 and	 investment	behavior	 in	 the	ATG	 (r=0.642,	p=0.001).	 The	greater	number	of	receivers	 that	our	 fMRI	participants	 thought	would	be	present	in	a	group	of	9	receivers,	the	more	tokens	they	invested.		Figure	13b	shows	that	participants	invested	more	in	the	ALOT	as	they	 saw	 more	 winning	 colors	 from	 the	 set	 of	 nine	 potential	 colors	(r=0.597,	p=0.003).	As	expected,	in	both	social	and	non-social	contexts,	the	 higher	 the	 probability	 of	 receiving	 half	 of	 the	 tripled	 investment	back,	the	more	tokens	participants	invested.		
Although	these	results	may	sound	very	intuitive,	these	are	trivial	for	 the	 upcoming	 neuroimaging	 analyses.	 Namely,	 when	 we	 add	
Figure	13	Beliefs	and	transfer	in	ATG	and	ALOT		 						Figure	13a	 	 	 	 	 Figure	13b	
Elicited	 beliefs	 influenced	 chosen	 transfer	 in	 the	 ATG.	 Based	 on	 individual	
beliefs,	participants	received	a	matching	amount	of	winning	colors	in	the	ALOT.	
Particpants	 included	 this	 information,	 given	 during	 instructions	 prior	 to	 the	
experiment	in	the	MRI	scanner,	as	transfer	positively	increased	as	afunction	of	
the	amount	of	winning	colors.	
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participant’s	 investment	 choices	 to	 our	 fMRI	 models	 we	 can	 reliably	state	that	these	investments	are	guided	by	their	individual	beliefs.		
Imaging	data	We	 first	 focused	 on	 our	 primary	 research	 question	 concerning	the	 anticipation	 phase.	 Did	 participants	who	 invested	most,	 which	 as	we	showed	earlier	is	influenced	by	their	beliefs	about	reciprocity,	show	a	 greater	 expected	 reward	 signal	 while	 they	 reviewed	 their	 chosen	investment	 prior	 to	 seeing	 the	 outcome	 (fourth	 screen	 in	 Figure	 11)?	We	 indeed	 found	 that	 the	 more	 one	 invested	 in	 the	 Trust	 Game,	 as	compared	to	the	lottery	context,	the	more	activation	was	observed	in	an	area	that	encompassed	both	the	 left	ventral	caudate	and	NAcc	(Figure	14).	 Although	 this	 activation	 appeared	 to	 extend	 into	 the	 lateral	ventricle,	 we	 lowered	 the	 statistical	 threshold	 to	 verify	 that	 the	activation	stemmed	from	the	striatum.			
	Although	 sources	 of	 uncertainty	 influence	 belief-mediated	rewards,	as	shown	above,	we	could	not	 identify	neural	differences	 for	types	of	uncertainty,	i.e.	we	did	not	find	differences	in	brain	activation	
Figure	 14:	 Anticipating	 rewards	 in	 the	 social	 context	 activates	 left	 ventral	
striatum	(FWE	<	0.05).	
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between	 anticipated	 rewards,	 which	 stem	 for	 risky	 trials	 versus	ambiguous	trials.	Then,	 we	 examined	 the	 question	 of	 neural	 differences	 when	outcomes	 resolved	 (outcome	 screens)	 Firstly,	 to	 replicate	 previous	findings,	 we	 investigated	 the	 contrast	 between	 experiencing	 a	 gain	versus	a	loss	during	the	outcome	phase,	collapsed	across	experimental	conditions	 (last	 screen	 in	 Figure	 11),	which	 exhibited	 strong	 bilateral	activation	 in	 the	 striatum	 (dorsal	 caudate)	 (FWE	p<0.05)	 (Figure	15).	The	 reverse	 contrast,	 a	 loss	 versus	 a	 gain,	 did	 not	 yield	 any	 striatal	activation,	even	at	a	lowered	threshold.		
	From	the	monkey	research	it	was	shown	that,	initially,	dopamine	neurons	 respond	 to	 rewards,	 but	 once	 cue-outcome	 associations	 are	learnt,	 dopamine	 neurons	 will	 not	 fire	 at	 the	 time	 the	 rewards	 gets	delivered.	 Only	 in	 case	 the	 reward	 unexpectedly	 changed,	 would	dopaminergic	 neuronal	 activity	 be	 observed	 (Schultz,	 2010).	 In	 our	setup,	this	would	imply	that	receiving	a	back-transfer	would	not	come	as	 much	 as	 a	 surprise	 for	 participants	 with	 high	 beliefs.	 Yet,	
Figure	15:	Bilateral	activation	in	the	striatum	as	participants	experience	a	gain	
over	a	loss	when	reviewing	their	outcomes	(FWE	<	0.05).		
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participants	who	had	 low	beliefs	would	presumably	not	expect	a	gain,	and	when	one	would	experience	a	gain,	it	would	therefore	be	somewhat	surprising.	We	divided	our	participants	 in	 three	equal	groups,	namely	those	 with	 low	 beliefs	 (who	 think	 only	 two	 or	 three	 receivers	 will	reciprocate),	those	with	medium	beliefs	(think	that	4	will	reciprocate),	and	those	with	high	beliefs	(think	that	five	or	six	will	reciprocate).29	We	performed	an	ANOVA	between	these	three	groups	on	the	contrast	gain	vs.	loss	collapsed	across	all	conditions.	We	indeed	found	greater	striatal	activation	when	the	outcomes	were	resolved	for	these	participants	who	had	 the	 lowest	 beliefs	 regarding	 the	 likelihood	 of	 their	 investment	being	 returned	by	 a	 receiver	 or	 the	 draw	of	 a	marble	with	 a	winning	color	in	the	lottery.	As	we	had	only	found	effects	of	sources	of	uncertainty	on	belief-mediated	 rewards,	 we	 also	 specifically	 investigated	 BOLD	 during	 the	outcome	screen	(collapsed	across	conditions	of	risk	and	ambiguity	and	across	 gain/loss)	 when	 participants	 viewed	 their	 selected	 receiver	 in	the	social	 context	as	 compared	 to	 their	 selected	marble	 in	 the	 lottery.	This	 contrast	 exhibiting	 increased	 activation	 for	 the	 social	 context	 in	the	dmPFC	and	precuneus	(Figure	16).			
																																																								29	Based	on	their	beliefs,	our	fMRI	participants	naturally	fell	 in	these	three	groups	of	(near	to)	equal	sizes	(see	Chapter	3	for	the	exact	numbers).	As	we	had	shown	in	the	previous	 Chapter	 that	 ambiguity	 preferences	 were	 greatly	 influenced	 by	 individual	beliefs,	 by	 treating	 beliefs	 as	 a	 continuous	 variable	 and	 as	 a	 categorical	 variable	 of	three	 groups	 of	 participants,	 we	 also	 wanted	 to	 look	 at	 the	 neural	 effect	 of	 beliefs	when	 outcomes	 are	 resolved.	 As	 the	 relationship	 between	 beliefs	 and	 ambiguity	preferences	 in	 the	 lottery	 showed	 a	more	 non-linear	 relationship	 (see	 Figure	 4b	 in	Chapter	 3),	 we	 chose	 to	 answer	 this	 question	 here	with	 an	 ANOVA	 by	 categorizing	participants	in	three	equal	groups	based	on	their	beliefs.	
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	Finally,	 we	 analyzed	 the	 BOLD	 response	 when	 participants	viewed	their	outcomes	in	light	of	the	interaction	between	experiencing	a	gain	or	a	loss	and	the	corresponding	optimal	investment	they	should	have	 chosen	 to	maximize	 rewards	 or	minimize	 losses.	 To	 do	 this,	we	added	 the	 variables	 that	 coded	 for	 regret	 and	 rejoice	 as	 parametric	modulators	 to	 our	 GLM	 model	 for	 the	 outcome	 screen.	 Whereas	 no	correlation	between	BOLD	and	regret	was	detected,	a	baseline	effect	of	rejoice	 (the	 effect	 of	 rejoice	 compared	 to	 all	 other	 regressors	 in	 the	outcome	model	being	set	to	zero)	bilaterally	activated	the	IFG	and	the	supplementary	motor	area.	Only	in	the	lottery	context	did	the	contrast	of	 rejoice	versus	regret	 show	activation	 in	 the	 left	 insula	extending	 to	the	orbitofrontal	pole	(p<0.001	uncorrected,	34	voxels)	and	in	the	right	IFG	(FWE	p<0.05)	(Figure	17).			
Figure	 16:	 While	 participants	 experience	 their	 outcomes	 in	 the	 social	 versus	
lottery	 conditions,	 neural	 activation	 in	 the	 the	mPFC	 and	 precuneus	 is	 found	
(FWE	<	0.05).	
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Discussion	Reward	 anticipation	 is	 a	 well-studied	 topic	 in	 the	 field	 of	Neuroeconomics	 (Knutson	 et	 al.,	 2008).	 In	 the	 wake	 of	 innovative	primate	 studies,	 a	 growing	 literature	 has	 emerged	 examining	 the	putative	 dopaminergic	 modulation	 of	 rewards	 (Schultz	 et	 al.,	 1997;	Schultz	et	al.,	1998),	with	the	MID	being	a	typical	task	used	to	study	the	neural	underpinnings	of	reward	anticipation	in	humans	(Knutson	et	al.,	2000).	Our	study	sought	to	implement	a	procedure	in	which	anticipated	rewards	stem	 from	 individuals’	beliefs	and	 their	 subsequent	decision-making	under	uncertainty	instead	of	learned	cue-outcome	associations	that	is	typically	evident	in	tasks	such	as	the	MID.	In	this	experiment,	we	examined	 the	 power	 of	 individuals’	 beliefs	 when	 making	 decisions	under	 uncertainty.	 We	 aimed	 to	 show	 that	 these	 belief-mediated	anticipated	rewards	are	processed	in	our	brain	as	an	expected	reward	signal,	 similarly	 if	 these	 rewards	 are	 evoked	 through	 abstract	 cue-outcome	associations.					
Figure	 17:	 Negative	 regret	 in	 the	 lottery	 context	 activates	 the	 left	 insula	 and	
orbitofrontal	pole	(p	<	0.001	uncorrected,	>	30	voxels)	
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Choices	made	 by	 participants	 in	 both	 the	 Trust	 Game	 and	 the	lottery	tasks	indicate	clearly	that	underlying	beliefs	guide	participants’	DMUU.	Participants	 invest	more	when	they	expect	more	of	 their	game	partners	 to	 reciprocate	 their	 investment	 in	 the	 ATG.	 Similarly,	 in	 the	ALOT	 participants	 invest	most	 when	 they	 know	 a	 greater	 number	 of	colors	 out	 of	 the	 nine	 possible	 colors	 will	 lead	 to	 a	 return	 on	 their	investment.		Our	 neuroimaging	 analyses	 then	 focused	 on	 whether	 these	belief-related	expectation	signals	were	evident	in	brain	regions	related	to	 standard	 cue-based	 reward	 anticipation.	 We	 found	 confirmatory	evidence	of	 this,	with	 the	 greater	 the	 expectation	of	 receiving	 a	back-transfer	 in	the	Trust	Game,	the	greater	the	 investment	amount,	and	in	turn	the	higher	the	activation	in	a	region	encompassing	the	left	ventral	caudate	 and	NAcc.	Many	 previous	 studies	 have	 established	 that	 these	regions	 track	 expected	 reward	 when	 cues	 with	 explicit	 reward	 and	punishment	 values	 are	 shown	 to	 participants	 (Knutson	 and	 Greer,	2008).	 Our	 novel	 result	 illustrates	 that	 one’s	 own	 investment	 choice,	modulated	by	expectations	regarding	receivers’	reciprocating	behavior,	serves	 as	 a	 similar	 type	of	 anticipatory	 cue.	This	 cue	 is	not	 externally	provided	nor	learned	in	a	Pavlovian	manner	such	as	in	an	MID	task,	but	rather	 is	 internally	constructed	via	participants’	own	beliefs	about	the	world.	This	 finding	 illustrates	that	eliciting	participants’	own	beliefs	 is	just	 as	 powerful	 in	 evoking	 anticipated	 rewards	 as	 going	 through	 the	effort	of	letting	participants	learn	to	associate	abstract	cues	with	gains	and	losses.		Interestingly,	we	did	not	find	a	similar	anticipated	reward	signal	in	 our	 lottery	 contexts.	 Participants	were	 also	 provided	with	 a	 belief-corresponding	scenario	in	the	ALOT,	with	the	number	of	winning	colors	matching	 their	 belief	 in	 the	ATG,	 as	we	did	not	want	 to	 confound	 the	underlying	 source	 of	 uncertainty	 by	 different	 sets	 of	 beliefs.	 One	consequence	of	 this	approach	 is	 that	participants	 in	 the	ALOT	did	not	actively	 have	 to	 form	 a	 prior	 belief.	 A	 feature	 of	 dopaminergic	modulation	of	reward	is	that	the	more	uncertain	a	reward	is,	the	more	information	the	consequent	outcome	will	reveal	to	enable	an	updating	of	priors.	Although	a	different	ambiguous	urn	was	constructed	on	every	trial	 in	 the	 ALOT,	 participants	 knew	 how	many	 colors	 were	 winning	colors.	 Firstly,	 this	 feature	 might	 have	 reduced	 the	 uncertainty	 as	
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compared	to	the	ATG,	and	secondly,	beliefs	may	be	simply	weaker	cues	in	 the	 ALOT	 as	 compared	 to	 the	 ATG,	 perhaps	 due	 to	 increased	engagement	when	dealing	with	other	people	as	opposed	to	mechanistic	devices.		This	latter	explanation	is	corroborated	by	the	findings	that	the	dmPFC	 and	 precuneus	 were	 active	 when	 participants	 viewed	 their	selected	 receiver	 in	 the	 social	 context,	 as	 compared	 to	 their	 selected	marble	 in	 the	 lottery.	These	areas	have	been	 linked	 to	 theory	of	mind	(De	Martino	et	al.,	2013;	Frith	and	Frith,	2006;	Hampton	et	al.,	2008).	These	fMRI	results	suggest	that	participants	consider	the	intentions	of	their	matched	partners	during	outcome	trials.		Our	design	also	allowed	the	possibility	to	look	more	specifically	at	 the	 neural	 effects	 when	 participants	 experience	 outcomes	 that	matched	 or	 are	 at	 odds	 with	 their	 expectations.	 Namely,	 when	participants	 experience	a	 gain	or	 a	 loss,	 they	 should	have	 invested	all	respectively	zero	tokens	to	maximize	gains	or	minimize	losses.	Sources	and	 types	 of	 uncertainty	 induced	 in	 our	 experiment	 might	 lead	participants	not	to	follow	this	optimal	behavior	The	contrast	of	rejoice	versus	 regret	activates	 the	 left	 insula	and	orbitofrontal	pole	when	 the	source	 of	 uncertainty	 stems	 from	 a	 lottery,	 which	 is	 consistent	 with	data	(Coricelli	et	al.	2005,	2007)	regarding	the	neural	underpinnings	of	counterfactual	thinking	in	lotteries.		The	 effect	 of	 rejoice	 was	 only	 observed	 in	 the	 lottery	 context.	Camille	 et	 al.	 (2004)	 argue	 that	 regret	 arises	 due	 to	 personal	responsibility	 for	 the	 consequence	 of	 one’s	 own	 choice.	 A	 potential	suggestion	is	that	one	feels	more	responsible	for	the	loss	in	the	lottery	context,	as	one	cannot	easily	argue	that	this	loss	is	due	to	the	conscious	action	 by	 somebody	 else	 like	 in	 the	 Trust	 Game.	 While	 in	 the	 social	context	one	could	more	easily	blame	somebody	else	 for	not	 returning	an	 investment,	 it	 is	more	difficult	 to	attribute	negative	 intentions	 to	a	random	mechanistic	device,	which	draws	a	losing	colored	marble.		Within	 the	 field	 of	 Economics	 it	 is	 common	 practice	 to	 elicit	beliefs	 and	 use	 these	 as	 independent	 variables	 for	 DMUU.	Neuroimaging	 studies	 on	 reward	 processing	 have	 typically	 neglected	the	 role	of	beliefs,	 but	 rather	have	generally	used	externally	provided	cues	to	examine	DMUU.	Based	on	our	results	in	this	Chapter,	as	well	as	the	 results	 from	 the	 previous	 Chapter,	 we	 stress	 the	 influence	 of	individual	 beliefs	 on	 DMUU	 and	 belief-mediated	 anticipated	 rewards.	
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When	neuroimaging	studies	leave	out	individual	beliefs,	they	will	miss	an	 important	 aspect	 of	 decision-making,	 and	 subsequently	 they	 will	miss	an	opportunity	to	discover	individual	variance	in	decision-making.	Yet,	 Neuroscience	 addresses	 questions	 not	 considered	 in	 Economics	(Etner	et	al.,	2012),	for	example	how	beliefs	come	about,	how	they	are	shaped,	 and	 to	 what	 extent	 are	 they	 adaptive	 (Vilares	 and	 Kording,	2011).	 Therefore	 one	 potential	 follow-up	 of	 this	 study	 is	 to	 design	 a	dynamic	 experiment	 in	 which	 participants	 would	 be	 able	 to	 change	future	 decision-making	 as	 a	 function	 of	 individuals’	 beliefs,	 which	arguably	 will	 get	 updated	 as	 participants	 learn	 their	 outcomes.	Nonetheless,	 this	 Chapter	 stresses	 the	 power	 of	 belief-mediated	anticipated	rewards	as	we	can	show	an	expected	reward	signal	 in	 the	absence	 of	 live	 decision-making.	 Likewise,	 very	 recent	 studies	 were	able	to	infer	the	choices	people	would	make	(if	given	the	opportunity)	based	 on	 their	 neural	 responses	 to	 simply	 viewing	 specific	 prospects	without	actual	decision-making	(Smith	et	al.,	2013;	Tusche	et	al.,	2010;	Levy	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 	 Altogether,	 by	 combining	 the	 instrumental	 use	 of	cues	 in	 anticipating	 rewards	 with	 the	 role	 of	 beliefs	 in	 DMUU,	 this	Chapter	shows	how	Neuroeconomics	can	contribute	to	an	existing	rich	literature	on	neural	mechanisms	of	anticipated	rewards.														
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Chapter	5	
Ambiguity	attitudes	and	
borrowing	behavior30		
Introduction		 Since	 the	 publication	 of	 the	 well-known	 Ellsberg	 paradox	(1961),	 ambiguity	 aversion	 has	 been	 found	 and	 replicated	 in	 many	laboratory	 studies	 (Trautmann	 and	 van	 de	 Kuilen,	 2013)31.	 This	aversion	entails	 a	preference	 for	 risky	over	ambiguous	prospects	 that	are	 equivalent	 under	 SEU.	 Ambiguity	 aversion	 is	 not	 a	 universal	behavioral	 trait,	 but	 domain	 specific.	 Likelihood	 insensitivity	 under	ambiguity,	 for	 instance,	 describes	 the	 phenomenon	 that	 most	 people	are	 ambiguity	 averse	 for	 high	 likelihood	 events,	 while	 ambiguity	seeking	 for	 low	 likelihood	 events.	 This	 behavioral	 pattern,	 which	 is	sometimes	 referred	 to	 as	 a-insensitivity	 (henceforth	 simply	insensitivity),	indicates	that	a	person	does	not	sufficiently	discriminate	between	various	likelihoods	(Wakker,	2010).	With	the	term	‘ambiguity	attitude’	we	refer	to	both	ambiguity	aversion	and	insensitivity.		 Although	 there	 is	 a	 substantial	 body	 of	 literature	 that	 has	studied	ambiguity	attitudes	in	a	variety	of	experimental	contexts	in	the	laboratory	 (Trautmann	 and	 van	 de	 Kuilen,	 2013),	 only	 few	 studies	investigated	 the	 external	 validity	 of	 experimentally	 elicited	 ambiguity	attitudes	 by	 linking	 them	 to	 real	 life	 decision-making.	 For	 ambiguity	aversion,	 Sutter	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 report	 a	 negative	 association	 with	smoking	 behavior	 in	 adolescents.	 Dimmock	 et	 al.	 (2015a)	 show	 that	ambiguity	aversion	positively	affects	retirement	planning.	In	the	field	of	developmental	 economics,	 Engle-Warnick	 et	 al.	 (2007)	 find	 negative																																																									
30	This	 chapter	 is	 based	 on	 a	 joint	 paper	with	 Utz	Weitzel,	 Ambiguity	 attitudes	 and	borrowing	behavior,	2015,	under	review.	31	Please	see	BOX	1	of	the	Introduction	for	an	explanation	of	the	experiment	by	Daniel	Ellsberg	(1961).	
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effects	of	ambiguity	aversion	on	the	adoption	of	new	varieties	of	crop	in	Peruvian	farmers	and	Ross	et	al.	(2012)	report	a	negative	relationship	with	the	adoption	of	new	variety	of	rice.	For	insensitivity,	Dimmock	et	al.	 (2015a)	 report	 a	 negative	 relation	with	 stock	market	 participation	and	private	business	ownership,	and	a	positive	relationship	with	being	insured	 (Dimmock	 et	 al.,	 2015b).	 This	 emerging	 literature	 shows	 that	there	 is	 a	 need	 for	 more	 research	 that	 investigates	 whether	 specific	behavioral	patterns,	as	we	observe	 them	in	 the	real	world,	are	 indeed	driven	by	ambiguity	attitudes	that	are	measured	in	the	lab	(Trautmann	and	van	de	Kuilen,	2013).		 We	contribute	to	this	literature	by	investigating	the	relationship	between	 ambiguity	 attitudes	 and	 student	 borrowing	 behavior	 of	 233	students	in	the	Netherlands.	This	type	of	decision-making	has	not	been	related	 to	 experimentally	 elicited	 ambiguity	 attitudes	 before.	 This	 is	surprising	as	student	borrowing	 is	an	 important	policy	 instrument	 for	the	 Dutch	 government	 (see	 next	 section)	 and	 elsewhere.	 Although	 a	substantial	share	of	students	(35	percent)	 in	the	Netherlands	take	out	student	 loans	 (Nibud,	 2012),	 the	 majority	 prefers	 to	 finance	 their	studies	 with	 a	 part-time	 job.	 Unfortunately,	 part-time	 jobs	 affect	 the	total	 amount	 of	 time	 spent	 on	 studying.	 Due	 to	 the	 high	 number	 of	students	 with	 a	 part-time	 job,	 the	 average	 study	 duration	 in	 The	Netherlands	 is	 nearly	 six	 years,	while	most	 curriculums	 are	 designed	for	 four	 yours	 only	 (Oosterbeek	 and	 van	 den	 Broek,	 2009).	 This	situation	is	not	unique	to	the	Netherlands	as	countries	like	the	UK,	the	US	and	Australia	face	similar	problems.	In	these	countries,	students	face	much	 higher	 education	 and	 admission	 fees	 compared	 to	 the	Netherlands,	which	 aggravates	 the	problem	 for	 students	who	want	 to	avoid	 loans	 (Institute	 for	 Higher	 Education	 Policy	 and	 Excelencia	 in	Education,	2008).	A	 number	 of	 studies	 focus	 on	 debt	 aversion	 amongst	 students.	Fear	of	debt	and	the	prospect	of	accumulating	debt	can	even	influence	the	 decision	 to	 study	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 This	 is	 especially	 prevalent	among	 low	 socio-economic	 groups	 (Callender	 and	 Jackson,	 2005;	2008).	The	majority	of	studies	measure	debt	aversion	and	determinants	for	 debt	 aversion	 with	 survey	 items	 like	 ‘owing	 money	 is	 basically	wrong’,	 ‘there	 is	 no	 excuse	 for	 borrowing	money’,	 or	 proxy	 questions	like	 ‘do	 you	 usually	 pay	 off	 your	 credit	 card	 balances	 each	 month	
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(conditional	 on	 having	 any)?’.	 The	 study	 of	 Eckel	 et	 al.	 (2007)	 is	 a	notable	 exception.	 The	 authors	 experimentally	 elicit	 debt	 aversion	 as	well	 as	 risk	 and	 time	 preferences	 with	 Canadian	 adults.	 The	 authors	find	 “no	 evidence	 that	 debt	 aversion	 is	 an	 important	 barrier	 to	investment	 in	 postsecondary	 education”	 (p.234).	 They	 do	 find,	however,	that	risk-seeking	and	patient	persons	are	more	likely	to	take	up	 education	 financing,	 supporting	 the	 notion	 that	 investing	 in	education	is	a	relatively	risky	choice.		 We	complement	this	literature	by	measuring	ambiguity	aversion	and	 its	 relationship	with	 student’s	 borrowing	 behavior	 for	 education.	We	 argue	 that	 taking	 out	 student	 loans	 is	 less	 about	 risk,	 where	possible	 states	 and	probabilities	 are	perfectly	known,	but	more	about	ambiguity,	where	probabilities	for	possible	states	are	not	known.	In	the	latter	case,	students’	aversion	to	borrowing	may	be	primarily	driven	by	their	 aversion	 to	 ambiguity	 regarding	 the	 repayment	 of	 their	 loans.	Students	 are	 uncertain	 if	 they	 will	 be	 able	 to	 repay	 their	 debt	 after	having	 obtained	 a	 degree,	 and	 also	 if	 they	 will	 graduate	 in	 the	 first	place.	Graduation	and	a	decent	job	most	likely	ensure	the	ability	to	pay	off	 debt	 in	 the	 future,	 but	 this	 goal	 is	 several	 years	 and	 numerous	ambiguous	events	away.	Yet	students	have	to	decide	at	the	start	of	their	study	 program	 whether	 to	 take	 out	 a	 student	 loan	 and,	 importantly,	how	much.	The	higher	the	stakes,	the	more	confident	a	student	needs	to	be	that	she	will	be	able	to	repay	the	loan	(Hill,	2013).			 As	explained	 in	more	detail	 in	 the	next	 section,	Dutch	students	face	 a	multitude	 of	 ambiguous	 elements	 in	 the	 decision	 to	 take	 out	 a	loan,	 including	 uncertain	 interest	 rates.	 Accordingly,	 we	 expect	 that	students	who	 are	more	 ambiguity	 averse	will	 borrow	 less	 than	 other	students.	 Furthermore,	 we	 expect	 a	 negative	 relationship	 between	insensitivity	and	borrowing.	Insensitivity	predicts	that	most	people	will	overweight	 low	 likelihood	 ambiguous	 events	 of	 bad	 outcomes.	 In	 the	context	 of	 this	 study	 such	 a	 low-likelihood	 event	 could	be	 a	 complete	loan	 default.	 We	 therefore	 predict	 that	 students	 who	 exhibit	 high	insensitivity	will	overweight	the	likelihood	of	a	loan	default,	and	will	try	to	 either	 refrain	 from	 borrowing	 completely,	 or	 borrow	 as	 little	 as	possible.	We	 elicit	 ambiguity	 aversion	 and	 insensitivity	 based	 on	matching	 probabilities	 of	 three	 uncertain	 events	 with	 the	 following	
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likelihoods:	 0.1,	 0.5	 and	 0.9	 (Abdellaoui	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Dimmock	 et	 al.,	2015a;	 2015b).	 After	 eliciting	 participants’	 ambiguity	 attitudes,	students	 answer	 a	 variety	 of	 questions	 concerning	 their	 borrowing	behavior.	 We	 find	 both	 ambiguity	 aversion	 and	 insensitivity	 in	 our	sample.	 In	 line	with	much	 larger	representative	samples	 (Biermans	et	al.,	 2003;	 van	 den	Broek	 and	Van	 de	Wiel,	 2005;	 Oosterbeek	 and	 van	den	 Broek,	 2009),	we	 find	 that	 33	 percent	 of	 our	 participants	 have	 a	student	 loan.	 We	 cannot	 reject	 our	 null	 hypothesis	 that	 ambiguity	attitudes	and	borrowing	behavior	are	unrelated.	Thus	we	do	not	find	a	relationship	between	ambiguity	attitudes	and	the	decision	to	take	out	a	student	 loan.	 Subsequently,	 we	 find	 no	 relationship	 between	insensitivity	 and	 student	 borrowing.	 A	 potential	 reason	 why	insensitivity	 does	 not	 influence	 student	 borrowing	 may	 be	 that	 the	likelihood	 of	 a	 loan	 default	 is	 not	 low	 enough	 that	 people	 would	 be	insensitive	to	it	or	overweight	its	probability.	In	fact,	in	the	Netherlands	the	default	rate	on	student	loans	increased	from	11	percent	in	2009	to	15.63	 percent	 in	 2013	 (Figures	 from	 Dutch	 Ministry	 of	 Education,	2014).	Within	the	sub	sample	of	borrowers	we	do	 find	that	ambiguity	aversion	 is	 negatively	 related	 to	 the	 amount	 they	 borrow:	 the	 more	ambiguity	averse,	the	less	a	student	borrows.	These	findings	hold	when	controlling	 for	 the	 number	 of	 study	 years,	 gender,	 study	 background,	risk	 preferences,	 income,	 financial	 literacy,	 scores	 on	 the	 cognitive	reflection	test	and	living	situation		 In	the	next	section	we	will	explain	the	system	of	issuing	student	loans	in	the	Netherlands	and	its	inherent	ambiguity.	Section	3	describes	the	 experimental	 design	 and	 how	 we	 elicited	 ambiguity	 attitudes.	Section	4	presents	the	results	and	section	5	concludes.		
Student	loans	in	The	Netherlands		 In	 the	 Netherlands,	 students	 can	 get	 two	 kinds	 of	 financial	support	 from	 the	government:	a	basic	 scholarship	and	a	 student	 loan.	Most	 students	 receive	 a	 basic	 government	 scholarship.	 The	 exact	amount	 depends	 on	 the	 individual’s	 and	 family’s	 wealth	 and	 income	level.	 Students	 receive	 the	 basic	 scholarship	 for	 up	 to	 four	 years,	because	 the	majority	of	 curriculums	are	 set	up	as	 four-year	programs	(three	 years	 bachelor;	 one	 year	 master).	 Next	 to	 this	 scholarship,	
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almost	 all	 students	 are	 able	 to	 take	 out	 student	 loans	 that	 are	subsidized	 and	 issued	by	 the	 government.	 Students	 can	borrow	up	 to	€301,27	 per	 month.	 After	 four	 years	 of	 study,	 when	 the	 basic	scholarship	 ends,	 students	 can	 borrow	 up	 to	 €916,96	 per	 month	 for	three	more	years.	As	 the	 student	 loans	by	 the	government	have	more	favorable	terms	than	individual	bank	loans,	the	latter	are	rarely	used	by	Dutch	students	for	secondary	education	(Nibud,	2012).		 Practically	every	student	is	eligible	for	the	full	loan	amount	and	application	 is	 very	 easy.	 All	 that	 a	 student	 needs	 to	 do	 is	 visit	 the	webpage	 of	 DUO	 (the	 relevant	 governmental	 agency	 of	 the	 Dutch	Ministry	of	Education)	and	enter	the	required	information.	The	web	site	is	 very	 transparent	 and	 accessible	 and	 no	 additional	 mailings	 or	requirements	are	needed.	A	student	who	decides	to	take	out	a	student	loan	will	receive	the	first	loan	payment	within	a	month.		 If	a	student	graduates	within	ten	years,	the	basic	scholarship	will	be	 awarded	 as	 a	 gift.	 The	 student	 loan	 has	 to	 be	 repaid.	 The	 interest	rate	on	government	student	loans	are	based	on	the	current	government	interest	rate	and	are	therefore	much	lower	than	the	interest	rate	a	bank	would	 issue	 on	 loans.	While	 studying,	 students	 already	 incur	 interest	costs	 based	 on	 the	 current	 interest	 rate.	 Two	 years	 after	 a	 student	graduates,	the	repayment	period	starts	and	the	graduate	has	to	repay	a	fixed	monthly	amount.	During	the	repayment	period,	 interest	costs	on	the	 remaining	 loan	 are	 still	 incurred.	 The	 graduate	 will	 be	 informed	about	this	interest	rate	at	the	start	of	the	repayment	period.	Every	five	years	 this	 interest	 rate	 is	adjusted	 for	a	new	period	of	 five	years.	The	repayment	 period	 has	 a	 maximum	 of	 15	 years,	 but	 graduates	 can	choose	to	repay	faster.		 A	 student	 who	 decides	 to	 take	 out	 a	 student	 loan	 has	information	on	the	current	interest	rate,	but	she	is	uncertain	about	the	different	 interest	 rates	 that	will	 apply	 in	 the	 following	 years	 of	 study	and	during	 the	various	 repayment	periods.	On	 its	web	page,	DUO	and	the	Ministry	of	Education	offer	calculation	modules	 to	estimate	 future	loan	 repayments.	 The	 estimated	 monthly	 repayment	 amounts	 are	provided	 for	 four	 different	 possible	 interest	 rates	 that	 could	 apply	 in	the	 future.	 There	 is	 no	 information	 provided	 about	 the	 consequences	when	a	student	is	unable	to	repay	her	loans.	
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	 A	 student,	 who	 decides	 to	 borrow	 now,	 can	 do	 so	 with	 a	 few	mouse	clicks.	Yet	she	does	not	know	the	exact	amount	that	she	needs	to	repay	in	the	future.	She	does	not	know	the	exact	interest	rate	that	will	apply.	 She	 does	 not	 know	 what	 actions	 can	 be	 taken	 if	 she	 will	 be	unable	 to	 repay	 in	 the	 future.	 Overall,	 there	 is	 substantial	 ambiguity	about	the	consequences	of	the	decision	to	take	out	a	student	loan	at	this	moment	in	time.		
Experimental	design	
	
Measuring	ambiguity	attitudes	with	matching	probabilities	The	method	we	used	 to	elicit	ambiguity	attitudes	 is	based	on	a	simple	and	tractable	method	developed	by	Abdellaoui	et	al.	(2011)	and	is	 known	 as	 probability	 matching.	 The	 idea	 is	 to	 elicit	 probability	equivalents	 of	 a	 specific	 uncertain	 prospect	 that	 makes	 the	 subject	indifferent	between	gambling	on	an	uncertain	and	a	risky	prospect.	One	of	 the	merits	 of	matching	probabilities	 is	 that	 ambiguity	 attitudes	 are	directly	 measured	 relative	 to	 risk	 attitudes,	 thereby	 ruling	 out	 risk	aversion	or	probability	weighting	as	confounding	factors.	We	estimated	individual’s	 ambiguity	 attitudes	 based	 on	 matched	 probabilities	 of	three	uncertain	events	with	underlying	likelihoods:	0.1,	0.5	and	0.9.	The	 unknown	 and	 the	 risky	 events	 in	 our	 experiment	 are	operationalized	 via	 the	 standard	 Ellsberg	 urn	 setup	 (1961).	 The	unknown	 urn	 was	 composed	 of	 100	 colored	 chips	 in	 an	 unknown	composition.	 If	 the	underlying	 likelihood	of	 the	unknown	urn	was	0.5	(henceforth	 U2),	 all	 chips	 in	 U2	were	 of	 one	 of	 two	 colors:	 yellow	 or	green.	The	colors	but	not	the	composition	were	known	to	the	subjects.	The	 risky	 (known)	urn	 (K2),	 had	 a	 known	 composition	 of	 yellow	 and	green	chips.		With	 a	multiple	 choice	 list	 procedure	we	 asked	 participants	 to	indicate	 their	 preference	 for	 a	 draw	 from	 either	 urn	 U2	 or	 K2.	 See	Figure	18	for	a	visualization	of	the	setup.	
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At	 the	 start	 of	 the	 experiment,	 before	 instructions	 had	 been	distributed,	 subjects	 selected	 one	 color:	 either	 yellow	 or	 green.	 The	number	 of	 X	 chips	 in	 urn	 K2,	 defined	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 participant’s	selected	 color,	 increased	 in	 each	 row	 (option	 B),	 whereas	 the	composition	of	 urn	U2	 remained	unknown	and	 fixed	 (option	A).	 Each	row	 i	∈	(1,	2,	…	 ,	20)	 in	this	 list	was	a	separate	binary	choice	between	urn	U2	and	K2.	In	other	words,	in	each	row	participants	had	to	choose	from	which	urn	they	would	like	to	draw	a	chip:	from	urn	U2	(option	A)	or	 from	urn	K2	 (option	 B).	 If	 the	 chip	 from	 the	 preferred	 urn	was	 of	their	selected	color,	participants	won	€	15,	else	nothing	(if	 this	choice	was	randomly	selected	at	the	end	of	the	experiment	to	be	played	out	for	real).		 The	switching	point	from	option	A	to	option	B	indicates	when	a	subject	 prefers	 a	 draw	 from	 urn	 K2	 with	 X	 amount	 of	 chips	 in	 their	selected	color	over	a	draw	from	urn	U2.	If	a	subject	switched	to	Option	B	in	row	i,	we	take	the	midpoint	between	Xi-1	and	Xi	chips	as	an	estimate	
Figure	18:	Choice	screen	2-color	urn	(with	green	as	illustration)	
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of	 subjects’	 matching	 probability	 of	 urn	 U2.	 The	 earlier	 a	 participant	switches	from	option	A	to	option	B	the	more	ambiguity	averse	she	is.		We	refer	to	an	individual’s	matched	probability	in	the	two-color	urn	 setup	 as	 m(0.5).	 For	 instance,	 if	 m(0.5)	 is	 0.38,	 then	 a	 subject	indicated	 to	 be	 indifferent	 between	 a	 draw	 from	 urn	 U2	 and	 a	 draw	from	urn	K2	which	is	composed	of	38	chips	in	the	participant’s	selected	color	and	62	chips	 in	 the	other	color.	 If	m(0.5)	has	a	value	below	0.5,	which	 is	 the	 ambiguity	 neutral	 probability	 of	 urn	 U2,	 ambiguity	aversion	 is	 expressed.	 A	 value	 of	 m(0.5)	 higher	 than	 0.5	 indicates	ambiguity	loving	behavior.			We	 also	 elicited	 the	 matched	 probabilities	 m(0.1)	 and	 m(0.9),	corresponding	 to	 the	underlying	 likelihoods	of	0.1	and	0.9,	by	using	a	10-color	urn.	To	elicit	m(0.1),	 the	unknown	urn	 (U10),	 contained	100	chips	 in	 an	 unknown	 composition	 of	 10	 colors.	Urn	K10	on	 the	 other	hand	 consisted	 of	 a	 known	 composition	 of	 100	 chips	 with	 10	 colors.	With	 the	 same	multiple	 choice	 list	 procedure	 as	 before,	we	measured	m(0.1)	by	letting	the	participant	choose	between	a	draw	from	urn	U10	(option	 A)	 or	 urn	 K10	 (option	 B).	 Again,	 participants	 knew	 that	 they	could	win	€	15	 if	 the	 chip	 they	draw	 from	 their	preferred	urn	was	of	their	selected	color,	else	 they	won	nothing.	 In	each	row	 i	∈	(1,	2,…,20)	the	 amount	X	 of	 the	 chips	with	 the	participant’s	 selected	 color	 in	urn	K10	increased.	The	minimum	amount	of	chips	in	row	1	(X1)	was	2	chips,	and	 the	maximum	amount	 of	 chips	 (X20)	was	40	 chips.	 The	 switching	point	 from	 option	 A	 to	 option	 B	 in	 row	 i	 indicated	 when	 subjects	preferred	a	draw	from	urn	K10	with	Xi	chips	in	their	selected	color	over	a	draw	from	urn	U10.	We	again	take	the	midpoint	of	tokens	before	and	at	 the	 switching	 point,	 Xi-1	+	3.(Xi	 -	 Xi-1),	 as	 the	 value	 of	 m(0.1).	 For	example,	 when	 m(0.1)	 is	 0.16,	 this	 indicates	 that	 the	 subject	 is	indifferent	between	gambling	on	a	draw	from	urn	K10	that	is	composed	of	16	chips	in	their	selected	color	versus	gambling	on	a	draw	from	urn	U10.	 A	 matched	 probability	 above	 (below)	 the	 ambiguity	 neutral	probability	of	0.1	implies	ambiguity	loving	(averse)	behavior.	To	 elicit	m(0.9)	we	 run	 the	 same	protocol	 as	discussed	before,	only	now	there	are	nine	winning	colors,	defined	as	the	nine	colors	that	were	not	selected	by	the	participant	(the	complement	of	urn	U10	with	1	winning	 color).	 Here	 X1	 was	 60	 chips	 and	 X20	was	 98	 chips.	 When	m(0.9)	 is	 0.7,	 for	 instance,	 the	 participant	 indicated	 to	 be	 indifferent	
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between	a	draw	from	urn	K10	filled	with	70	chips,	colored	by	any	of	the	nine	winning	colors,	versus	a	draw	from	urn	U10.	For	all	three	list	procedures,	we	designed	the	program	in	such	a	way	that	participants	could	only	switch	once.	Subjects	who	immediately	‘switched’	to	option	B	in	row	1	received	the	amount	of	chips	in	row	1	as	their	matching	 probability.	 At	 the	 other	 extreme,	 subjects	 who	 never	switched	 to	Option	B	 received	 the	amount	of	 chips	 in	 row	20	as	 their	matching	probability.	We	classified	a	participant	as	ambiguity	neutral	if	she	switched	from	option	A	to	option	B	when	the	risky	urn	was	in	line	with	the	ambiguity	neutral	probability	(for	the	two-color	urn	U2	this	is	row	10	in	Figure	1).	AAp	 refers	 to	 the	 degree	 of	 ambiguity	 aversion	 for	 each	uncertain	event	with	ambiguity-neutral	probability	p.	We	compute	the	AAp	with	each	individual’s	matched	probability	as	follows:		AA0.1	=	0.1	–	m(0.1)	AA0.5	=	0.5	–	m(0.5)	AA0.9	=	0.9	–	m(0.9)		 We	 use	 the	 method	 developed	 by	 Abdellaoui	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 to	extract	 two	 indices:	 ambiguity	 aversion	 and	 insensitivity.	 For	 each	participant	 we	 estimate	 the	 best-fitting	 line	 between	 p	 and	 m(p),	 by	means	of	OLS	on	the	open	interval	(0,1).	We	refer	to	the	intercept	with	c,	 and	 the	slope	with	s.	Finally,	we	compute	d	=	1	–	c	–s,	which	 is	 the	distance	 from	 1	 at	 the	 regression	 line	 where	 p	 =	 1	 (see	 Figure	 19).	Based	on	these	three	parameters,	we	define:		Index	a	=	1	–	s	(=	c	+	d),	which	is	the	index	of	insensitivity,	and	Index	b	=	1-s-2c	(=	d	–	c),	which	is	the	index	of	ambiguity	aversion.		Index	b	is	an	anti-index	of	the	average	height	of	the	curve	and	refers	to	a	 global	 index	 of	 ambiguity	 aversion.	 Index	 a	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 is	 an	anti-index	 of	 the	 steepness	 of	 the	 curve	 and	 it	 reflects	 the	 neglect	 to	differentiate	 between	 intermediate	 levels	 of	 likelihood	 and	 thereby	treating	these	more	like	a	probability	of	0.5	(Wakker,	2010;	Abdellaoui	et	al.,	2011;	Dimmock	et	al.,	2015a).			
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	 	Figure	19	provides	an	illustration	of	these	indices.	In	Panel	A,	the	45°	 line	 indicates	 that	 the	 matched	 probabilities	 are	 equal	 to	 the	ambiguity-neutral	probabilities.	A	participant	who	can	be	characterized	as	such	does	not	exhibit	ambiguity	aversion	or	insensitivity.	In	Panel	B	ambiguity	 aversion	 is	 expressed	 with	 an	 index	 b	 of	 0.22,	 but	 no	insensitivity.	Panel	C	displays	insensitivity	with	an	index	of	0.22,	but	no	ambiguity	aversion.	Finally,	Panel	D	shows	the	most	common	pattern	of	both	ambiguity	aversion	and	insensitivity	with	index	b	=	0.06	and	index	a	=	0.22,	respectively.			
Consistency	In	 order	 to	 test	 the	 consistency	 of	 participants’	 preferences	elicited	in	the	multiple	choice	list,	we	also	administer	a	direct	binominal	choice	 between	 each	 of	 the	 three	 ambiguous	 likelihood	 events	 and	 a	risky	urn	defined	by	their	respective	ambiguity	neutral	probabilities	of	0.1,	 0.5	 and	 0.9.	 Please	 see	 Figure	 20	 for	 an	 illustration	 of	 the	consistency	check	for	the	two-color	ambiguous	urn	U2.		This	 binominal	 choice	 was	 elicited	 before	 participants	 were	confronted	 with	 the	 choice	 list	 procedure.	 We	 should	 observe	 that	 a	participant	expresses	similar	preferences	for	either	a	draw	from	urn	U2	or	urn	K2	in	the	direct	choice	(Figure	20)	as	in	row	10	from	Figure	18.	The	direct	comparison	between	the	ambiguous	and	risky	urn	allows	us	to	assess	the	robustness	of	participants’	preferences.		
Figure	 19:	 Indices	 of	 ambiguity	 aversion	 (index	 b)	 and	 insensitivity	 (index	 b)	
(from	Abdellaoui	et	al.,	2011)	
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The	 consistency	 rates	 (in	 percentages	 of	 the	 total	 participant	pool)	are	81.97	percent,	76.39	percent	and	94.42	percent	for	the	three	likelihoods	 of	 0.5,	 0.1	 and	 0.9,	 respectively.	 Our	 consistency	 rates	 are	higher	than	Dimmock	et	al.	(2015a;	2015b),	and	in	line	with	Trautmann	et	al.	(2014).	Overall,	69.66	percent	(n=136)	of	our	participants	showed	a	 consistent	 pattern	 for	 all	 three	 likelihoods	 (henceforth	 ‘consistent	sample’).	 For	 robustness	we	 rerun	 all	 our	 analyses	 on	 our	 consistent	sample.	 Our	 findings	 remain	 qualitatively	 intact	 across	 both	 samples	(see	Models	5	and	6	in	Table	9).	
Risk	attitudes	
As	 risk	 attitudes	 positively	 correlate	with	 borrowing	 behavior,	we	also	measure	individuals’	risk	preferences	to	control	for	this	factor	(Eckel	 et	 al.,	 2007;	Oosterbeek	 and	 van	 den	Broek,	 2009).	Within	 the	same	 framing	 as	 above	we	 elicited	 subjects’	 certainty	 equivalent	 to	 a	draw	from	a	two-color	risky	urn	(equivalent	to	K2	with	10	balls	and	a	probability	 of	 0.5).	 Participants	 are	 informed	 that	 a	 drawn	 marble	corresponding	to	their	selected	color	(yellow	or	green)	would	lead	to	a	gain	of	€	15,	else	they	win	nothing.	
Figure	20:	Choice	screen	‘consistency	check’	(with	green	as	illustration)	
	
120	
	
Participants	had	to	select,	 in	each	row	in	a	choice	 list	 format	of	20	rows	in	total,	 their	preference	between	drawing	a	marble	 from	the	risky	 urn	 and	 receiving	 a	 sure	 payoff.	 The	 sure	 payoff	 increased	with	each	row	and	reached	a	maximum	amount	of	€	15	at	row	20	(see	Task	4	 in	 the	 instructions	 in	 Section	 3	 of	 the	 Appendix).	 At	 some	 point	participants	 switched	 from	 choosing	 the	 risky	 urn	 to	 the	 sure	 option.	We	 take	 the	 midpoint	 of	 the	 two	 sure	 payoffs	 before	 and	 at	 the	switching	 point	 as	 each	 participant’s	 certainty	 equivalent	 (CE).	 As	 a	measure	 of	 individual	 risk	 attitudes	 we	 use:	 r	 =	 1	 –	 CE/15	 (Wakker,	2010).	 A	 value	 of	 r	 larger	 (smaller),	 than	 0.5,	 indicates	 risk	 aversion	(risk	loving).	
	
Questionnaire	After	we	 elicited	 participants’	matching	 probabilities	 and	 their	attitudes	 towards	 risk,	 we	 administered	 a	 questionnaire.	 We	specifically	asked	if	they	were	familiar	with	DUO	before	they	answered	subsequent	questions.	All	students	were	well	aware	of	the	existence	of	DUO.		 The	 questionnaire	 consisted	 of	 three	 parts	 (the	 complete	questionnaire	can	be	found	in	Section	3	of	the	Appendix).	Part	1	of	the	questionnaire	 dealt	 with	 questions	 concerning	 their	 borrowing	behavior.	The	main	questions	we	use	 for	our	analyses	ask	whether	or	not	 they	borrow,	 and	 if	 so,	 how	much	 they	borrow.	 In	part	1	we	also	conducted	a	 cognitive	 reflection	 test	 (Frederick,	2005)	and	a	 financial	literacy	 test	 (Lusardi	 and	 Mitchel,	 2006).	 Both	 these	 tests	 contained	three	 questions	 and	 each	 participant	 received	 a	 normalized	 score	between	0-1	depending	on	the	amount	of	correct	answers.	Part	 2	 of	 the	 questionnaire	 included	 demographic	 questions	such	as	age,	gender,	living	situation,	study	year	and	study	topic.	The	last	part	of	the	questionnaire,	part	3,	was	the	life	orientation	test,	 which	 measured	 general	 optimism	 and	 pessimism	 (Scheier	 and	Carver,	1985;	Scheier	et	al.,	1994).	Participants	 indicated	on	a	5-point	Likert	 scale	 (scored	with	 a	 range	 from	0-4)	 if	 they	 totally	 (dis)agreed	
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with	the	statement	being	posed.	A	maximum	score	of	24,	respectively	0,	means	an	extremely	optimistic	and	pessimistic	view	on	life.32	
	
Procedures	The	experiments	were	conducted	at	NSM	laboratory	(Nijmegen	School	of	Management)	at	the	Radboud	University	Nijmegen	and	ELSE	(Experimental	 Laboratory	 for	 Sociology	 and	 Economics)	 at	 the	University	of	Utrecht	in	March	2014.	233	participants	-	130	females	and	103	 males	 -	 participated	 in	 our	 study.	 The	 experiments	 were	computerized	 using	 the	 software	 z-Tree	 (Fischbacher,	 2007).	 All	participants	had	to	answer	comprehension	questions	before	each	task.	We	checked	their	answers	and,	in	case	of	mistakes,	privately	explained	the	 correct	 answer	 before	 all	 participants	 were	 allowed	 to	 start	 the	task.	 There	was	a	fixed	order	of	tasks.	The	matched	probabilities	were	elicited	in	the	following	order:	m(0.5),	m(0.1)	and	m(0.9).	This	is	in	line	with	procedures	from	Dimmock	et	al.	(2015a;	2015b).	Subsequently	we	elicited	participants’	 risk	preferences.	 Finally	participants	 filled	 in	 the	questionnaire	 before	 any	 feedback	 was	 given	 on	 the	 results	 and	payment	of	the	experimental	tasks.	Participants	received	a	sure	amount	of	€4	as	show-up	fee.	At	the	end	 of	 each	 session	 the	 computer	 would	 randomly	 select	 one	 choice	from	one	of	the	four	experimental	tasks:	one	row	from	one	of	the	choice	lists	 used	 to	 elicit	 the	 matching	 probabilities	 of	 the	 ambiguous	likelihood	events	of	0.1,	0.5	and	0.9	and	participants’	risk	preferences.	This	 randomly	 selected	 choice	 was	 played	 out	 for	 real	 by	 letting	participants	select	a	chip	 from	either	urn	U2,	urn	U10	or	 from	a	risky	urn.	 If	a	participant	would	have	to	draw	a	chip	from	the	risky	urn,	we	would	 compose	 an	 ‘urn’	 in	 front	 of	 their	 eyes	 by	 filling	 it	 with	 the	
																																																								32	We	 added	 this	 part	 to	 the	 questionnaire	 as	 we	 were	 interested	 to	 study	 if	 the	optimism	 and	 pessimism	 scores	 from	 this	 life	 orientation	 test	would	 correlate	with	the	optimism	and	pessimism	labels	used	to	describe	overweighting	of	low	likelihoods,	respectively	underweighting	of	high	likelihood	events	(See	Table	A7	of	the	Appendix).	As	scores	on	the	life	orientation	test	had	no	relationship	with	borrowing	behavior,	we	do	not	report	them	in	our	main	results	section.		
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amount	of	 chips	 in	 their	 selected	color	 (corresponding	 to	 the	selected	row).		 Subjects	 were	 paid,	 in	 cash	 and	 in	 private,	 €12.15	 on	 average	(including	show-up	fee)	for	a	session	lasting	about	one	and	a	half	hour	The	production	of	the	unknown	urns	U2	and	U10	was	explained	very	 carefully	 at	 the	 start	 of	 the	 experiment.	 We	 used	 four	 different	production	 methods	 to	 construct	 urns	 U2	 and	 U10,	 namely	 ‘human’,	‘compound’,	 ‘unknown’	 and	 ‘nature’.33	During	 the	 whole	 experiment	urn	U2	and	urn	U10	were	visibly	placed	 in	 the	 laboratory	so	 that	any	suspicion	 participants	 could	 have	 had	 with	 regard	 to	 potential	manipulation	of	the	ambiguous	urns	was	eliminated.	The	instructions	of	the	experiment	can	be	found	in	the	Appendix.		
Results	
	
Sample	descriptives	We	 excluded	 five	 participants	 from	 our	 total	 set	 of	 233	 participants.	Three	 participants	 turned	 out	 not	 to	 be	 a	 student	 in	 violation	 of	 our	selection	criteria.	Two	participants	did	not	report	 their	 income,	which	we	use	as	a	control	variable	in	our	analyses.	All	analyses	are	conducted	with	the	remaining	228	participants.	Table	5	shows	that	33	percent	of	our	subjects	borrow	money	at	DUO	on	a	monthly	basis.	The	average	amount	borrowed	is	€388,16	per	month.34	Both	 these	 figures	 are	 very	 consistent	 with	 findings	 from	much	 larger	 representative	 samples	 (Biermans	 et	 al.,	 2003;	 van	 den	Broek	 and	 van	 de	Wiel,	 2005;	 Oosterbeek	 and	 van	 den	 Broek,	 2009;																																																									33	The	 four	 production	 methods	 were	 implemented	 as	 four	 separate	 treatments	randomized	over	17	different	sessions	in	a	between-subjects	design.	In	a	companion	paper	 we	 focus	 on	 the	 question	 if	 ambiguity	 attitudes	 are	 influenced	 by	 the	construction	of	an	ambiguous	urn.	All	results	in	this	paper	remain	qualitatively	valid	when	 including	 dummies	 for	 either	 sessions	 or	 for	 production	 methods	 in	 our	statistical	 models.	 Please	 see	 our	 Appendix	 for	 a	 more	 detailed	 explanation	 of	 the	production	methods	and	for	the	results	of	the	robustness	analyses	(Table	A9).	34	This	 amount	 is	 higher	 than	 the	 maximum	 of	 €301,27	 per	 month,	 because	 many	students	study	longer	than	four	years,	after	which	they	can	borrow	up	to	€916,96	(see	Section	2	of	this	Chapter).	
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Nibud,	2012).	Table	5	also	shows	that	borrowers	 live	more	frequently	on	 their	 own,	 have	 higher	 living	 expenses,	 more	 siblings,	 are	 further	progressed	in	their	study,	and	older	than	non-borrowers	(p<0.05,	two-sample	t-test).	Also,	the	total	amount	of	income	is	higher	for	borrowers	than	for	non-borrowers;	this	may	indicate	that	borrowers	need	to	offset	higher	living	expenses.			
Table	5:	Frequencies	for	borrowers	versus	non-borrowers	 		Variables:	 Borrowers	 Non-borrowers	 Overall	
	
32,62%	 67,38%	 100%	Income	 €	661,04	 €	556,88	 €	602,10	Age	 21,92	 21,05	 21,68	Siblings	 1,83	 1,61	 1,674	Female	 56,58%	 55,41%	 55,79%	Economics	study	 9,21%	 24,20%	 19,31%	Live	on	own	 85,53%	 70,70%	 75,54%	Amount	borrowed	 €	388,16	 €	0	 €	126,61	
	
Ambiguity	attitudes	Table	 6	 shows	 that,	 on	 average,	 subjects	 have	matching	 probabilities	below	the	ambiguity	neutral	probabilities	of	0.5	and	0.9	and	overweight	the	ambiguity	neutral	probability	of	0.1.	This	pattern	is	both	consistent	with	 ambiguity	 aversion	 (mean	 index	 b	 value	 of	 0.097,	 which	 is	significantly	 higher	 than	 0:	 t(227)=13.235,	 p<0.001)	 and	 insensitivity	(mean	 index	 a	 value	 of	 0.254,	 which	 is	 significantly	 higher	 than	 0:	
t(227)=22.712,	p<0.001).		In	 Table	 7	 the	 percentages	 of	 participants	 who	 can	 either	 be	classified	as	ambiguity	averse,	neutral	or	seeking	are	distinguished	for	the	 three	 different	 likelihoods.	 In	 coherence	 with	 a	 positive	 value	 of	insensitivity,	the	percentage	of	ambiguity	averse	(seeking)	participants	increases	(decreases)	in	the	ambiguity	neutral	probability.35		 	
																																																								35	Please	 see	 Table	 A8	 in	 the	 Appendix	 for	 more	 descriptive	 data	 on	 ambiguity	attitudes.	
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Table	6:	Ambiguity	attitudes	 	 	 	Variable									 Mean	 Std.	Dev.	 Min	 Max	MP01	 0.142	 0.064	 0.02	 0.40	MP05	 0.475	 0.083	 0.23	 .8	MP09	 0.738	 0.110	 0.60	 .98	AA01	 -0.042	 0.065	 -0.30	 0.08	AA05	 0.025	 0.083	 -0.30	 .27	AA09	 0.162	 0.110	 -0.08	 .3	Index	b	(ambiguity	aversion)	 0.097	 0.110	 -0.45	 .31	Index	a	(insensitivity)	 0.254	 0.169	 -0.2	 .89	
		
Table	7:	Ambiguity	attitudes	for	each	likelihood		 				 Ambiguity	neutral	probabilities	
Ambiguity	attitude	 0.1	 0.5	 0.9	Ambiguity	averse	 13	(6%)	 87	(38%)	 197	(86%)	Ambiguity	neutral	 59	(26%)	 76	(33%)	 20	(9%)	Ambiguity	seeking	 156	(68%)	 65	(29%)	 11	(5%)		
Ambiguity	attitudes	and	borrowing	behavior	In	 order	 to	 test	 if	 ambiguity	 attitudes	 influence	 the	decision	 to	take	out	a	student	loan,	we	first	run	a	logistical	regression	model	with	the	borrowing	decision	as	dependent	variable.	This	dependent	variable	is	 a	 dichotomous	 variable,	 with	 1	 indicating	 if	 a	 student	 borrows,	irrespective	 of	 how	much,	 and	 0	 indicating	 when	 a	 student	 does	 not	borrow.	 We	 find	 marginally	 significant	 (p<0.1)	 trends	 of	 financial	literacy,	studying	economics,	and	whether	one	lives	on	her	own	on	the	decision	to	borrow	(Table	8).	Both	ambiguity	aversion	and	insensitivity,	however,	do	not	influence	the	decision	to	take	out	a	student	loan.		Please	 recall	 from	 Table	 1	 that	 33	 percent	 of	 our	 subjects	borrow	 money	 monthly	 at	 DUO.	 Subsequently	 we	 analyze	 the	 role	between	ambiguity	attitudes	and	the	amount	borrowers	(n=76)	in	our	student	 population	 borrow.	 A	 Pearson	 product-moment	 correlation	shows	 a	 significant	 negative	 correlation	 between	 ambiguity	 aversion	(index	b)	and	the	amount	a	student	borrows	(r=-0.235,	p<0.05).		
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We	also	run	an	OLS	regression	with	the	amount	borrowed	(on	a	monthly	 basis)	 as	 dependent	 variable	 (Table	 9).	 We	 created	 two	interaction	 variables	 by	 multiplying	 the	 dichotomous	 variable	 if	 one	borrows	(indicated	by	1)	or	not	(indicated	by	0)	with	each	of	 the	 two	ambiguity	 attitudes	 indices.	 The	 variables	 Borrow*Index	 b	 and	Borrow*Index	 a	 in	 Table	 9,	 respectively,	 indicate	 the	 values	 of	ambiguity	 aversion	 and	 insensitivity	 for	 all	 borrowers	 in	 our	 student	population.	 The	 previously	 found	 negative	 bivariate	 relationship	between	borrowers’	 ambiguity	 aversion	 and	 the	 amount	 they	 borrow	remains	 significantly	 valid	 in	 a	 multivariate	 setting	 (Table	 9).	 For	robustness	we	performed	the	same	analyses	with	the	consistent	sample	(see	 models	 5	 and	 6	 in	 Table	 9).	 The	 negative	 relationship	 between	ambiguity	 aversion	 and	 the	 amount	 borrowed	 also	 holds	 when	considering	only	the	consistent	subsample.		Finally,	 in	 the	 Appendix	 we	 report	 several	 other	 robustness	analyses.	We	include	all	sessions	separately	as	dummy	variables	in	our	regression	 models,	 as	 well	 dummies	 for	 the	 different	 production	methods	 of	 the	 ambiguous	 urn	 we	 employed	 in	 our	 study	 (Table	 A9	Appendix).	 All	 our	 reported	 results	 remain	 qualitatively	 stable:	 the	more	ambiguity	averse	a	student	is,	the	less	she	borrows.			
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Discussion	and	conclusion	This	study	is	part	of	a	relatively	new	stream	in	decision	research	that	 attempts	 to	 relate	 experimentally	 elicited	 ambiguity	 attitudes	 to	real	 life	 decision-making	 outside	 the	 laboratory.	 Contrary	 to	 our	hypothesis	we	do	not	 find	a	 relationship	between	ambiguity	 attitudes	and	 borrowing	 behavior.	 We	 find	 a	 weak	 effect	 between	 ambiguity	aversion	and	borrowing	behavior	by	showing	 that	ambiguity	aversion	affects	 the	 amount	 a	 student	 borrows:	 the	 less	 ambiguity	 averse	students	 are	more	willing	 to	borrow.	We	do	not	 find	any	 relationship	with	insensitivity,	which	may	be	due	to	the	fact	that	the	most	extreme	event,	 total	 default,	 is	 not	 very	 rare	 (Figures	 from	 Dutch	 Ministry	 of	Education,	2014).		Ambiguity	preferences	affect	the	amount	a	student	borrows,	but	not	 the	 decision	 to	 borrow	 at	 all.	 This	 finding	 is	 in	 line	 with	 other	studies.	 For	 instance,	 Dimmock	 et	 al.	 (2015a)	 only	 find	 a	 statistically	significant	 relationship	between	ambiguity	 aversion	and	 stock	market	participation	when	considering	participants	with	a	minimum	amount	of	$500	in	financial	assets.	Also,	ambiguity	preferences	affect	the	amount	a	person	 plans	 to	 save	 for	 retirement	 planning,	 but	 ambiguity	preferences	 do	 not	 influence	 the	 initial	 decision	 whether	 to	 plan	 for	retirement	 or	 not	 (Dimmock	 et	 al.,	 2015b).	 As	 our	 results	 show	 a	similar	pattern,	more	research	is	needed	to	disentangle	the	factors	that	determine	the	loan	amount	from	those	that	determine	whether	a	loan	is	taken	out	at	all.	As	discussed	in	section	2	of	this	Chapter,	the	cohort	of	students	that	 participated	 in	 our	 study	 receive(d)	 a	 basic	 scholarship	 from	 the	government	along	the	possibility	to	take	out	a	study	loan.	As	the	Dutch	government	 faces	 pressures	 to	 reduce	 costs,	 fewer	 resources	 are	allocated	 to	 education.	 One	 of	 the	 recent	 consequences	 is	 that	 the	cohort	 of	 Dutch	 students	 who	 started	 in	 September	 2015	 did	 not	receive	a	monthly	basic	scholarship	and	will	have	to	exclusively	rely	on	student	 loans.	 This	 will	 make	 a	 less	 ambiguous	 and	 more	 cost-transparent	design	of	the	student	loan	allocation	even	more	important.	From	countries	with	higher	 educational	 fees,	 results	 show	 that	students,	who	are	reluctant	to	borrow,	choose	more	frequently	to	work	part-time	 or	 opt	 for	 a	 lower	 cost	 institution,	 or	 study	 part-time	(Institute	 for	 Higher	 Education	 Policy	 and	 Excelencia	 in	 Education,	
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2008).	These	are	all	factors	that	increase	the	risk	of	study	dropout.	Next	to	this	potential	risk	of	higher	dropout	rates,	a	2.1	percent	decline	in	the	amount	of	Dutch	students	pursuing	higher	education	 is	predicted	as	a	consequence	of	this	new	policy	(SEO	Economic	Research,	2014).	How	can	we	utilize	the	relationship	between	ambiguity	aversion	and	the	amount	a	student	 is	willing	 to	borrow	in	order	 to	avoid	these	negative	consequences?	Easley	and	O’Hara	(2009)	show	that	regulation,	especially	 when	 focused	 on	 worst-case	 scenarios,	 can	 moderate	 the	effects	 of	 ambiguity	 aversion	 on	 non-participation	 on	 stock	 markets.	They	show,	theoretically,	that	investors,	who	are	guaranteed	that	worst	case	 scenarios	 cannot	materialize,	 for	 example	by	 introducing	deposit	insurance	 and	 guarantees,	 are	more	 likely	 to	 participate.	 Such	 a	 legal	regulation	 guarantees	 that	 no	 matter	 what,	 investors	 will	 always	receive	their	money	back.	As	we	can	assume	that	most	graduates	have	an	 intrinsic	 as	well	 as	 an	 extrinsic	motivation	 to	 find	 the	 best	 paying	work	after	they	finished	their	studies,	 it	 is	unlikely	that	such	a	bailout	regulation	will	be	abused	strategically.		The	worst-case	 scenario	 for	 a	 student	deciding	on	 taking	out	 a	student	 loan	 is	 that	 she	will	not	be	able	 to	 repay	 the	debt.	An	explicit	guarantee	 that	 the	 government	 will	 act	 as	 a	 last	 resort	 could	 be	installed	 to	 reduce	 ambiguity.	 As	 our	 results	 tentatively	 show,	 this	would	 increase	 students’	 willingness	 to	 borrow	 for	 secondary	education	and	potentially	improve	study	results	and	speed	by	reducing	negative	effects	of	part-time	 jobs.	Secondly,	uncertainty	can	be	greatly	diminished	 by	 introducing	 more	 stable	 future	 interest	 rates.	 Future	research	is	needed	to	test	if	this	and	other	regulatory	measures	would	actually	 diminish	 the	 effect	 of	 ambiguity	 aversion	 on	 borrowing	 and	study	success.		 	
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Chapter	6	
The	uncertain	adolescent36	
Correlates	 of	 self-confidence	 and	 preferences	 for	 risk	
and	ambiguity	in	adolescents		
Introduction		 Uncertainty	 is	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 our	 day-to-day	 decisions.	 In	some	 (relatively	 rare)	 situations	 we	 possess	 clear	 information	 about	the	 likelihood	 of	 the	 various	 outcomes	 of	 a	 particular	 choice,	 for	instance	the	probability	that	it	will	rain	in	the	coming	hour	and	we	will	get	 wet	 when	 biking	 home.	 However,	 most	 of	 the	 typical	 choice	scenarios	we	confront	require	that	a	decision	be	made	without	having	access	to	such	clear	probabilities,	for	instance,	to	give	another	weather-related	 example,	 if	 you	 should	 plan	 your	 next	month’s	 birthday	 party	outside	or	arrange	 for	alternative	 indoor	arrangements	 in	 case	of	bad	weather.	 In	 economics,	 the	 distinction	 between	 choices	 made	 with	known	 and	 unknown	 probabilities	 have	 been	 labeled	 as	 ‘risky’	 and	‘ambiguous’	choices	respectively	(Trautmann	and	van	de	Kuilen,	2013).			 In	 a	 now	 classic	 demonstration,	 Ellsberg	 (1961)	 showed	 that	majority	 of	 people	 demonstrate	 ambiguity	 aversion,	 that	 is,	 a	preference	for	betting	on	a	risky	rather	than	on	an	ambiguous	prospect,	when	 each	 option	 possesses	 equivalent	 SEUs	 (Savage,	 1954) 37	Subsequently,	 theoretical	 models	 have	 attempted	 to	 incorporate	ambiguity	aversion	in	order	to	explain	particular	choice	anomalies	that	previously	could	not	be	accounted	for	adequately	using	SEU	(Easley	and	O’Hara,	2009;	Guidolin	and	Rinaldi,	2009;	Uppal	and	Wang,	2003;	Liu,																																																									36	This	chapter	 is	based	on	a	 joint	paper	with	Alan	Sanfey,	The	uncertain	adolescent.	Correlates	 of	 self-confidence	 and	 preferences	 for	 uncertainty	 in	 adolescents,	 2015,	under	review.		37	See	 Box	 1	 and	 2	 in	 the	 Introduction	 for	 a	 detailed	 explanation	 of	 both	 the	experimental	setup	by	Ellsberg	(1961)	as	well	as	SEU.	
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2011;	Alary	et	al.,	2013;	Snow,	2011).	Experimental	laboratory	studies	on	 the	 other	 hand	 have	 focused	 on	 moderators	 of	 both	 risk	 and	ambiguity	 aversion	 (see	 the	 Introduction	 for	 examples	 of	 such	moderators).	 One	 such	 moderator,	 the	 comparative	 ignorance	hypothesis,	stresses	how	ambiguity	aversion	is	affected	when	elicited	in	isolation	or	directly	 in	 comparison	 to	 risk	 (Qiu	and	Weitzel,	2011).	 In	experimental	 laboratory	 studies	 on	 ambiguity,	 this	moderator	 should	be	 taken	 into	 account	 as	 it	 influences	 individual	 scores	 for	 ambiguity	depending	 on	 the	 order	 in	which	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	 are	 elicited.	We	will	discuss	this	moderator	and	its	effect	on	our	results	in	greater	detail	in	 the	discussion.	 Furthermore,	 experimental	 studies	have	extensively	examined	 the	 correlation	 between	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	 and	 primarily	found	 a	 positive	 correlation	 between	 both	 constructs	 (Kocher	 et	 al.,	2015;	Vieider	et	 al.,	 2012;	Abdellaoui	 et	 al.,	 2011;	Heath	and	Tversky,	1991;	Tversky	and	Fox,	1995).			 While	these	theoretical	and	experimental	results	are	interesting	and	informative,	there	has	been	much	recent	interest	in	extending	our	knowledge	beyond	 the	 laboratory	 and	examining	 choices	made	 in	 the	real	 world.	 This	 is	 important	 as	 theoretical	 literature	 on	 real-life	anomalies,	such	as	why	people	do	not	participate	in	the	stock	market	as	much	 as	 theory	 would	 predict,	 refer	 to	 experimental	 evidence	 on	ambiguity	 to	motivate	an	alternative	 theoretical	 explanation	based	on	ambiguity	aversion.	As	there	is	surprisingly	little	evidence	supporting	a	relationship	 between	 experimentally	 elicited	 ambiguity	 preferences	and	behavior	outside	the	laboratory	(see	Chapter	6	for	an	overview	of	these	 studies),	 exploring	 the	 external	 validity	 of	 ambiguity	 is	 a	worthwhile	endeavor	(Trautmann	and	van	de	Kuilen,	2013).	In	addition	to	 lacking	 a	 real-life	 context,	 the	 laboratory	 studies	 typically	 explore	these	choice	preferences	in	the	population	of	university	undergraduate	students,	 which	 naturally	 reduces	 socio-demographic	 variation	 (von	Gaudecker	et	al.,	2011).			 In	contrast	to	ambiguity,	the	external	validity	of	risk	preferences	has	 received	 some	 attention	 (Dohmen	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Einav	 et	 al.,	 2012;	Lauriola	 et	 al.,	 2007;	 Pennings	 and	 Smidts,	 2000;	Vieider	 et	 al.,	 2014;	Tanaka	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Liu	 and	 Huang,	 2013;	 Cole	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 see	Introduction	 for	 an	 overview	 of	 these	 studies).	 Some	 of	 these	 studies	have	 also	 been	 conducted	with	 non-student	 populations,	 for	 instance	
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studying	 people	 living	 in	 developing	 countries	 (Vieider	 et	 al.,	 2014;	Tanaka	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Liu	 and	Huang,	 2013;	Cole	 et	 al.,	 2013).	Whereas	results	 of	 some	 studies	 (Dohmen	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Vieider	 et	 al.,	 2014)	demonstrate	 stability	 of	 individual	 risk	 preferences	 across	 various	decision	domains,	other	studies	(Weber	et	al.,	2002;	2006)	have	shown	that	 individual	 risk	 preferences	 are	 domain	 specific.	 This	means	 that	one	study	proposes	that	context-specific	risks	such	as	health,	 financial	or	recreational	risks	should	be	captured	separately	(Weber	et	al.,	2002),	whereas	at	the	other	spectrum,	one	study	proposes	the	existence	of	one	underlying	 ‘risk	 preference’,	 which	 should	 capture	 behavior	 towards	risks	 independently	of	 its	corresponding	choice	domain	(Vieider	et	al.,	2014).			 In	summary,	we	believe	that	more	research	is	needed	to	address	if,	 and	 under	 which	 circumstances,	 individual	 risk	 preferences	 are	domain-specific	 and	 subsequently	 what	 the	 implications	 are	 for	understanding	 real-life	 decision-making.	 Moreover,	 as	 most	uncertainties	in	life	are	of	an	ambiguous	rather	than	a	risky	type	(Post	et	 al.,	 2008),	 empirical	 studies	 could	 usefully	 explore	 both	 types	 of	uncertainty	 as	 potential	 underpinnings	 of	 choice	 behavior.	 Indeed,	acknowledging	 both	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	 is	 important	 in	 order	 to	pinpoint	which	type	of	uncertainty	affects	the	specific	decision	domain	under	 investigation.	 For	 example,	 when	 only	 considering	 risk	preferences,	previous	research	(Oosterbeek	and	van	den	Broek,	2009)	found	 a	 positive	 relationship	 between	 risk	 aversion	 and	 students’	borrowing	 behavior.	 However,	 as	 shown	 in	 the	 previous	 Chapter,	 we	could	not	identify	a	relationship	between	risk	preferences	and	students’	borrowing	 behavior	 when	 both	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	 were	 included	 as	independent	predictors	of	students’	borrowing	behavior.		 Taken	 together	 therefore,	 it	 would	 be	 a	 useful	 endeavor	 to	explore	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	 in	 more	 detail,	 and	 also	 to	 extend	 the	investigation	 of	 risk	 and	 ambiguity,	 in	 particular	 preferences	 for	ambiguity,	 to	 both	 a	 broader	 sample	 and	 to	 more	 ecologically	 valid	decisions.	 In	 the	 current	 paper	 we	 address	 both	 of	 these	 aims,	 by	examining	 the	 external	 validity	 of	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	 outside	 the	laboratory	 by	 using	 a	 sample	 of	 non-university	 students.	 Specifically,	we	focused	on	adolescence,	a	phase	of	 life	beginning	around	the	onset	of	puberty	and	ending	when	an	individual	achieves	adult-like	 levels	of	
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independence	 (Somerville,	 2013).38	Adolescents	 are	 often	 confronted	with	serious	decisions	with	uncertain	outcomes,	and,	more	often	 than	any	 other	 age	 group,	 this	 cohort	 engages	 in	 risky	 behavior	 such	 as	drinking,	 smoking,	 unprotected	 sex,	 criminal	 activities	 and	 reckless	driving	(Steinberg,	2004;	Tymula	et	al.,	2012;	Blum	and	Nelson-Mmari,	2004;	Williams	et	al.,	2002).		Given	 the	 clear	 societal	 importance	 of	 examining	 decision-making	 in	 this	 age	 group,	 adolescents’	 risk	 preferences	 have	 been	previously	 studied	 (Reyna	 and	 Farley,	 2006;	 Steinberg,	 2004,	 2008;	Harbough	 et	 al.,	 2002;	 Levin	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 However,	 and	 importantly,	the	role	of	ambiguity	in	adolescents	has	received	far	less	attention	(see	Tymula	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 for	 a	 notable	 exception).	 To	 the	 best	 of	 our	knowledge,	 only	 Sutter	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 has	 explored	 the	 relationship	between	risk/ambiguity	and	real-life	behavior	of	adolescents,	with	this	study	 focusing	 on	 health	 related	 behavior,	 such	 as	 drinking	 and	smoking.	Though	this	latter	behavior	is	indeed	important,	we	wanted	to	extend	 the	 research	 to	 an	 examination	 of	 a	 different,	 yet	 equally	relevant,	aspect	of	health,	namely	mental	health.	Specifically,	we	 focus	here	on	the	concept	of	self-confidence.	Low	self-esteem	in	adolescents,	which	 is	a	product	of	 low	self-confidence,	 is	 found	 to	be	an	 important	predictor	 of	 psychological	 problems	 such	 as	 suicidal	 ideation	 (McGee	and	Williams,	2000),	criminal	behavior,	and	limited	economic	prospects	(Trzesniewski	et	al.,	2006)	later	in	life.	The	 concept	 of	 self-confidence	 is	 comprised	 of	 self-belief	regarding	 one’s	 own	 capabilities	 and	 one’s	 social	 standing.	 The	 latter	component	 in	 particular	 is	 a	 defining	 feature	 of	 this	 period,	 as	adolescents	have	a	 strong	desire	 for	 social	 relatedness	 and	are	highly	sensitive	 to	 information	 concerning	 social	 evaluation	 and	 social	standing	 (Somerville,	 2013).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 social	 complexity	 has	dramatically	increased	with	the	rise	of	digital	communication	(Pfeifer	et	al.,	 2013).	 Adolescents	 spend	 relatively	 less	 time	 with	 their	 families,	more	 time	with	 their	 peers,	 and	 digital	 peer	 communication	 peaks	 at	this	 age	 (Larson,	 2001;	 Lenhart	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 Although	 adolescents	spend	a	lot	of	time	with	their	peers,	either	in	real	life	or	virtually,	these																																																									38	Typically,	 the	age	range	of	adolescence	 is	between	10	and	19	years	(World	Health	Organization,	2014).	
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relationships	are	quite	labile.	Friends	come	and	go,	and	adolescents	will	experience	 peer	 rejection	 more	 often	 compared	 to	 other	 age	 groups	(Wang	et	al.,	2009).			 Overall,	 adolescents	 care	 about	 their	 social	 relationships	 and	their	 social	 standing	 amongst	 their	 peers.	 Adolescents’	 social	relationships	are	rather	unstable	however.	As	self-confidence	 is	partly	shaped	 by	 how	 individuals	 evaluate	 their	 social	 standing,	 we	 are	interested	therefore	in	exploring	if	risk	and	ambiguity,	as	measured	via	standard	 economic	 elicitation	 techniques,	 capture	 some	 of	 the	uncertainty	 inherent	 in	 adolescents’	 peer-to-peer	 relationships.	Specifically,	we	examine	 if	 risk	 and	ambiguity	 aversion	 in	 adolescents	transcend	to	another	domain	of	uncertainty,	namely	one’s	self-belief	in	social	 standing	 and	 own	 capabilities.	 	 We	 hypothesize	 that	 those	adolescents	 who	 dislike	 uncertainty	most,	 that	 is,	 who	 are	more	 risk	and	ambiguity	averse,	will	at	 the	same	time	express	more	uncertainty	concerning	 their	 social	 standing	 and	 self-belief	 regarding	 their	 own	capabilities.				 So	 far	 we	 have	 focused	 on	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	 as	 types	 of	uncertainty	 and	 stressed	 the	 importance	 to	 address	 the	 external	validity	of	these	constructs	in	adolescents.	In	this	study	we	also	propose	to	empirically	examine	the	construct	of	prudence	in	this	group.			 Prudence	 is	 a	 higher	 order	 risk	 attitude	 which	 can	 be	operationalized	as	the	sign	of	the	third	derivative	of	the	utility	function.	A	positive	third	derivative	can	be	interpreted	as	reperesenting	prudent	behavior,	 implying	 precautionary	 saving,	 that	 is,	 greater	 savings	 in	response	to	an	increase	in	background	risk	(Kimball,	1990;	Noussair	et	al.,	2013).	This	concept	has	been	linked	to	economic	applications	such	as	 bargaining	 (White,	 2008),	 sustainable	 development	 and	 climate	change	 (Gollier,	2011),	and	 tax	compliance	 (Snow	and	Warren,	2005).	Similarly	 to	 risk	 and	 ambiguity,	 these	 theoretical	 insights	 are	 not	supported	to	date	by	much	empirical	validation.	A	notable	exception	is	a	 recent	 paper	 by	 Noussair	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 which	 found	 evidence	 of	prudence	in	both	the	general	population	as	well	in	a	sample	of	students.	In	 line	with	 theoretical	predictions,	 they	 found	a	positive	 relationship	between	prudence	and	general	wealth,	for	example,	a	greater	likelihood	of	possessing	a	savings	account	and	a	lower	likelihood	of	having	credit	
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card	 debt.	 Interestingly,	 students	 were	 especially	 prudent,	 with	education	 levels	 being	 positively	 correlated	 with	 prudent	 behavior.	These	findings	are	in	line	with	our	empirical	results	from	the	previous	Chapter,	 where	 we	 showed	 that	 students	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 would	rather	 opt	 for	 a	 part-time	 job	 to	 increase	 their	 saving	 and	 spending	possibilities	than	borrow	money	(see	Chapter	5).	Though	such	behavior	is	 suggestive	 of	 prudent	behavior,	 to	date	no	 studies	have	 specifically	examined	higher	order	risk	attitudes	in	adolescents.			 We	 believe	 prudence	 is	 an	 important	 concept	 to	 explore	 in	adolescents.	 Adolescents	will	 be	 confronted	with	managing	 their	 own	budget	 for	the	first	time	in	their	 lives,	 that	 is,	during	adolescence	they	typically	 experience	 a	 transition	 from	 high	 school	 to	 college	 or	 the	workforce,	 and	 this	 often	 forces	 them	 to	 think	 more	 carefully	 about	their	 spending	 and	 savings	 behavior.	 As	 Sutter	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 found	 a	positive	 correlation	between	 intelligence	 and	 saving	behavior	 in	 their	adolescent	 population,	 we	 will	 examine	 if	 prudence	 is	 one	 of	 the	underlying	explanatory	drivers.		 As	 a	 first	 investigation	 of	 prudence	 and	 adolescence,	 in	 this	study	 we	 aim	 to	 examine	 if	 prudence	 is	 a	 construct	 that	 is	 already	present	 at	 a	 young	 age,	 and	 to	 what	 extent	 it	 correlates	 with	demographic	 characteristics.	 These	 insights	 could	 potentially	 identify	those	adolescents	who	may	be	vulnerable	to	taking	on	too	much	debt	or	who	are	not	likely	to	take	out	a	student	loan	when	they	start	studying	after	they	finished	high	school	(see	Chapter	5	for	implications).		To	 answer	 this	 set	 of	 research	 questions,	we	 recruited	 a	 large	sample	of	adolescents	(aged	12	to	17)	from	a	high	school	in	Nijmegen,	The	 Netherlands.	 We	 elicited	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	 preferences	 via	 a	standard	 Ellsberg	 lottery	 setup	 (Ellsberg,	 1961),	 and	 subsequently	examined	 preferences	 for	 prudence	 via	 a	 model	 free	 measurement	approach	 as	 per	 Eeckhoudt	 and	 Schlesinger	 (2006).	 We	 also	investigated	 adolescents’	 attitudes	 towards	 losses,	 as	 this	 could	be	 an	important	 factor	 driving	 adolescents’	 attitudes	 in	 social	 relationships.	Finally,	 we	 employed	 the	 cognitive	 reflection	 test	 as	 a	 construct	 of	cognitive	 ability	 (Frederick,	 2005).	 Our	 participants	 also	 completed	 a	set	 of	 validated	 questionnaires	 that	 provided	 individual	 scores	 for	measures	such	as	intelligence,	motivation,	and	well-being	(Liepmann	et	al.,	 2007;	 Smits	 and	Vorst,	 2008).	 Our	 primary	 interest	 in	 this	 regard	
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was	 the	 construct	of	 self-confidence.	The	questions	on	 self-confidence	capture	 important	 aspects	of	 adolescents’	 social	 sensitivity,	 as	well	 as	measuring	self-belief	in	their	own	capabilities.	In	 summary,	 this	 study	 examined	 the	 role	 of	 adolescents’	 risk	and	ambiguity	preferences	 in	 their	self-belief	of	 their	own	capabilities	and	 social	 standing.	 Additionally,	 we	 explored	 adolescents’	 attitude	towards	 the	higher	order	risk	concept	of	prudence	and	related	 this	 to	adolescent’s	demographics.	
	
Methods	
	
Participants	We	conducted	this	study	with	187	adolescents	at	a	high	school	in	Nijmegen,	 The	 Netherlands.	 This	 paper	 and	 pencil	 experiment	 took	place	over	 the	course	of	one	week	 in	May	2014.	The	responsible	 local	ethics	committee	approved	this	study.			Two	 classes	 per	 school-year	 were	 randomly	 selected,	 with	participants’	 age	 ranging	 from	12-17	years.	We	excluded	 the	 first	 and	last	 school	 year	 as	 the	 former	 had	 been	 recently	 exposed	 to	 the	intelligence	 test	 and	 psychological	 measures,	 and	 the	 latter	 were	preparing	 for	 their	 final	 school	 exams.	We	 organized	 the	 experiment	during	regular	school	hours	in	the	‘mentor	class’.	This	is	a	weekly	class	hour	 especially	 dedicated	 for	 the	 class	mentor	 to	 inform	pupils	 about	school	news,	to	discuss	class	matters,	and	talk	to	pupils	individually.		The	mentors	of	the	selected	classes	informed	the	parents	of	the	participants	about	the	upcoming	experiment	via	an	 information	 letter.	In	order	for	their	child	to	participate,	parents	were	required	to	return	a	signed	statement	(opt-in	consent).	They	could	either	return	this	to	the	mentor,	or	they	could	send	an	email	to	the	researchers	along	with	any	questions	they	might	have.		In	total,	we	tested	187	participants	during	regular	school	hours.	As	 there	 were	 missing	 data	 from	 15	 participants,	 we	 excluded	 them	from	our	sample.	This	 left	us	with	a	 total	of	172	participants	(83	girls	and	89	boys).	All	the	results	we	present	in	the	next	section	are	based	on	these	172	participants.	
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Experimental	design	Participants	 completed	 experimental	 tasks	 in	 their	 classroom.	First	 we	 elicited	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	 preferences,	 followed	 by	 an	assessment	of	their	beliefs	regarding	the	ambiguous	prospect.	We	also	estimated	 parameters	 for	 prudence	 and	 loss	 aversion.	 Finally,	participants	 completed	 the	 three	questions	on	 the	 cognitive	 reflection	test	(Frederick,	2005).	The	instructions	(in	Dutch)	can	be	found	in	the	Appendix.			
Risk	and	ambiguity	We	elicited	risk	and	ambiguity	preferences	via	a	multiple-choice	list	 procedure,	 as	 per	 Sutter	 et	 al.	 (2013).	 In	 both	 the	 risky	 and	ambiguous	settings,	participants	chose	on	each	trial	between	a	gamble	and	a	sure	pay-off,	with	the	latter	increasing	in	size	after	each	choice.		Risk	and	ambiguity	were	 induced	via	a	standard	Ellsberg	setup	(Ellsberg,	 1961).	 In	 our	 version	 there	 were	 two	 (actual)	 bags,	 which	were	both	 filled	with	20	ping-pong	balls.	One	bag,	 the	 risky	prospect,	was	 filled	 with	 exactly	 10	 orange	 and	 10	 white	 ping-pong	 balls.	 The	other	 bag,	 the	 ambiguous	 prospect,	 was	 filled	 with	 an	 unknown	composition	 of	 white	 and	 orange	 ping-pong	 balls.	 Beforehand,	participants	 chose	 either	 white	 or	 orange	 as	 ‘their’	 color,	 with	 this	choice	determining	the	specific	ping-pong	ball	color	that	would	lead	to	a	win	for	them.	A	gamble	in	this	setting	meant	that	a	participant	would	draw	 a	 ping-pong	 ball	 from	 the	 bag.	 A	 participant	won	 5	 Euro	 if	 this	ping-pong	 ball	 matched	 the	 color	 she	 selected	 beforehand,	 otherwise	she	would	win	nothing.	It	was	important	that	participants	could	choose	their	own	winning	color	in	order	to	(correctly)	eliminate	any	suspicion	that	 the	 likelihood	 of	 a	 win/loss	 from	 the	 ambiguous	 bag	 may	 have	been	predetermined	(Wakker,	2010).		 For	both	risky	and	ambiguous	prospects,	participants	saw	a	total	of	20	choices	each.	Each	choice	was	between	gambling	on	the	draw	of	a	winning	colored	ping-pong	ball	from	the	bag,	or	receiving	the	sure	pay-off.	The	sure	pay-off	increased	from	0	to	5	Euro	in	20	equal	steps	of	0.50	Euro.	We	observed	when	participants	switched	from	the	gamble	to	the	sure	pay-off.	The	later	they	switched	to	the	sure	pay-off,	the	more	they	were	 willing	 to	 gamble,	 and	 therefore	 the	 less	 they	 expressed	
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risk/ambiguity	 averse	 behavior.	 The	 choice	 lists	 for	 the	 risky	 and	ambiguous	 prospect	 were	 counterbalanced	 across	 different	 class	groups	to	control	for	any	potential	order	effect.		After	 participants	 made	 their	 decisions	 for	 the	 ambiguous	prospect,	 we	 elicited	 their	 beliefs	 regarding	 the	 composition	 of	 the	ambiguous	bag.	Specifically,	we	asked	them	to	indicate	how	many	ping-pong	balls	they	thought	were	present	in	the	ambiguous	bag,	which	were	colored	in	their	selected	color.	As	there	are	a	total	number	of	20	ping-pong	balls	in	the	ambiguous	bag,	which	have	a	color	from	a	set	of	only	two	potential	colors,	the	objective	underlying	likelihood	to	draw	a	ping-pong	 ball	 that	matches	 participants’	 selected	 color	 is	 0.5,	which	 boils	down	to	10	ping-pong	balls	that	match	participant’s	selected	color.	Any	difference	 participants	 report	 in	 their	 expectation	 that	 10	 ping-pong	balls	 will	 have	 a	 color	 matching	 their	 selected	 color	 indicates	 a	deviation	from	the	ambiguity	neutral	state.		
Prudence	We	estimated	preferences	for	prudence	via	a	number	of	decision	problems	 that	 do	 not	 require	 any	 axiomatic	 assumptions	 concerning	the	utility	function.	Specifically,	we	elicited	a	measure	of	the	construct	of	 prudence	 using	 a	 model-free	 method	 that	 defines	 prudence	 as	 a	preference	for	adding	a	lottery	with	a	mean	of	zero	to	a	state	in	which	income	is	high,	rather	than	adding	it	to	a	state	in	which	income	is	 low	(Eeckhoudt	and	Schlesinger,	2006;	Noussair	et	al.,	2013).	See	Figure	21	for	an	illustration	of	one	choice	setup.	The	original	monetary	amounts	used	 in	 this	 task	were	scaled	down	 to	appropriate	monetary	amounts	for	 adolescents.	 In	 this	 example	 (Figure	 21)	 the	 decision	maker	 faces	two	 problems,	 which	 are	 the	 possibility	 to	 win	 less	 (a	 reduction	 of	wealth	by	1.50	Euro)	and	the	possibility	to	face	a	zero-mean	lottery.	A	prudent	decision-maker	prefers	to	disaggregate	both	harms	(Rothschild	and	Stiglitz,	1970),	 therefore	she	would	opt	 for	Option	A	 in	Figure	21.	The	 five	 decision	 problems	 presented	 to	 participants	 were	 similar	 in	structure	to	Figure	21,	but	varied	in	terms	of	the	initial	endowment	and	the	wealth	reduction	(lottery	attached	to	the	red	dice	in	Figure	21),	and	the	size	of	 the	zero-mean	 lottery	(lottery	attached	to	 the	black	dice	 in	Figure	21).	Each	participant	received	a	score	for	prudence	based	on	the	
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number	 of	 prudent	 choices	 she	 made.	 A	 score	 of	 0	 implied	 extreme	imprudence,	whereas	a	score	of	5	implied	extremely	prudent	behavior.	We	 assessed	 the	 level	 of	 prudence	 in	 our	 population	 by	 relating	participants’	score	for	prudence	compared	to	a	score	of	2.5,	a	score	that	indicates	indifference	(Noussair	et	al.,	2013).	 	
Loss	aversion		Our	elicitation	method	for	loss	aversion	was	based	on	the	choice	list	procedure	developed	by	Fehr	and	Goette	 (2007).	We	scaled	down	the	 original	 monetary	 amounts	 to	 appropriate	 amounts	 for	 our	experimental	sample.	This	task	consisted	of	six	decision	problems.	Each	decision	 problem	 was	 a	 binominal	 choice	 between	 playing	 a	 gamble	and	a	status	quo	of	0	Euro.	The	gamble	involved	a	50	percent	chance	to	win	 2.25	 Euro	 and	 a	 50	 percent	 chance	 to	 lose	 an	 amount	 x.	 This	negative	amount	x	increased	from	-0.25	to	-2.75	Euro	in	equal	steps	of	0.50	 Euro.	 The	more	 often	 the	 participant	 refrained	 from	 playing	 the	gamble,	the	more	we	infer	she	disliked	the	potential	loss.	This	number	was	the	individual	measure	of	loss	aversion.	We	compared	participants’	score	 for	 loss	 aversion	 to	 a	 score	 of	 3,	 which	 score	 would	 indicate	random	choice.		
Questionnaire	data	and	auxiliary	measures	The	 high	 school	 provided	 us	 with	 a	 large	 set	 of	 auxiliary	measures.	Firstly,	we	received	basic	demographic	data,	such	as	age	and	gender,	as	well	as	participants’	grades	for	all	courses	as	listed	on	their	most	recent	semester	report.	Secondly,	the	high	school	provided	scores	on	a	set	of	validated	 intelligence	tests	and	psychological	measures.	All	
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pupils	 take	these	tests	 in	 the	 first	year	at	 this	high	school,	with	pupils	that	 score	 above	 average	 on	 the	 intelligence	 test	 offered	 an	 extra	curricular	 program.	 Pupils	 who	 score	 low	 on	 psychological	measures	like	 self-confidence	 are	 offered	 specific	 training	 or	 receive	 more	individual	support	from	their	class	mentor.			The	school	used	the	 ‘IST	Intelligence	Structure	Test’	(Liepmann	et	al.,	2007),	which	provides	a	score	for	six	subdomains	of	intelligence,	namely:	 general	 intelligence,	 memory,	 general	 development,	 verbal	intelligence,	numerical	intelligence,	and	abstract	intelligence,	as	well	as	a	 total	 average	 score	 of	 intelligence.	 We	 used	 the	 scores	 for	 verbal	reasoning,	 numerical	 reasoning,	 abstract	 reasoning	 and	 the	 total	intelligence	score	in	our	analyses.		The	 psychological	 test	 is	 a	 validated	 questionnaire	 of	 160	statements	 in	which	pupils	have	to	rate	the	extent	to	which	the	posed	statements	 are	 similar	 to	 their	 character/behavior	 (Smits	 and	 Vorst,	2008).	 The	 outcome	 is	 a	 score	 on	 three	 domains,	 namely	 self-confidence,	well-being,	and	motivation,	with	these	domains	divided	into	sub-domains.	For	self-confidence,	 these	sub-domains	are	 the	ability	 to	express	 oneself	 in	 a	 social	 environment,	 confidence	 in	 taking	 exams,	and	 social	 skills.	 For	 well-being,	 the	 sub-domains	 are	 whether	 pupils	enjoy	 school,	 feel	 accepted	 at	 school,	 and	 how	 they	 value	 the	relationship	 with	 their	 teachers.	 Finally,	 motivation	 is	 captured	 by	study	 focus,	 concentration	 in	 the	 classroom,	 and	 attitude	 towards	homework.	 In	 our	 analyses	we	 first	 planned	 to	 use	 the	 overall	 scores	for	 self-confidence,	 well-being,	 and	 motivation.	 If	 we	 identified	 a	significant	 relationship	between	our	experimental	 variables	and	 these	psychological	 main	 scores,	 we	 further	 analyzed	 the	 individual	 sub-domain	scores	that	comprised	the	overall	score	in	each	domain.		Lastly,	 we	 conducted	 the	 cognitive	 reflection	 test	 (CRT;	Frederick,	 2005).	 This	 test	 contains	 three	 questions,	 which	 proxy	cognitive	capabilities.	For	instance,	one	such	question	is	the	following:	a	bat	 and	 a	 ball	 together	 cost	 1.10	 Euro	 in	 total.	 The	 bat	 costs	 1	 Euro	more	than	the	ball.	How	much	does	the	ball	cost?	The	natural	tendency	is	 to	 answer	with	0.10	Euro,	 yet	 the	 correct	 answer	 is	0.05	Euro.	The	other	two	questions	similarly	pose	cognitive	load	to	inhibit	the	natural	tendency	to	answer	quickly	and	intuitively.	Each	participant	received	a	
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normalized	 score	 between	 0-1	 depending	 on	 the	 amount	 of	 correct	answers.	
Procedures	Each	 participant	 listed	 their	 school	 ID	 number	 on	 their	 set	 of	instructions.	 On	 the	 basis	 of	 this	 ID	 number	 the	 school	 provided	 the	individual	 participant’s	 data,	 as	 outlined	 above.	 The	 link	 between	 ID	number	and	participant’s	identity	was	unknown	to	us,	and	additionally	the	school	did	not	receive	our	experimental	data.	In	this	way	we	could	guarantee	participants	complete	anonymity	in	this	experiment.		At	the	start	of	the	class,	all	participants	were	seated	in	an	exam-style	 format	whereby	 they	 could	 not	 directly	 look	 at	 their	 neighbor’s	table.	We	 extensively	 trained	 two	 research	 assistants	 who	 conducted	the	 experiment	 in	 the	 classrooms.	 One	 would	 read	 the	 instructions	aloud	 in	 front	 of	 the	 classroom.	 Any	 questions	 participants	 asked	 for	clarification,	 were	 publicly	 discussed.	 Each	 experimental	 task	 would	only	 start	 after	 everything	 was	 clear	 and	 the	 clarification	 questions	given	for	each	experimental	task	were	correctly	answered.	One	 randomly	 selected	 decision	 from	 one	 randomly	 selected	task	was	played	out	for	real	after	the	participant’s	last	school	class.	We	decided	 to	 randomly	 select	 one	 choice	 on	 each	 test	 day	 that	 would	determine	 the	 payoff	 of	 all	 participants	 who	 participated	 in	 the	experiment	on	 that	specific	day.	On	average	our	participants	earned	a	total	of	5.42	Euro	for	an	experiment	lasting	50	minutes.		If	a	choice	from	the	risky	or	ambiguous	prospect	was	randomly	selected	 to	 determine	 the	 payoff,	 participants’	 decisions	 were	 played	out	 in	 the	 following	 way.	 If	 they	 had	 decided	 to	 gamble	 they	 could	themselves	 draw	 a	 ping-pong	 ball	 from	 the	 corresponding	 bag.	 The	color	of	the	ping-pong	ball	determined	a	win	or	a	loss.	If	they	had	opted	for	 the	 sure	 payoff,	 this	 corresponding	 amount	was	 immediately	 paid	out	to	them	without	further	action.	If	one	choice	from	the	prudence	task	were	to	be	played	out	for	real,	participants	had	to	roll	a	die	twice	in	a	row	for	the	specific	gamble	they	had	chosen.	Finally,	if	one	choice	from	the	 loss	 aversion	 task	was	 selected,	 participants	 flipped	 a	 coin	 if	 they	had	decided	to	play	the	gamble	in	that	specific	choice.	They	could	state	if	they	would	rather	bet	on	head	or	tails	to	receive	the	positive	amount	of	money	in	the	chosen	gamble.	If	they	did	not	want	to	play	the	gamble	
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in	the	pay-off	determining	choice,	they	neither	lost	nor	gained	anything.	Beliefs	regarding	the	composition	of	the	ambiguous	bag	and	answers	to	the	cognitive	reflection	task	were	not	incentivized.		
Results		
Parameters	for	risk	and	ambiguity		 Based	 on	 our	 participants’	 switching	 point,	 we	 defined	 their	certainty	 equivalents	 (CE)	 and	 these	 parameters	 served	 as	 our	dependent	variables	 for	risk	and	ambiguity.	 In	contrast	to	Sutter	et	al.	(2013)	we	did	not	remove	participants	who	switched	more	than	once.	In	 this	 situation,	we	 took	 the	midpoint	 of	 several	 switching	 points	 in	case	participants	had	switched	more	than	once	from	the	gamble	to	the	sure	pay-off.	CEr	and	CEa	 denote	 the	 certainty	 equivalents	 of	 the	 risky	prospect	 respectively	 the	 ambiguous	 prospect.	 The	 parameter	 r	captures	individual’s	degree	of	risk	taking.			
r	=	1	−	CER/5		A	value	of	r	larger	(smaller)	than	0.5	indicates	risk	averse	(risk	seeking)	behavior.	 A	 score	 of	 0.5	 means	 risk	 neural	 behavior.	 Individual	ambiguity	preferences	are	estimated	as	follows:		
a	=	(CER	−	CEA)/(CER	+	CEA)		The	difference	between	CEr	and	CEa	 is	divided	by	 the	absolute	 level	of	the	CE	of	risk	and	ambiguity	in	order	to	control	for	the	fact	that	similar	differences	 in	CE	will	weigh	more	heavily	 for	a	risk	averse	participant	than	a	risk	neutral	or	risk	seeking	participant.	This	parameter	a	ranges	from	 -1	 (extreme	 ambiguity	 seeking)	 to	 1	 (extreme	 ambiguity	aversion).	A	score	of	0	indicates	ambiguity	neutrality	(Wakker,	2010).	
Summary	statistics	On	average,	our	experimental	population	was	risk	neutral	(mean	
r	 value	 of	 0.504,	 not	 significantly	 different	 from	 0.5:	 t(171)=0.401,	
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p=0.345),	 but	 ambiguity	 averse	 (mean	 a	 value	 of	 0.036,	 significantly	higher	than	0:	t(171)=3.714,	p<0.001).	See	Table	10	for	an	overview	of	the	descriptive	statistics	of	all	our	experimental	variables.		The	 summary	 statistics	 from	 Table	 10	 demonstrate	 that	participants	were	both	significantly	loss	averse	and	prudent	(the	score	for	 loss	 aversion	 was	 significantly	 different	 from	 3,	 respectively	different	 from	a	score	of	2.5	 for	prudence,	 t-test,	p<0.05).	On	average,	adolescents’	beliefs	were	in	line	with	the	ambiguity	neutral	probability,	as	 they	 estimated	 10.26	 winning	 colored	 ping-pong	 balls	 in	 the	ambiguous	bag,	not	significantly	different	from	10.	There	were	notable	gender	differences	however.	Girls,	 on	average,	 expected	an	amount	of	10.76	 winning	 colored	 ping-pong	 balls	 in	 this	 bag,	 whereas	 boys,	 on	average,	 thought	 there	 were	 9.80	 winning	 colored	 ping-pong	 balls	 in	this	 bag	 (Mann-Whitney,	 z=-2.128,	p<0.05).	 Surprisingly,	 girls	 did	 not	differ	in	their	ambiguity	preferences	compared	to	boys,	and	if	anything	they	were	more	ambiguity	averse	(mean	a	value	of	0.034	for	boys	and	mean	 a	 value	 of	 0.039	 for	 girls).	 Finally,	 risk	 preferences	 did	 not	significantly	differ	between	boys	and	girls.			 	
Table	10:	Descriptive	statistics	Variables	 Observations	 Mean	 Std.	dev.	 Min	 Max	Ambiguity	 172	 0.036	 0.128	 -0.84	 0.36	Risk	 172	 0.504	 0.124	 0.025	 0.95	Loss	aversion	 172	 3.884	 0.871	 0	 6	Prudence	 172	 3.843	 1.317	 0	 5	Beliefs	 172	 10.262	 3.130	 2	 16	CRT	 172	 1.977	 0.979	 0	 3	
	
Correlations		 Table	 11	 provides	 a	 correlation	 matrix	 between	 our	experimental	 variables	 and	 the	 school	 data.	 Risk	 and	 ambiguity	were	negatively	 correlated.	 Negative	 correlations	 between	 risk	 and	ambiguity	 have	 been	 reported	 before	 (Akay	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Cubitt	 et	 al.,	
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2012;	 Sutter	 et	 al.,	 2013),	 though	 less	 frequently	 than	 positive	relationships	(Trautmann	and	van	de	Kuilen,	2013).			 Furthermore,	 Table	 11	 shows	 a	 high	 correlation	 between	 the	different	 measures	 that	 capture	 degrees	 of	 intelligence	 and/or	cognitive	abilities;	the	overall	score	for	intelligence,	the	subcomponents	of	verbal,	numerical	and	abstract	reasoning,	the	scores	on	the	CRT	and	pupil’s	 mathematics	 grade	 were	 all	 positively	 correlated.	 	 Also,	 we	found	that	prudence	was	positively	correlated	with	overall	intelligence,	and	specifically	with	the	verbal	intelligence	subcomponent.		In	 line	 with	 our	 hypothesis,	 we	 found	 that	 risk	 preferences	negatively	 correlated	with	 participants’	 self-confidence;	 the	more	 risk	averse	 they	 were,	 the	 less	 positively	 they	 perceived	 their	 self-confidence	 (Figure	 22).	 We	 did	 not	 find	 a	 relationship	 between	ambiguity	 and	 self-confidence.	 Loss	 aversion	 neither	 played	 a	 role	 in	adolescents’	scores	on	self-confidence.	
Multivariate	analyses	Table	12	shows	the	results	of	a	multivariate	analysis	to	test	the	robustness	 of	 the	 bivariate	 correlations	 between	 our	 experimental	variables	and	the	demographic	data.	We	found	that	risk	and	ambiguity	remained	 negatively	 correlated	 in	 a	 multivariate	 analysis.	 Also,	 our	non-parametric	finding	between	gender	and	beliefs	remained	the	same:	girls	 had	 significantly	 higher	 beliefs	 regarding	 the	 amount	 of	winning	colored	 ping-pong	 balls	 in	 the	 ambiguous	 bag.	 Intelligence	(participants’	 total	 score	 on	 general	 intelligence)	 was	 still	 a	 positive	predictor	of	prudence	after	controlling	for	other	demographics.	Finally,	 we	 analyzed	 the	 relationship	 between	 risk	 and	 self-confidence	by	looking	at	the	subcomponents	of	social	skills,	confidence	in	exam-taking,	and	ability	 to	express	oneself	 in	social	situations.	Risk	aversion	 remained	a	 significant	predictor	of	 the	overall	 score	 for	 self-confidence	(Table	13,	models	1	and	2).	Specifically,	the	more	risk	averse	participants	 were,	 the	 more	 negatively	 they	 rated	 their	 social	 skills	(Table	13,	models	3	and	4).						 	
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Figure	22:	Participants’	risk	preferences	and	self-confidence	
	
		 Finally,	 we	 performed	 some	 robustness	 analyses.	 As	 expected,	we	found	that	ambiguity	aversion	was	influenced	by	the	order	in	which	participants	 made	 choices	 between	 the	 risky	 and	 ambiguous	 choice	formats.	 In	 line	 with	 the	 comparative	 ignorance	 hypothesis	 (Fox	 and	Tversky,	1995),	the	parameter	for	ambiguity	aversion	increased	by	0.15	when	participants	had	first	made	choices	regarding	the	risky	prospects,	as	compared	to	making	the	ambiguous	choices	first.	Also,	we	found	that	11	 percent	 of	 our	 participants	 switched	 more	 than	 once	 from	 the	gamble	to	the	sure	option	in	either	the	risky	or	ambiguous	prospect.	We	created	 two	 dummy	 variables	 that	 indicate	 the	 order	 of	 playing	 the	risky	 and	 ambiguous	 prospects,	 and	 whether	 a	 participant	 switched	more	 than	 once.	 Our	 main	 results	 in	 this	 paper	 remain	 qualitatively	valid	 when	 we	 analyzed	 the	 models	 in	 Table	 12	 and	 13	 with	 these	dummy	variables.	
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Discussion		 In	 this	 study	 we	 were	 interested	 in	 expanding	 current	knowledge	 regarding	 preferences	 for	 uncertainty	 by	 examining	 the	economic	constructs	of	 risk	and	ambiguity	 in	a	sample	of	adolescents,	and	 how	 these	 related	 to	 social	 uncertainty,	 in	 particular	 self-confidence	 in	 one’s	 social	 standing.	 Additionally,	 we	 explored	 how	 a	
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previously	 understudied	 aspect	 of	 risk,	 namely	 prudence,	 was	represented	in	this	age-group.			 Adolescence	is	a	time	period	characterized	by	the	importance	of	peer-to-peer	contacts	and	peer	evaluation	(Somerville,	2013),	while	at	the	same	time,	these	relationships	are	in	a	constant	state	of	flux	(Wang	et	 al.,	 2009).	 Therefore,	 we	 hypothesized	 that	 adolescents	 who	 were	more	 risk	 and	ambiguity	 averse	would	 also	 express	more	uncertainty	regarding	their	social	standing	at	their	high	school.	We	found	a	positive	relationship	between	risk	aversion	and	self-confidence	 in	adolescents.	When	we	investigated	the	subcomponents	of	self-confidence,	this	effect	appeared	 primarily	 driven	 by	 self-reported	 ratings	 of	 social	 skills.	 In	other	 words,	 adolescents	 who	 were	 more	 risk	 averse	 were	 more	uncertain	regarding	their	social	skills.	In	a	further	multivariate	analysis	this	 relationship	 remained	 qualitatively	 valid	 when	 controlling	 for	other	 elicited	 experimental	 variables	 and	demographic	 characteristics	such	as	age,	gender,	and	intelligence.	Additionally,	these	results	did	not	change	when	we	introduced	two	dummy	variables,	which	characterized	those	subjects	who	were	impacted	by	the	order	of	playing	the	risky	and	ambiguous	 prospects	 and	 also	 those	 who	 switched	 multiple	 times	between	 the	 prospects	 and	 the	 sure	 option	 in	 the	 risky	 and/or	ambiguous	gamble.			 We	 did	 not	 find	 a	 relationship	 between	 ambiguity	 and	 self-confidence.	We	suspect	 that	adolescents	are	well	aware	of	 their	social	standing	 amongst	 their	 peers,	 that	 is,	 if	 peer	 contacts	 do	 not	 run	smoothly,	peer	 rejection	often	 follows	 (Wang	et	 al.,	 2009).	This	direct	feedback	 offers	 continuous	 information	 about	 adolescents’	 social	environment.	In	other	words,	adolescents	are	able	to	assess	their	social	standing	and	how	it	evolves	over	time	as	a	result	of	peer	bonding	and	peer	 rejection.	 Continuous	 information	 on	 social	 standing	 therefore	may	correspond	better	to	risk	as	a	type	of	uncertainty.	We	suggest	that	this	might	be	a	potential	explanation	for	the	demonstrated	relationship	between	 risk	 and	 social	 standing,	 but	 the	 absence	 of	 one	 between	ambiguity	and	social	standing.	Similarly,	Sutter	et	al.	(2013)	also	found	that	 the	 relationship	 between	 ambiguity	 and	 real-life	 health	 choices	was	quite	weak,	at	best.	It	 is	 also	 interesting	 to	 review	 the	 basic	 findings	 from	 our	adolescent	 pool,	 as	 experiments	 with	 adolescents	 are	 still	 relatively	
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rare	(von	Gaudecker	et	al.,	2011).	We	also	did	not	find	an	indication	of	risk	averse	behavior	in	adolescents	(Harbaugh	et	al.,	2007;	Levin	et	al.,	2002;	 Steinberg,	 2004).	 However,	 we	 did	 find	 evidence	 of	 ambiguity	averse	preferences.	 Interestingly,	Tymula	et	al.	(2012)	found	the	exact	opposite	pattern,	that	is,	risk	averse	and	ambiguity	tolerant	behavior	in	adolescents.	 As	 there	 is	 evidence	 showing	 that	 individual	 preferences	for	risk	and	ambiguity	are	highly	dependent	on	 the	specific	elicitation	method	 (Charness	 et	 al.,	 2013),	 we	 believe	 this	 might	 be	 a	 potential	explanation	 for	 the	 differences	 in	 results.	 Upon	 examining	 the	elicitation	 methods	 of	 Tymula	 et	 al.	 (2012),	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 their	experimental	 procedures	 were	 substantially	 different	 than	 ours.	 In	their	setup,	ambiguity	was	operationalized	as	a	weak	form	by	offering	lotteries	whereby	only	part	of	the	unknown	bag	was	revealed,	which	is	in	 contrast	 to	 our	 ambiguous	 setup	 where	 the	 unknown	 bag	 was	completely	unknown.	Their	procedure	is	more	in	line	with	a	compound	lottery	and	it	is	known	that	this	is	perceived	differently	than	complete	ambiguity	 (Halevy,	 2007).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 we	 used	 the	 same	procedure	to	elicit	risk	and	ambiguity	as	Sutter	et	al.	(2013),	with	our	results	aligning	in	that	we	both	identify	ambiguity	averse	preferences	in	adolescents.	 That	 elicitation	 methods	 might	 be	 a	 reason	 for	 the	aforementioned	 differences	 in	 results	 becomes	 even	 more	 plausible	when	 we	 compare	 our	 correlation	 between	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	preferences	 to	 previous	 reported	 correlations.	 We	 found	 risk	 and	ambiguity	 preferences	 to	 be	 negatively	 correlated.	 As	 most	 studies	report	 positive	 relationships	 between	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	 (Trautmann	and	van	de	Kuilen,	2013),	it	is	interesting	to	note	that	those	studies	that	employed	 the	 same	 elicitation	 procedure	 as	 ours	 also	 reported	 a	negative	 correlation	 between	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	 (Sutter	 et	 al.,	 2013;	Akay	et	al.,	2012;	Cubitt	et	al.,	2012).	A	final	note	regarding	differences	between	these	methods	is	that	the	elicitation	technique	used	in	Tymula	et	 al.	 (2012)	 provides	 a	 convenient	 way	 to	 model	 increasing	uncertainty,	 but	 it	 does	 not	 capture	 true	 ambiguity	 in	 the	 sense	 of	unknown	 probabilities,	 yet	 it	 assumes	 that	 people	 form	 second-order	expectations	concerning	real-life	decisions.	On	the	other	hand,	Ellsberg	urn	 experiments,	 which	 we	 used	 in	 this	 study,	 have	 been	 most	frequently	 used	 to	 elicit	 ambiguity	 aversion	 because	 they	 are	transparent,	 easily	 implemented	 and	 truly	 capture	 preferences	
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regarding	unknown	probabilities	(Trautmann	and	van	de	Kuilen,	2013,	p.	94).			Although	 it	 is	 reassuring	 that	we	 found	similar	results	as	other	experimental	 studies	 on	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	 which	 employed	 similar	elicitation	 techniques,	 the	 ultimate	 goal	 is	 to	 identify	 adolescents’	preferences	 for	 risk	 and	 ambiguity.	 The	 Ellsberg	 paradigm,	which	we	used	 in	 this	 experiment,	 is	 a	 very	 standard	 elicitation	 technique	 to	measure	 individuals’	 ambiguity	 preferences	 and	 it	 has	 been	 used	 in	many	 experimental	 studies	 with	 non-adolescent	 samples	 (Trautmann	and	van	de	Kuilen,	 2013).	Majority	 of	 these	 studies	 reported	 risk	 and	ambiguity	aversion	(Trautmann	and	van	de	Kuilen,	2013).	Based	on	our	results,	 we	 can	 conclude	 that	 adolescents	 dislike	 ambiguity,	 as	 do	adults.	On	the	other	hand,	adolescents’	CEs	for	the	risky	prospect	were	in	accordance	with	 the	expected	value	of	 the	 risky	prospect,	 and	 thus	they	cannot	be	characterized	as	risk	averse,	which	is	commonly	found	in	adults.		Although	we	did	not	measure	risk	perception	in	this	study,	it	has	been	 shown	 that	 risk	 preferences	 and	 risk	 perception	 are	 correlated	(Weber	 et	 al.,	 2002;	 2006).	 Although	 most	 real-life	 events	 cannot	 be	described	 in	 terms	 of	 objective	 probabilities	 and	 are	 thus	 rather	ambiguous	 than	 risky	 (Post	 et	 al.,	 2008),	 it	 seems	 that	 adolescents,	especially	those	who	report	participating	in	potential	harmful	activities,	report	that	they	are	better	informed	as	to	associated	‘risks’	(Cohn	et	al.,	1995).	Moreover,	they	are	more	likely	to	minimize	the	perceived	risks	of	 potential	 harmful	 activities,	 like	 for	 instance	 getting	 drunk	 when	consuming	alcoholic	beverages	(Cohn	et	al.,	1995).	The	combined	effect	of	 adolescents’	 neutral	 attitude	 towards	 risks	 and	 their	 tendency	 to	minimize	 risks	 related	 to	 harmful	 activities	 could	 potentially	 explain	why	adolesents	engage	more	often	in	risky	activities	compared	to	other	age-groups.	 In	 order	 to	 verify	 this	 intuition,	 in	 future	 studies	 we	propose	to	directly	relate	the	relationship	between	risk	perception	and	risk	preferences	on	adolescents’	behavior	in	real-life.		In	 contrast	 to	 risk	 perception	 we	 did	 measure	 adolescents’	perception	 regarding	 the	 underlying	 likelihood	 in	 the	 ambiguous	prospect.	 Namely,	 we	 explicitly	 asked	 participants	 to	 report	 their	beliefs	regarding	the	composition	of	the	ambiguous	bag.	An	interesting	finding	in	our	experimental	sample	was	the	gender	difference	in	beliefs	
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regarding	 the	 composition	of	 the	 ambiguous	bag.	We	 found	 that	 girls,	compared	 to	boys,	expected	one	more	ping-pong	ball	of	 their	selected	color	 in	 the	ambiguous	bag.	 It	was	rather	surprising	 that	girls	did	not	act	 on	 their	 more	 positive	 beliefs	 by	 expressing	 more	 willingness	 to	gamble	 in	 the	 ambiguous	 lottery.	 Namely,	 we	 could	 not	 identify	 any	gender	 differences	 in	 ambiguity	 aversion.	 Future	 research	 could	investigate	if	confidence	in	one’s	stated	beliefs	is	a	possible	explanation	why	girls	were	not	willing	to	express	more	ambiguity	seeking	behavior,	as	 compared	 to	 boys,	 despite	 substantial	 higher	 beliefs	 regarding	 the	ambiguous	 prospect.	 Further	 research	 could	 also	 look	 into	 the	relationship	 between	 perceived	 likelihood	 and	 perceived	 risk	 in	adolescents.	 If	 adolescents	 indeed	 minimize	 perceived	 risks,	 yet	overweight	 perceived	 likelihoods,	 the	 latter	 is	 a	 common	 finding	 in	adults	 (Abdellaoui	 et	 al.,	 2011),	 this	 could	 potentially	 explain	 the	negative	correlation	between	risk	and	ambiguity	preferences.	Our	 results	 also	 highlight	 that	 adolescents	 are	 sensitive	 to	 a	particular	 moderator	 of	 ambiguity,	 known	 as	 the	 comparative	ignorance	effect	(Fox	and	Tversky,	1995),	whereby	ambiguity	aversion	is	 increased	 when	 participants	 experience	 ambiguity	 after	 they	 have	been	first	exposed	to	risk.	Research	suggests	that	the	uncertain	aspect	of	 the	 ambiguous	 prospect	 is	 particularly	 discomforting	 as	 it	 can	 be	easily	 compared	 to	 the	 clear	 information	 structure	 of	 the	 risky	prospect,	which	evidently	occurs	when	participants	 first	 indicate	their	choices	for	the	risky	prospect	before	making	choices	in	the	ambiguous	prospect	(Rubaltelli	et	al.,	2010).	Based	on	our	findings	we	can	conclude	that,	as	with	adults,	adolescents	are	more	prone	to	ambiguity	aversion	when	 they	 have	 the	 possibility	 to	 evaluate	 clear	 and	 vague	 prospects	jointly.	Related	to	this	moderator,	Fox	and	Tversky	(1995)	also	showed	that	 knowledge	 and	 specific	 expertise	 can	 diminish	 the	 distinction	between	 clear	 and	 vague	 choice	 events,	 and	 can	 flip	 individual	preferences	 from	 ambiguity	 aversion	 to	 ambiguity	 seeking	 and	 vice	versa.	Namely,	 if	 people	 (think	 they)	possess	knowledge	 regarding	an	ambiguous	 prospect,	 this	 prospect	 does	 not	 seem	 vague	 to	 them	anymore,	which	will	not	necessarily	 lead	to	ambiguity	aversion	in	this	case.	 It	would	be	worthwhile	to	test	how	perceived	expertise	on	more	real-life	ambiguous	events	guides	adolescents	in	their	decision-making	under	uncertainty.		
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	 In	 our	 experiment	 we	 also	 tested	 attitudes	 of	 prudence	 in	adolescents.	 To	 the	 best	 of	 our	 knowledge,	 this	 is	 the	 first	 study	examining	this	higher-order	risk	attitude	in	adolescents.	For	a	prudent	individual,	 the	 expected	 marginal	 utility	 of	 saving	 increases	 as	background	risk	 increases.	 In	our	experimental	 task	on	prudence,	 this	behavior	is	identified	when	participants	prefer	to	disaggregate	harms	of	accepting	 a	 smaller	monetary	 outcome	 and	 a	 zero-mean	 risky	 lottery	(Rothschild	 and	 Stiglitz,	 1970).	 Our	 experimental	 population	 was,	 on	average,	significantly	prudent.	Noussair	et	al.	 (2013)	also	showed	that	their	population	of	undergraduate	students	expressed	prudence.	 	In	 line	with	Nousair	et	al.	 (2013),	we	also	 found	 that	prudence	and	 intelligence	 were	 positively	 correlated,	 but	 intelligence	 did	 not	correlate	 with	 risk	 or	 ambiguity	 aversion.	 Our	 findings	 support	 the	view	 that	 prudence	 is	 particularly	 pervasive	 among	 people	with	 high	cognitive	ability	and	education	(Noussair	et	al.,	2013,	p.	345).	Theoretical	predictions	(Kimball,	1990)	and	the	empirical	result	of	 Noussair	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 stress	 the	 importance	 of	 prudence	 for	precautionary	 saving	 behavior.	 Namely,	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 future	income	risk,	agents	who	are	prudent	save	more.	As	Sutter	et	al.	(2013)	found	a	positive	 correlation	between	 intelligence	and	 saving	behavior	in	their	adolescent	population,	it	might	well	be	that	prudence	is	one	of	the	 underlying	 explanatory	 drivers.	 Future	 studies	 could	 focus	 on	directly	 relating	 a	 prudent	 attitude	 of	 adolescents	 to	 their	 saving	behavior.		 It	 is	 also	 interesting	 to	 consider	 the	 correlation	 between	 risk	aversion	 and	 prudence.	 Experimental	 studies	 on	 prudence	 with	 non-adolescent	samples	report	a	positive	correlation	between	risk	aversion	and	prudence	(Ebert	and	Wiesen,	2010;	Noussair	et	al.,	2013).	We	did	not	 find	 a	 correlation	 between	 risk	 aversion	 and	 prudence	 in	adolescents.	 Although	 Noussair	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 did	 not	 address	 this	 in	their	 main	 text,	 their	 correlation	 matrix	 illustrated	 a	 non-significant	correlation	 between	 risk	 aversion	 and	 prudence	 in	 their	 student	sample,	 as	 opposed	 to	 a	 significant	 positive	 correlation	 between	 risk	aversion	and	prudence	 in	 their	 representative	panel	 sample	of	 adults.	Subsequently,	when	 they	 excluded	 risk	 neutral	 individuals	 from	 their	sample,	 who	 should	 in	 theory	 be	 indifferent	 between	 prudent	 and	imprudent	 gambles,	 they	 still	 found	 evidence	 of	 prudence	 in	 the	
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remaining	 sample.	 These	 findings	 support	 our	 result	 that	 adolescents	can	be	risk	neutral,	yet	averse	to	higher-order	risk	attitudes.	Aversion	 to	higher-order	risk	attitudes	could	affect	adolescents	in	their	decision-making	as	they	will	soon	either	experience	a	transition	from	high	school	to	college	or	from	high	school	to	the	workforce.	Those	adolescents	 who	 will	 pursue	 an	 educational	 trajectory	 have	 to	 rely	more	on	student	 loans	as	 financial	benefits	 for	 students	are	 cut	down	due	 to	 economic	 turmoil	 in	 many	 countries	 (Chapter	 5).	 As	 already	explained	 before,	 a	 prudent	 individual	 has	 a	 tendency	 to	 save	 when	background	 risk	 increases,	 instead	 of	 obtaining	 a	 student	 loan.	Moreover,	 it	 is	rather	worrisome	that	prudence	is	especially	prevalent	amongst	those	who	have	the	highest	cognitive	ability	and	will	therefore	probably	pursue	a	longer	than	average	educational	trajectory.	A	follow-up	 study	 on	 our	 experiment	 from	Chapter	 5	 could	 test	 if	 prudence	 is	prevalent	in	those	students	who	borrow	least.	On	the	other	hand,	those	adolescents	 who	 will	 enter	 the	 workforce	 soon	 and	 which	 show	indication	of	prudent	behavior	might	select	 into	 jobs	with	 low	income	risk	 (Browning	 and	 Lusardi,	 1996),	 yet	 perhaps	 less	 future	 career	prospects.	A	follow-up	study	could	explicitly	relate	adolescents’	attitude	towards	prudence	and	their	preferred	job	options	in	the	future.			 All	of	the	findings	we	reported	in	this	paper	can	be	related	to	a	larger	 discussion	 of	 whether	 experimentally	 elicited	 preferences	 for	uncertainty	relate	to	real-life	decision-making	under	uncertainty.	Some	researchers	argue	for	eliciting	domain	specific	risk	preferences	(Weber	et	al.,	2002),	whereas	others	state	that	risk	and	ambiguity	preferences	can	 be	 captured	 by	 one	 general	 measurement	 (Dohmen	 et	 al.,	 2011;	Vieider	et	al.,	2014;	Lauriola	et	al.,	2007),	thus	suggesting	that	risk	and	ambiguity	 attitudes	 are	 somewhat	 stable	 across	 contexts.	 Our	 results	show	 that	 risk	 preferences	 elicited	 via	 a	 standard	 lottery	 setup	correlate	with	adolescents’	self-confidence	regarding	 their	social	skills	at	 their	 high	 school.	 This	 result	 shows	 that	 risk,	 elicited	 via	 a	 lottery,	captures	an	aspect	of	risk	 in	another,	more	social,	decision	domain.	At	the	 same	 time,	 individual	 lottery	 risk	 preferences	 did	 not	 explain	adolescents’	 variation	 in	 confidence	 ratings	 of	 taking	 exams.	 As	 there	are	 relatively	 few	 studies	 that	 investigate	 the	 relationship	 between	experimentally	elicited	variables	and	real-life	decision	variables,	more	research	 is	 needed	 to	 follow-up	 on	 the	 specificity	 when	 it	 comes	 to	
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relating	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	 to	 real-life	 decision-making	 under	uncertainty,	especially	in	the	population	of	adolescents.			 Throughout	 the	 discussion	 we	 have	 outlined	 several	 variables	that	 should	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 if	 we	 aim	 to	 provide	 a	 good	characterization	 of	 adolescents’	 decision-making	 under	 uncertainty.	 A	unifying	 experiment	 that	 looks	 at	 the	 interaction	 between	 risk	perception,	 risk	 preferences,	 beliefs,	 confidence	 in	 beliefs,	 ambiguity	preferences	and	prudence	could	 specifically	pinpoint	why	adolescents	are	 at	 the	 same	 time	 risk	 neutral,	 yet	 ambiguity	 averse	 and	 prudent.	This	would	also	aid	 in	designing	better	policies	 to	protect	adolescents	from	engaging	in	harmful	risky	activities	and/or	saving	too	much	when	background	risk	increases.	Apart	from	providing	useful	directions	for	follow-up	studies,	our	results	 already	 demonstrate	 that	 preferences	 for	 risk,	 elicited	 by	 a	standard	 lottery,	 capture	 a	meaningful	 aspect	 of	 social	 uncertainty	 in	adolescents.	Adolescents’	 confidence	 regarding	 their	 social	 standing	 is	an	 important	 aspect	 of	 their	 mental	 health.	 Understanding	 social	uncertainty	in	adolescents	as	a	general	aversion	to	risk,	amongst	other	causes,	could	help	pedagogues	to	identify	and	design	better	training	to	help	those	adolescents	who	are	struggling	with	their	social	standing.																	
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Chapter	7	
Discussion	and	conclusion		
Summary		 The	 central	 theme	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 DMUU.	 We	 aimed	 to	understand	 how	 sources	 and	 types	 of	 uncertainty	 affect	 individual’s	decision-making	and	their	external	validity.	We	explored	this	topic	with	several	 research	 methodologies.	 This	 enabled	 us	 to	 investigate	 why	sources	and	types	of	uncertainty	play	a	role	 in	the	mind	of	a	decision-maker	and	how	this	affects	real-life	decision-making.		 In	 Chapter	 2	 we	 studied	 sources	 of	 risk.	 In	 economics,	preferences	 for	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	 are	 predominantly	 elicited	 by	lottery	 setups	 (Charness	et	 al.,	 2010;	Dohmen	et	 al.,	 2011;	Lauriola	et	al.,	2007).	In	real	life,	however,	uncertainty	often	stems	from	the	actions	of	 other	decision-makers,	 referred	 to	 as	 strategic	uncertainty	 (Houser	et	 al.,	 2010).	 Hence,	 there	 is	 a	 difference	 between	 the	 sources	 of	uncertainty	 regarding	 typical	 preference	 elicitations	 and	 situations	 of	strategic	 uncertainty.	 The	 distinction	 between	 these	 sources	 of	uncertainty	was	the	main	topic	of	Chapter	2.	We	focussed	on	the	Trust	Game	as	previous	research	that	related	individual	preferences	for	risk,	elicited	via	a	lottery,	to	individual	trust,	as	observed	in	the	Trust	Game,	found	mixed	results	(Eckel	and	Wilson,	2004;	Ashraf	et	al.,	2006;	Ben-Ner	and	Halldorsson,	2010;	Houser	et	al.,	2010;	and	Etang	et	al.,	2011).	In	Chapter	2	we	shed	some	light	on	the	reason	why	these	results	might	be	 so	mixed.	We	 developed	 a	 risky	 version	 of	 the	 Trust	 Game	 (RTG),	which	underlying	source	of	uncertainty,	namely	the	risk	of	betrayal	by	a	Trustee,	 was	 aligned	 with	 strategic	 uncertainty	 in	 the	 Trust	 Game.	Indeed,	 our	 results	 showed	 that	 behavior	 in	 the	 RTG	 influenced	 the	amount	 of	 trust	 a	 Trustor	 displayed	 in	 the	 Trust	 Game.	 On	 the	 other	hand,	 our	 participants’	 risk	 preferences,	 elicited	 via	 a	 lottery,	 did	 not	correlate	 with	 their	 decision	 to	 trust	 in	 the	 Trust	 Game.	 This	 paper	illustrated	 that	 a	 lottery	measurement	 of	 risk	 (Holt	 and	 Laury,	 2002)	
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does	not	capture	the	risk	a	decision-maker	faces	 in	a	strategic	context	such	as	the	Trust	Game.		In	 Chapter	 3	we	 extended	 our	 paradigm	of	 the	RTG	 to	 include	ambiguity.	We	were	able	to	investigate	a	fourfold	pattern	of	types	and	sources	of	uncertainty.	Prior	 to	 the	decision-making	phase	we	elicited	individuals’	beliefs	concerning	receiver’s	reciprocity	in	the	Trust	Game.	We	 used	 these	 individual	 beliefs	 to	 create	 so-called	 belief-corresponding	 scenarios	 whereby	 participants	 faced	 a	 lottery	 setup	with	 an	 equal	 underlying	 likelihood.	 This	 study	 was	 conducted	 in	 an	MRI	 scanner.	 We	 specifically	 investigated	 the	 neural	 correlates	 of	individuals’	 ambiguity	preferences	 in	both	 lottery	and	 social	domains.	We	 found	 a	 main	 effect	 of	 ambiguity	 aversion.	 Although	 ambiguity	aversion	was,	on	average,	also	prevelant	when	the	underlying	source	of	uncertainty	stemmed	from	another	decision-maker	and	we	did	not	find	significant	 differences	 in	 responses	between	 the	 risky	 and	 ambiguous	lottery,	this	interaction	was	not	significant.	Likewise,	we	found	similar	brain	areas	actively	involved	for	both	sources	of	uncertainty.	We	found	substantial	individual	differences	in	social	ambiguity	preferences	when	taking	 individual	 differences	 in	 beliefs	 into	 account.	 These	 individual	differences	have	a	neural	basis,	as	activation	in	the	IFG	correlates	with	the	 degree	 of	 social	 ambiguity	 aversion.	 We	 did	 not	 find	 neural	correlates	 of	 individual	 differences	 related	 to	 lottery	 ambiguity	preferences.	 The	 IFG	 is	 involved	 in	 establishing	 accurate	 perceptual	judgments	 about	 other	 peoples’	 actions	 (Pobric	 et	 al.,	 2006).	 Overall,	these	 findings	 suggest	 that	 the	 IFG	 is	 involved	when	 decision-makers	are	deciding	under	uncertainty,	and	specifically	when	the	uncertainty	is	resolved	by	another	person.		 In	 economics	 we	 assume	 that	 DMUU	 is	 guided	 by	 individual	beliefs	(Savage,	1954).	In	our	behavioral	setup	in	Chapter	3	we	indeed	found	 that	 individuals	 invested	 most	 of	 their	 tokens	 when	 they	expected	a	higher	rate	of	 reciprocation	amongst	Trustees	 in	 the	Trust	Game.	 This	 notion	 that	 individuals’	 beliefs	 are	 powerful	 enough	 to	explain	 decision-making	 is	 not	 so	 deeply	 rooted	 in	 the	 field	 of	neuroscience	(Glimcher	and	Rustichini,	2004).	In	Chapter	4	we	aimed	to	show	 that	 individuals’	 beliefs	 directly	 affect	 neural	 mechanisms	 of	anticipated	 reward.	 Anticipatory	 reward	 is	 a	 well-studied	 topic	 in	neuroeconomics	(Fiorillo	et	al.,	2003;	Schultz	et	al.,	1997;	Schultz	et	al.,	
	 	 			
159	
1998;	Schultz,	2010).	The	monetary	incentive	delay	task	by	Knutson	et	al.	 (2000)	 is	 a	 common	 approach	 to	 experimentally	 studying	anticipated	reward	modalities	in	humans.	In	this	task	participants	have	to	perform	some	task	(e.g.	a	button	press	task	in	which	they	need	to	hit	a	 button	 within	 a	 certain	 time-limit)	 in	 order	 to	 receive	 rewards	 or	avoid	losses.	Importantly,	prior	to	this	task,	participants	have	learned	to	associate,	via	performing	the	button	press	task,	which	abstract	cues	will	lead	to	gains	and	losses.	In	this	Chapter	we	used	the	neural	data	of	the	second	 part	 of	 the	 same	 fMRI	 experiment	 conducted	 in	 the	 previous	chapter.	In	this	second	part	of	the	experiment,	participants	experienced	the	outcomes	of	their	choices	while	still	lying	in	the	MRI	scanner.	Here,	we	 investigated	whether	 decision-makers’	 beliefs	 about	 the	 outcomes	of	 their	 choices	 can	 also	 act	 as	 a	 cue	 for	 reward	 anticipation.	 As	 the	neural	correlates	of	anticipated	rewards	are	very	robustly	identified	in	the	 ventral	 striatum	 (Knutson	 et	 al.,	 2001;	Knutson	 and	Greer,	 2008),	we	 identified	 a	 similar	 expected	 reward	 signal	 in	 the	 striatum	 when	participants	were	 awaiting	 their	 outcomes	 in	 our	 experimental	 setup.	This	 expected	 reward	 signal	 stems	 from	 participants’	 own	 invested	choices	 as	modulated	by	 their	beliefs.	These	 results	 stress	 that	belief-mediated	 anticipatory	 rewards	 are	 just	 as	 powerful	 in	 activating	 an	expected	 reward	 signal	 as	 when	 humans	 learn	 to	 associate	 abstract	cues	with	rewards	in	a	task	like	the	monetary	incentive	delay	task.			 In	 Chapters	 5	 and	 6	 we	 extended	 sources	 and	 types	 of	uncertainty	 beyond	 the	 laboratory.	 Although	 risk	 and	 ambiguity	preferences	 are	well-researched	 behavioral	 constructs	 in	 the	 artificial	environment	of	the	laboratory,	few	empirical	translations,	especially	for	ambiguity,	 have	 been	 undertaken	 (Trautmann	 and	 van	 de	 Kuilen,	2013).			 In	Chapter	5	we	tested	the	external	validity	of	risk	and	ambiguity	preferences	 by	 relating	 students’	 ambiguity	 attitudes	 to	 their	borrowing	 behavior.	 Although	 the	 relationship	 between	 risk	 and	students’	borrowing	behavior	had	been	identified	(Oosterbeek	and	van	den	 Broek,	 2009),	 we	 considered	 ambiguity	 as	 an	 important	 type	 of	uncertainty	within	this	real-life	decision	context.	We	hypothesized	that	students’	 aversion	 to	 borrowing	 may	 be	 primarily	 driven	 by	 their	aversion	 to	ambiguity	 regarding	 the	 repayment	of	 their	 loans.	 Indeed,	we	found	a	negative	relation	between	students’	ambiguity	aversion	and	
	 	 			
160	
the	 amount	 they	 borrowed.	 We	 could	 not	 identify	 a	 relationship	between	students’	risk	preferences	and	their	borrowing	behavior.		 In	Chapter	6	we	conducted	a	field	study	with	adolescents	during	regular	 school	 hours	 at	 their	 high	 school.	 We	 measured	 adolescents’	risk	and	ambiguity	preferences	and	related	these	to	demographic	data	and	 a	 collection	 of	 psychological	 and	 school	 performance	 measures,	which	 were	 directly	 provided	 by	 the	 high	 school.	 We	 were	 mostly	interested	 in	 testing	 the	 relationship	 between	 risk	 and	 ambiguity,	 as	measured	by	standard	economic	experimental	tasks,	and	an	important	aspect	of	mental	health,	namely	adolescents’	self-confidence	levels.	Self-confidence	is	shaped	by	self-belief	regarding	own	capabilities	and	social	standing.	 This	 last	 feature	 is	 especially	 important	 during	 adolescence,	as	 adolescents	 are	 much	 concerned	 about	 peer-to-peer	 evaluation.	Although	adolescents	spend	a	lot	of	time	with	their	peers,	either	in	real	life	 or	 in	 the	 digital	 world	 (Larson,	 2001;	 Lenhart,	 Ling,	 Campbell,	 &	Purcell,	 2010),	 these	 relationships	 are	 not	 very	 stable.	 Friends	 come	and	 go	 and	 adolescents	 will,	 more	 frequently	 compared	 to	 other	 age	groups,	 experience	 peer	 rejection	 (Wang,	 Iannotti	 and	 Nansel,	 2009).	We	studied	whether	less	risk	and	ambiguity	averse	adolescents	flourish	more	in	their	confidence	regarding	their	social	relationships.	We	indeed	found	 that	 risk	 aversion	 in	 adolescents	 correlate	with	 self-confidence.	In	particular,	risk	aversion	affected	the	way	adolescents	perceived	their	own	social	skills	at	their	high	school.			
Policy	relevance		 As	 DMUU	 is	 a	 viable	 part	 of	 our	 daily	 lives,	 our	 research	 into	sources	 and	 types	 of	 uncertainty	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 help	 individual	decision-makers	 and	 to	 inform	 policy	makers	 to	 better	 design	 public	policy	(Farber,	2011).		 Firstly,	 this	thesis	showed	that	 in	strategic	uncertainty	settings,	it	 is	 important	 to	 consider	 the	 source	 of	 uncertainty	 decision-makers	face.	 In	 real-life	 one	 can	 think	 of	many	 economic	 relationships	where	people	 need	 to	 interact	 with	 others	 in	 order	 to	 cooperate,	 trade	 or	invest.	Many	of	 these	 interactions	occur	with	others	across	 the	world,	which	taps	more	into	ambiguity	as	type	of	uncertainty.	Companies	and	governments	 should	 be	 aware	 that	 social	 ambiguity	 aversion	 is	 a	
	 	 			
161	
prominent	 feature	 of	 individuals’	 decision-making.	 This	 should	 be	particularly	valuable	to	those	in	positions	of	power,	as	there	is	evidence	that	a	society	in	which	trust	in	other	people	is	low,	negatively	influences	economic	performance	(Knack	and	Keefer,	1997).			 The	personal	example	 I	 started	with	 in	 the	 Introduction	of	 this	thesis	was	an	illustration	of	strategic	uncertainty.	As	I	had	to	transfer	a	substantial	 amount	 of	 money	 via	 Western	 Union	 to	 somebody	 I	 had	never	met,	 it	was	difficult	to	assess	the	odds	of	being	scammed.	Fraud	occus	 frequently	 via	 a	 money	 agency	 like	 Western	 Union.	 With	 the	phrase	‘fraudsters	gain	your	trust	and	then	steal	your	money’,	Western	Union	 aims	 to	 create	 fraud	 awareness	 on	 their	 website.	 Instead	 of	trying	to	establish	awareness	to	detect	potential	fraud,	the	uncertainty	in	a	succesfull	outroll	of	their	transactions	would	greatly	be	reduced	if	Western	Union	offered	a	proper	and	thorough	background	check	on	the	end-receiver.	As	this	is	not	an	exercise	in	comparing	which	companies	or	 governments	 perform	 better,	 I	 do	 want	 to	 mention	 a	 counter	example	 of	 the	 company	Airbnb,	which	 I	 recently	 learned	 takes	 great	care	 in	 reducing	 strategic	 uncertainty	 for	 both	 renters	 and	 landlords.	This	 company	 performs	 detailed	 background	 checks	 before	 allowing	individuals	to	use	their	services,	and	in	contrast	to	Western	Union,	they	have	 a	 clear	 refund	 policy	 if	 the	 transaction	 does	 not	 go	 through	properly.	 Via	 these	 policies,	 the	 uncertainty	 concerning	 interacting	economic	 partners	 around	 the	 globe	 substantially	 decreases,	 and	 this	might	 be	 a	 way	 to	 facilitate	 interactions	 characterized	 by	 strategic	uncertainty.	A	 last	note	on	sources	of	uncertainty	 is	 that	public	policy	makers	 who	 wish	 to	 identify	 if	 individuals	 are	 particularly	 averse	 to	social	sources	of	uncertainty,	should	take	into	account	that	preferences	for	risk	and	ambiguity	cannot	be	solely	captured	by	lottery	elicitations	measures,	 but	 has	 to	 be	 measured	 via	 an	 elicitation	 procedure	 that	aligns	sources	of	uncertainty	(see	Chapter	2	and	6).		 Moreover,	policy	makers	might	also	want	to	consider	both	types	of	 uncertainty.	 Individuals	 mostly	 face	 decision	 problems	 that	 are	characterized	as	ambiguity	as	most	choice	events	cannot	be	defined	by	exact	 probabilities.	 More	 research	 is	 needed	 that	 aims	 to	 test	 the	external	validity	of	both	types	of	uncertainty	 in	the	field.	For	 instance,	the	 relationship	 we	 addressed	 between	 ambiguity	 attitudes	 and	students’	 borrowing	 behavior	 led	 us	 to	 formulate	 explicit	 policy	
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recommendations.	 We	 proposed	 to	 introduce	 a	 guarantee	 that	 the	government	will	 act	 as	 a	 last	 resort	 in	 case	 of	 loan	 default	 and	more	stable	future	interest	rates	to	reduce	ambiguity.			 	
Limitations	This	 thesis	 naturally	 has	 some	 limitations,	 which	 at	 the	 same	time	offer	opportunities	for	future	research	(see	below).	The	limitations	that	we	want	to	make	explicit	concern	the	low	statistical	power	in	fMRI	experiments,	 our	 tailor-made	 design	 structure	 based	 on	 participants’	beliefs	in	Chapters	3	and	4,	and	finally	the	survey	measures	we	used	as	real-life	decision-making	indicators	in	Chapters	5	and	6.		 Neuroimaging	 experiments	 are	 more	 expensive	 than	conventional	 behavioral	 laboratory	 experiments	 due	 to	 the	 high	operations	costs	of	the	MRI	scanner.	Therefore,	fMRI	experiments	have	always	been	characterized	by	relatively	small	sample	sizes	(Huettel	et	al.,	 2009).	 Recently,	 the	 debate	 on	 sample	 sizes	 in	 neuroscientific	research	 has	 become	 more	 prominent	 due	 to	 an	 influential	 article	(Button	et	al.,	2013),	which	posed	that	low	sample	sizes	in	neuroscience	cause	low	statistical	power.	The	fMRI	experiments	we	completed	in	this	thesis	 (see	 Chapter	 3	 and	 4)	 were	 conducted	 with	 a	 number	 of	participants	 that	 adheres	 to	 convential	 sample	 sizes	 in	 neuroscience	research	(Huettel	et	al.,	2009).	Yet,	in	light	of	this	recent	debate,	and	as	our	 research	 points	 towards	 individual	 differences	 in	 ambiguity	preferences,	 a	 larger	 sample	 size	 is	 an	 important	 point	 to	 take	 into	consideration	for	future	fMRI	studies.		 An	important	variable	throughout	our	thesis	has	been	the	role	of	individuals’	 beliefs	 on	 DMUU	 (see	 Chapter	 2	 and	 3)	 and	 anticipated	rewards	(see	Chapter	4).	As	we	aimed	to	examine	sources	and	types	of	uncertainty	in	one	experimental	design,	we	had	to	control	for	individual	variation	 in	beliefs.	 In	 contrast	 to	beliefs	 in	 social	 contexts,	 subjective	probabilities	can	be	easily	manipulated	in	a	lottery	context.	We	aligned	elicited	beliefs	 in	 the	ATG	to	an	equal	underlying	 likelihood	 to	draw	a	winning-colored	 marble	 in	 the	 ALOT	 and	 corresponding	 objective	probabilities	 in	the	RTG	and	RLOT	(see	Figure	1,	Chapter	3).	Although	this	 design	 enabled	us	 to	 study	neural	 effects	 of	 sources	 and	 types	 of	uncertainty	without	 individual	 beliefs	 as	 confounds,	 it	 is	 important	 to	
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bear	 in	 mind	 the	 interpretation	 of	 our	 result.	 For	 one,	 we	 cannot	compare	individual	differences	in	lottery	ambiguity	preferences	as	they	solely	faced	a	likelihood,	which	stemmed	from	their	beliefs	in	the	ATG.	Also,	 our	 procedure	 of	 aligning	 beliefs	 from	 the	 social	 context	 to	 the	lottery	source	produced	a	difference	in	the	amount	of	information	given	between	 both	 sources.	 A	 consequence	 of	 this	 approach	 is	 that	participants	in	the	ALOT	did	not	actively	have	to	form	a	prior	belief	and	therefore	 our	 interpretation	 between	 the	 contextual	 differences	 in	ambiguity	preferences	and	belief-mediated	anticipated	rewards	should	be	interpreted	with	some	caution.	A	small	robustness-check	we	carried	out	 to	 see	 if	 participants	might	 experience	 the	uncertainty	 across	 our	social	and	non-social	sources	of	uncertainty	differently	was	to	compare	the	 standard	 deviation	 of	 their	 investment	 chocies	 across	 contexts.	Namely,	 if	 participants	 might	 feel	 that	 the	 ATG	 is	 more	 uncertain	compared	to	 the	ALOT,	due	 to	differences	 in	 information	received,	we	reasoned	that	they	would	vary	more	in	their	investment	choices	in	the	ATG.	We	did	not	find	any	evidence	suggesting	this	was	the	case.	A	final	note	 on	 beliefs	 is	 that	 we	 did	 not	 take	 confidence	 in	 beliefs	 into	consideration.	 For	 example,	 if	 participants	 expressed	 the	 same	 belief,	yet	 they	 differ	 in	 their	 confidence	 concerning	 their	 stated	 belief,	 this	might	have	an	effect	on	their	behavior.	In	subsequent	research,	as	also	outlined	 below,	 we	 want	 to	 understand	 how	 beliefs	 are	 shaped;	confidence	is	one	variable	to	take	into	consideration	as	well.	A	final	limitation	we	want	to	discuss	are	the	survey	measures	we	used	as	real-life	indicators	for	decision-making	in	Chapters	5	and	6.	Due	to	privacy	reasons	we	could	not	obtain	students’	ambiguity	borrowing	behavior	from	the	corresponding	organization	that	lends	students	these	loans.	We	have	no	reason	to	assume	that	students	would	lie	about	their	borrowing	 behavior.	We	 also	 took	 great	 care	 in	 reassuring	 them	 that	these	 details	 kept	 private	 and	 were	 only	 considered	 for	 research	purposes.	 In	 Chapter	 6	 the	 high	 school,	 at	 which	 we	 conducted	 our	experiment,	 provided	 data	 on	 adolescents’	 scores	 on	 a	 set	 of	psychological	 measures.	 From	 these	 measures	 we	 extracted	 our	dependent	variable,	namely	adolescents’	scores	on	the	concept	of	self-confidence.	 These	 scores	 came	 from	 validated	 tests,	 which	 were	conducted	 at	 high	 school	 during	 participants’	 first	 school	 year.	Nonetheless,	 if	 we	 would	 have	 had	 more	 time	 to	 conduct	 our	
	 	 			
164	
experiment	outside	the	class,	which	was	now	limited	to	50	minutes,	we	would	have	validated	 these	original	 scores	with	some	other	measures	that	proxy	for	self-confidence.				
Future	research		 In	this	thesis	we	used	several	methodologies	to	understand	how	decision-makers	 react	 to	 sources	 and	 types	 of	 uncertainty	 and	subsequently	how	this	affects	real-life	decision-making.	An	outcome	of	this	approach	is	that	we	could	indentify	behavioral	and	neural	effects	of	individual	 differences	 in	 DMUU	 (see	 Chapter	 3)	 and	 anticipated	rewards	(see	Chapter	4)	as	a	function	of	individual	beliefs.	It	would	be	interesting	 to	 follow	 up	 on	 these	 outcomes	 by	 assessing	 why	 people	have	high	or	low	priors	concerning	the	reciprocity	of	others.	Are	these	shaped	 over	 the	 course	 of	 one’s	 life	 through	 personal	 experiences,	 or	are	 they	more	biologically	determined?	Our	 results	 from	Chapter	6	at	least	 suggest	 that	 there	 are	 substantial	 differences	 in	 beliefs	 between	girls	and	boys.	Subsequently,	another	possible	study	could	examine	the	extent	 to	 which	 individuals’	 social	 priors	 are	 adaptive	 and	 can	 be	influenced.	 For	 instance,	 if	 a	 follow-up	 study	 would	 find	 that	 social	priors	 in	 the	 context	 of	 DMUU	 are	 to	 some	 extent	 biologically	determined,	 then	 hormonal	 interventions,	 similar	 to	 studies	 on	oxytocin	and	trust	(Kosfeld	et	al.,	2005),	could	be	a	nice	follow-up.			 Another	 interesting	 avenue	 for	 future	 studies	 is	 how	 decision-makers	 update	 their	 beliefs	 based	 on	 the	 outcomes	 they	 experience.	This	 would	 implicate	 a	 dynamic	 follow-up	 study	 on	 the	 design	discussed	 in	 Chapter	 4.	 Learning	 about	 ambiguous	 assets	 has	 been	labeled	 a	 promising	 future	 direction	 in	 a	 recent	 meta-analysis	 on	experimental	ambiguity	research	(Trautmann	and	van	de	Kuilen,	2003).	Yet,	in	the	spirit	of	this	thesis,	we	would	propose	to	also	take	sources	of	uncertainty	into	consideration.	Especially	as	we	found	in	Chapter	4	that	belief-mediated	anticipated	rewards	are	observed	in	the	social	context,	but	not	in	the	lottery	context.	We	suggested	that	this	is	due	to	the	fact	that	social	priors	are	probably	stronger	than	priors	established	through	mechanistic	 devices.	 Subsequently,	 future	 studies	 could	 examine	dynamic	 learning	setting	 in	ambiguity	whereby	sources	of	uncertainty	are	taken	into	account	as	well.	
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	 Finally,	in	Chapters	5	and	6	we	investigated	the	external	validity	of	risk	and	ambiguity.	Based	on	these	results	we	proposed	some	policy	recommendations.	 It	would	 come	 full	 circle	 if	 follow-up	 studies	 could	examine,	 if	based	on	the	 interaction	between	types	of	uncertainty	and	real-life	decision-making,	these	interventions	prove	to	be	successful	 in	changing	 peoples’	 behavior.	 For	 instance,	 based	 on	 the	 literature	 on	social	 norms,	 successful	 intervention	 studies	 have	 been	 undertaken,	which	 successfully	 increased	 more	 environmental	 friendly	 behavior	(Fairley	et	al.,	2013).	Likewise,	intervention	studies	could	be	conducted	to	test	if	students	will	take	out	higher	student	loans	if	the	government	will	 act	 as	 a	 last	 resort	 in	 case	of	 loan	default	 and	more	 stable	 future	interest	rates	will	be	introduced.			 	
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Appendix	
	
1)	
Appendix	-	Trust	and	risk	revisited		You	can	find	the	instructions	of	our	experiment	below.	Subsequently	we	explain	the	coding	scheme	of	remaining	incentivized	auxiliary	measures	we	 did	 not	 discuss	 in	 the	 main	 paper.	 Finally	 we	 perform	 additional	robustness	analyses	to	show	that	our	main	results	hold.			
Instructions	
Note:	task	1	is	the	lottery	ambiguity	task,	task	2	is	the	social	preferences	
task,	task	3	is	the	lottery	risk	task	and	finally	task	4	is	the	Trust	Game.	
	
INTRODUCTION	You	 will	 now	 participate	 in	 an	 economic	 experiment.	 	 In	 this	experiment,	you	will	earn	money	depending	on	the	decisions	 that	you	will	 make.	 For	 this	 reason,	 it	 is	 very	 important	 that	 you	 read	 these	instructions	carefully.	
	During	 the	 experiment,	 your	 income	will	 be	 expressed	 in	 tokens.	 The	total	 amount	 of	 tokens	which	 you	 earn	will	 be	 converted	 to	Euro’s	 at	the	end	of	the	experiment;	the	following	conversion	rate	applies:	
	
1	token	=	€	0,50	
	You	will	be	paid	in	cash	at	the	end	of	the	experiment.	The	payment	will	be	 made	 in	 privacy;	 no	 other	 participant	 will	 learn	 how	 much	 you	earned.	
	Please	 note	 that	 you	 are	 not	 allowed	 to	 communicate	 with	 other	participants	 during	 this	 experiment.	 Should	 you	 have	 any	 questions,	please	raise	your	hand	and	we	will	come	to	you	to	answer	them.	Note	however	that	we	do	not	answer	questions	of	the	type	-	‘what	shall	I	do	in	the	experiment’	–	this	is	your	own	choice.	We,	however,	are	happy	to	
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answer	questions	on	how	to	use	the	computer	to	make	decision,	and	to	explain	the	details	of	the	experiment	instructions.	
	The	experiment	consists	of	five	independent	Tasks.	At	the	beginning	of	each	task,	you	will	receive	instructions.		You	will	make	decisions	in	each	of	the	Tasks,	and	will	be	paid	based	on	your	 decisions,	 and	 possibly	 decisions	 of	 other	 subjects	 in	 the	experiment.		At	the	end	of	the	experiment,	you	will	learn	the	outcome	of	each	Task,	as	well	as	how	many	tokens	you	collected	in	the	individual	Tasks.	The	total	 amount	 earned	 in	 the	 experiment	 will	 be	 then	 paid	 to	 you,	individually.	No	other	experiment	participant	will	learn	how	much	you	earned.	
Task	1	This	task	consists	of	two	parts.	In	EACH	part,	there	are	20	rows.	In	each	row,	 you	 are	 asked	 to	 choose	 between	 Option	 A	 and	 B.	 After	 the	experiment,	 the	 computer	 will	 randomly	 pick	 one	 of	 the	 20	 rows	 of	each	 part	 of	 the	 Task,	 and	 determine	 your	 earnings	 based	 on	 your	decision	in	these	rows.	
	If	you	choose	option	A	in	the	selected	row,	you	will	receive	the	amount	of	 tokens	given	at	 this	 row.	 If	 you	choose	option	B,	 the	 computer	will	randomly	pick	one	out	of	10	balls.	Each	ball	is	either	blue	or	yellow.	If	the	color	of	the	ball	picked	by	the	computer	is	yellow,	your	earning	will	be	5	tokens,	otherwise	0	tokens.	
	There	is	only	one	difference	between	part	1	and	part	2	of	this	task.	
	In	 part	 1,	 THERE	 ARE	 5	 blue	 and	 5	 yellow	 balls,	 and	 the	 computer	randomly	picks	one	out	of	them.	In	part	2,	YOU	WILL	NOT	 learn	 from	how	many	blue	and	yellow	balls	there	are	among	the	10	balls,	and	any	composition	of	the	two	colors	of	the	balls	is	possible.		
	
1)	In	this	 first	part	of	the	task,	 there	are	10	balls:	5	yellow	balls	and	5	blue	 balls.	 Please	 indicate	 for	 each	 row	 if	 you	 prefer	 receiving	 the	
	 	 			
187	
certain	amount	of	 tokens	at	 that	 row,	or	you	choose	 to	draw	a	ball.	 If	you	choose	to	draw	a	ball,	the	computer	will	randomly	select	one	out	of	the	 5	 blue	 and	 5	 yellow	 balls,	 and	 the	 color	 of	 the	 selected	 ball	 will	determine	your	earnings.	You	will	be	asked	to	enter	your	decision	at	the	computer	screen.	
	 Option	A	 	 	 	 	 	 Option	B	1				O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	0.25	tokens					O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	2				O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	0.50	tokens					O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	3				O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	0.75	tokens					O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	4				O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	1	tokens											O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	5				O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	1.25	tokens					O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	6				O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	1.50	tokens					O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	7				O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	1.75	tokens					O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	8				O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	2	tokens											O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	9				O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	2.25	tokens					O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	10		O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	2.50	tokens				O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	11		O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	2.75	tokens				O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	12		O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	3	tokens										O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	13		O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	3.25	tokens				O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	14		O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	3.50	tokens				O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	15		O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	3.75	tokens				O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	16		O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	4	tokens										O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	17		O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	4.25	tokens				O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	18		O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	4.50	tokens				O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	19		O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	4.75	tokens				O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	20		O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	5	tokens										O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	
	2)	In	this	second	part	of	the	task,	there	are	10	balls:	but	you	will	not	be	informed	how	many	of	them	are	blue	and	how	many	are	yellow.	Please	indicate	for	each	row	if	you	choose	the	certain	amount	at	that	row,	or	you	choose	 to	draw	a	ball.	 If	you	choose	 to	draw	a	ball,	 the	computer	will	 randomly	 select	one	out	 ten	balls	of	unknown	color	mix	between	yellow	and	blue	balls,	and	the	color	of	the	selected	ball	will	determine	your	earnings.	You	will	be	asked	to	enter	your	decision	at	the	computer	screen.	
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Option	A	 	 	 	 	 	 Option	B	1				O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	0.25	tokens					O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	2				O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	0.50	tokens					O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	3				O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	0.75	tokens					O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	4				O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	1	tokens											O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	5				O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	1.25	tokens					O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	6				O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	1.50	tokens					O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	7				O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	1.75	tokens					O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	8				O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	2	tokens											O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	9				O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	2.25	tokens					O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	10		O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	2.50	tokens				O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	11		O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	2.75	tokens				O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	12		O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	3	tokens										O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	13		O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	3.25	tokens				O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	14		O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	3.50	tokens				O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	15		O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	3.75	tokens				O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	16		O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	4	tokens										O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	17		O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	4.25	tokens				O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	18		O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	4.50	tokens				O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	19		O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	4.75	tokens				O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	20		O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	5	tokens										O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	
	You	will	be	 informed	about	 the	outcome	of	 this	 task	at	 the	end	of	 the	experiment.	Please	raise	your	hand	if	you	have	any	questions.		
Task	2	In	 this	 task,	 you	will	 be	 randomly	matched	 to	 one	 another	 subject	 in	this	experiment.	One	of	you	two	will	be	assigned	at	random	the	role	of	the	SENDER	 in	 this	 task,	and	 the	other	one	 is	assigned	 the	role	of	 the	RECEIVER.		You	will	learn	whether	you	are	SENDER	or	RECEIVER	in	this	task,	only	at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 experiment.	 	 Therefore,	 you	 have	 to	 indicate	 your	choice	 below	 for	 the	 case	 that	 you	 will	 be	 assigned	 the	 role	 of	 the	SENDER.	
	In	this	task,	you	will	face	24	situations.	In	each	of	them,	you	are	asked	to	choose	one	out	of	two	options.	In	case	you	will	be	assigned	the	role	of	the	 SENDER,	 the	 option	 that	 you	 choose	 could	 have	 monetary	consequences	for	you	and	also	for	the	other	person,	the	RECEIVER.	
	 	 			
189	
In	case	you	will	be	assigned	the	role	of	the	RECEIVER,	the	choices	made	by	the	other	subject,	the	SENDER,	will	determine	your	earnings.	At	the	end	of	the	experiment,	the	computer	will	select	one	out	of	the	24	decision	 situations	 at	 random,	 and	 the	 chosen	 alternative	 of	 the	SENDER	 in	 that	 situation	will	 determine	 the	 earnings	 of	 the	 SENDER	and	the	RECEIVER.	Let	 us	 now	 explain	 the	 options	 available	 in	 each	 of	 the	 24	 decision	situations.	For	each	option,	two	numbers	will	be	displayed:	the	number	of	 points	 you	 will	 receive	 yourself	 (positive	 or	 negative)	 when	 you	choose	this	option,	and	the	number	of	points	(positive	or	negative)	the	other	subject	will	receive	when	you	choose	this	option.	These	situations	are	 listed	 below.	 You	 will	 be	 asked	 to	 enter	 your	 decision	 at	 the	computer	screen.	
	 														OPTION	A	 												OPTION	B		
	 SENDER	 						RECEIVER	 	SENDER	 	RECEIVER	SITUATION1	 3	tokens	 						0	tokens	 2.90	tokens	 					-0.78	tokens	SITUATION2	 2.90	tokens	 					-0.78	tokens	 2.60	tokens	 					-1.50	tokens	SITUATION3	 2.60	tokens	 					-1.50	tokens	 2.12	tokens	 					-2.12	tokens	SITUATION4	 2.12	tokens	 					-2.12	tokens	 1.50	tokens	 					-2.6	tokens	SITUATION5	 1.50	tokens	 					-2.60	tokens	 0.78	tokens	 					-2.90	tokens	SITUATION6	 0.78	tokens	 					-2.90	tokens	 0	tokens	 					-3	tokens	SITUATION7	 0	tokens	 					-3	tokens	 -0.78	tokens	 					-2.90	tokens	SITUATION8	 -0.78	tokens	 					-2.90	tokens	 -1.5	tokens	 					-2.60	tokens	SITUATION9	 -1.50	tokens	 					-2.6	tokens	 -2.12	tokens	 					-2.12	tokens	SITUATION10	 -2.12	tokens	 					-2.12	tokens	 -2.6	tokens	 					-1.50	tokens	SITUATION11	 -2.60	tokens	 					-1.50	tokens	 -2.90	tokens	 					-0.78	tokens	SITUATION12	 -2.90	tokens	 					-0.78	tokens	 -3	tokens	 					0	tokens	SITUATION13	 -3	tokens	 					0	tokens	 -2.90	tokens	 					0.78	tokens	SITUATION14	 -2.90	tokens	 					0.78	tokens	 -2.6	tokens	 					1.50	tokens	SITUATION15	 -2.60	tokens	 					1.50	tokens	 -2.12	tokens	 					2.12	tokens	SITUATION16	 -2.12	tokens	 					2.12	tokens	 -1.50	tokens	 					2.6	tokens	SITUATION17	 -1.50	tokens	 					2.60	tokens	 -0.78	tokens	 					2.90	tokens	SITUATION18	 -0.78	tokens	 					2.90	tokens	 0	tokens	 					3	tokens	SITUATION19	 0	tokens	 					3	tokens	 0.78	tokens	 					2.90	tokens	SITUATION20	 0.78	tokens	 					2.90	tokens	 1.50	tokens	 					2.6	tokens	SITUATION21	 1.50	tokens	 					2.60	tokens	 2.12	tokens	 					2.12	tokens	SITUATION22	 2.12	tokens	 					2.12	tokens	 2.6	tokens	 					1.50	tokens	SITUATION23	 2.60	tokens	 					1.50	tokens	 2.90	tokens	 					0.78	tokens	SITUATION24	 2.90	tokens	 					0.78	tokens	 3	tokens	 					0	tokens	
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You	will	be	 informed	about	 the	outcome	of	 this	 task	at	 the	end	of	 the	experiment.	Please	raise	your	hand	if	you	have	any	questions.	
	
Task	3	In	 this	 task	you	will	be	presented	with	10	 rows.	 In	each	 row,	you	are	asked	 to	 choose	 one	 out	 of	 two	 alternatives.	 	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	experiment,	the	computer	will	choose	one	of	these	10	rows	at	random,	and	this	row	will	determine	your	earnings	in	the	following	way.	
	The	 computer	 will	 identify	 which	 of	 the	 two	 options	 A	 or	 B	 did	 you	choose	 in	 the	 selected	 row.	 The	 computer	will	 then	 select	 at	 random	one	out	of	chips	to	determine	your	earnings.		These	chips	have	value	which	is		
• either	2	tokens	or	1.60	tokens	if	you	choose	Option	A,	or		
• either	3.85	tokens	or	0.10	tokens,	if	you	choose	Option	B.	
	In	 each	 row,	 the	 number	 of	 chips	 with	 the	 respective	 prizes	 the	computer	 selects	 from	 is	 described	 below.	 For	 example,	 in	 row	 1	 in	Option	A,	the	computer	chooses	one	out	of	10	chips,	where	one	of	these	chips	has	 the	prize	2	 tokens,	 and	9	of	 these	 chips	have	 the	prize	1.60	tokens	
	You	will	be	asked	to	enter	your	decision	at	the	computer	screen.	
	 Option	A	 	 	 	 									Option	B	1/10	of	2	tokens,	9/10	of	1.60	tokens						1/10	of	3.85	tokens,	9/10	of	0.10	tokens	2/10	of	2	tokens,	8/10	of	1.60	tokens						2/10	of	3.85	tokens,	8/10	of	0.10	tokens	3/10	of	2	tokens,	7/10	of	1.60	tokens						3/10	of	3.85	tokens,	7/10	of	0.10	tokens	4/10	of	2	tokens,	6/10	of	1.60	tokens						4/10	of	3.85	tokens,	6/10	of	0.10	tokens	5/10	of	2	tokens,	5/10	of	1.60	tokens						5/10	of	3.85	tokens,	5/10	of	0.10	tokens	6/10	of	2	tokens,	4/10	of	1.60	tokens						6/10	of	3.85	tokens,	4/10	of	0.10	tokens	7/10	of	2	tokens,	3/10	of	1.60	tokens						7/10	of	3.85	tokens,	3/10	of	0.10	tokens	8/10	of	2	tokens,	2/10	of	1.60	tokens						8/10	of	3.85	tokens,	2/10	of	0.10	tokens	9/10	of	2	tokens,	1/10	of	1.60	tokens						9/10	of	3.85	tokens,	1/10	of	0.10	tokens	10/10	of	2	tokens,	0/10	of	1.60	tokens	10/10	of	3.85	tokens,	0/10	of	0.10	tokens	
	You	will	be	 informed	about	 the	outcome	of	 this	 task	at	 the	end	of	 the	experiment.	Please	raise	your	hand	if	you	have	any	questions.	
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Task	4	
	
General	description:	
	In	 this	 task,	 your	 earnings	 will	 depend	 on	 your	 decision	 and	 the	decision	of	one	randomly	selected	other	participant	in	this	experiment.	You	will	 not	 learn	 the	 identity	 of	 this	 participant,	 neither	 during	 nor	after	the	experiment.		In	this	task,	one	of	 the	subjects	 in	the	pair	will	be	assigned	the	role	of	SENDER,	and	the	other	one	will	be	assigned	the	role	of	RECEIVER.	We	will	now	explain	the	payments	and	the	decision	procedure.	
	
The	payments:	
	At	the	beginning	of	this	Task,	both	SENDER	and	RECEIVER	will	receive	an	endowment	of	10	tokens.		Then,	 SENDER	 will	 be	 asked	 to	 make	 a	 choice	 first.	 SENDER	 will	 be	asked	 to	 choose	 how	many	 of	 his/her	 10	 tokens	 he/she	 transfers	 to	RECEIVER.		
• SENDER	can	choose	to	send	either	0,	1,	2	…	10	tokens	to	RECEIVER.	
	The	 tokens	 will	 be	 multiplied	 by	 three	 on	 the	 way	 to	 RECEIVER,	 i.e.	RECEIVER	receives	three	times	as	many	tokens	as	SENDER	transferred	to	him/her.	
	After	that,	RECEIVER	will	be	asked	to	make	a	choice.	RECEIVER	will	be	asked	how	many	tokens	he/she	wants	to	send	back	to	SENDER	from	the	tokens	received.	RECEIVER	can	choose	either	to	send	back	nothing,	or	to	send	back	half	of	the	received	tokens.	
• RECEIVER	can	choose	to	send	back	either	one	half	of	the	received	tokens,	or	nothing.		
	At	the	end	of	the	task,	the	payments	to	SENDER	and	RECEIVER	will	be	made	based	on	the	tokens	they	hold,	that	means:		SENDER	will	be	paid	for		
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	(10	tokens)	MINUS	(number	of	tokens	transferred	to	RECEIVER)	PLUS	(tokens	received	from	RECEIVER)	and	RECEIVER	will	be	paid	for		
	(10	 tokens)	 PLUS	 (three	 times	 number	 of	 tokens	 transferred	 by	SENDER	 to	 RECEIVER)	 MINUS	 (either	 half	 of	 the	 received	 tokens,	 or	zero,	depending	on	RECEIVER’s	decision)			
The	decision	procedure:	We	 will	 now	 describe	 the	 procedure	 by	 which	 you	 will	 make	 your	decisions	in	this	Task.	In	the	experiment,	you	will	be	randomly	assigned	the	role	of	SENDER	,	or	the	role	of	RECEIVER.	The	computer	will	match	at	random	subjects	into	pairs,	consisting	of	one	SENDER	and	one	RECEIVER.	You	will	learn	your	role	only	at	the	end	of	the	experiment.	Therefore,	we	will	ask	you	to	 submit	 your	 decision	 both	 as	 SENDER	 and	 as	 RECEIVER.	 Your	decision	 in	 the	 role	 randomly	 assigned	 to	 you	 will	 determine	 your	earnings	in	the	following	way.	
	
The	decision	procedure	of	sender:	Each	SENDER	will	be	faced	with	a	situation	of	being	randomly	matched	to	one	out	of	FOUR	possible	RECEIVERS.	We	will	ask	you,	in	the	role	of	the	SENDER,	to	submit	your	decision	on	how	many	tokens	you	choose	to	send	to	the	RECEIVER.	You	will	do	it	in	SIX	possible	scenarios.	Please	be	aware	 that	you	have	an	endowment	of	10	 tokens	 in	every	possible	scenario.	You	need	to	decide	how	much	of	this	10	tokens	to	send	to	the	RECEIVER	in	each	of	the	six	scenarios.	
	One	scenario	without	information:	In	one	of	these	scenarios,	you	will	not	be	informed	about	the	choices	of	the	 four	 possible	RECEIVERS.	 You	will	 be	 simply	 asked	 to	 choose	 the	number	 of	 tokens	 to	 send	 to	 the	 RECIVER.	 Then	 one	 out	 of	 the	 four	possible	RECEIVERS	will	be	randomly	matched	to	you.	
	Five	scenarios	with	information:	
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	In	five	scenarios,	you	will	be	able	to	choose	the	number	of	tokens	you	send	 to	 the	RECEIVER.	You	have	 to	 choose	 the	number	of	 tokens	 that	you	send	for	each	of	the	following	scenarios:	
	
à	none	of	the	four	possible	receivers	returns	back	half	of	the	received	tokens	
à	one	of	 the	 four	possible	 receivers	returns	back	half	of	 the	received	tokens	
à	 two	of	 the	 four	possible	receivers	returns	back	half	of	 the	received	tokens	
à	three	of	the	four	possible	receivers	returns	back	half	of	the	received	tokens	
à	 all	 of	 the	 four	 possible	 receivers	 returns	 back	 half	 of	 the	 received	tokens.	
	After	 the	 four	 possible	 RECEIVERS	 have	 made	 their	 choices,	 we	 will	count	 the	number	of	RECEIVERS	which	chose	 to	send	back	half	of	 the	tokens.	 This	 number	 will	 then	 determine	 which	 of	 the	 five	 above	scenarios	 (with	 information)	 the	 computer	 will	 consider	 when	calculating	your	earnings	 for	 this	part	of	 the	experiment.	Thus,	 out	of	these	five	scenarios,	only	one	can	be	an	actual	scenario	that	is	relevant	for	your	earnings.	 In	 this	 actual	 scenario,	 one	out	of	 the	 four	possible	RECEIVERS	is	then	randomly	matched	with	you.	
	You	will	 submit	 your	 decisions	 at	 six	 different	 computer	 screens,	 one	for	each	of	the	six	scenarios.	After	 your	 six	decisions,	 the	 computer	will	 randomly	 select	 either	 the	scenario	 without	 information,	 or	 the	 one	 actual	 scenario	 with	information,	 to	 be	 the	 scenario	 that	 is	 relevant	 for	 your	 earnings.	Depending	on	your	decision,	how	much	to	send	in	this	specific	scenario,	and	 on	 the	 RECEIVER’S	 individual	 decision	 on	 returning	 back	 half	 or	not,	your	payoff	for	this	task	is	determined.	
	
The	decision	procedure	of	receiver	After	 the	decision	made	by	SENDER,	 the	RECEIVER	will	make	his/her	decision.		
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• DECISION	OF	RECEIVER	IS	either	RETURN	NOTHING	or	RETURN	ONE	HALF	
	Note	that	RECEIVER	will	not	be	 informed	about	how	many	tokens	did	SENDER	 transfer	 to	 him/her,	 but	 makes	 only	 one	 decision	 to	 either	send	nothing	or	half	of	the	received	tokens	back.	At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 experiment,	 the	 computer	will	 randomly	 assign	 the	role	of	SENDER	to	half	of	the	subjects,	and	the	role	of	RECEIVER	to	the	other	half.	Your	payments	will	depend	on	the	role	that	is	assigned	to	you,	and	the	decision	 of	 the	 subject	matched	 to	 you	 by	 the	 computer,	 in	 the	 other	role,	as	described	above.	
	
Auxiliary	measures	We	 tested	 participants’	 lottery	 ambiguity	 preferences,	 their	 social	preferences	and	their	beliefs	regarding	the	behavior	of	Trustees	in	the	Trust	Game.	To	 elicit	 lottery	 ambiguity	 preferences,	 each	 subject	made	 a	sequence	 of	 20	 pair	 wise	 choices	 between	 a	 lottery	 with	 a	 known	composition	of	the	urn	and	a	sure	option	(risk	choice	list);	as	well	as	a	sequence	of	20	pair	wise	 choices	between	a	 lottery	with	 an	unknown	composition	of	 the	urn	and	a	sure	option	(ambiguous	choice	 list).	The	sure	option	increases	with	each	row	to	a	maximum	amount	of	5	tokens.	From	both	choice	lists	we	define	a	subject’s	certainty	equivalent	as	the	midpoint	 of	 two	 sure	 payoffs	 related	 to	 the	 choice	 before	 and	 at	 the	(last)	 switching	 point.	 For	 instance	 when	 a	 subject	 chooses	 ten	consecutive	 times	 to	draw	a	ball	 from	the	urn	before	switching	 to	 the	sure	payoff	 of	 2.75	 tokens,	 this	 subject’s	 certainty	 equivalent	 is	 2.625	tokens	 (midpoint	 between	 2.5	 and	 2.75	 tokens).	 We	 estimate	 each	subject’s	 lottery	ambiguity	preferences	based	on	certainty	equivalents	(Wakker,	2010).			
Lottery	ambiguity	preferences	=	(CER	−	CEA)	/	(CER	+	CEA)	
	
CEr	 and	 CEa	 denote	 the	 certainty	 equivalents	 of	 the	 risk	 choice	 list	respectively	 the	 ambiguous	 choice	 list.	 This	 measure	 ranges	 from	 -1	(extreme	 ambiguity	 seeking)	 to	 1	 (extreme	 ambiguity	 aversion).	 A	
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score	 of	 0	 indicates	 ambiguity	 neutrality.	 The	 difference	 between	CEr	and	CEa	is	divided	by	the	absolute	level	of	risk	and	ambiguity	attitude	in	order	 to	 control	 for	 the	 fact	 that	 similar	 differences	 in	 certainty	equivalents	will	weigh	more	heavily	for	a	risk	averse	subject	than	a	risk	neutral	or	risk	seeking	subject	(Sutter	et	al.,	2013).			 We	 measure	 social	 preferences	 by	 applying	 the	 value	orientation	task	(ring	task)	(Liebrand,	1984).	By	collecting	24	decisions	on	 pairs	 of	 payoffs	 this	 task	 measures	 the	 willingness	 to	increase/decrease	 the	payoff	 of	 an	anonymous	 co-player	 at	 a	 cost.	All	pair	of	choices	can	be	represented	in	a	circle	on	adjacent	equally	spaced	coordinates.	 The	 horizontal	 axis	 of	 the	 imaginary	 circle	 indicates	 the	amount	of	money	allocated	to	oneself	and	the	vertical	axis	indicates	the	amount	of	money	allocated	 to	 the	other	anonymous	person.	Summing	all	decisions,	a	measure	of	the	unconditional	willingness	to	give	or	take	is	obtained.	Five	 roles	 can	be	distinguished,	namely	altruistic	 subjects	(vectors	 lying	 between	 67.5	 –	 112.5),	 cooperators	 (vectors	 lying	between	22.5	–	67.5),	individuals	(vectors	lying	between	-22.5	–	22.5),	competitors	(vectors	lying	between	-67.5	–	-22.5)	and	finally	aggressors	(vectors	lying	between	-112.5	–	-67.5).		We	also	collected	subjects’	beliefs	by	administering	a	non-incentivized	questionnaire	 in	which	 they	 indicated	 (on	a	5-point	Likert	 scale)	how	likely	they	considered	each	of	the	scenarios	of	trustworthiness	from	the	RTG	to	materialize.	The	variable	beliefs	records	the	most	likely	scenario	of	 x0,	 x1,…,x4	 that	 subjects	 expect.	 A	 higher	 value	 indicates	 subjects’	optimism	about	the	general	trustworthiness	in	Trustees.	On	average,	participants	can	be	classified	as	ambiguity	averse	(Table	1),	individualistic	 (Table	 2)	 and	 holding	 quite	 pessimistic	 beliefs	 with	regard	to	Trustees’	reciprocity	(Table	3).								
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Table	A1	Lottery	ambiguity	preferences	Certainty	equivalent	of	the	risk	lottery	minus	certainty	equivalent	of	ambiguous	lottery,	while	controlling	for	the	absolute	level	of	risk	and	ambiguity	preferences	(range:	-1	to	1)	Normalized	ambiguity	attitude	 Total	in	%		(N=92)	 Type	>0	 40.22	(37)	 Ambiguity	averse	0	 29.35	(27)	 Ambiguity	neutral	<0	 30.43	(28)	 Ambiguity	seeking	Mean	value	 -0.054	 		
Table	A2	Social	preferences	
Social	preferences	categorization	(angle)	 Total	in	%	(N=92)	Cooperative	(22.5	–	67.5)	 39.13	(33)	Individualistic	(-22.5	–	22.5)	 51.09	(47)	Competitive	(-67.5	–	-22.5)	 3.26	(3)	Aggressive	(<	-67.5)	 6.52	(6)	Mean	Angle	 11.0			
Note:	When	the	highest	score	was	attached	to	more	than	one	RTG	scenario,	we	report	the	average.	
Table	A3	Beliefs	with	regard	to	RTG:	scenarios	that	subjects	find	most	likely		 RTG	scenario	 Frequency	in	%	(N=92)	0	 0.18	(17)	0.5	 0.09	(8)	1	 0.12	(11)	1.5	 0.02	(2)	2	 0.31	(29)	2.5	 0.08	(7)	3	 0.09	(8)	3.5	 0.00	(0)	4	 0.11	(10)	
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Robustness	analyses	We	run	additional	multivariate	analyses	 to	 show	 that	 the	main	results	reported	in	the	paper	are	robust.	First	we	report	the	results	of	analyses	where	we	included	the	auxiliary	measures	to	the	main	models	reported	in	the	paper	(Table	4	and	5).	In	Table	4	we	specifically	test	for	the	order	in	which	we	implemented	our	experimental	tasks:	lottery	risk	and	auxiliary	measures	either	before	or	after	 the	Trust	Game,	and	 the	order	 of	 the	 Trust	 Game	 treatment	 (RTG	 before	 or	 after	 the	 STG).	 In	Table	5	we	control	for	session	fixed	effects.	The	 effect	 of	 the	 RTG	 risk	 preferences	 on	 transfer	 in	 the	 STG	remains	valid	in	both	models.	The	order	in	which	the	standard	and	the	risky	 environment	 are	 presented	 to	 the	 subjects	 in	 the	 experiment	affects	their	transfer	 in	the	STG.	Subjects,	who	first	participated	in	the	RTG,	 transfer	 on	 average	 1.5	 tokens	 less	 in	 the	 STG	 compared	 to	subjects	 who	 were	 first	 exposed	 to	 the	 STG.	 This	 order	 effect	 is	significant	 as	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 Table	 4	 by	 the	 negative	 and	 statistically	significant	coefficient	of	 the	dummy	variable	 indicating	an	ordering	of	RTG	before	STG	(equal	1	and	0	otherwise).	We	also	find	that	Trustors’	beliefs	about	Trustees’	return	decisions	play	a	role	when	explaining	the	variation	of	transfers	in	the	STG	(Table	4	and	5).		Lastly,	 we	 excluded	 all	 subjects	 from	 the	 regression	 analyses,	who	 either	 transferred	 more	 than	 zero	 tokens	 and/or	 less	 than	 ten	tokens	in	the	scenarios	x0	and	x4,	respectively	(Table	6).	This	resulted	in	a	 smaller	 sample	 of	 51	 subjects.	 All	 our	 results	 remain	 qualitatively	valid.															
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Table	A4	Trust	and	risk:	controlling	for	additional	individual	measures		Transfer	 in	 STG	 (dependent	variable)	 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	
Constant	 2.842											(0.915)	 1.043											(1.406)	 1.072							(1.467)	RTG	risk	Preferences	 0.344***								(0.096)	 		 0.367***								(0.090)	Lottery	risk	preferences	 		 0.364													(0.267)	 0.434													(0.270)	Lottery	ambiguity	preferences	 -0.351							(1.395)	 -0.617							(1.356)	 -0.121								(1.230)	Social	preferences	 -0.002							(0.015)	 -0.002								(0.016)	 -0.007								(0.016)	Beliefs	 0.703**								(0.309)	 0.631								(0.313)	 0.707**							(0.308)	Gender	 -0.192							(0.849)	 -0.052								(0.914)	 0.142								(0.877)	Economic	major	 -0.064								(0.860)	 -0.047							(0.853)	 -0.141								(0.827)	Session	1	 -0.033										(1.255)	 0.103										(1.328)	 -0.273									(1.251)	Session	2	 -2.008*										(1.055)	 -1.822										(1.130)	 -2.200**										(1.049)	Session	3	 0.088										(1.163)	 0.681										(1.177)	 0.101										(1.144)	Session	4	 0.069										(1.026)	 0.167										(1.092)	 -0.308										(0.958)	Session	5	 -0.345									(1.181)	 0.099										(1.256)	 -0.574										(1.148)	N	 92	 92	 92	F	test	 (11,	80)	=	3.32	 (11,	 80)	 =	2.07	 (12,	 79)	 =										3.63	Prob	>	F	 0,0009	 0,0319	 0,0002	R	-	squared	 0,1995	 0,1596	 0,2249	
***,	**,	*	significant	at	the	0.01,	0.05,	0.1	level,	respectively.	Heteroskedasticity-corrected	
(robust)	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
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Table	A5	Trust	and	risk:	controlling	for	additional	individual	measures	and	
sessions	
	
Transfer	in	STG	(dependent	
variable)	 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	Constant	 -4.567											(2.045)	 1.083											(2.168)	 1.072							(1.467)	RTG	risk	Preferences	 13.842***								(3.184)	 		 0.367***								(0.090)	Lottery	risk	preferences	 		 0.579													(0.380)	 0.434													(0.270)	Lottery	ambiguity	preferences	 		 		 -0.121								(1.230)	Social	preferences	 		 		 -0.007								(0.016)	Beliefs	 		 		 0.707**							(0.308)	Gender	 1.237							(0.834)	 0.525								(1.244)	 0.142								(0.877)	Economic	major	 0.582								(1.226)	 0.196							(1.547)	 -0.141								(0.827)	Session	1	 1.510										(1.400)	 -0.338										(1.738)	 -0.273									(1.251)	Session	2	 -1.128										(1.232)	 -3.223										(1.100)	 -2.200**										(1.049)	Session	3	 1.359										(1.646)	 0.806										(1.668)	 0.101										(1.144)	Session	4	 0.844										(1.338)	 -0.613									(1.698)	 -0.308										(0.958)	Session	5	 -1.177									(1.67)	 -0.796										(1.700)	 -0.574										(1.148)	N	 51	 51	 51	F	test	 (8,	42)	=	4.93	 (8,	42)	=	3,32	 (8,	42)	=	4.93	Prob	>	F	 0,0002	 0,0049	 0,0002	R	-	squared	 0,4398	 0,1657	 0,4398	
	
***,	**,	*	significant	at	the	0.01,	0.05,	0.1	level,	respectively.	Heteroskedasticity-corrected	
(robust)	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
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Table	A6	Trust	and	risk:	smaller	sample	(subjects	who	transferred	more	than	zero	
tokens	and/or	less	than	ten	tokens	in	the	scenarios	x0	and	x4,	respectively)	Transfer	in	STG	(dependent	variable)	 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	 Model	4	
Constant	 -4.567											(2.045)	 1.083											(2.168)	 -5.219							(2.075)	 -5.238							(2.424)	RTG	risk	Preferences	 13.842***								(3.184)	 		 13.357***								(3.360)	 11.496***								(3.683)	Lottery	risk	preferences	 		 0.579													(0.380)	 0.216												(0.340)	 0.272												(0.324)	Lottery	 ambiguity	preferences	 		 		 		 0.001												(0.117)	Social	preferences	 		 		 		 0.046											(0.030)	Beliefs	 		 		 		 0.440												(0.333)	Gender	 1.237							(0.834)	 0.525								(1.244)	 1.394								(0.880)	 0.596								(1.010)	Economic	major	 0.582								(1.226)	 0.196							(1.547)	 0.489								(1.218)	 -0.212								(1.191)	Session	1	 1.510										(1.400)	 -0.338										(1.738)	 1.396									(1.449)	 1.758									(1.345)	Session	2	 -1.128										(1.232)	 -3.223										(1.100)	 -1.252									(1.254)	 -0.457									(1.128)	Session	3	 1.359										(1.646)	 0.806										(1.668)	 1.332										(1.662)	 1.498										(1.583)	Session	4	 0.844										(1.338)	 -0.613									(1.698)	 0.613										(1.411)	 -0.245										(1.260)	Session	5	 -1.177									(1.67)	 -0.796										(1.700)	 -1.197										(1.148)	 -1.414										(1.503)	N	 51	 51	 51	 51	F	test	 (8,	 42)	 =	4.93	 (8,	42)	=	3,32	 (9,	 41)	 =	4.89	 (12,	 38)	 =	7.54	Prob	>	F	 0,0002	 0,0049	 0,0002	 0,0002	R	-	squared	 0,4398	 0,1657	 0,4458	 0,4458	
	
***,	**,	*	significant	at	the	0.01,	0.05,	0.1	level,	respectively.	Heteroskedasticity-corrected	
(robust)	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
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2)	
Appendix	–	Instructions	used	for	papers:	
	 - Social	sources	of	uncertainty:	an	fMRI	study:	
an	fMRI	study	- Anticipating	rewards:	The	power	of	beliefs	in	
activating	an	expected	reward	signal	in	the	
ventral	striatum	
	
	
INTRODUCTION		Thank	you	for	participating	in	this	experiment	on	decision	making.	This	experiment	will	last	for	about	3	hours.			
1. The	preparations	before	you	go	into	the	MRI	scanner	last	for	1	hour,	and	consist	of:	
- Reading	 Instructions	 ‘sender-receiver	 game’	 and	comprehension	test.	
- Extra	Task	related	to	the	sender-receiver	game.	
- Reading	Instructions	‘lottery	game’	and	comprehension	test.		
2. Then	you	will	play	the	sender-receiver	game	and	the	lottery	game	in	the	MRI	scanner	(1	hour	for	the	experiment	and	0.5	hr	 preparations	 MRI	 scanner).	 In	 total	 you	 will	 make	 96	choices,	 48	 for	 the	 sender-receiver	 game	 and	 48	 for	 the	lottery	game.	Also,	after	making	all	choices,	the	outcomes	of	all	choices	will	be	revealed	to	you	while	still	lying	in	the	MRI	scanner.		
3. After	 you	 have	 finished	 the	 experiment,	 we	 will	 start	 the	payment	 procedure	 (0.5	 hr).	 You	 will	 be	 paid	 for	 multiple	randomly	chosen	decisions	you	made	in	these	games.		
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During	 the	 experiment,	 information	 about	 the	 outcomes	 of	 your	decisions	will	 be	 expressed	 in	 tokens.	 The	 amount	 of	 tokens	 that	 you	will	earn	for	these	decisions	will	be	converted	to	Euro’s;	the	following	conversion	rate	applies:		 1	token	=	€	0.10		It	is	very	important	that	you	read	these	instructions	carefully	as	we	will	thoroughly	 explain	 the	 experiment	 to	 you.	 You	 can	 ask	 questions	 for	clarification	at	any	moment	in	time.	We	ask	you	to	fill	in	the	answer	to	the	 comprehension	 questions	 which	 you	 can	 find	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	instructions	 for	 both	 games.	 Thereby	 we	 can	 assess	 if	 everything	 is	clear	to	you.		You	 may	 read	 the	 payment	 procedure	 in	 the	 attachment	 of	 these	instructions.		Let	us	now	carefully	explain	the	experiment	to	you.	
	
The	sender-receiver	game		In	this	game	two	persons	will	be	matched	into	a	pair:	one	person	will	be	called	SENDER	and	one	RECEIVER.	Both	SENDER	and	RECEIVER	start	the	game	with	10	tokens.		The	SENDER	has	to	choose	an	amount	of	TRANSFER	(in	tokens)	either:	TRANSFER:			0		-		2		-		4		-		6		-		8		-		10.		
• If	 SENDER	 chooses	 TRANSFER=0,	 no	 interaction	 between	SENDER	 and	 RECEIVER	 takes	 place,	 and	 the	 outcome	 is	 10	tokens	for	SENDER	and	10	tokens	for	RECEIVER.	
• If	SENDER	chooses	an	amount	of	TRANSFER	(2,	4,	6,	8	or	10),	interaction	 between	 SENDER	 and	 RECEIVER	will	 take	 place	 in	the	 following	 way.	 The	 chosen	 level	 of	 TRANSFER	 will	 be	multiplied	 by	 3,	 and	 transferred	 to	 the	 RECEIVER.	 The	RECEIVER	 will	 thus	 hold	 10	 own	 tokens	 PLUS	 3*transferred	tokens.	Then	RECEIVER	will	choose	to	SEND	BACK	NOTHING	or	SEND	BACK	HALF.	
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EXAMPLE:	 Let	 us	 consider	 for	 illustration	 that	 SENDER	 chooses	TRANSFER=6.	 Therefore,	 SENDER	keeps	 4	 tokens	 (10	 –	 6	 tokens)	 for	him/herself.	 The	 RECEIVER	 will	 now	 hold	 10	 own	 tokens	 PLUS	 3*6	transferred	tokens	=	28	tokens.	The	outcome	of	the	interaction	depends	now	 on	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 RECEIVER.	 RECEIVER	 can	 choose	 either	
SEND	BACK	NOTHING	or	SEND	BACK	HALF.	
o If	 RECEIVER	 chooses	 SEND	 BACK	 NOTHING,	 the	outcomes	are	
§ for	SENDER:	10	tokens	MINUS	transferred	tokens.		
§ for	 RECEIVER:	 10	 tokens	 PLUS	 3*transferred	tokens	for	RECEIVER.	
§ In	our	example:	 if	RECEIVER	chooses	SEND	BACK	NOTHING,	 the	SENDER	will	end	up	with	4	 tokens	and	the	RECEIVER	with	28	tokens.	
o If	 RECEIVER	 chooses	 SEND	 BACK	 HALF,	 the	 outcomes	are	
§ for	SENDER:	10	tokens	MINUS	transferred	tokens	PLUS	 one	 half	 of	 the	 RECEIVER’s	 tokens	 (that	 is	one	half	of	 (10	 tokens	PLUS	3*transferred	 tokens	from	SENDER)).		
§ for	RECEIVER:	one	half	of	the	RECEIVER’s	tokens,	that	 is	 one	half	 of	 (10	 tokens	PLUS	3*transferred	tokens).		
§ In	our	example:	 if	RECEIVER	chooses	SEND	BACK	HALF,	the	SENDER	will	end	up	with	4	tokens	PLUS	14	tokens	=	18	tokens;	and	the	RECEIVER	with	14	tokens.	The	more	the	SENDER	decides	to	TRANFER,	the	higher	the	total	amount	of	tokens	that	the	RECEIVER	will	hold	and	could	potentially	send	back	to	 SENDER,	 or	 keep	 for	 him/her	 self.	 The	 outcome	 depends	 on	 the	decision	of	the	RECEIVER.	Please	see	the	table	below	for	the	outcomes	corresponding	to	each	level	of	TRANSFER.					
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Chosen	level	 of	TRANSFER	by	SENDER	
Receiver	will	hold:	 Outcome	of	the	interaction	if	RECEIVER	chooses	send	
back	half	
Outcome	 of	 the	interaction	 if	RECEIVER	 chooses	
send	back	nothing	
0	 	10	 SENDER:	10	RECEIVER:	10	 SENDER:	10	RECEIVER:	10	
2	 16	 SENDER:	16	RECEIVER:	8	 SENDER:	8	RECEIVER:	16	
4	 22	 SENDER:	17	RECEIVER:	11	 SENDER:	6	RECEIVER:	22	
6	 28	 SENDER:	18	RECEIVER:	14	 SENDER:	4	RECEIVER:	28	
8	 34	 SENDER:	19	RECEIVER:	17	 SENDER:	2	RECEIVER:	34	
10	 40	 SENDER:	20	RECEIVER:	20	 SENDER:	0	RECEIVER:	40			In	this	experiment,	you	will	be	assigned	the	role	of	SENDER.		
Information	about	the	RECEIVERS	In	 a	 previous	 session	 of	 this	 experiment	 (beginning	 of	 the	 second	Semester)	participants	were	assigned	the	role	of	RECEIVERS	and	they	made	 one	 single	 choice	 between	 SEND	 BACK	 NOTHING	 and	 SEND	BACK	 HALF	 in	 case	 they	 would	 interact	 with	 a	 SENDER	 that	 would	choose	a	level	of	TRANSFER	higher	than	0.	You	will	receive	a	booklet	with	information	about	all	participants	who	made	 their	 choice	 as	 RECEIVER.	 You	 will	 learn	 their	 gender,	 study	background,	age,	hobbies,	relationship	status	and	family	background.	For	each	decision	you	will	make	 in	 this	 game,	 you	will	be	matched	 to	
one	 RECEIVER	 who	 will	 be	 randomly	 selected	 out	 of	 a	 group	 of	 9	RECEIVERS.	These	9	RECEIVERS	are	 randomly	selected	 from	the	 total	pool	 of	 RECEIVERS.	 For	 each	 and	 every	 decision	 a	 new	 draw	 of	 9	RECEIVERS	 will	 be	 assigned	 to	 you.	 These	 9	 RECEIVERS	 will	 be	indicated	to	you	by	displaying	their	photo	silhouettes	which	were	taken	
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from	 the	 back	 while	 these	 participants	 were	 making	 their	 choice	 as	RECEIVER	behind	the	computer	in	this	laboratory	(Figure	1).		
Figure	A1	NINE	assigned	RECEIVERS	
	
	
Decisions	and	screens	When	 you	 have	 seen	 the	 silhouettes	 of	 the	 9	 RECEIVERS	 assigned	 to	you,	you	have	 to	choose	a	 certain	amount	of	TRANSFER	on	 the	actual	choice	screen.		On	 this	 choice	 screen	 you	 can	 see	 some	 information	 on	 the	 choices	made	by	the	9	RECEIVERS	assigned	to	you.	Please	see	Fig.	2	on	the	next	page	 for	 an	 example.	 In	 this	 example	 you	 see	 that	 out	 of	 the	 9	RECEIVERS	assigned	 to	you	3	RECEIVERS	 chose	 to	send	back	half	 of	the	 received	 tokens	 (green	 background),	 and	 6	 RECEIVERS	 chose	 to	
send	back	nothing	(red	background).		For	 each	 decision	 a	 new	draw	of	 9	RECEIVERS	 from	 the	 total	 pool	 of	RECEIVERS	 will	 be	 assigned	 to	 you.	 On	 each	 decision	 screen,	information	 about	 the	 receivers	will	 be	 given	 to	 you.	 The	RECEIVERS	that	chose	send	back	HALF	will	be	visually	 represented	on	 the	green	background,	 and	 the	 RECEIVERS	 that	 chose	 send	back	NOTHING	 on	the	 red	 background.	 Based	 on	 the	 information	 given	 to	 you	 on	 the	choice	 screens	 in	 the	 experiment	 you	 can	 select	 a	 preferred	 level	 of	TRANSFER.				However	 on	 some	 choice	 screens	 you	 may	 learn	 nothing	 about	 the	decisions	made	by	the	nine	assigned	RECEIVERS.	Please	see	Fig.	3	for	an	example	 of	 such	 a	 case,	 when	 no	 information	 about	 the	 9	 assigned	receivers	 is	provided	to	you.	You	can	recognize	such	a	decision	by	the	grey	background.	
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Please	be	aware	 that	you	start	each	new	decision	with	10	 tokens	
again!	
	
Figure	 A2	 Example	 choice	 screen	 of	 the	 sender-receiver	 game	 WITH	
INFORMATION	
	
Figure	A3	Sender-receiver	game	WITHOUT	INFORMATION	
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COMPREHENSION	TEST:	sender-receiver	game	Please,	 answer	 now	 the	 following	 questions	 to	 make	 sure	 that	 you	understand	the	instructions	so	far.	if	you	have	any	questions,	please	let	us	know	by	raising	your	hand.			
1. If	I	choose	transfer	=	4	in	the	sender-receiver	game	and	it	is	the	case	 that	 the	 RECEIVER	 randomly	 assigned	 to	 me	 out	 of	 9	RECEIVERS	 made	 a	 	 decision	 	 to	 send	 back	 half,	 then	 my	outcome	(in	tokens)	would	be:	_____________																	(calculate)		
2. If	I	choose	transfer	=	4	in	the	sender-receiver	game	and	it	is	the	case	 that	 the	 RECEIVER	 randomly	 assigned	 to	 me	 out	 of	 9	RECEIVERS	 made	 a	 	 decision	 	 to	 send	 back	 nothing,	 then	 my	outcome	(in	tokens)	would	be:	_____________												(calculate)	
3. If	I	choose	transfer	=	8	in	the	sender-receiver	game	and	3	out	of	9	 RECEIVERS	 assigned	 to	 me	 in	 this	 decision	 choose	 to	 send	back	 half,	 I	 have	 a	 chance	 of	 33%	 that	 the	 specific	 RECEIVER	randomly	paired	to	me	in	this	decision	chooses	to	send	back	half.	That	is,	I	have	a	chance	of	33%	that	I	will	earn	19	tokens;	and	the	RECEIVER	matched	to	me	will	earn	17	tokens.	True	or	False?	
4. If	 in	 one	 decision,	 I	 receive	 information	 that	 5	 out	 of	 9	RECEIVERS	assigned	to	me	in	this	decision	choose	to	send	back	half,	then	I	will	have	the	same	chance	of	55%	in	each	consecutive	decision	 that	 a	RECEIVER	 randomly	paired	 to	me	 in	 that	 other	decision	chooses	to	send	back	half.	True	or	False?	
5. If	 I	 choose	 transfer=0	 in	 the	 sender-receiver	 game	 then	 the	choice	of	the	RECEIVER	matched	to	me	in	this	decision	will	not	affect	my	outcome.		True	or	False?	
6. When	 I	 receive	 no	 information	 about	 the	 decisions	 of	 the	 nine	RECEIVERS	 randomly	 assigned	 to	 me	 in	 some	 decision,	 then	information	that	I	received	in	the	previous	screens	tells	me	a	lot	about	 the	 chances	 that	 a	 randomly	 assigned	 RECEIVER	 out	 of	these	9	will	choose	to	SEND	BACK	HALF.		True	or	False?		
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Extra	Task	1	
1	token	=		€	0.50	(only	for	this	task!!)		We	have	 explained	 to	 you	 all	 the	details	 of	 the	 sender-receiver	 game.	We	also	explained	to	you	that	the	RECEIVERS	were	asked	in	a	previous	experimental	 session	 to	 send	 back	 nothing	 or	 send	 back	 half	 in	 case	they	 would	 interact	 with	 a	 SENDER	 that	 would	 choose	 a	 level	 of	TRANSFER	higher	than	0.	We	have	collected	these	decisions.		
	
SOCK	UNKNOWN	In	 this	 task	 we	 will	 first	 create	 a	 SOCK,	 which	 we	 will	 label	 SOCK	UNKNOWN	 here.	 It	 will	 consist	 of	 the	 choices	 made	 by	 9	 randomly	selected	RECEIVERS	out	of	all	RECEIVERS	who	made	 their	 choice.	We	will	 now	 demonstrate	 to	 you	 an	 A4	 envelope	 that	 contains	 all	RECEIVERS’	 choices	 (send	 back	 half	 or	 send	 back	 nothing).	 You	 will	take	 (without	 looking)	 9	 RECEIVERS	 from	 this	 A4	 envelope	 and	 put	them	into	the	SOCK	without	looking.	This	is	the	SOCK	UNKNOWN	which	will	be	sealed	with	a	tag.	
	
Prediction	In	this	extra	task	we	ask	you	to	indicate	how	many	RECEIVERS	–	out	of	the	 9	 RECEIVERS	 in	 your	 SOCK	 UNKNOWN	 –	 you	 think	 chose	 SEND	BACK	NOTHING	respectively	SEND	BACK	HALF.	You	may	 indicate	 this	in	 the	 table	 like	 the	one	below	with	a	number	between	0-9.	You	may	
only	choose	the	numbers	0	–	1	–	2	–	3	–	4	–	5	–	6	–	7	–	8	–	9.	
	
How	many	RECEIVERS	do	you	
think	chose	SEND	BACK	
NOTHING	
How	many	RECEIVERS	do	you	
think	chose	SEND	BACK	HALF	
Left	answer	box	 Right	answer	box	
	
Example	Let	us	assume	that	you	believe	the	composition	of	the	SOCK	UNKNOWN	consists	 of	 2	 RECEIVERS	 that	 chose	 send	 back	 nothing,	 and	 thus	 7	RECEIVERS	that	chose	send	back	half.	Then	please	write	the	numbers	2	and	 7	 in	 the	 table,	 respectively	 in	 the	 left	 and	 right	 answer	 box.	The	
numbers	must	always	add	up	to	9.		
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The	payment	procedure	for	this	task	is	designed	in	such	a	way	that	you	are	 best	 advised	 to	 indicate	 the	 composition	 of	 the	 SOCK	UNKNOWN	that	correspond	to	what	you	think	is	the	true	situation.		You	may	read	 the	attachment	 (back	of	 this	page)	 if	you	wish	 to	know	the	payment	procedure.		
	
ATTACHMENT	–	Explanation	payment	procedure	
	At	 the	end	of	 this	experiment	you	will	draw	one	RECEIVER	out	of	 the	SOCK	 UNKNOWN	 and	 the	 decision	 made	 by	 this	 RECEIVER	 will	 be	compared	 to	your	prediction.	We	will	pay	you	 for	 the	accurateness	of	your	 prediction.	 The	 better	 you	 predict	 the	 composition	 of	 the	 SOCK	UNKNOWN,	 the	more	chance	you	have	 to	draw	a	RECEIVER	matching	your	prediction.		Note	that	the	payment	procedure	is	designed	in	such	a	way	that	you	are	best	 advised	 to	 indicate	 the	 composition	of	 the	SOCK	UNKNOWN	 that	correspond	to	what	you	think	is	the	true	situation.			Your	earnings	for	the	correctness	of	your	prediction	will	be	calculated	in	the	following	way:	Let	 us	 assume	 the	 predictions	 given	 in	 the	 example	 above	 (2	 for	 left	answer	box	and	7	for	right	answer	box)	and	let	us	also	assume	that	the	RECEIVER	 you	 draw	 from	 the	 UNKNOWN	 SOCK	 chose	 to	 send	 back	HALF.	 Your	 earnings	would	 then	 be:	 10	 –	 5*(1-7/9)2	 –	 5*(2/9)2	=	 9.5	tokens.	In	other	words,	we	give	you	10	tokens	to	start	with	and	subtract	it	 with	 the	 inaccurateness	 of	 your	 correct	 prediction	 about	 the	RECEIVER’s	choice	=	5*(1-7/9)2	and	lastly	subtract	 it	with	the	number	you	assigned	to	the	incorrect	prediction	with	regard	to	the	RECEIVER’s	choice	=	5*(2/9)2.			Please	note	that	the	best	prediction	you	can	make	is	when	you	correctly	predict	 the	 choice	behavior	of	 the	RECEIVER	you	will	 randomly	draw	from	 the	 SOCK	 UNKNOWN	 by	 assigning	 the	 number	 9	 to	 the	 correct	RECEIVER’s	choice.	In	that	case	you	earn	10	tokens.	The	worst	that	can	happen	in	this	task	is	when	you	believe	in	an	incorrect	choice	behavior	of	 the	 RECEIVER	 you	will	 randomly	 draw	 from	 the	 SOCK	UNKNOWN	
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and	therefore	decide	to	assign	the	number	9	to	this	outcome.	Then	your	earnings	will	be	0	tokens	in	this	task.			
The	best	thing	you	can	do	in	this	task	is	to	state	your	true	beliefs	
about	what	 you	 think	 are	 your	 chances	 to	 face	 a	RECEIVER	 from	
the	 SOCK	 UNKNOWN	 that	 chose	 send	 back	 half	 and	 send	 back	
nothing.	
	
	
How	many	RECEIVERS	do	you	
think	chose	SEND	BACK	
NOTHING	
How	many	RECEIVERS	do	you	
think	chose	SEND	BACK	HALF	
	 			
Task	2	In	 this	 experiment,	 you	 will	 make	 decisions	 in	 two	 types	 of	 games:	sender-receiver	game	and	a	 lottery	game.	Before,	we	explained	to	you	the	details	of	sender-receiver	game,	please	bear	this	in	your	mind:		Both	games	have	many	similarities,	AND	one	important	distinction.		
• In	 the	 sender-receiver	 game,	 you	will	 affect	 the	 payoffs	 of	 one	other	 person,	 and	 this	 person	 will	 affect	 your	 payoffs.	 You	interact	with	a	human	being	in	the	sender-receiver	game.	
• In	 the	 lottery	 game,	 you	 will	 affect	 the	 payoffs	 of	 one	 other	person,	 but	 that	 person	 cannot	 affect	 your	 earnings.	 Instead	of	that,	 a	 randomized	 outcome	 of	 a	 computer	 will	 affect	 your	earnings.	You	interact	with	a	computer	in	the	lottery	game.	
	
	
Lottery	game	In	 this	 game	 there	 is	 a	DECISION	MAKER	 and	 a	 computerized	 lottery	device,	 namely	 an	 URN	 filled	 with	 9	 marbles.	 The	 DECISION	 MAKER	
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starts	 the	game	with	10	tokens.	The	starting	amount	of	10	 tokens	has	also	been	placed	in	the	computerized	lottery	device.		Remember	that	 in	the	lottery	game	your	choice	affects	the	outcome	of	one	other	person,	called	the	RECIPIENT	here.			The	 DECISION	 MAKER	 has	 to	 choose	 an	 amount	 of	 TRANSFER	 (in	tokens)	either:	TRANSFER:			0		-		2		-		4		-		6		-		8		-		10.		
• If	 DECISION	 MAKER	 chooses	 TRANSFER=0,	 no	 interaction	between	DECISION	MAKER	and	the	computerized	lottery	device	takes	 place,	 and	 outcome	 of	 the	 interaction	 is	 10	 tokens	 for	DECISIONMAKER	and	10	tokens	for	RECIPIENT.	
• If	DECISIONMAKER	chooses	a	certain	level	of	TRANSFER	(2,	4,	
6,	8,	or	10),	these	tokens	of	DECISION	MAKER	will	be	multiplied	by	 3,	 and	 placed	 into	 a	 computerized	 lottery	 device.	 The	outcome	of	the	interaction	depends	now	on	the	outcome	of	this	lottery,	generated	by	COMPUTER.	 It	 can	either	happen	 that	 the	random	 lottery	 draws	 a	WINNING	 COLOR	 or	 LOSING	 COLOR	MARBLE	from	the	urn.	Let	us	assume	for	illustration	purposes	that	DECISION	MAKER	chooses	TRANSFER=4.	The	DECISION	MAKER	chooses	to	transfer	4	tokens	to	be	placed	 into	 the	 computerized	 lottery	 device	 and	 therefore	 keeps	 6	tokens	 (10	 –	 4	 tokens)	 for	 him/herself.	 The	 lottery	will	 thus	 hold	 10	starting	tokens	PLUS	3*4	transferred	tokens	=	22	tokens.		The	 outcome	 of	 the	 interaction	 depends	 now	 on	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	lottery.	 Following	 the	 example	 with	 TRANSFER=4,	 the	 outcomes	 will	be:	
o If	 the	 computerized	 lottery	 device	 draws	 a	 LOSING	
COLOR	marble,	the	outcomes	are:	
§ for	 DECISION	 MAKER:	 10	 tokens	 MINUS	transferred	tokens	(=	6	tokens).		
§ for	 RECIPIENT:	 the	 amount	 of	 tokens	 the	computerized	 lottery	 device	 holds,	 which	 is	 10	tokens	PLUS	3*transferred	tokens	from	DECISION	MAKER	(=	22	tokens).	
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o If	 the	 computerized	 lottery	 device	 draws	 a	 WINNING	
COLOR	marble,	the	outcomes	are:	
§ for	 DECISION	 MAKER:	 10	 tokens	 MINUS	transferred	 tokens	 PLUS	 one	 half	 of	 the	 tokens	hold	 by	 the	 computerized	 lottery	 device	 (17	tokens).	
§ for	RECIPIENT:	one	half	of	the	tokens	hold	by	the	computerized	lottery	device	(11	tokens).		The	more	 the	 DECISION	MAKER	 decides	 to	 TRANFER,	 the	 higher	 the	total	amount	of	tokens	placed	in	the	lottery	device	and	the	more	can	be	returned	if	a	marble	with	a	winning	color	is	randomly	selected,	or	will	be	 retained	 by	 the	 lottery,	 and	 distributed	 to	 the	 RECEPIENT,	 if	 the	marble	 is	 a	 losing	 color.	 Please	 see	 the	 table	on	 the	next	page	 for	 the	outcomes	 corresponding	 to	 each	 chosen	 levels	 of	 TRANSFER	 in	 the	lottery	game.	DECISION	MAKER	is	shorted	for	DM	in	the	table	below.		Chosen	level	of	TRANSFER	by	DECISION	MAKER	
Amount	of	tokens	placed	in	the	lottery:	
Outcome	of	the	interaction	if	winning	
color	marble	is	drawn	from	the	urn	(in	tokens)	
Outcome	 of	 the	interaction	 if	
losing	 color	marble	 is	 drawn	from	 the	 urn	 (in	tokens)	
0	 10	 DM:	10	RECEPIENT:	10	 DM:	10	RECEPIENT:	10	
2	 16	 DM:	16	RECEPIENT:	8	 DM:	8	RECEPIENT:	16	
4	 22	 DM:	17	RECEPIENT:	11	 DM:	6	RECEPIENT:	22	
6	 28	 DM:	18	RECEPIENT:	14	 DM:	4	RECEPIENT:	28	
8	 34	 DM:	19	RECEPIENT:	17	 DM:	2	RECEPIENT:	34	
10	 40	 DM:	20	RECEPIENT:	20	 DM:	0	RECEPIENT:	40			
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In	this	experiment,	you	will	be	assigned	the	role	of	DECISION	MAKER.		
Information	about	the	RECEPIENTS	In	the	lottery	game	your	choice	affects	the	outcome	of	one	other	person,	called	the	RECIPIENT,	but	the	RECEPIENT	cannot	affect	your	outcome.	Participants	 came	 into	 the	 laboratory	 (beginning	 of	 this	 month)	 and	read	the	instructions	of	the	lottery	game.	At	the	end	of	the	instructions	they	 were	 informed	 about	 their	 role	 as	 RECEPIENT.	 All	 participants	signed	a	 consent	 form	and	 filled	 in	a	questionnaire	with	details	about	their	 gender,	 study	 background,	 age,	 hobbies,	 relationship	 status	 and	family	 background.	 You	 will	 receive	 a	 booklet	 with	 all	 RECEPIENTS	details.	You	will	be	matched	to	one	RECEPIENT	during	all	choices	you	make	in	the	lottery	game.	
	
Information	about	the	URN	In	 this	 game	 the	 computerized	 lottery	 device	 is	 an	 urn	 filled	 with	 9	marbles.	There	 are	9	different	 colors	 each	marble	 could	have:	 yellow,	orange,	blue,	pink,	purple,	brown,	white,	grey	and	black.	There	are	two	types	of	URNS	in	this	game,	namely	a	KNOWN	URN	and	an	UNKNOWN	URN.	The	KNOWN	URN	is	filled	with	9	marbles,	each	of	a	different	color	(Figure	 4)	 The	 UNKNOWN	 URN	 is	 also	 filled	 with	 9	 marbles	 but	 the	color	 of	 each	 marble	 is	 unknown	 to	 you.	 The	 computer	 randomly	selects	9	marbles	 into	 the	UNKNOWN	URN	from	a	 total	of	81	marbles	consisting	 of	 9	 yellow,	 9	 orange,	 9	 blue,	 9	 pink,	 9	 purple,	 9	 brown,	 9	white,	9	grey	and	9	black	marbles.	In	Figure	5	you	see	an	example	of	an	UNKNOWN	URN,	which	 in	 this	 case	 is	 composed	of	 2	 blue	marbles,	 3	yellow	marbles,	4	brown	marbles	and	1	purple	marble.	Figure	5	 is	an	
Figure	 A5	 An	 example	 of	 a	 possible	
composition	for	the	UNKNOWN	urn:	
Each	 marble	 color	 is	 determined	 at	
random.	 Colors	 can	 repeat	 themselves	 in	
any	way.	
Figure	A4	KNOWN	urn:	
Each	 marble	 has	 one	
color.	
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illustration	how	the	composition	of	an	UNKNOWN	URN	could	look	like.	Any	combination	with	9	different	colors	is	possible.			For	each	decision	you	will	make	in	this	game	one	marble	will	be	drawn	from	 the	 urn.	 Remember	 that	 the	 KNOWN	 urn	 contains	 all	 9	 colors.	However	 if	 the	urn	 is	UNKNOWN,	 the	9	marble	can	have	any	possible	combination	with	9	different	colors.	In	 this	 experiment	we	will	 display	 the	 following	 picture	 (Figure	 6)	 to	inform	you	that	you	are	playing	the	lottery	game	with	the	computerized	lottery	device,	namely	the	urn	filled	with	9	marbles.		
Figure	A6	Nine	assigned	marbles	in	Lottery	game		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Decisions	and	screens	After	you	have	seen	the	urn,	you	have	to	choose	a	level	of	TRANSFER	on	the	actual	choice	screen.		On	the	choice	screens	you	are	able	to	recognize	the	two	types	of	urns.	If	you	see	marbles	that	do	not	have	any	color	(because	they	are	unknown)	on	 a	 grey	 background,	 you	 will	 learn	 that	 the	 computerized	 lottery	device	 for	 this	 decision	 stems	 from	 an	 UNKNOWN	 urn.	 Please	 see	Figure	7	for	an	illustration	of	this	choice	screen.	For	each	new	decision	of	 a	 lottery	 game	 WITHOUT	 information,	 the	 computerized	 lottery	device	will	randomly	select	9	marbles	into	the	UNKNOWN	urn.	
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If	you	see	information	which	marbles	from	the	9	colored	marbles	in	the	urn	 are	 winning	 colors	 (green	 background)	 and	 which	 are	 losing	
colors	 (red	background),	you	will	 learn	 that	 the	computerized	 lottery	device	 for	 this	decision	 is	a	KNOWN	urn.	 In	Figure	8	on	the	next	page	you	 can	 indicate	 that	 out	 of	 the	 9	marbles	 in	 the	 urn	 6	marbles	 have	
winning	 colors,	 and	 3	 marbles	 have	 losing	 colors.	 On	 each	 new	decision	 screen	 of	 a	 lottery	 game	 WITH	 information,	 information	 is	given	about	the	amount	of	marbles	that	have	winning	colors	and	losing	colors.	This	will	be	visualized	by	the	green	background	respectively	the	red	background.	Based	 on	 the	 information	 given	 to	 you	 on	 the	 choice	 screens	 in	 the	experiment	you	can	select	a	preferred	level	of	TRANSFER.			
	
Please	be	aware	 that	you	start	each	new	decision	with	10	 tokens	
again!	
	
Figure	A7	Lottery	game	WITHOUT	INFORMATION	
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Figure	A8	Example	choice	screen	of	the	lottery	game	WITH	INFORMATION	
	
	
Marbles	with	winning	and	losing	colors	Before	 the	 experiment	 you	 have	 filled	 in	 a	 color	 table.	 Please	 see	 the	table	 below	 for	 your	 color	 table.	 The	 colors	 you	 selected	 in	 each	 row	have	been	implemented	in	the	computerized	lottery	device.	Let	us	work	out	the	example	from	Figure	8.	Here	you	learn	that	you	face	6	marbles	that	have	a	winning	color	and	3	marbles	that	have	a	losing	color.	Please	see	 line	 6	 in	 the	 table	 below.	 The	 colors	 you	 selected	 are:	 yellow,	orange,	brown,	pink,	purple	and	blue.	The	computerized	lottery	device	determines	which	colors	are	winning	or	losing	colors	based	on	the	color	table	you	filled	in,	as	you	can	see	in	Figure	8.	Please	let	us	give	a	second	example.	 If	 you	 need	 to	 make	 a	 choice	 in	 the	 lottery	 game	 and	information	on	the	choice	screen	tells	you	that	1	marble	has	a	winning	color	(on	green	background)	and	8	marbles	have	a	losing	color	(on	red	background),	 then	 the	 computerized	 lottery	 device	 is	 programmed	 to	define	the	color	yellow	as	winning	color.		
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When	 you	 have	 to	 make	 a	 choice	 in	 the	 lottery	 game	 WITHOUT	information,	5	colors	are	defined	as	winning	colors.	Please	see	line	5	in	the	color	table	below	for	the	colors	the	computerized	lottery	device	will	assess	as	winning	colors	for	the	9	marbles	with	unknown	colors	in	the	UNKNOWN	urn.	Therefore	the	winning	colors	for	the	UNKNOWN	urn	are:	brown,	blue,	grey,	white	and	black.	If	the	unknown	urn	would	be	composed	as	in	Fig.	5	five	marbles	have	a	winning	color.	Or,	to	give	another	example,	if	the	UNKNOWN	 urn	 would	 be	 composed	 of	 7	 pink	 marbles	 and	 2	 yellow	marbles,	no	single	marble	in	the	unknown	urn	has	a	winning	color.		 	 yellow	 orange	 brown	 pink	 purple	 blue	 grey	 white	 black	1	 X	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	 X	 X	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 X	 	 X	 X	4	 	 X	 X	 X	 X	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 X	 	 	 X	 X	 X	 X	6	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 	 	 	7	 X	 X	 X	 X	 	 X	 	 X	 X	8	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 	
	
	
COMPREHENSION	TEST:	lottery	game	
1. In	 the	 lottery	game,	 I	will	be	matched	 to	one	other	person,	 the	RECIPIENT,	 and	 this	 person	 can	 affect	 the	 outcome	 of	 my	decision	should	I	choose	TRANSFER.	True	or	False?	
2. Suppose	 that	 in	 the	 lottery	 game	 with	 the	 KNOWN	 urn,	 you	choose	TRANSFER=2,	and	 the	computer	randomly	selected	one	marble	from	the	lottery	composed	of	9	marbles,	and	this	marble	was	COLORED	BY	A	WINNING	COLOR.	What	is	your	outcome	in	tokens	 in	 this	 case?	 __________(calculate)	 And	 what	 is	 the	outcome	in	tokens	of	the	RECIPIENT	randomly	matched	to	you,	that	 makes	 no	 decisions	 in	 the	 lottery	 game?	
__________(calculate)	
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3. Suppose	 that	 in	 the	 lottery	 game	 with	 the	 KNOWN	 urn,	 you	choose	TRANSFER=2,	and	 the	computer	randomly	selected	one	marble	from	the	lottery	composed	of	9	marbles,	and	this	marble	was	 COLORED	 BY	 A	 LOSING	 COLOR.	What	 is	 your	 outcome	 in	tokens	in	this	case?	__________(calculate)	And	that	is	the	outcome	in	 tokens	 of	 the	 RECEPIENT	 randomly	 matched	 to	 you,	 that	makes	no	decisions	in	the	lottery	game?	__________(calculate)	
4. Suppose	you	 receive	 information	 that	out	of	 these	9	marbles	6	were	 colored	 by	 some	 winning	 color,	 and	 3	 were	 colored	 by	some	 losing	 colors.	 If	 you	 choose	 TRANSFER=10,	 what	 is	 the	chance	 that	 the	 outcome	 of	 this	 decision	will	 be	 20	 tokens	 for	you?	_________________	AND,	what	is	the	chance	that	the	outcome	of	this	 decision	 will	 be	 20	 tokens	 for	 the	 RECIPIENT	 randomly	ASSIGNED	to	you?	_________________	
5. How	many	colors	are	winning	colors	in	the	UNKNOWN	URN?	___	Which	 colors	 are	 the	 winning	 colors	 for	 the	 UNKNOWN	 URN?	_________________	
6. Consider	 now	 the	 following	 possible	 lotteries,	 and	 circle	POSSIBLE/IMPOSSIBLE	for	each	of	them,	based	on	whether	the	computerized	lottery	device	could	generate	such	an	UNKNOWN	URN	 in	 the	 lottery	 game	 WITHOUT	 information.	 Also	 please	indicate	 how	 many	 marbles	 in	 these	 lotteries	 have	 a	 winning	color.	
	
Lottery	 1:	 Possible	 /	 Impossible.	 How	 many	 marbles	 with	 winning	colors	are	in	this	UNKNOWN	urn?	___	Marble	1	 Marble	2	 Marble	3	 Marble	4	 Marble	5	 Marble	6	 Marble	7	 Marble	8	 Marble	9	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Lottery	 2:	 	 Possible	 /	 Impossible.	 How	 many	 marbles	 with	 winning	colors	are	in	this	UNKNOWN	urn?	___	Marble	1	 Marble	2	 Marble	3	 Marble	4	 Marble	5	 Marble	6	 Marble	7	 Marble	8	 Marble	9	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 			
219	
Lottery	 3:	 	 Possible	 /	 Impossible.	 How	 many	 marbles	 with	 winning	colors	are	in	this	UNKNOWN	urn?	___	
	 Marble	1	 Marble	2	 Marble	3	 Marble	4	 Marble	5	 Marble	6	 Marble	7	 Marble	8	 Marble	9	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
How	to	indicate	your	responses	in	the	MRI	scanner?	
	Once	 you	 see	 a	 choice	 screen	 you	 have	7	seconds	 to	 think	 about	 the	level	 of	 transfer.	 After	 7	 seconds	 the	 response	 options	 appear	 in	 the	following	 way	 (Figure	 9).	 Please	 push	 one	 of	 the	 far	 most	 three	 left	buttons	on	your	 left	button	box	 for	 the	 first	 three	options	of	Transfer	level	(in	this	case	6,	2	and	4)	and	one	of	the	far	most	three	right	buttons	on	your	right	button	box	(in	this	case	10,	8	and	0).									The	numbers	related	to	the	six	levels	of	TRANSFER	do	NOT	have	a	fixed	position	on	the	choice	screen,	but	will	be	presented	in	a	random	fashion	for	every	response.	 Just	remember	that	the	far	most	three	left	buttons	on	 your	 left	 button	 box	 represent	 the	 first	 three	 displayed	 options	 of	Transfer	level	and	the	far	most	three	right	buttons	on	your	right	button	box	represent	the	last	three	displayed	options	of	TRANSFER.	You	have	to	indicate	your	level	of	transfer	within	2	seconds,	so	please	realize	that	you	have	to	actually	make	your	choice	in	the	7	seconds	time	window	 when	 you	 see	 the	 choice	 screen,	 and	 simply	 indicate	 your	choice	immediately	when	the	response	options	appear.			
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Figure	A9	Example	of	response	option	
			After	 you	 indicated	 your	 preferred	 level	 of	 TRANSFER,	 a	 circle	 will	appear	 around	 the	 selected	 Transfer	 on	 the	 choice	 screen.	 The	experiment	will	continue	automatically	to	the	next	choice.			At	the	beginning	of	the	experiment	you	will	have	the	chance	to	practice	with	the	button	responses.		
	
Outcomes	of	your	choices	in	the	MRI	scanner	Once	you	have	made	all	your	decisions	we	will	show	you	the	outcomes	for	 each	 and	 every	 choice	 you	made	 in	 this	 experiment.	 First	we	will	inform	you	 if	 the	 outcome	 you	will	 see	 stems	 from	a	 choice	 from	 the	sender-receiver	game	or	the	lottery	game.	Then	we	will	remind	you	of	the	actual	choice	screen	and	the	decision	you	made	yourself	by	putting	a	 black	 circle	 around	 the	 chosen	 level	 of	 TRANSFER.	 Lastly	 we	 will	indicate	if	the	computer	draws	a	marble	with	a	winning	or	losing	color	(in	the	lottery	game)	or	a	RECEIVER	that	chose	send	back	half	or	send	back	nothing	(in	the	sender-receiver	game).	
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Please	 see	 Figure	 10	 for	 an	 example	 of	 an	 outcome	 from	 the	 lottery	game	WITH	information.	The	marble	drawn	by	the	computer	is	circled.	As	this	selected	marble	is	placed	on	a	red	background,	you	can	indicate	that	a	losing	marble	has	been	drawn.		
Figure	A10	Example	outcome	(in	lottery	game	WITH	information)	
	On	the	other	hand,	if	you	face	an	outcome	from	either	the	lottery	game	or	the	sender-receiver	game	WITHOUT	information,	a	grey	background	is	visible.	You	can	indicate	the	selected	marble	(in	the	lottery	game)	or	selected	RECEIVER	(in	the	sender-receiver	game)	from	the	red	or	green	background	 that	 will	 be	 highlighted	 for	 only	 one	 marble,	 or	 one	RECEIVER.	 Please	 see	 Figure	 11	 for	 an	 example	 of	 an	 outcome	stemming	 from	 the	 sender-receiver	 game	WITHOUT	 information.	 The	computer	 selected	 the	 second	 RECEIVER,	 and	 as	 this	 selected	RECEIVER	is	highlighted	by	a	green	background,	you	will	learn	that	this	RECEIVER	chose	send	back	HALF.	A	similar	process	for	the	lottery	game	WITHOUT	 information	will	 be	 conducted	where	 either	 a	 red	or	 green	
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background	 will	 surround	 the	 selected	 marble	 indicating	 that	 the	marble	is	respectively	a	losing	versus	a	winning	color.				
	
Figure	A11	Example	outcome	(in	sender-receiver	game	WITHOUT	information)	
		After	 you	have	 seen	5	 outcomes	 from	 the	 lottery	 game	 and	5	 choices	from	 the	 sender-receiver	 game,	 the	 computer	 will	 randomly	 draw	 1	outcome	 from	 both	 games	 and	 your	 earnings	 will	 be	 displayed.	 All	earnings	will	be	added	and	paid	to	you	at	the	end	of	the	experiment.									
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3)	
Appendix	 -	 Ambiguity	 attitudes	 and	 borrowing	
behavior		
Section	1		In	 this	 section	 we	 provide	 additional	 descriptive	 analyses	 and	perform	robustness	analyses.		Table	 A7	 shows	 correlations	 between	 our	 most	 important	experimental	variables.	Similar	to	previous	research	we	also	find	quite	some	 correlations	 between	 our	 measures	 (Dimmock	 et	 al.,	 2015a;	2015b).	 The	 indices	 of	 ambiguity	 aversion	 and	 insensitivity	 are	significantly	 positively	 correlated.	 Risk	 is	 positively	 correlated	 with	ambiguity	aversion,	and	weakly	with	insensitivity.	As	financial	 literacy	and	 scores	 on	 the	 cognitive	 reflection	 test	 are	 both	 negatively	correlated	 with	 ambiguity	 aversion	 and	 insensitivity,	 ambiguity	attitudes	 can	 somewhat	 be	 explained	 as	 a	 cognitive	 bias	 (as	 also	 put	forward	 by	 Wakker	 (2010)).	 Surprisingly	 general	 optimism	 and	pessimism	 do	 not	 correlate	 with	 matching	 probabilities	 of	 0.1,	respectively	 0.9.	 This	 indicates	 that	 general	 optimism	 and	 pessimism	are	different	from	the	optimism	and	pessimism	labels	we	use	when	we	refer	 to	 participants,	 that	 respectively	 overweight	 and	 underweight	likelihoods	of	0.1	and	0.9.		Table	 A8	 shows	 that	 bivariate	 correlations	 between	 ambiguity	aversion	 (index	 b)	 and	 risk,	 financial	 literacy	 and	 scores	 on	 the	cognitive	 reflection	 test	 hold	when	 controlling	 for	 other	 demographic	variables.	 Only	 the	 effect	 of	 risk	 remains	 prevalent,	 however,	 when	explaining	insensitivity	in	a	multivariate	model.	Secondly,	we	perform	several	robustness	checks	to	validate	the	main	 findings	 of	 our	 study.	 In	 this	 study	 we	 used	 four	 different	production	methods	 to	 construct	 urns	U2	 and	U10.	 These	 production	methods	were	 implemented	 as	 four	 separate	 treatments,	 randomized	over	 17	 different	 sessions.	 In	 a	 companion	 paper	 we	 focus	 on	 the	question	if	ambiguity	attitudes	are	influenced	by	the	construction	of	an	ambiguous	 urn	 via	 a	 between-subjects	 design.	 The	 four	 different	production	methods	 are:	 unknown,	 human,	 compound	 and	 nature.	 In	the	 unknown	 treatment	 we	 created	 the	 urns	 U2	 and	 U10	 before	
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participants	entered	the	laboratory,	and	we	did	not	tell	them	anything	with	regard	to	the	production	of	these	urns.	In	the	human	treatment	we	randomly	 selected	 two	 participants	 from	 the	 session.	 These	participants	could	create	urn	U2	and	urn	U10	in	any	composition	they	pleased.	After	they	had	composed	the	urns,	they	were	kindly	requested	to	 leave	 the	 experiment.	 In	 the	 compound	 treatment	 the	 underlying	uniform	probability	distribution	from	which	the	urns	arise	is	explicitly	detailed.	 Finally,	 in	 the	 nature	 treatment	 the	 colored	 marble	composition	of	 the	urns	were	determined	by	a	number	corresponding	to	a	temperature	in	a	set	of	different	cities	around	the	world.		In	Table	A9	 we	 reran	 our	 main	 OLS	 regression	 model	 with	 three	 dummy	variables	 relating	 to	 the	 production	 methods	 (we	 left	 the	 unknown	production	method	out	as	benchmark).	We	also	reran	the	same	model	by	 adding	 all	 sessions	 as	 separate	 dummy	 variables	 (not	 shown	 in	 a	model	 here).	 The	 main	 results	 presented	 in	 this	 study	 remain	qualitatively	valid.				 	
Table	A7:	Correlation	matrix	Variable	 		 		 		 		 		 			 Index	b	 Index	a	 AA01	 AA05	 AA09	 Risk	Index	b		 1	 	 	 	 	 	Index	a	 0.321***	 1	 	 	 	 	AA01	 0.471***	 -0.598***	 1	 	 	 	AA05	 0.732***	 -0.059	 0.354***	 1	 	 	AA09	 0.674***	 0.881***	 -0.148**	 0.136**	 1	 	Risk	 0.132**	 0.108*	 0.019	 0.056	 0.145**	 1	Optimism	 -0.074	 -0.034	 -0.038	 -0.033	 -0.064	 -0.076	Financial	Literacy	 -0.191***	 -0.122*	 -0.081	 -0.055	 -0.198**	 0.065	Cognitive	reflection	test	 -0.234***	 -0.129**	 -0.054	 -0.172***	 -0.190***	 0.086		***,	**,	*	significant	at	the	0.01,	0.05,	0.1	level,	respectively.	 	
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Table	A8:	OLS	regression	ambiguity	attitude	with	demographic	variables	 		 				 Index	b	 Index	a	 AA0.1	 AA0.5	 AA0.9	Risk	aversion	 0.136**					(0.055)	 0.157*			(0.088)	 0.011	(0.034)	 0.056			(0.043)	 0.136**		(0.055)	Financial	literacy	 -0.026**				(0.012)	 -0.022				(0.019)	 -0.009		(0.007)	 -0.003		(0.010)	 -0.026**			(0.012)	Cognitive	reflection	test	 -0.065***	(0.021)	 -0.052				(0.033)	 -0.008		(0.012)	 -0.040**		(0.016)	 -0.050**	(0.021)	Optimism	 -0.002			(0.002)	 -0.001		(0.003)	 -0.000	(0.001)	 -0.001	(0.001)	 -0.001		(0.002)	Income	 -0.000	(0.000)	 0.000	(0.000)	 -0.000	(0.000)	 -0.000	(0.000)	 -0.000	(0.000)	Age	 0.001		(0.003)	 -0.003			(0.004)	 0.001	(0.001)	 -0.001	(0.002)	 -0.001	(0.003)	Female	 0.009			(0.015)	 0.010			(0.024)	 0.002		(0.009)	 0.003	(0.012)	 0.009		(0.015)	Economics	study	 -0.003	(0.019)	 -0.033			(0.031)	 0.011		(0.012)	 -0.001	(0.015)	 -0.015			(0.019)	Siblings	 0.007					(0.006)	 0.007	(0.010)	 -0.002		(0.004)	 0.008*	(0.005)	 0.004		(0.006)	Living	expenses	 -0.000			(0.000)	 -0.000			(0.000)	 -0.000			(0.000)	 -0.000			(0.000)	 -0.000			(0.000)	Constant	 0.120						(0.078)	 0.321						(0.124)	 -0.038	(0.048)	 -0.001	(0.061)	 0.219						(0.078)		 	 	 	 	 	Observations	 228	 228	 228	 228	 228	F-test	 F(10,217)	=	2.89	 F(10,217)	=	1.24	 F(10,217)	=	0.42	 F(10,217)	=	1.17	 F(10,217)	=	2.54	Prob	>	F	 0.0021	 0.2675	 0.9376	 0.3132	 0.0066	R-squared	 0,117	 0,054	 0,019	 0,057	 0,105	
***,	**,	*	significant	at	the	0.01,	0.05,	0.1	level,	respectively.	Standard	errors	reported	in	parentheses.	
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Table	A9:	Robustness	checks	for	production	method	
Amount	
borrowed	
(1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	Index	b	 23.641																					(107.735)	 82.746																					(112.893)	 80.480																				(115.511)	Index	a	 	 16.339																													(70.685)	 38.628																													(71.094)	 43.297																													(72.199)	Do	you	borrow	 440.267***						(26.034)	 386.669***						(36.897)	 425.029***						(36.904)	 427.141***						(37.465)	Borrow*IndexB	 -503.868***					(172.384)	 	 -655.691***					(179.472)	 -643.101***					(181.946)	Borrow*IndexA	 	 9.660					(119.575)	 105.922					(121.834)	 96.566					(123.330)	Risk	aversion	 	 	 	 -15.116																																					(71.368)	Financial	literacy	 	 	 	 9.772																																				(15.956)	Cognitive	reflection	test	 	 	 	 -10.446																																						(27.647)	Income	 	 	 -0.053*																													(0.029)	 -0.055*																													(0.030)	Study	years	 	 	 10.770***																																																									(4.041)	 10.700*** 																														(4.086)	Female	 	 	 -17.824																																													(18.983)	 -17.868 																														(19.622)	Economic	study	 	 	 55.161**																																			(23.790)	 51.692* 																												(25.008)	Siblings	 	 	 16.784**																																					(7.850)	 16.728* 																												(7.952)	Live	on	own	 	 	 40.693*																																(23.230)	 40.842* 																														(23.463)	Human	 -13.828					(26.182)	 -19.718					(27.664)	 -6.494					(26.527)	 -6.646					(26.866)	Compound	 38.659					(26.182)	 34.004					(27.244)	 43.884					(26.155)	 43.915					(26.314)	Nature	 26.406					(26.501)	 29.137					(27.206)	 36.501					(26.201)	 35.759					(26.380)	Constant	 -16.572					(23.475)	 -16.417					(29.155)	 -87.386					(38.652)	 -95.480					(67.075)	Observations	 228	 228	 228	 228	F	test	 F	(6,223)	=	68.34	 F	(6,223)	=	62.72	 F	(14,213)	=	32.62	 F(17,210)	=	26.59	Prob	>	F	 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.0000	 0.0000	Adj.	R-squared	 0.638	 0.618	 0.661	 0.657	
***,	**,	*	significant	at	the	0.01,	0.05,	0.1	level,	respectively.	Standard	errors	reported	in	parentheses.			 	
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Section	2	
	
Instructions	
	
Introduction	Welcome	to	this	experiment.	In	this	experiment,	you	will	make	several	decisions.	You	can	earn	money	depending	on	the	decisions	that	you	will	make.	 For	 this	 reason,	 it	 is	 very	 important	 that	 you	 read	 these	instructions	carefully.	Additionally	 to	your	earnings,	you	will	ALWAYS	receive	€	4	for	your	participation	in	this	experiment.	You	will	be	paid	in	cash	at	the	end	of	the	experiment.	This	payment	will	be	done	in	private,	and	thus	no	other	participant	will	learn	how	much	you	earned.		Please	 note	 that	 you	 are	 not	 allowed	 to	 communicate	 with	 other	participants	in	this	experiment.	Also	please	turn	off	your	cell	phone	to	avoid	any	distractions	and	remain	seated	and	quiet	during	the	course	of	the	experiment.	 If	 at	 any	moment	 in	 time	you	have	a	question,	please	raise	your	hand	and	an	experimenter	will	come	to	you.			This	experiment	consists	of	four	independent	tasks	and	a	questionnaire	at	 the	 final	 end.	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 each	 new	 task,	 you	 will	 receive	instructions.	 At	 the	 final	 end	 of	 this	 experiment,	 the	 computer	 will	randomly	 select	one	 choice	 from	 one	 of	 the	 four	 tasks.	 This	 selected	choice	will	be	played	out	for	real	 in	order	to	determine	your	earnings.	Thus,	 you	 should	 take	 all	 tasks	 seriously	 as	 any	 of	 the	 four	 tasks	 can	determine	your	payoff	at	the	end.	The	first	three	tasks	in	this	experiment	involve	lotteries	with	urns	filled	with	100	chips	of	different	colors.	One	urn	is	filled	with	100	chips	and	is	composed	in	any	combination	of	2	colors:	green	and	yellow	(called	U2)	and	 another	 urn	 has	 also	 100	 chips	 but	 can	 be	 composed	 in	 any	combination	 of	 up	 to	 10	 colors:	 red,	 yellow,	 grey,	 green,	 blue,	 purple,	pink,	orange,	light	green	and	black	chips	(called	U10).	Thus	the	urn	can	either	 contain	 only	 one	 color	 or	 two	 colors,	 three,	 four,	 etc.	 or	 all	 ten	colors	with	 any	 possible	 number	 of	 chips	 per	 color.	We	will	 produce	both	these	urns	as	follows.		
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Production	of	the	urns	Urn	U2	is	already	produced	and	has	an	unknown	composition	of	green	and	yellow	balls.	Please	see	urn	U2	here.		Urn	U10	is	also	already	produced	and	has	an	unknown	composition	of	red,	yellow,	grey,	green,	blue,	purple,	pink,	orange,	light	green	and	black	chips.	Please	see	urn	U10	here.			These	two	urns	will	be	used	in	the	following	three	tasks.	U2	will	be	used	in	the	first	task	and	U10	in	task	2	and	3.			Let	us	now	carefully	explain	the	first	task	of	this	experiment	to	you.	 	
	
TASK	1	In	this	task	you	will	make	several	decisions	between	two	different	urns	each	filled	with	100	chips.	Let	us	first	inform	you	about	these	urns.		
	
Urns	In	this	task	there	are	two	urns,	named	‘urn	U2’	and	‘urn	K2’.	Urn	U2	and	urn	 K2	 are	 each	 filled	 with	 100	 chips.	 Each	 chip	 is	 either	 green	 or	yellow.	
- Urn	K2	has	a	fixed	composition	of	green	and	yellow	chips	which	will	be	described	to	you	below.		
- Urn	U2	was	 produced	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	 experiment	 and	has	an	unknown	composition	of	green	and	yellow	chips.		
Your	decisions			
	
Part	1	In	part	1	of	 this	 task	you	have	 to	chose	between	a	draw	from	urn	U2,	which	 we	 produced	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 experiment,	 and	 urn	 K2.	Remember,	that	both	urns	have	100	chips	that	can	either	have	a	green	or	yellow	color.	In	urn	U2	you	do	not	know	how	many	chips	are	of	the	one	or	the	other	color.	In	part	1	of	this	task	urn	K2	has	exactly	50	green	and	50	yellow	chips.	See	the	screen	shot	below	for	an	illustration	of	this	task.	Remember	that	you	have	selected	a	color	right	at	the	start	of	the	experiment.	 In	 the	 screenshot	 we	 assume,	 but	 only	 for	 illustration	purposes,	that	you	have	selected	the	color	green	at	the	beginning	of	the	
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experiment.	In	part	1	of	this	task	you	simply	have	to	choose	from	which	of	the	two	urns	you	would	like	to	draw	a	chip	(without	looking):	from	urn	U2	(Option	A)	or	from	urn	K2	(Option	B).		If	 part	 1	 of	 this	 task	 is	 selected	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 experiment	 to	determine	 your	 payoff,	 you	 can	 draw	 a	 chip	 from	 the	 urn	 you	 have	chosen	(without	 looking).	 If	 the	drawn	chip	has	the	color	you	selected	at	the	beginning	of	the	experiment,	you	will	win	€15.	If	the	drawn	chip	has	the	other	color,	you	win	nothing	(€0).		
	
Part	2	After	the	choice	in	part	1,	you	will	make	several	choices	in	part	2	of	this	task	where	you	will	again	decide	if	you	wish	to	draw	a	chip	from	Urn	U2	or	Urn	K2.	We	again	assume	here	for	illustration	purposes	that	you	had	selected	green	at	 the	beginning	of	 the	experiment.	Please	see	Figure	2	for	a	 screenshot	of	 the	choice	screen	on	which	you	may	 indicate	your	choices.	As	you	can	see	in	Fig	2	you	will	have	to	make	20	choices.	These	are	all	displayed	 on	 one	 screen.	 In	 every	 choice	 you	 will	 have	 to	 decide	between	 Urn	 U2	 and	 Urn	 K2.	 Urn	 U2	 is	 the	 urn	 produced	 at	 the	
Figure	1	Choice	screen	Part	1	(with	green	simply	as	illustration)	
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beginning	of	the	experiment.	Just	as	a	reminder,	Urn	U2	has	100	chips	in	an	unknown	composition	of	green	and	yellow	marbles.	Urn	K2	also	has	100	chips,	but	in	a	composition	you	will	know.	For	every	choice	you	will	be	 informed	how	many	of	 the	100	chips	 in	urn	K2	have	 the	color	you	 selected	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 experiment	 (in	 the	 screen	 shot	below	it	is	green).	The	remaining	marbles	are	then	yellow.			
		Let	us	describe	choice	number	6,	see	line	6	in	Fig.	2,	as	an	example.	Let	us	first	look	at	the	left	hand	side	(Option	A):	Option	A	is	always	Urn	U2.	Your	 selected	 color	 (in	 the	 example	 it	 is	 green)	 will	 be	 visually	displayed	behind	the	winning	amount	of	€15.	The	other	color,	yellow,	is	visually	displayed	behind	the	amount	of	€0.	Now	let’s	look	at	the	right	hand	side	(Option	B):	Option	B	for	choice	(row)	number	6	is	Urn	K2	and	it	states	that	38	chips	out	of	the	total	amount	of	100	chips	are	of	your	selected	color	(in	the	example	it	is	green).	The	remaining	chips,	62,	are	thus	yellow.			
Figure	2	Choice	screen	Part	2	(with	green	simply	as	illustration)	
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If	part	2	of	 task	1	 is	randomly	chosen	at	 the	end	of	 the	experiment	as	the	one	that	determines	your	payoff,	your	payment	will	be	determined	as	 follows.	The	computer	will	randomly	select	with	equal	chances	one	of	 the	 20	 choices.	 If	 the	 computer,	 for	 instance,	 selects	 choice	 (row)	number	 6	 from	 this	 task	 to	 be	 played	 for	 real	 in	 order	 to	 determine	your	earnings	at	the	end	of	this	experiment,	we	will	let	you	draw	a	chip	from	the	urn	that	you	indicated	to	prefer	in	that	row:	
- If	 you	have	 chosen	option	A,	 you	may	draw	one	 chip	 from	urn	U2.	Remember	 this	 is	 the	urn	produced	at	 the	beginning	of	 the	experiment.	 If	 the	color	you	draw	corresponds	to	your	selected	color,	you	win	€15.	If	you	draw	the	other	color,	you	win	nothing.		
- If	 you	 have	 chosen	 option	 B,	we	will	 create	 a	 see-through	 urn	with	 as	many	 chips	 in	 your	 selected	 color	 as	 indicated	 in	 that	row.	For	example,	in	row	6	(choice	6)	we	would	put	38	chips	of	your	selected	color	(green)	into	the	urn	and	62	chips	of	the	other	color.	 You	 may	 then	 draw	 one	 chip	 from	 this	 urn	 without	looking.	If	you	draw	a	chip	corresponding	to	your	selected	color,	you	win	€15,	and	nothing	if	you	draw	a	chip	in	the	other	color.		In	this	part	2	of	task	1	you	will	have	to	make	20	decisions	like	the	one	described	 above.	 Each	 time	 you	 will	 be	 asked	 to	 indicate	 your	preference	for	drawing	a	chip	from	urn	U2	(option	A)	or	urn	K2	(option	B).		
Quiz	
	To	 make	 sure	 that	 everything	 is	 clear	 to	 you,	 you	 may	 answers	 the	questions	below.	These	 answers	 are	not	 related	at	 all	 to	 the	 earnings	you	can	win	in	this	experiment.	If	you	have	completed	all	questions	you	can	 raise	 your	 hand	 and	 an	 experimenter	 will	 come	 to	 check	 your	answers.	If	anything	is	unclear,	you	may	also	raise	your	hand.		Please	 take	 your	 time	 to	 fill	 in	 the	 questions.	 You	 may	 start	 making	decisions	in	Task	1	once	all	participants	are	ready.		Please	indicate	whether	the	statements	below	are	true	or	false:		
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1. I	will	be	informed	about	the	exact	content	of	urn	K2	throughout	task	1	 	 	True	/	False		
2. In	Part	2,	Urn	K2	is	always	composed	of	50	green	and	50	yellow	chips	 	 	True	/	False		
3. I	have	selected	a	color	at	the	start	of	the	experiment	 		 	 	True	/	False		
4. What	is	the	minimum	amount	of	colors	in	urn	U2?		Minimum	____	different	colors		
5. How	many	chips	do	both	urns	contain?	 	 	 		 	 		___	balls		
6. What	is	the	probability	that	you	will	draw	a	chip	in	your	selected	color	if	urn	K2	has	a	composition	as	shown	in	choice	number	7	in	Fig	2?	____%	chance	of	winning			
7. Do	you	know	 the	probability	 that	you	will	draw	a	 chip	 in	your	selected	color	from	urn	U2?		 	 Yes	/	No		
8. The	content	of	urn	U2	changes	between	the	decisions	I	need	to	make	 	 	True	/	False		
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TASK	2	In	this	task	you	will	again	make	several	decisions	between	two	different	urns	each	filled	with	100	chips.	Let	us	first	inform	you	about	the	urns	in	task	2.		
	
Urns	In	this	task	there	are	two	urns,	named	‘urn	K10’	and	‘urn	U10’.	Urn	K10	and	urn	U10	are	each	filled	with	100	chips.	There	are	10	possible	colors:	black,	green,	grey,	red,	light	green,	blue,	orange,	purple,	pink	and	yellow	chips.		
- Urn	K10	has	a	fixed	composition	of	10	colors	which	will	be	described	to	you	below.		
- Urn	U10	is	the	urn	that	was	produced	at	the	beginning	of	the	experiment	and	it	has	an	unknown	composition	of	red,	yellow,	grey,	green,	blue,	purple,	pink,	orange,	light	green	and	black	chips.		
Your	decisions			
	
Part	1	In	part	1	of	this	task	you	have	to	choose	between	a	draw	from	urn	U10,	which	we	produced	 at	 the	beginning	of	 the	 experiment,	 and	urn	K10.	Remember,	 that	 both	urns	have	100	 chips	 that	 can	 either	 have	 a	 red,	yellow,	grey,	green,	blue,	purple,	pink,	orange,	light	green	or	black	color.	In	 urn	 U10	 you	 do	 not	 know	 how	many	 chips	 are	 of	 each	 of	 the	 ten	possible	 colors.	 In	 part	 1	 of	 this	 task	 urn	 K10	 has	 exactly	 10	 red,	 10	yellow,	 10	 grey,	 10	 green,	 10	 blue,	 10	 purple,	 10	 pink,	 10	 orange,	 10	light	 green	 and	 10	 black	 chips,	 so	 10	 chips	 of	 each	 color.	 In	 the	following	we	again	assume,	but	only	for	illustration	purposes,	that	you	have	selected	the	color	green	at	the	beginning	of	the	experiment.	In	part	1	 of	 this	 task	 you	 simply	 have	 to	 choose	 once	 from	which	 of	 the	 two	urns	you	would	 like	 to	draw	a	chip:	 from	urn	U10	(Option	A)	or	 from	urn	K10	(Option	B).		If	 part	 1	 of	 this	 task	 is	 selected	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 experiment	 to	determine	your	payoff,	you	can	draw	a	chip	(without	looking)	from	the	urn	you	have	chosen.	If	the	drawn	chip	has	the	color	you	selected	at	the	
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beginning	of	the	experiment,	you	will	win	€15.	If	the	drawn	chip	has	the	other	color,	you	win	nothing	(€0).	
	
Part	2	After	your	decision	in	part	1,	you	will	make	several	choices	in	part	2	of	this	 task	where	you	will	again	decide	 if	you	wish	 to	draw	a	chip	 from	Urn	U10	 or	Urn	K10.	We	 again	 assume	here	 for	 illustration	 purposes	that	you	had	selected	green	at	the	beginning	of	the	experiment.	You	will	have	to	make	20	choices	which	are	all	displayed	on	one	screen.	In	every	choice	you	will	have	to	decide	between	Option	A:	Urn	U10	and	Option	B:	 Urn	 K10.	 Urn	 U10	 is	 the	 urn	 produced	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	experiment.	Just	as	a	reminder,	Urn	U10	has	100	chips	in	an	unknown	composition	of	red,	yellow,	grey,	green,	blue,	purple,	pink,	orange,	light	green	or	black	chips.	Urn	K10	also	has	100	chips,	but	in	a	composition	you	will	know.	For	every	choice	you	will	be	informed	how	many	of	the	100	chips	in	urn	K10	have	the	color	you	selected	at	the	beginning	of	the	experiment.	 The	 remaining	 marbles	 are	 then	 a	 combination	 of	 the	remaining	9	colors.			If	part	2	of	 task	2	 is	randomly	chosen	at	 the	end	of	 the	experiment	as	the	one	that	determines	your	payoff,	your	payment	will	be	determined	as	 follows.	The	computer	will	randomly	select	with	equal	chances	one	of	 the	 20	 choices.	 If	 the	 computer,	 for	 instance,	 selects	 the	 following	choice	(row)	to	be	played	for	real	in	order	to	determine	your	earnings;	a	 choice	 between	Option	 A	 (urn	 U10)	 and	Option	 B	 (urn	 K10)	which	gives	 you	 information	 that	 15	 chips	 in	 Urn	 K10	 are	 of	 your	 selected	color.	We	will	 let	 you	draw	a	 chip	 from	 the	urn	 that	 you	 indicated	 to	prefer	in	that	row:	
- If	 you	have	 chosen	option	A,	 you	may	draw	one	 chip	 from	urn	U10.	Remember	this	is	the	urn	produced	at	the	beginning	of	the	experiment.	 If	 the	color	you	draw	corresponds	to	your	selected	color,	you	win	€15.	If	you	draw	the	other	color,	you	win	nothing.		
- If	 you	 have	 chosen	 option	 B,	we	will	 create	 a	 see-through	 urn	with	 as	many	 chips	 in	 your	 selected	 color	 as	 indicated	 in	 that	row.	 In	 this	 example,	 we	 would	 put	 15	 chips	 of	 your	 selected	color	(green)	into	the	urn	and	85	chips	of	the	other	nine	colors.	You	may	then	draw	one		
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- chip	 from	 this	 urn	 without	 looking.	 If	 you	 draw	 a	 chip	corresponding	to	your	selected	color,	you	win	€15,	and	nothing	if	you	draw	a	chip	in	the	other	color.		In	this	part	2	of	task	2	you	will	have	to	make	20	decisions	like	the	one	described	 above.	 Each	 time	 you	 will	 be	 asked	 to	 indicate	 your	preference	 for	 drawing	 a	 chip	 from	 urn	 U10	 (option	 A)	 or	 urn	 K10	(option	B).	
	
Quiz	
	To	make	 sure	 that	 everything	 is	 clear	 for	 you,	 you	may	 answers	 the	questions	below.	If	you	have	completed	all	questions	you	can	raise	your	hand	and	an	experimenter	will	come	to	check	your	answers.	If	anything	is	unclear,	you	may	also	raise	your	hand.		Please	take	your	time	to	fill	in	the	questions.	We	will	continue	with	Task	2	once	all	participants	are	ready.		Please	indicate	whether	the	statements	below	are	true	or	false:		
1. The	content	of	Urn	K10	changes	throughout	part	2	of	this	task		 	 	True	/	False		
2. In	part	1	of	 this	 task,	Urn	K10	 is	composed	of	50	green	and	50	yellow	chips	 	True	/	False		
3. Is	green	the	selected	color	for	all	participants	 	 		 	 	True	/	False		
4. Is		urn	U10	composed	of	all	10	colors	 	 	 		 	 	True	/	False		
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5. What	is	the	probability	that	you	will	draw	a	chip	in	your	selected	color	from	urn	K10	in	Part	1?			 	 	 									 		 	 	 	____%	chance	of	winning			
6. How	many	balls	do	both	urns	contain?	 	 	 	 	Both	urns	contain	___	balls		
7. What	is	the	probability	that	you	will	draw	a	chip	in	your	selected	color	if	urn	K10	has	a	composition	of	30	marbles	in	your	selected	color?	 	 	____%	chance	of	winning			
8. Do	you	know	 the	probability	 that	you	will	draw	a	 chip	 in	your	selected	color	from	urn	U10?		 	 Yes	/	No			
TASK	3	In	this	task	you	will	make	again	several	decisions	between	two	different	urns	each	filled	with	100	chips.	Let	us	first	inform	you	about	the	urns	in	task	3.		
	
Urns	In	this	task	there	are	two	urns,	named	‘urn	K10’	and	‘urn	U10’.	These	urns	are	the	exact	same	urns	from	the	previous	task!	As	a	reminder,	urn	K10	and	urn	U10	are	each	filled	with	100	chips.	There	are	10	possible	colors:	black,	green,	grey,	red,	light	green,	blue,	orange,	purple,	pink	and	yellow.		
- Urn	K	has	a	fixed	composition	of	10	colors,	which	will	be	described	to	you	below.		
- Urn	U	has	an	unknown	composition	of	red,	yellow,	grey,	green,	blue,	purple,	pink,	orange,	light	green	and	black	chips.	It	is	the	exact	same	urn	from	the	last	task!	It	was	produced	at	the	beginning	of	the	experiment.	
Selected	colors	
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In	the	beginning	of	the	experiment	you	selected	one	color;	either	green	or	yellow.	Let	us	assume,	only	for	illustration	purposes,	that	you	chose	green.	The	other	nine	colors	are	then:	black,	grey,	red,	light	green,	blue,	orange,	purple,	pink	and	yellow.	 In	 this	 task	 these	are	 then	your	nine	
selected	colors.	
	
Part	1	In	part	1	of	this	task	you	have	to	choose	between	a	draw	from	urn	U10,	which	we	produced	 at	 the	beginning	of	 the	 experiment,	 and	urn	K10.	Remember,	 that	 both	 urns	 have	 100	 chips	 that	 can	 either	 have	 red,	yellow,	grey,	green,	blue,	purple,	pink,	orange,	light	green	or	black	chips.	In	 urn	 U10	 you	 do	 not	 know	 how	many	 chips	 are	 of	 each	 of	 the	 ten	possible	 colors.	 In	 part	 1	 of	 this	 task	 urn	 K10	 has	 exactly	 10	 red,	 10	yellow,	 10	 grey,	 10	 green,	 10	 blue,	 10	 purple,	 10	 pink,	 10	 orange,	 10	light	 green	 and	 10	 black	 chips,	 so	 10	 chips	 of	 each	 color.	 In	 the	following	we	again	assume,	but	only	for	illustration	purposes,	that	you	have	 selected	 the	 color	 green	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 experiment	 and	thus	 that	 black,	 grey,	 red,	 light	 green,	 blue,	 orange,	 purple,	 pink	 and	yellow	 are	 your	 nine	 selected	 chips.	 In	 part	 1	 of	 this	 task	 you	 simply	have	to	choose	from	which	urn	you	would	like	to	draw	a	chip:	from	urn	U10	(Option	A)	or	from	urn	K10	(Option	B).		If	 part	 1	 of	 this	 task	 is	 selected	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 experiment	 to	determine	your	payoff,	you	can	draw	a	chip	(without	looking)	from	the	urn	you	have	chosen.	If	 the	drawn	chip	has	any	of	your	nine	selected	
colors,	you	will	win	€15.	If	the	drawn	chip	has	the	other	color,	you	win	nothing	(€0).	
	
Part	2	After	your	decision	in	part	1,	you	will	make	several	choices	in	part	2	of	this	 task	where	you	will	again	decide	 if	you	wish	 to	draw	a	chip	 from	Urn	U10	 or	Urn	K10.	We	 again	 assume	here	 for	 illustration	 purposes	that	you	had	selected	green	at	the	beginning	of	the	experiment.	Also	for	
this	 part	 it	 means	 that	 the	 other	 nine	 colors	 are	 your	 selected	
colors	for	task	3,	part	2:	black,	grey,	red,	light	green,	blue,	orange,	
purple,	pink	and	yellow.	You	will	have	to	make	20	choices	which	are	all	 displayed	 on	 one	 screen.	 In	 every	 choice	 you	 will	 have	 to	 decide	between	 Urn	 U10	 and	 Urn	 K10.	 Urn	 U10	 is	 the	 urn	 produced	 at	 the	
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beginning	of	the	experiment.	Just	as	a	reminder,	Urn	U10	has	100	chips	in	 an	 unknown	 composition	 of	 red,	 yellow,	 grey,	 green,	 blue,	 purple,	pink,	orange,	light	green	or	black	chips.	Urn	K10	also	has	100	chips,	but	in	a	composition	you	will	know.	For	every	choice	you	will	be	informed	how	 many	 of	 the	 100	 chips	 are	 of	 your	 nine	 selected	 colors.	 The	remaining	marbles	 are	 then	 green	 (or	 yellow	 depending	 on	 the	 color	you	selected	at	the	beginning	of	the	experiment).			If	part	2	of	 task	2	 is	randomly	chosen	at	 the	end	of	 the	experiment	as	the	one	that	determines	your	payoff,	your	payment	will	be	determined	as	 follows.	The	computer	will	randomly	select	with	equal	chances	one	of	 the	 20	 choices.	 If	 the	 computer,	 for	 instance,	 selects	 the	 following	choice	(row)	to	be	played	for	real	in	order	to	determine	your	earnings;	a	 choice	 between	Option	 A	 (urn	 U10)	 and	Option	 B	 (urn	 K10)	which	gives	you	information	that	75	chips	in	Urn	K10	are	of	your	nine	selected	colors.	We	will	 let	you	draw	a	chip	 from	the	urn	that	you	 indicated	to	prefer	in	that	row:	
- If	 you	have	 chosen	option	A,	 you	may	draw	one	 chip	 from	urn	U10.	Remember	this	is	the	urn	produced	at	the	beginning	of	the	experiment.	 If	 the	 color	 you	 draw	 corresponds	 to	 one	 of	 your	nine	 selected	 colors,	 you	win	€15.	 If	 you	draw	 the	other	 color,	you	win	nothing.		
- If	 you	 have	 chosen	 option	 B,	we	will	 create	 a	 see-through	 urn	with	 as	many	 chips	 in	 your	 nine	 selected	 color	 as	 indicated	 in	that	 row.	 In	 this	 example,	we	would	 put	 75	 chips	 of	 your	 nine	selected	color	 into	 the	urn	and	15	chips	of	 the	remaining	color	(in	this	example	thus	green).	You	may	then	draw	one	chip	from	this	 urn	 without	 looking.	 If	 you	 draw	 a	 chip	 corresponding	 to	one	of	your	nine	selected	colors,	you	win	€15,	and	nothing	if	you	draw	a	chip	in	the	remaining	color.		In	this	part	2	of	task	3	you	will	have	to	make	20	decisions	like	the	one	described	 above.	 Each	 time	 you	 will	 be	 asked	 to	 indicate	 your	preference	 for	 drawing	 a	 chip	 from	 urn	 U10	 (option	 A)	 or	 urn	 K10	(option	B).	
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Quiz	
	To	make	 sure	 that	 everything	 is	 clear	 for	 you,	 you	may	 answers	 the	questions	below.	If	you	have	completed	all	questions	you	can	raise	your	hand	and	an	experimenter	will	come	to	check	your	answers.	If	anything	is	unclear,	you	may	also	raise	your	hand.		Please	take	your	time	to	fill	in	the	questions.	We	will	continue	with	Task	3	once	all	participants	are	ready.	Please	indicate	whether	the	statements	below	are	true	or	false:		
1. The	content	of	Urn	U10	is	the	same	as	from	Task	2	 		 	 	True	/	False		
2. In	Task	3	there	are	nine	selected	colors	 	 	 		 	 	True	/	False		
3. If	Urn	K10	is	composed	as	in	part	1	of	this	task,	I	have	90%	chance	to	draw	a	chip	corresponding	to	one	of	my	nine	selected	colors	 	 	 	 	 	True	/	False	 			 	 	 	 	 			
4. I	also	have	a	90%	chance	to	draw	a	chip	corresponding	to	one	of	my	nine	selected	colors	for	urn	U10		 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	True	/	False	 			 	 	 	 	 	
5. How	many	balls	do	both	urns	contain?	 	 	 	 	Both	urns	contain	___	balls		
6. What	is	the	probability	that	you	will	draw	a	chip	in	your	selected	color	if	urn	K10	has	a	composition	of	70	marbles	in	your	nine	selected	color?	____%	chance	of	winning			
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7. Do	you	know	the	probability	that	you	will	draw	a	chip	in	your	selected	color	from	urn	U10?	Yes/No	
	
Task	4	In	 this	 last	 task,	 an	 urn	 is	 filled	 with	 10	 balls:	 5	 yellow	balls	 and	 5	
green	 balls.	Please	 indicate	 for	 each	 row	 if	 you	 prefer	 receiving	 the	certain	amount	of	money	at	 that	 row,	or	you	choose	 to	draw	a	ball.	 If	one	 of	 your	 choices	 from	 task	 4	 gets	 selected	 to	 determine	 your	earnings,	 you	 may	 either	 draw	 a	 ball	 if	 you	 chose	 Option	 B	 or	 you	receive	the	sure	amount	if	you	chose	Option	A.	If	you	choose	to	draw	a	ball,	you	may	randomly	select	a	marble	from	a	bowl	filled	with	exactly	5	yellow	 and	 5	 green	 marbles,	 and	 the	 color	 of	 the	 selected	 ball	 will	determine	 your	 earnings.	 If	 the	 color	 of	 the	marble	 is	 similar	 to	 your	selected	 color	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 experiment,	 you	 win	 €15,	 else	nothing.	 You	 will	 be	 asked	 to	 enter	 your	 decision	 at	 the	 computer	screen.	
	 Option	A	 	 	 	 	 	 Option	B	1	 O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	€	0.75	 	 O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	2	 O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	€	1.50		 	 O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	3	 O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	€	2.25		 	 O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	4	 O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	€	3.00		 	 O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	5	 O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	€	3.75		 	 O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	6	 O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	€	4.50		 	 O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	7	 O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	€	5.25		 	 O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	8	 O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	€	6.00		 	 O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	9	 O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	€	6.75		 	 O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	10	 O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	€	7.50		 	 O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	11	 O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	€	8.25		 	 O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	12	 O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	€	9.00		 	 O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	13	 O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	€	9.75		 	 O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	14	 O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	€	10.50		 	 O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	15	 O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	€	11.25		 	 O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	16	 O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	€	12.00		 	 O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	17	 O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	€	12.75		 	 O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	18	 O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	€	13.50		 	 O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	19	 O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	€	14.25		 	 O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	20	 O	I	choose	the	certain	amount	of	€	15.00	 	 O	I	choose	to	draw	a	ball	
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Section	3	
	
Questionnaire	
	
Part	1	1. Suppose	you	had	€100	in	a	savings	account	and	the	interest	rate	was	 2%	 per	 year.	 After	 5	 years	 how	 much	 do	 you	 think	 you	would	have	in	the	account	if	you	left	the	money	to	grow?		2. Imagine	 that	 the	 interest	 rate	on	your	savings	account	was	1%	per	year	and	the	inflation	was	2%	per	year.	After	1	year,	would	you	 be	 able	 to	 buy	 more	 than,	 exactly	 the	 same,	 or	 less	 than	today	with	the	money	in	this	account?	3. Please	 tell	 us	whether	 this	 statement	 is	 true	 or	 false.	 Buying	 a	single	 company	 stock	 usually	 provides	 a	 safer	 return	 than	 a	stock	mutual	fund.	4. Are	you	familiar	with	the	‘Dienst	Uitvoerbaar	Onderwijs’	(DUO)	(Dutch	agency	responsible	for	student	loans)?	5. Are	you	aware	of	the	possibility	to	obtain	a	loan	from	DUO?	6. If	yes:	do	you	borrow	from	DUO	(excluding	allowance	for	public	transport	and	student	finance)?	7. If	yes:	how	much	do	you	borrow	per	month	from	DUO?	8. Do	you	sometimes	(not	on	a	monthly	basis)	borrow	an	amount	(more	than	€50)	 for	one	these	reasons:	 to	save,	 for	clothing,	 to	buy	 certain	 products,	 for	 travelling,	 other	 activities;	 I	 do	 not	borrow.	9. Do	you	 (also)	borrow	money	 from	other	 sources	 (bank,	 family,	friends	etc.)?	10. What	 is	 your	 total	 monthly	 income	 (including	 salary,	 student	allowance,	 parents)?	 Note:	 this	 is	 anything	 but	 EXCEPT	 your	potential	LOAN.	11. How	much	do	you	save	each	month?	12. After	 obtaining	 your	 degree,	 what	 amount	 of	 student	 debt	 do	you	think	you	will	have?	13. What	are	your	living	expenses?	14. A	bat	and	a	ball	cost	$1.10	 in	total.	The	bat	costs	$1	more	than	the	ball	costs.	How	much	does	the	ball	cost?	
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15. If	 it	 takes	 5	machines	 5	minutes	 to	make	 5	widgets,	 how	 long	would	it	take	100	machines	to	make	100	widgets?	16. 	In	 a	 lake,	 there	 is	 a	 patch	 of	 lily	 pads.	 Every	 day,	 the	 patch	doubles	 in	 size.	 If	 it	 takes	 48	 days	 for	 the	 patch	 to	 cover	 the	entire	 lake,	 long	would	it	 take	for	the	patch	to	cover	half	of	 the	lake?		
Part	2	1. What	is	your	age?	2. What	is	your	gender?	3. Were	you	born	in	the	Netherlands?	4. If	not,	where	were	you	born?	5. What	is	your	nationality?	6. What	is	your	mother	tongue?	7. How	many	brothers	do	you	have?	8. How	many	sisters	do	you	have?	9. What	is	your	rank	amongst	your	siblings?	10. Which	topic	do	you	study?	11. For	how	many	years	have	you	been	studying	now?	12. Do	you	live	with	your	parents,	or	by	yourself?		
Part	3	1. In	uncertain	times,	I	usually	expect	the	best.	2. It’s	easy	for	me	to	relax.	3. If	something	can	go	wrong	for	me,	it	will.	4. I	always	look	on	the	bright	side	of	things.	5. I’m	always	optimistic	about	my	future.	6. I	enjoy	my	friends	a	lot.	7. It’s	important	for	me	to	keep	busy.	8. I	hardly	ever	expect	things	to	go	my	way.	9. Things	never	work	out	the	way	I	want	them	to.	10. I	don’t	get	upset	too	easily.	11. I’m	a	believer	in	the	idea	that	‘every	cloud	has	a	silver	lining’.	12. I	rarely	count	on	good	things	happening	to	me.				
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4)	
Appendix	–	The	uncertain	adolescent		
These	experimental	 instructions	are	in	Dutch.	On	request	English	
version	can	be	obtained.		
Inleiding		Welkom	 bij	 ons	 experiment.	 Het	 totale	 experiment	 bevat	 vijf	verschillende	 onderdelen.	 In	 3	 onderdelen	 ga	 je	 keuzes	maken	 en	 de	laatste	2	onderdelen	zijn	vragenlijsten.	Per	onderdeel	volgt	een	aparte	uitleg.	Als	je	vragen	hebt	of	als	er	iets	onduidelijk	is,	steek	dan	je	hand	op	en	dan	komen	we	langs	om	je	te	helpen.			Voordat	we	beginnen	met	de	eerste	taak	van	dit	experiment	zullen	we	eerst	 wat	 organisatorische	 regels	 uitleggen.	 Praat	 vanaf	 nu	 asjeblieft	niet	meer	met	je	buurman	of	buurvrouw.	Je	kunt	geld	verdienen	met	dit	experiment,	 dus	 luister	 aandachtig	 zodat	 de	 spelregels	 duidelijk	worden.	 Voor	 je	 medewerking	 in	 dit	 experiment	 ontvang	 je	 een	deelname-bedrag	 van	 €3.	 Naast	 dit	 deelname-bedrag	 kun	 je	 nog	 een	bonus	winnen.	De	hoogte	van	deze	bonus	hangt	af	van	de	keuzes	die	je	in	de	3	keuzeonderdelen	van	dit	experiment	maakt.	Het	geld	dat	je	wint	wordt	 na	 jullie	 laatste	 lesuur	 in	 contante	 uitbetaald.	 Tijdens	 de	 uitleg	zullen	we	herhaaldelijk	even	stoppen	om	jullie	de	gelegenheid	te	geven	om	 vragen	 te	 stellen.	 Mocht	 je	 een	 vraag	 hebben,	 of	 iets	 onduidelijk	vinden,	steek	dan	gerust	je	hand	op.		Vanochtend	hebben	wij	willekeurig	een	van	de	3	keuzeonderdelen	van	dit	experiment	geselecteerd.	In	die	specifieke	taak	is	vervolgens	1	keuze	willekeurig	geselecteerd.	Deze	keuze	zal	voor	alle	leerlingen	gelden	en	wordt	aan	het	einde	van	deze	schooldag	uitgespeeld.	De	beslissing	die	jijzelf	 maakt	 voor	 de	 geselecteerde	 keuze	 bepaalt	 de	 hoogte	 van	 je	bonus.	 In	 de	 afzonderlijke	 taken	 die	 we	 met	 jullie	 gaan	 doornemen,	staat	 precies	 uitgelegd	 hoe	 en	wat	 de	 hoogte	 is	 van	 de	 bonus	 (in	 het	geval	een	keuze	uit	die	taak	de	bonus	zal	bepalen).	Alles	duidelijk	tot	nu	doe?	(tijd	om	vragen	te	beantwoorden)	
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Taak	1		Deel	1	Taak	1	van	dit	experiment	bestaat	uit	twee	delen.	 In	totaal	moet	 je	40	beslissingen	maken,	20	in	het	eerste	deel	en	20	in	het	tweede	deel.	We	zullen	 nu	 eerst	 het	 eerste	 deel	 uitleggen.	 In	 dit	 deel	moet	 je	 20	 keer	kiezen	 tussen	 het	 ontvangen	 van	 een	 zekere	 uitkomst	 óf	 het	 trekken	van	een	pingpongbal	uit	zak	A.	Bij	het	trekken	van	een	pingpongbal	uit	deze	zak	A	kun	je	€	5	winnen	of	niets.	Slechts	één	van	deze	beslissingen	is	 relevant	 voor	 het	 eventueel	 ontvangen	 van	 een	 bonus.	 Welke	beslissing	dit	is	zullen	we	uitleggen	aan	het	einde	van	de	instructie	van	deel	1.	We	leggen	nu	uit	hoe	het	trekken	van	de	pingpongbal	uit	zak	A	in	zijn	werk	 gaat.	 Als	 eerste	wordt	 deze	 zak	 gevuld	met	 10	witte	 en	 10	oranje	 pingpongballen.	 (vul	de	zak	waarbij	de	pingpongballen	expliciet	
geteld	worden).	Als	je	in	de	relevante	beslissing	ervoor	gekozen	hebt	om	een	bal	te	trekken	uit	zak	A	pak	je	blindelings	een	pingpongbal	uit	deze	zak.	 Voordat	 je	 een	 pingpongbal	 pakt	 mag	 je	 zelf	 een	 kleur	 kiezen	(bijvoorbeeld	de	kleur	oranje).	Als	de	getrokken	bal	overeenkomt	met	jouw	gekozen	kleur	ontvang	je	€	5.	Als	de	kleur	van	de	pingpongbal	niet	overeenkomt	met	jouw	geselecteerde	kleur,	dan	ontvang	je	niets.	Je	ontvangt	een	keuzeformulier	dat	eruit	ziet	als	de	slide	op	de	beamer.	
(Zet	beamer	aan	en	wijs	erna).	Wanneer	 je	het	 spel	 speelt	 zullen	we	 je	vragen	om	bij	iedere	regel	een	keuze	te	maken	tussen	het	trekken	van	een	 pingpongbal	 uit	 zak	 A	 (wijs	naar	links)	 of	 het	 ontvangen	 van	 een	gegarandeerd	 bedrag	 (wijs	naar	rechts).	 Dit	 ziet	 er	 als	 volgt	 uit:	 in	 de	eerste	regel	kies	je	of	je	liever	een	pingpongbal	uit	zak	A	wilt	trekken	en	kans	maakt	om	€	5	te	winnen	of	dat	je	liever	het	gegarandeerde	bedrag	van	€	0.25	wilt	ontvangen.	Stel	dat	je	liever	een	pingpongbal	uit	zak	A	wilt	 trekken	dan	het	gegarandeerde	bedrag	wilt	ontvangen,	welke	van	de	twee	rondjes	moet	 je	dan	aankruisen?	Juist,	dan	kruis	 je	het	rondje	aan	de	linker	kant	aan.		In	 de	 tweede	 rij	 moet	 je	 weer	 kiezen	 tussen	 het	 trekken	 van	 een	pingpongbal	uit	zak	A	of	het	ontvangen	van	een	zeker	bedrag.	Nu	kun	je	er	echter	voor	kiezen	om	€	0.50	als	gegarandeerd	bedrag	te	ontvangen.	Zoals	je	kunt	zien	neem	het	bedrag	dat	aan	de	rechter	zijde	staat	steeds	toe.	Zo	lang	je	liever	een	pingpongbal	trekt	uit	zak	A	dan	dat	je	dit	vaste	bedrag	wilt	ontvangen	kruis	je	het	rondje	aan	de	linker	kant	aan.		
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Nu	leggen	we	uit	hoe	de	uitbetaling	in	zijn	werk	gaat.	Als	deel	1	van	taak	1	was	geselecteerd	als	de	taak	die	de	individuele	bonus	zal	bepalen,	was	vervolgens	een	van	de	20	rijen	willekeurig	geselecteerd.	Vervolgens	zal	deze	 geselecteerde	 rij	 voor	 alle	 leerlingen	 de	 hoogte	 van	 de	 bonus	bepalen.	De	keuze	die	ieder	apart	in	deze	rij	heeft	gemaakt,	bepaalt	de	exacte	 hoogte	 van	 de	 bonus.	 Bijvoorbeeld,	 stel	 dat	 rij	 nummer	 10	willekeurig	is	geselecteerd	(wijs	aan	op	beamer),	dan	mag	je	eerst	een	kleur	 selecteren	 en	 vervolgens	 een	 pingpongbal	 uit	 zak	 A	 trekken	wanneer	jijzelf	het	linker	bolletje	had	gevinkt.	Je	wint	dan	dus	€	5	als	de	pingpongbal	 overeenkomt	 met	 jouw	 geselecteerde	 keuze,	 en	 niets	wanneer	dit	niet	het	geval	is.	Als	je	voor	rij	10	het	rechter	bolletje	had	aangevinkt,	dan	ontvang	je	€	2.50.		Maak	nu	je	keuzes	in	keuzeformulier	1.A.		Keuzeformulier	1.A		[1]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	A			Ο		 	 of		 Ο			0.25	euro	zeker	weten	[2]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	A			Ο		 	 of		 Ο			0.50	euro	zeker	weten	[3]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	A			Ο		 	 of		 Ο			0.75	euro	zeker	weten	[4]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	A			Ο		 	 of		 Ο			1	euro	zeker	weten	[5]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	A			Ο		 	 of		 Ο			1.25	euro	zeker	weten	[6]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	A			Ο		 	 of		 Ο			1.50	euro	zeker	weten	[7]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	A			Ο		 	 of		 Ο			1.75	euro	zeker	weten	[8]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	A			Ο		 	 of		 Ο			2	euro	zeker	weten	[9]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	A			Ο		 	 of		 Ο			2.25	euro	zeker	weten	[10]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	A	Ο		 	 of		 Ο			2.50	euro	zeker	weten	[11]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	A	Ο		 	 of		 Ο			2.75	euro	zeker	weten	[12]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	A	Ο		 	 of		 Ο			3	euro	zeker	weten	[13]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	A	Ο		 	 of		 Ο			3.25	euro	zeker	weten	[14]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	A	Ο		 	 of		 Ο			3.50	euro	zeker	weten	[15]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	A	Ο		 	 of		 Ο			3.75	euro	zeker	weten	[16]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	A	Ο		 	 of		 Ο			4	euro	zeker	weten	[17]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	A	Ο		 	 of		 Ο			4.25	euro	zeker	weten	[18]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	A	Ο		 	 of		 Ο			4.50	euro	zeker	weten	[19]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	A	Ο		 	 of		 Ο			4.75	euro	zeker	weten	[20]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	A	Ο		 	 of		 Ο			5	euro	zeker	weten			
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Deel	2	Nu	leggen	we	het	tweede	gedeelte	van	taak	1	uit.	Het	tweede	gedeelte	is	vergelijkbaar	met	 het	 eerste	 gedeelte.	 Het	 enige	 verschil	 is	 dat	 zak	 A	wordt	vervangen	door	zak	B.	Nu	moet	je	kiezen	tussen	het	trekken	van	een	pingpongbal	uit	 zak	B	en	misschien	€	5	winnen	of	het	ontvangen	van	een	gegarandeerd	bedrag.		Het	trekken	van	een	bal	uit	zak	B	werkt	als	volgt:	deze	zak	bevat	ook	20	pingpongballen.	Deze	pingpongballen	zijn	wit	of	oranje,	maar	deze	keer	vertellen	 we	 je	 niet	 wat	 het	 exacte	 aantal	 witte	 en	 oranje	pingpongballen	in	zak	B	zijn.	In	totaal	zijn	er	20	pingpongballen	in	zak	B.	Als	je	ervoor	kiest	om	een	pingpongbal	uit	zak	B	te	trekken,	dan	mag	je	 blindelings	 een	 pingpongbal	 uit	 zak	 B	 graaien.	 Voordat	 je	 deze	pingpongbal	trekt,	mag	je	eerst	een	kleur	kiezen.	Als	de	pingpongbal	die	jij	 zelf	 uit	 zak	 B	 trekt	 overeenkomt	 met	 jouw	 gekozen	 kleur,	 dan	ontvang	je	€	5.	Als	de	kleur	van	de	pingpongbal	niet	overeenkomt	met	jouw	gekozen	kleur,	dan	ontvang	je	niets.	Je	ontvangt	een	keuzeformulier	dat	overeenkomt	met	het	voorbeeld	op	de	slide	op	de	beamer.	(Zet	beamer	aan	en	wijs	erna).	We	vragen	je	om	ook	 bij	 dit	 formulier	 een	 keuze	 te	maken	 voor	 iedere	 rij.	 Nu	moet	 je	ervoor	kiezen	om	een	pingpongbal	uit	zak	B	te	trekken	(wijs	naar	links)	of	een	zeker	bedrag	te	ontvangen	(wijs	naar	rechts).	Dit	ziet	er	als	volgt	uit:	in	de	eerste	regel	kies	je	of	je	liever	een	pingpongbal	uit	zak	B	wilt	trekken	en	kans	maakt	om	€	5	te	winnen	of	dat	 je	 liever	€	0.25	zeker	weten	ontvangt.	 Stel	dat	 je	 liever	een	pingpongbal	uit	 zak	B	 trekt	dan	dat	 je	het	gegarandeerde	bedrag	ontvangt,	welke	van	de	 twee	rondjes	moet	je	dan	aankruisen?	Juist,	dan	kruis	je	het	rondje	aan	de	linkerkant	aan.		In	 de	 tweede	 rij	 moet	 je	 weer	 kiezen	 tussen	 het	 trekken	 van	 een	pingpongbal	uit	zak	B	of	een	gegarandeerd	bedrag.	Nu	kun	je	er	echter	voor	kiezen	om	€	0.50	gegarandeerd	 te	 ontvangen.	 Zoals	 je	 kunt	 zien	neem	 het	 bedrag	 dat	 aan	 de	 rechter	 zijde	 staat	 steeds	 toe.	 Zo	 lang	 je	liever	 een	 pingpongbal	 uit	 zak	 B	 wilt	 trekken	 dan	 dat	 je	 het	 vaste	bedrag	wilt	ontvangen,	kruis	je	het	rondje	aan	de	linker	kant	aan.		Nu	leggen	we	uit	hoe	de	uitbetaling	in	zijn	werk	gaat.	Als	deel	2	van	taak	1	was	geselecteerd	als	de	taak	die	de	individuele	bonus	zal	bepalen,	 is	vervolgens	een	van	de	20	rijen	willekeurig	geselecteerd.	Vervolgens	zal	deze	 geselecteerde	 rij	 voor	 alle	 leerlingen	 de	 hoogte	 van	 de	 bonus	
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bepalen.	De	keuze	die	ieder	apart	heeft	gemaakt	in	deze	geselecteerde	rij,	 bepaalt	 de	 exacte	 hoogte	 van	 de	 bonus.	 Bijvoorbeeld,	 stel	 dat	 rij	nummer	15	willekeurig	is	geselecteerd	(wijs	aan	op	beamer),	dan	mag	je	 eerst	 een	kleur	 selecteren	en	vervolgens	een	pingpongbal	uit	 zak	B	trekken	wanneer	jijzelf	het	linker	bolletje	had	gevinkt.	Je	wint	dan	dus	€	5	 als	 de	 pingpongbal	 overeenkomt	met	 jouw	 geselecteerde	 keuze,	 en	niets	wanneer	dit	niet	het	geval	is.	Als	je	voor	rij	15	het	rechter	bolletje	had	aangevinkt,	dan	ontvang	je	€	3.75.		Keuzeformulier	1.B		[1]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	B		Ο		 of		 Ο			0.25	euro	zeker	weten	[2]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	B			Ο		 of		 Ο			0.50	euro	zeker	weten	[3]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	B			Ο		 of		 Ο			0.75	euro	zeker	weten	[4]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	B			Ο		 of		 Ο			1	euro	zeker	weten	[5]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	B			Ο		 of		 Ο			1.25	euro	zeker	weten	[6]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	B			Ο		 of		 Ο			1.50	euro	zeker	weten	[7]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	B			Ο		 of		 Ο			1.75	euro	zeker	weten	[8]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	B			Ο		 of		 Ο			2	euro	zeker	weten	[9]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	B			Ο		 of		 Ο			2.25	euro	zeker	weten	[10]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	B	Ο		 of		 Ο			2.50	euro	zeker	weten	[11]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	B	Ο		 of		 Ο			2.75	euro	zeker	weten	[12]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	B	Ο		 of		 Ο			3	euro	zeker	weten	[13]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	B	Ο		 of		 Ο			3.25	euro	zeker	weten	[14]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	B	Ο		 of		 Ο			3.50	euro	zeker	weten	[15]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	B	Ο		 of		 Ο			3.75	euro	zeker	weten	[16]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	B	Ο		 of		 Ο			4	euro	zeker	weten	[17]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	B	Ο		 of		 Ο			4.25	euro	zeker	weten	[18]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	B	Ο		 of		 Ο			4.50	euro	zeker	weten	[19]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	B	Ο		 of		 Ο			4.75	euro	zeker	weten	[20]	trek	een	bal	uit	zak	B	Ο		 of		 Ο			5	euro	zeker	weten		Zak	B	Wanneer	 een	 van	 de	 rijen	 uit	 deel	 2	 wordt	 geselecteerd	 en	 je	 hebt	aangegeven	dat	 je	voor	die	rij	een	pingpongbal	uit	zak	B	wilt	 trekken,	mag	 je	 zelf	 de	 kleur	 kiezen	 –	 wit	 of	 oranje	 –	 die	 zal	 bepalen	 of	 de	getrokken	pingpongbal	tot	een	bonus	leidt.			
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Graag	willen	we	nu	van	 jou	weten	wat	 je	denkt	dat	de	compositie	van	Zak	B	is?	Hoeveel	pingpongballen	zijn	er	in	jouw	gekozen	kleur?			……	pingpongballen	in	mijn	gekozen	kleur.		
Taak	2		Taak	 2	 van	 dit	 experiment	 bestaat	 uit	 5	 verschillende	 loterijkeuzes	waarbij	je	elke	keer	een	keuze	dient	te	maken	tussen	Optie	A	en	Optie	B.	Elke	keuze	wordt	grafisch	op	dezelfde	manier	weergegeven.	Laten	we	keuze	1	als	voorbeeld	samen	doorlopen	(wijs	aan	op	beamer).			Optie	A	in	keuze	1	beschrijft	een	rode	dobbelsteen	waarbij	je	€	3	kunt	ontvangen	als	een	van	de	nummers	1,	2	of	3	worden	gerold.	Worden	de	overige	 cijfers	 4,	 5	 of	 6	 gerold,	 dan	 dient	 er	 een	 zwarte	 dobbelsteen	gerold	 te	 worden.	 Je	 ontvangt	 €	 1	 wanneer	 de	 zwarte	 dobbelsteen	vervolgens	de	nummers	1,	2	of	3	rolt	en	verliest	€	1	wanneer	4,	5	of	6	wordt	gerold.	Bij	Optie	B	daarentegen	zul	je	€	4.50	ontvangen	wanneer	een	van	de	nummers	1,	2	of	3	worden	gerold,	 en	zal	er	wederom	een	zwarte	dobbelsteen	aan	te	pas	komen	wanneer	bij	de	rode	dobbelsteen	4,	5	of	6	wordt	gerold.	 	Je	ontvangt	vervolgens	€	1	wanneer	de	zwarte	dobbelsteen	 vervolgens	 de	 nummers	 1,	 2	 of	 3	 rolt	 en	 verliest	 €	 1	wanneer	4,	5	of	6	wordt	gerold.		Bij	de	overige	4	loterijen	gaat	het	om	andere	cijfers,	maar	de	afbeelding	van	de	dobbelstenen	en	de	implicaties	daarvan	zijn	identiek.			Geef	 je	keuze	aan	door	het	rondje	bij	Optie	A	of	het	rondje	bij	Optie	B	aan	te	kruisen.			Nu	 leggen	we	uit	 hoe	de	 uitbetaling	 in	 zijn	werk	 gaat.	 Als	 taak	2	was	geselecteerd	 als	 de	 taak	 die	 de	 individuele	 bonus	 zal	 bepalen,	 is	vervolgens	een	van	de	5	 loterijen	willekeurig	geselecteerd.	Stel	nu	dat	loterij	 3	 willekeurig	 geselecteerd	 is,	 dan	 zullen	 we	 ofwel	 de	 loterij	behorende	bij	Optie	A	uitspelen	als	je	daarvoor	gaat	kiezen,	danwel	de	loterij	 van	Optie	 B	 uitspelen	 als	 je	 daarvoor	 gaat	 kiezen.	Dit	 doen	we	
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daadwerkelijk	aan	de	hand	van	een	rode	en	zwarte	dobbelsteen	die	 je	zelf	mag	rollen.			Alles	duidelijk?	(tijd	om	vragen	te	beantwoorden)		Keuzeformulier	2		
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Taak	3		Taak	 3	 van	 dit	 experiment	 bestaat	 uit	 6	 verschillende	 loterijkeuzes	waarbij	 je	 elke	 keer	 een	 keuze	 dient	 te	 maken	 tussen	 Ja	 en	 Nee.	 ‘Ja’	betekent	dat	 je	de	 loterij	wilt	spelen	en	 ’nee’	houdt	 in	dat	 je	de	 loterij	niet	 wilt	 spelen.	 In	 dat	 geval	 ontvang	 je	 niets.	 Elke	 keuze	 wordt	hieronder	 op	 dezelfde	 manier	 weergegeven.	 Laten	 we	 keuze	 1	 als	voorbeeld	samen	doorlopen.		De	 loterij	bestaat	uit	een	50%	kans	om	€	2.25	 te	winnen	en	een	50%	kans	om	€	0.25	te	verliezen.	Als	je	deze	loterij	graag	zou	willen	spelen,	dan	kruis	 je	het	bolletje	bij	 ‘ja’	aan.	Als	 je	deze	 loterij	niet	wilt	spelen,	dan	kruis	 je	 ‘nee’	 aan.	Bij	 een	keuze	van	 ‘nee’	 is	altijd	het	geval	dat	 je	niets	ontvangt.		Bij	de	overige	6	loterijen	gaat	het	om	andere	cijfers,	maar	de	strekking	van	de	loterijen	is	hetzelfde.			Nu	 leggen	we	uit	 hoe	de	 uitbetaling	 in	 zijn	werk	 gaat.	 Als	 taak	3	was	geselecteerd	 als	 de	 taak	 die	 de	 individuele	 bonus	 zal	 bepalen,	 is	vervolgens	een	van	de	6	 loterijen	willekeurig	geselecteerd.	Stel	nu	dat	
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loterij	 5	 willekeurig	 geselecteerd	 is,	 dan	 zullen	 we	 ofwel	 de	 loterij	uitspelen	als	 je	voor	 ‘	 ja’	zou	kiezen,	of	er	gebeurt	niets	 in	het	geval	 je	voor	 ‘nee’	gaat	kiezen.	De	loterij	wordt	uitgespeeld	met	een	muntstuk.	Je	mag	hierbij	 zelf	 aangeven	of	 je	kop	of	munt	wilt	 verbinden	aan	het	winnende	getal.			Keuzeformulier	3		[1]	Zou	je	de	volgende	loterij	willen	spelen:	-	50%	kans:	+	€	2.25		-	50%	kans:	-	€	0.25	Ja			Ο		 	 of		 	 Ο			Nee	(€	0)		[2]	Zou	je	de	volgende	loterij	willen	spelen:	-	50%	kans:	+	€	2.25	-	50%	kans:	-	€	0.75	Ja			Ο		 	 of		 	 Ο			Nee	(€	0)		[3]	Zou	je	de	volgende	loterij	willen	spelen:	-	50%	kans:	+	€	2.25	-	50%	kans:	-	€	1.25	Ja			Ο		 	 of		 	 Ο			Nee	(€	0)		[4]	Zou	je	de	volgende	loterij	willen	spelen:	-	50%	kans:	+	€	2.25	-	50%	kans:	-	€	1.75	Ja			Ο		 	 of		 	 Ο			Nee	(€	0)		[5]	Zou	je	de	volgende	loterij	willen	spelen:	-	50%	kans:	+	€	2.25	-	50%	kans:	-	€	2.25	Ja			Ο		 	 of		 	 Ο			Nee	(€	0)		[6]	Zou	je	de	volgende	loterij	willen	spelen:	-	50%	kans:	+	€	2.25	-	50%	kans:	-	€	2.75	Ja			Ο		 	 of		 	 Ο			Nee	(€	0)	
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Taak	4	
	In	 de	 vierde	 taak	 van	 dit	 experiment	 zul	 je	 enkele	 vragen	 moeten	beantwoorden.	Probeer	het	goede	antwoord	te	geven.	Je	hebt	maximaal	5	minuten	de	tijd.		Keuzeformulier	4		Een	 honkbalknuppel	 en	 een	 bal	 kosten	 bij	 elkaar	 €1.10.	 De	 knuppel	kost	€1.00	meer	dan	de	bal.	Hoeveel	kost	de	bal?																		Cent		Als	5	machines	er	5	minuten	over	te	doen	om	5	onderdelen	te	maken,	hoe	 lang	 hebben	 100	 machines	 dan	 nodig	 om	 100	 onderdelen	 te	maken?																Minuten		In	een	meer	drijft	een	groep	leliebladeren	rond.	Iedere	dag	wordt	deze	groep	twee	keer	zo	groot.	Als	de	bladeren	er	48	dagen	over	doen	om	het	gehele	meer	te	beslaan,	hoe	lang	duurt	het	dan	voordat	de	helft	van	het	meer	is	bedekt?																																					
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Nederlandse	samenvatting	
(Dutch	summary)		In	 ons	 dagelijks	 leven	 worden	 we	 geconfronteerd	 met	 vele	keuzes	 waarvan	 we	 niet	 precies	 weten	 wat	 de	 uitkomst	 zal	 zijn.	Economen	maken	 onderscheid	 tussen	 twee	 typen	 onzekerheid:	 risico	en	ambiguïteit.	We	spreken	van	risico	als	we	weten	met	hoeveel	kans	een	 bepaalde	 uitkomst	 zal	 plaatsvinden.	 Een	 welbekende	 situatie	 dat	wordt	gekenmerkt	door	risico	is	bijvoorbeeld	het	weer.	Je	staat	op	het	punt	om	te	gaan	 fietsen	en	kijkt	nog	even	op	 je	weer	applicatie	om	te	verifiëren	dat	de	komende	uren	de	kans	op	regen	laag	is,	bijvoorbeeld	maar	10	procent.	Een	ander	bekend	voorbeeld	van	risico	is	het	gooien	van	 een	 muntstuk	 waarvan	 je	 evenveel	 kans	 hebt	 op	 kop	 of	 munt.	Echter,	 vele	keuzes	waarmee	we	worden	geconfronteerd,	kunnen	niet	in	precieze	kansen	uitgedrukt	worden.	Je	weet	niet	wat	de	kans	is	dat	je	vandaag	op	de	racefiets	ten	val	zal	komen.	 Je	weet	niet	wat	de	kans	 is	dat	je	favoriete	sportteam	hun	aankomende	wedstrijd	zal	winnen.	Aan	deze	 situaties	 kunnen	 we	 geen	 objectieve	 kansen	 toeschrijven,	 maar	maken	we	gebruik	van	onze	verwachtingen,	ook	wel	subjectieve	kansen	genoemd.	 Standaard	 economische	 modellen	 (zie	 BOX	 2	 in	 de	introductie)	veronderstellen	dat	mensen	geen	voorkeur	hebben	tussen	risico	 en	 onzekerheid	wanneer	 de	 objectieve	 kans	 in	 lijn	 ligt	met	 een	subjectieve	kans.	Bijvoorbeeld,	je	verwacht	dat	Dafne	Schippers	met	50	procent	kans	tijdens	de	Olympische	Spelen	volgend	jaar	in	Rio	de	100m	zal	winnen.	Je	weet	dit	uiteraard	niet	zeker	en	daarom	spreken	we	ook	wel	van	een	subjectieve	kans.	Nu	leg	ik	je	het	volgende	kansspel	voor:	je	wint	10	Euro	als	Dafne	Schippers	inderdaad	goud	wint	(een	subjectieve	kans	die	je	met	50%	waarschijnlijk	acht),	of	je	gooit	liever	een	muntstuk	en	wint	10	Euro	als	je	kop	gooit	(een	objectieve	kans	van	50%).	Volgens	rationele	 economische	 theorie	 zou	 je	 onverschillig	 zijn	 tussen	 een	weddenschap	 op	 voorgaande	 scenarios.	 In	 een	 zeer	 influentieel	experiment	 (zie	 BOX	 1	 in	 de	 introductie)	 liet	 Daniel	 Ellsberg	 (1961)	zien	dat	mensen	wel	degelijk	schuwen	voor	ambiguïteit,	dat	wil	zeggen	dat	 ze	 eerder	 geneigd	 zijn	 om	 keuzes	 te	 maken	 in	 situaties	 die	uitgedrukt	 kunnen	 worden	 in	 objectieve	 kansen	 dan	 in	 onzekere	
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situaties	 waarvan	 individuele	 verwachtingen	 de	 leidraad	 zijn.	 Dit	gedragspatroon	wordt	omschreven	als	ambiguïteit	aversie.			 In	dit	proefschrift	heb	ik	mezelf	twee	onderzoeksvragen	gesteld	die	voortbouwen	op	de	inzichten	die	ik	hierboven	heb	beschreven.	Ten	eerste	heeft	het	experimentele	gedragsonderzoek	ten	aanzien	van	risico	en	ambiguïteit	 zich	voornamelijk	 gericht	op	 loterij	 keuzes.	Het	 gooien	van	 een	 muntstuk	 of	 rollen	 van	 een	 dobbelsteen	 zijn	 voorbeelden	daarvan.	 Vele	 van	 onze	 keuzes	 en	 de	 onzerkerheid	 waarmee	gerelateerde	 uitkomsten	 plaatsvinden,	 worden	 juist	 veroorzaakt	 door	het	handelen	van	een	andere	persoon.	Bijvoorbeeld,	je	leent	geld	aan	je	beste	 vriend,	 je	 investeert	 geld	 in	 een	 entrepreneur	 zodat	 deze	 een	bedrijf	 kan	 starten,	 of	 je	 boekt	 een	 kamer	 bij	 een	 wildvreemde	 via	airbnb.	 In	al	deze	 situaties	 is	de	bron	van	de	onzekerheid	gerelateerd	aan	 de	 acties	 van	 een	 andere	 persoon.	 Deze	 sociale	 context	 is	vooralsnog	 nauwelijks	 aan	 bod	 gekomen	 bij	 economische	 onderzoek	naar	 individuele	 voorkeuren	 voor	 risico	 en	 ambiguïteit.	 Ik	 heb	onderzocht	 of	 ambiguïteit	 aversie	 beïnvloed	wordt	wanneer	 risico	 en	onderzekerheid	tot	stand	komen	door	een	loterij	(niet-sociale	context)	danwel	 door	 het	 handelen	 van	 een	 andere	 persoon	 (sociale	 context).	Ten	 tweede	 heb	 ik	 onderzocht	 hoe	 gedragsresultaten	 uit	 het	laboratorium	 een	 accurate	 voorspeller	 kunnen	 zijn	 van	 keuzes	 die	mensen	 daadwerkelijk	 maken	 in	 hun	 dagelijks	 leven.	 Oftewel,	 als	 ik	tijdens	 mijn	 gedragsexperimenten	 kan	 identificeren	 welke	 personen	(het	 meest)	 schuwen	 voor	 ambiguïteit	 aversie,	 laten	 deze	 zelfde	individuen	 deze	 aversie	 ook	 zien	 in	 hun	 dagelijkse	 handelen?	 Er	 is	onderzoek	 verricht	 naar	 de	 externe	 validiteit	 van	 risico	 preferenties,	maar	ambiguïteit	aversie	wordt	vaak	niet	 in	ogenschouw	genomen	bij	dergelijke	veldstudies.	In	mijn	onderzoek	heb	ik	onder	andere	bekeken	of	 risico	 én	 ambiguïteit	 aversie	 van	 studenten	 correleren	 met	 hun	leengedrag.	 Ook	 heb	 ik	 bekeken	 of	 risico	 en	 ambiguïteit	 aversie	 van	jongvolwassenen,	 die	 ik	 testte	 op	 hun	 middelbare	 school,	 een	voorspeller	 zijn	 van	 hun	 zelfvertrouwen	 in	 de	 omgang	 met	 hun	klasgenoten.			 Een	 divers	 pallet	 aan	 onderzoekstechnieken	 komen	 in	 dit	proesfschrift	 aan	 bod.	 Dat	 is	 deels	 ingegeven	 omdat	 ik	 ten	 doel	 had	
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gesteld	om	te	achterhalen	waarom	mensen	gevoelig	zouden	zijn	voor	de	context	waarin	risico	en	ambiguïteit	tot	stand	komt	en	wat	de	implicatie	daarvan	is	op	hun	handelen	in	het	dagelijks	leven.	Daartoe	heb	ik	in	dit	proefschrift	 gebruik	 gemaakt	 van	 een	 mix	 aan	 gedragsexperimenten,	fMRI	experimenten	(zie	BOX	3	in	de	introductie)	en	veldexperimenten.	De	inzet	van	fMRI	experimenten	in	economie	is	een	relatief	jong	veld	en	beoogt	om	kennis	van	het	brein	te	relateren	aan	gedrag.			 De	 resultaten	 van	 mijn	 proefschrift	 laten	 zien	 dat	 ambiguïteit	aversie	 in	 een	 sociale	 context	 sterker	 is	 vergeleken	 met	 een	 loterij	context.	Kort	door	de	bocht	gezegd,	het	is	erger	wanneer	je	geld	verliest	aan	 de	 roulettetafel,	 dan	 wanneer	 je	 zakenpartner	 er	 met	 jouw	investering	 vandoor	 gaat.	 Er	 zijn	wel	 grote	 individuele	 verschillen	 en	die	 worden	 met	 name	 veroorzaakt	 door	 verschillen	 in	 individuele	verwachtingen.	 De	 invloed	 van	 deze	 context	 is	 ook	 in	 het	 brein	 te	achterhalen	 en	 deze	 resultaten	 geven	 ons	 meer	 inzicht	 in	 de	onderliggende	processen	van	menselijk	handelen	ten	aanzien	van	risico	en	ambiguïteit.	Zo	 leiden	 individuele	verschillen	 in	sociale	ambiguïteit	aversie	 naar	 een	 breingedeelte,	 de	 inferior	 frontal	 gyrus,	waarvan	we	onder	 andere	 weten	 dat	 deze	 betrokken	 is	 bij	 het	 interpreteren	 van	situaties	 die	 ambigue	 zijn.	 Een	 persoon	 die	 dus	 meer	 schuwt	 voor	onzekerheid,	 is	 meerdere	 mogelijke	 interpretaties	 aan	 het	(her)overwegen	in	vergelijking	tot	een	persoon	die	we	zouden	kunnen	omschrijven	als	meer	kordaat.		Daarnaast	 vind	 ik	dat	 gedragsresultaten	 correleren	met	 gedrag	buiten	 het	 laboratorium.	 Ik	 vind,	 bijvoorbeeld,	 dat	 studenten	 die	 het	meest	 schuwen	voor	ambiguïteit	ook	het	minst	bereid	zijn	om	geld	 te	lenen	tijdens	hun	studie.	Op	basis	van	deze	resultaten	heb	ik	suggesties	gedaan	 voor	 beleidsmaatregelen.	 Tevens	 geeft	 dit	 proefschrift	aanleiding	 tot	 verder	 vervolgonderzoek	 (zie	 conclusie)	 en	 deze	onderzoeksvragen	 hoop	 ik	 in	 de	 nabije	 toekomst	 te	 kunnen	beantwoorden.	
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